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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article began many years ago, during a time when appellate practice
as a special area of the law was emerging in the nation and Texas in
particular. It has become a highly specialized practice area now. Appellate
lawyers are keenly aware that standards of review are vital to success on
appeal. Many years ago, I started to gather these standards in outlines,
notebooks, in the margins of important opinions, etc. Soon, the collection
of notes began to take the shape of a comprehensive outline and then grew
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into a law review article.1 Through the years, the Article continued to evolve
as the standards evolved, and interest in the profession likewise grew.2
In this revised Article, you will find an in-depth discussion of the most
common standards of review seen in Texas civil appeals. Once again, the
Article presents a substantial and comprehensive update of standards of
review for reviewing various trial court rulings, whether they are made
during pre-trial, trial, or post-trial proceedings. Finally, the Article describes
some aspects of appellate practice that put the standards of review in
context.
A. Standards of Review Generally
Standards of review promote efficiency in the judicial system because
each standard of review determines the likelihood of success in an appeal.3
The more deferential the standard of review, the less likely the appeal will
be successful and, theoretically, the less likely a losing party will appeal. The
standard of review also “provides a lens through which the parties on appeal
can focus and frame their arguments” for the reviewing court.4
Standards of review also distribute power within the judicial branch by
defining the relationship between trial and appellate courts.5 These
standards “frame the issues, define the depth of review, assign power among
judicial actors, and declare the proper materials to review.”6 Standards of

1. The first edition of W. Wendell Hall’s article was published in 1998. W. Wendell Hall,
Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST. MARY’S L.J. 351 (1998).
2. See generally W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1 (2002)
(providing an update to the 1998 article); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 47 (2006) (amending previous versions of the Article to reflect changes in the law since it was last
published); W. Wendell Hall, O. Rey Rodriguez, Rosemarie Kanusky, & Mark Emery, Hall’s Standards
of Review in Texas, 42 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 3 (2010) (Although Mr. Hall had retired and asked that his name
be removed as an author, the other authors insisted “[i]n light of W. Wendell Hall’s exceptional
contributions to Texas law, and to his firm, colleagues, and community, Mr. Hall’s co-authors have
insisted that the title of this Article bear his name. They respectfully refer the reader to the Foreword
of [that] Article for a summary of Mr. Hall’s enduring contributions.”).
3. Jared K. Carter, Appellate Practice: Tips for Effectively Defining and Using Standards of Review in
Appellate Practice, VT. B.J., Spring 2018, at 28, 28.
4. Id.
5. See Patrick W. Brennan, Standards of Appellate Review, 33 DEF. L.J. 377, 378–79 (1984)
(describing the functions of appellate courts, including the basic functions of “error-correcting and
rule-making”).
6. Steven Alan Childress, Standards of Review Primer: Federal Civil Appeals, 229 F.R.D. 267, 269
(2005).
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review are simply the appellate court’s “measuring stick”7 or “the decibel
level at which the appellate advocate must play to catch the judicial ear.”8
They are a “powerful organizing principle[,]” and even when “hopelessly
imprecise, they do provide a language . . . we can use to good advantage in
giving logical form and focus to our arguments.”9 Therefore, a litigant must
measure his factual and legal arguments against the appropriate “measuring
stick” to write an effective and persuasive brief.10 As two leading scholars
have observed, “[S]tandards of review were never meant to be the end of
the inquiry but rather a frame and limit on the substantive law.”11
Standards of review are the cornerstone of an appeal, and these standards
must be woven into the discussion of the facts and the substantive law in a
manner that persuades the appellate court that the trial court erred. The
standard of review should direct the appellate court to the party’s most
relevant and important legal arguments. Typically, lawyers make two
mistakes in handling appeals. First, many lawyers are so focused on arguing
the facts that they fail to discuss the governing standard of review, or they
fail to consider what that standard allows the reviewing court to do with
those facts.12 Second, when lawyers do discuss the standard of review, they
often recite the applicable standard in boilerplate language and with all the
enthusiasm and conviction of a high school student reciting Dante’s
Inferno, thus losing an opportunity to use the standards as a roadmap for
convincing the appellate court that the trial court erred and that the error
requires reversal.13 As Professors Childress and Davis noted:
Standards of review, though slippery, cannot be dismissed as sheer politics,
especially as the court-watcher begins to look at the practical meaning below
the surface catchphrase. The ubiquitous standard, either in basic form or as
defined and refined, is presented as a meaningful guidepost to frame both the
arguments to the appellate court and that court’s analytical response. Even
7. See John C. Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes—Effective Advocacy on Appeal, 30 SW. L.J.
801, 810–11 (1976) (examining the role of the standard of review and the importance of determining
the applicable standard of review on a case-by-case basis).
8. Alvin B. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REV. 869, 873 (1983).
9. Barry Sullivan, Standards of Review, in APPELLATE ADVOCACY 59, 59, 62 (Peter J. Carre et al.
eds., 1981).
10. See Godbold, supra note 7, at 810 (explaining how the standard of review is a measuring stick
for the appellate judge).
11. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW: FEDERAL
CIVIL CASES AND REVIEW PROCESS § 1.3, at 21 (1986).
12. Sullivan, supra note 9, at 59, 62.
13. Id.
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when the slogans have no real internal meaning, in many cases it is clear that
the issue framing or assignment of power behind the words is the turning
point of the decision.14

Appellate judges agree that a mechanical recitation of the relevant
standard of review, without more, is no more helpful than completely
ignoring the standard altogether.15 While it is important to accurately
discuss the facts and persuasively argue the substantive law, a lawyer’s failure
to place meritorious arguments in the context of the applicable standard of
review gives the appellate court little help. “If courts apply standards of
review to give them meaning, litigants would be advised to give the review
language life through application within an integrated strategy.”16 In other
words, a formal statement of the standard of review, standing alone, will not
advance the process of persuading the appellate court. Under Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 28(a)(9)(B) and Fifth Circuit Rule 28.3(i), for
example, the standard of review must be identified and set forth for each
issue of the argument.17 Those practicing in state appellate courts would
be wise to follow the federal rule and the Fifth Circuit’s local rule.18
As one judge observed, “[N]o single concept is more important than the
standard of review.”19 Consequently, the litigant who ignores the standard
of review loses credibility with the reviewing court. Even a credible
appellate argument can be easily lost if it is not advanced in the context of

14. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
CIVIL CASES AND GENERAL REVIEW PRINCIPLES § 1.01, at 1-2 (4th ed. 2010) (emphasis omitted).
15. See generally Sullivan, supra note 9, at 61 (noting many lawyers recognize the need “to say
something about the standard of review, but think that they need not develop the concept as part of their
argument”).
16. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
CIVIL CASES AND GENERAL REVIEW PRINCIPLES § 1.02, at 1-16 (4th ed. 2010).
17. FED. R. APP. P. 28(a)(8)(B); 5TH CIR. R. 28.3(i).
18. Appellate judges invariably advise that advocates address standards of review. See Leonard
I. Garth, How to Appeal to an Appellate Judge, LITIG., Fall 1994, at 20, 22 (stating the “[s]tandard of review
is the element of appellate advocacy that distinguishes the good appellate advocate”); Godbold, supra
note 7, at 811 (“Early in his presentation counsel should state to the court the standard of review which
he considers applicable.”); Harry Pregerson, The Seven Sins of Appellate Brief Writing and Other
Transgressions, 34 UCLA L. REV. 431, 437 (1986) (calling counsels’ omission of the standards of review
in appellate brief writing “The Fifth Sin”); Rubin, supra note 8, at 872 (indicating an author should
“[s]tart the brief by stating briefly the applicable standard of review”).
19. Jacques L. Wiener, Jr., Ruminations from the Bench: Brief Writing and Oral Argument in the Fifth
Circuit, 70 TUL. L. REV. 187, 189 (1995).
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the governing standard of review.20 If a party does not identify the relevant
standard and vigorously approach that standard in briefing, the party leaves
a void that may be filled by his adversary or the reviewing court, and perhaps
filled incorrectly with the wrong standard.21 Because the reviewing court
will undoubtedly determine the relevant standard on its own and review the
appeal accordingly, litigants who do not meaningfully address the standard
of review risk failing to persuade the reviewing court that the standard, as
applied to the facts and the law, requires reversal.22 No advocate wants the
reviewing court to write: “The critical issue in this case is one not discussed
by the parties: our standard of review.”23
Identifying the standard of review in most cases is not complicated.24
Like tying a shoe, it is often easier to demonstrate the proper use of the
standard of review than it is to explain that use. For example, the abuse of
discretion standard is the most common standard of review, but who can
define the phrase in a simple way that will be useful in every case in which
it is applied? No one has met the challenge of describing the standard so
that it may be applied objectively in every appeal. While the words used to
describe standards of review may escape a clear and precise definition,
“[t]here are no talismanic words that can avoid the process” of applying the
standard to the record and explaining in a cogent manner why the reviewing
court should reach a certain result.25
Justice Felix Frankfurter described standards of review as “undefined
defining terms.”26 While standards of review often escape precise
definition, it is incumbent upon appellate litigants to identify the standards
and apply them in an effective manner to the relevant facts. Otherwise, a
litigant who is unfamiliar with “the standard of review for each issue . . . may

20. See James B. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762, 767 (Ct. App. 1995) (“[C]ounsel’s
failure to acknowledge the proper standard of review might . . . be considered a concession of lack of
merit.”).
21. See United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086, 1091 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (“The parties’
failure to brief and argue properly the appropriate standard may lead the court to choose the wrong
standard.”).
22. See Fox v. Comm’r, 718 F.2d 251, 253–54 (7th Cir. 1983) (noting the parties failed to address
the standard of review, and ultimately affirming the lower court under the abuse of discretion standard).
23. Id. at 253.
24. See Nathan L. Hecht, Foreword: Revisiting Standards of Review in Civil Appeals, 24 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 1041, 1041 (1993) (“The law prescribing the standard of review applicable to a particular ruling is
complex but relatively well settled.”).
25. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 489 (1951).
26. Id.
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find himself trying to run for a touchdown when basketball rules are in
effect.”27 Woe to that lawyer when the final score is tabulated.
B. Distinguishing the Standard of Review from the Scope of Review
Standards of review must be carefully distinguished from the scope of
review. The standard of review is the framework by which a reviewing court
determines whether the trial court erred.28 By comparison, the scope of
review describes that portion of the appellate record a reviewing court may
examine to determine whether the trial court erred.29 It asks: “Does the
appellate court review the entire record or only some portion of the record
to determine error?”30 The scope of review includes the issues presented
on appeal and the record relevant to the appellate complaints. Because the
appropriate standard of review and scope of review generally determine the
outcome of an appeal, a litigant must shape the factual and legal arguments
in a manner that will satisfy the relevant standard as applied to the relevant
evidence.
C. Typical Standards of Review in Texas
There are three major standards of review described in this Article: de
novo, abuse of discretion, and sufficiency of the evidence. Of these main
standards, de novo is the most helpful for the appellate practitioner because
it permits the court of appeals to take a completely fresh look at the trial
court’s rulings.31 The availability of de novo review, however, is limited to
relatively few trial court rulings and needs no in-depth analysis.32
On the other hand, the second standard—abuse of discretion—is the
most frequently used; yet its application may be the most onerous from an
27. Godbold, supra note 7, at 811.
28. See Sullivan, supra note 9, at 61 (explaining the purpose of the standard of review).
29. STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW:
CIVIL CASES AND GENERAL REVIEW PRINCIPLES § 1.03, at 1-18 to 1-19 (4th ed. 2010).
30. See Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 380 (Tex. 2001) (Baker, J.,
dissenting, joined by Hankinson & O’Neill, JJ.) (noting abuse of discretion was traditionally reviewed
based on the entire record, but observing that a rule change now expressly allows review based on a
partial record when factual sufficiency or legal sufficiency is the issue).
31. See Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 156–57 (Tex. 2004) (stating the
court reviews a summary judgment de novo and takes “as true all evidence favorable to the
nonmovant” (citing Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2002); Sci. Spectrum, Inc.
v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997))); Kutner v. Russell, 658 S.W.2d 585, 590 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1983) (en banc) (Onion, J., dissenting) (defining “de novo” and providing the constitutional and
statutory sources of “trial de novo”).
32. See infra Part IV(O) (discussing joinder) and Part IV(R) (discussing personal jurisdiction).
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appellate practitioner’s point of view.33 Accordingly, an entire section of
this Article is devoted to its explication.
Likewise, this Article focuses extensively on the history and scope of the
third major standard of review: sufficiency of the evidence. This standard
typically applies following either a jury trial or bench trial.34 Specialized
evidentiary review may apply to certain types of cases, as in family matters
or administrative agency appeals.35
II. ABUSE OF DISCRETION
A. Abuse of Discretion Generally
Perhaps no standard of review is subject to more misuse than the most
common standard: abuse of discretion.36 Lawyers often wonder how
appellate courts can make “abuse of discretion” mean so many different
things.37 Indeed, one appellate court judge lamented that the abuse of
discretion standard “means everything and nothing at the same time[.]”38
One appellate court panel’s view of an abuse of discretion can be another
panel’s notion of a completely reasonable decision.39 Similar to identifying
hard-core pornography, knowing when there has been an abuse of
discretion, for most appellate judges, tracks Justice Stewart’s famous line: “I
know it when I see it[.]”40

33. See Maurice Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 173 (1978)
(“Discretion is a pervasive yet elusive concept . . . .”).
34. See Young v. State, 283 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (reviewing a jury verdict
for sufficiency of the evidence); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414–17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)
(describing the history of sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal of a jury verdict), overruled in part on
other grounds by Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 911–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
35. See infra Part III(C)(1) (discussing the clear and convincing evidence standard) and
Part III(C)(2) (discussing administrative agency appeals).
36. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 176–180 (recognizing various degrees of discretion).
37. Id. at 173–74.
38. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931, 935 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no
writ).
39. See Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939)
(“Naturally appellate courts will differ on the delicate question of whether trial courts have abused their
discretion.”).
40. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (noting the difficulty
to “define what may be indefinable” as to the kinds of material that fall within the description of “hardcore pornography”).
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Appellate courts have understandable difficulty in applying the abuse of
discretion standard consistently.41 This difficulty is inherent in the standard
itself. To suggest that the abuse of discretion standard is a concept “not
easily defined”42 or “not susceptible to rigid definition”43 is an
understatement. “[J]udicial attempts to define the concept almost routinely
take the form of merely substituting other terms that are equally unrefined,
variable, subjective, and conclusory.”44 Consequently, it is often easier for
a reviewing court to state what is not an abuse of discretion than to
determine what is an abuse of discretion.45 As a result, the amorphous
concept of abuse of discretion often fails to assist either appellate courts or
trial courts in deciding cases, and it also makes briefing difficult for appellate
lawyers.46 Therefore, as one court observed: “An appeal directed toward
demonstrating an abuse of discretion is one of the tougher appellate
propositions.”47
All too often the primary problem with appellate court application of the
abuse of discretion standard of review to trial court rulings is the tendency
to assume that the standard is “absolute discretion” rather than “abuse of
discretion” and the reviewing court never appears to engage in a thorough
and substantial analysis of the trial court’s ruling for an “abuse.”48 When
that occurs, it constitutes ineffective or no review. Too often, it seems, that
41. See, e.g., Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 62–77 (2000) (elaborating on different appellate cases and approaches to
abuse of discretion).
42. Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 934 (quoting Bennett v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1976, no writ) (per curiam)).
43. Hodson v. Keiser, 81 S.W.3d 363, 368 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (citing Lindsey
v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 591 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.); Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 934).
44. Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 934 (citing Landry v. Traveler’s Ins. Co., 458 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex.
1970); Johnson v. City of Richardson, 206 S.W.2d 98, 100 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1947, no writ); Cty. Sch.
Trs. of Callahan Cty. v. Dist. Trs. of Dist. No. 15 (Hart) Common Sch. Dist. of Callahan Cty.,
192 S.W.2d 891, 898 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1946, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Brazos River Conservation &
Reclamation Dist. v. Harmon, 178 S.W.2d 281, 292–93 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.);
Bobbitt v. Gordon, 108 S.W.2d 234, 238 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1937, no writ) (per curiam)).
45. See id. at 936 (describing a hypothetical example of when a court has not abused its
discretion).
46. See Pearson v. Dennison, 353 F.2d 24, 28 (9th Cir. 1965) (reasoning an abuse of discretion
“must necessarily depend upon the peculiar facts of the case”); In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182
(1st Cir. 1954) (attempting to define “abuse of discretion” without making it “sound[ ] worse than it
really is”).
47. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d at 592.
48. See, e.g., Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 184 (“[T]oo much discretion in too many areas is now
being accorded to trial judges by appellate courts.”).
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the default ruling on appeal is that there is “no abuse of discretion” or “no
clear abuse of discretion” and to consistently affirm the trial court’s ruling
without substantively analyzing the trial court’s decision other than to
conclude that no abuse of discretion occurred.
B. Abuse of Discretion in Texas
The development of the abuse of discretion standard varies between
jurisdictions and over time.49 In Texas, abuse of discretion is routinely
defined in the following manner: “The test for abuse of discretion is not
whether, in the opinion of the reviewing court, the facts present an
appropriate case for the trial court’s action.”50 Rather, a trial court abuses
its discretion if its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, and without reference
to [any] guiding [rules and] principles”51 or is “‘so arbitrary and
unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law.’”52
By requiring the trial court’s conduct to be arbitrary or unreasonable as a
condition of reversal, Texas appellate courts acknowledge the discretion trial
49. Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 50–51 (2000). Over fifty years of California case law recites the abuse of
discretion standard as follows: “In a legal sense discretion is abused whenever in the exercise of its
discretion the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered.”
Berry v. Chaplin, 169 P.2d 453, 456 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1946) (citing Makzoume v. Makzoume,
123 P.2d 72, 73 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1942)). Early Texas decisions suggested that an “‘abuse of
discretion . . . implies not merely error of judgment, but perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality,
or moral delinquency.’” Bobbitt, 108 S.W.2d at 238 (quoting Grayson County v. Harrell, 202 S.W. 160,
163 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1918, writ ref’d)).
50. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985); Cire v.
Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 838–39 (Tex. 2004).
51. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex. 1996) (citing Downer,
701 S.W.2d at 241); accord Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 766 (Tex. 2006) (Medina,
J., dissenting, joined by Wainwright & Johnson, JJ.) (“A court abuses its discretion when it renders an
arbitrary decision, lacking support in the facts and circumstances of the case.” (citing Goode v.
Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997); Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917
(Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), abrogated in part by In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary,
L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding))).
52. In re Bass, 113 S.W.3d 735, 738 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Walker v. Packer,
827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand,
83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Johnson, 700 S.W.2d at 917). The abuse of discretion standard
in Texas has been compared to “the federal standard of ‘clearly erroneous.’” See Goode, 943 S.W.2d
at 446 (observing the two standards are “similar, although not identical”). In Goode, one supreme court
justice observed in a concurring opinion that it is debatable whether any real difference exists between
the two standards. Id. at 454 (Gonzalez, J., concurring). But see Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 268 S.W.3d
508, 515 (Tex. 2008) (suggesting the federal clearly erroneous standard is distinct from the Texas abuse
of discretion standard).
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courts must have to judge the credibility of witnesses and make decisions
within broad legal parameters.53 At the same time, it is only by requiring
trial courts to follow guiding rules and principles that appellate courts can
impose some measure of control over ad hoc decision making.54 The trial
court’s action is reasonable, and therefore not an abuse of discretion, only
when the court exercises its discretion within the correct legal parameters.55
Recently, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that “[t]he trial court
abuses its discretion when its decision lies ‘outside the zone of reasonable
disagreement.’”56
“[T]he abuse of discretion standard is typically applied to procedural or
other trial management” decisions, either when challenged on appeal or by
original proceeding.57 At its core, “discretion” means choice.58 To find an
abuse of discretion, the reviewing court “must determine that the facts and
circumstances presented ‘extinguish any discretion [or choice] in the
matter.’”59 Therefore, simply because a trial court has exercised its
discretion to decide a matter differently than a reviewing court under similar
circumstances does not establish an abuse of discretion.60 In other words,
the reviewing court “may not substitute its own judgment for the trial

53. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 22 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., dissenting, joined by
Enoch, J.) (“The abuse of discretion standard of review recognizes that these functions rest with the
trial court and not the appellate court.”).
54. See In re R.R., 26 S.W.3d 569, 573 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, orig. proceeding) (“A trial
court’s wrong decision in applying or analyzing the law, even in an unsettled area of the law, is an abuse
of discretion.” (citing Huie v. DeShazo, 922 S.W.2d 920, 927–28 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding))).
55. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 840 (“[A] clear failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the
law correctly will constitute an abuse of discretion . . . .”).
56. Buntion v. State, 482 S.W.3d 58, 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Apolinar v. State,
155 S.W.3d 184, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005)).
57. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000).
58. See Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 175 (“The basic idea that discretion conveys is choice.”).
59. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Tex. v. Bridewell, 946 S.W.2d 642, 646 (Tex. App.—Waco
1997, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (per curiam) (mem. op.) (quoting F.A. Richard & Assoc. v.
Millard, 856 S.W.2d 765, 767 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding)); see In re Nitla
S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (noting a reviewing court
may not set aside a trial court’s order unless the record clearly shows that the court could only arrive
at one decision).
60. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (“[T]he court of
appeals may not reverse for abuse of discretion merely because it disagrees with a decision by the trial
court . . . .”); Jones v. Strayhorn, 321 S.W.2d 290, 295 (Tex. 1959) (“The mere fact or circumstance that
a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a manner different from what an
appellate judge would decide if placed in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate that an abuse of
discretion has occurred.”).
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court’s judgment.”61 This discretion insulates the trial judge’s reasonable
choice “from appellate second guessing.”62 Where a party challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a discretionary decision, courts often
employ a two-pronged analysis: “(1) Did the trial court have sufficient
information upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) Did the trial court
err in its application of discretion?”63
There are at least two instances in which a perceived error does not
constitute an abuse of discretion. First, “[a] mere error of judgment is not
an abuse of discretion.”64 Second, a trial court does not “‘abuse its
discretion if it reaches the right result’” for the wrong reason.65 These
exceptions demonstrate that appellate court standards permit a trial judge a
limited right to be wrong without being reversed.
One appellate court described four ways in which a trial court commits
an abuse of discretion:66 (1) a court abuses its discretion if it attempts to
exercise a power of discretion that it does not legally possess;67 (2) a court
abuses its discretion if it declines to exercise a power of discretion vested to

61. Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (citing Flores v.
Fourth Court of Appeals, 777 S.W.2d 38, 41 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding)); Nitla, 92 S.W.3d at 422;
see Flores, 777 S.W.2d at 41 (indicating a lower court’s decision should not be altered absent an abuse
of discretion).
62. Brazil v. Khater, 223 S.W.3d 418, 420 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet. denied) (citing Bowie,
79 S.W.3d at 52).
63. Lindsey v. Lindsey, 965 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.).
64. Loftin v. Martin, 776 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding), abrogated in part on other
grounds by Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 841–42 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see Kolfeldt v.
Thoma, 822 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding [leave denied])
(suggesting “[a] mere error in judgment” still has some basis in reason and law); Air Prods. & Chems.,
Inc. v. Sanderson, 789 S.W.2d 651, 653 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied])
(per curiam) (noting “a mere error in judgment” becomes abusive when the order is “so unreasonable,
so arbitrary, or based upon so gross and prejudicial an error of law as to have no basis in reason or in
law”).
65. Bruce Terminix Co. v. Carroll, 953 S.W.2d 537, 540 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, orig.
proceeding) (quoting Luxenberg v. Marshall, 835 S.W.2d 136, 142 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, orig.
proceeding)), mand. granted In re Bruce Terminix Co., 988 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1998) (per curiam);
Hawthorne v. Guenther, 917 S.W.2d 924, 931 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1996, writ denied); Luxenberg,
835 S.W.2d at 142.
66. Landon v. Jean-Paul Budinger, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 931, 937–40 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no
writ); see Minns v. Piotrowski, 904 S.W.2d 161, 168 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, writ denied) (referring to
the abuse of discretion analysis applied in Landon), overruled in part on other grounds by Van Es v. Frazier,
230 S.W.3d 770, 776 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied); Stephens v. Stephens, 877 S.W.2d 801, 805
(Tex. App.—Waco 1994, writ denied) (applying the Landon abuse of discretion analysis).
67. Landon, 724 S.W.2d at 937.
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it by law when the circumstances require that the power be exercised;68 (3) a
court abuses its discretion if it purports to exercise its discretion without
sufficient information upon which a rational decision may be made, as
reflected in the appellate record;69 and (4) a court abuses its discretion if it
exercises its power of discretion by making an erroneous choice as a matter
of law, in one of the following ways: (i) by making a choice that is “not
within the range of choices permitted by law”;70 (ii) by arriving at its choice
in violation of an “applicable legal rule, principle, or criterion”;71 or (iii) by
making a choice that is “legally unreasonable in the factual-legal context in
which it [is] made.”72
The following chart may assist the reader in analyzing the abuse of
discretion standard of review and its application to a particular challenged
error.
TRIAL COURT

REFERS TO AND PROPERLY
APPLIES “GUIDING RULES
AND PRINCIPLES”

ACTS
REASONABLY

ACTS
UNREASONABLY

NO ABUSE OF
DISCRETION

ABUSE OF
DISCRETION

DOES NOT REFER TO OR
MISAPPLIES “GUIDING
RULES AND PRINCIPLES”

ABUSE OF
DISCRETION

C. Texas Mandamus Proceedings
A writ of mandamus is an order from a court, usually to an inferior court,
commanding the performance of some action.73 To be entitled to a writ of
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 938.
Id.
Id. at 939.
Id.
Id.
Mandamus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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mandamus in a Texas civil suit, the relator or party seeking relief must
establish: (1) that the ruling of the trial court constitutes a clear abuse of
discretion and (2) that there is no adequate remedy at law.74 The relator has
the burden of establishing both requirements of mandamus relief.75
Because the writ of mandamus is discretionary, “its denial, without
comment on the merits, cannot deprive another appellate court from
considering the matter in a subsequent appeal.”76
While writs of mandamus are the most common invocation of original
jurisdiction in appellate courts,77 mandamus proceedings are not the only
writs available to appellate courts.78 Of the various forms of extraordinary
relief, the writ of prohibition is most like the writ of mandamus.79 A writ
of prohibition “operates like an injunction issued by a superior court to
control, limit[,] or prevent action in a court of inferior jurisdiction.”80 The
74. In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 630 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding); In re CSX
Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 151 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). See generally In re McAllen Med.
Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 467–68 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (describing Bradley v. McCrabb, Dallam
504 (Tex. 1843), as the seminal mandamus decision in Texas allowing for mandamus to issue when
“other modes of redress are inadequate or tedious” or when mandamus is simply the better remedy
(quoting id. at 506)). Before the 1950s, “the writ of mandamus issued only to compel the performance
of a ministerial act or duty.” Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding)
(citing Wortham v. Walker, 128 S.W.2d 1138, 1150 (Tex. 1939) (orig. proceeding); Arberry v. Beavers,
6 Tex. 457, 463 (1851); Helen A. Cassidy, The Instant Freeze-Dried Guide to Mandamus Procedure in Texas
Courts, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 509, 510 (1990); Tim Gavin, Comment, The Expanding Use of Mandamus to
Review Texas District Court Discovery Orders: An Immediate Appeal Is Available, 32 SW. L.J. 1283, 1288
(1979)). That rule is still followed in criminal cases, where “[m]andamus relief may be granted if the
relator shows . . . (1) that the act sought to be compelled is purely ministerial and (2) that there is no
adequate remedy at law.” Winters v. Presiding Judge of Criminal Dist. Court No. Three of Tarrant
Cty., 118 S.W.3d 773, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003), superseded by statute on other grounds by TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(c).
75. In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d at 151.
76. Chambers v. O’Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30, 32 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (citing In re AIU Ins.
Co., 148 S.W.3d 109, 119 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)).
77. For a thorough and comprehensive discussion of mandamus proceedings in Texas, see
Justice Marialyn Barnard, Lorien Whyte, & Emmanuel Garcia, Is My Case Mandamusable?: A Guide to the
Current State of Texas Mandamus Law, 45 ST. MARY’S L.J. 143 (2014).
78. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002 (describing numerous writs available to justices of
the Texas Supreme Court); id. § 22.221 (explaining the writ power of courts of appeals); Ex parte Jones,
97 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (per curiam) (illustrating a court’s authority to consider
applications for the “writ of habeas corpus, . . . writs of prohibition[,] and other extraordinary
matters”).
79. E.g., Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 676 n.4 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (noting a
writ of mandamus compels an action while a writ of prohibition blocks one).
80. Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680, 682 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding)
(citing City of Houston v. City of Palestine, 267 S.W. 663, 665 (Tex. 1924)). In contrast, an appellate
“writ of quo warranto is an extraordinary remedy” used “to determine disputed questions about the
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two-step formula for granting mandamus relief also applies to the writ of
prohibition.81
1.

“Clear” Abuse of Discretion

Because the abuse of discretion standard applies in both appeals and
mandamus actions, the question arises whether there is any distinction
between the standard of review on appeal and that required for the issuance
of mandamus relief.82 Many courts have observed, with regard to whether
“error” has in fact occurred for purposes of mandamus, that writs of
mandamus issue generally only for a “clear” abuse of discretion.83 Other
courts, however, have granted writs of mandamus without any reference as
to whether the trial court’s abuse of discretion was “clear.”84 On appeal,
error is usually couched in terms of abuse of discretion—without any
discussion of whether the abuse needs to be “clear.”85
proper person entitled to hold a public office and exercise its functions.” State ex rel. Angelini v.
Hardberger, 932 S.W.2d 489, 490 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (citing State ex. rel. R.C. Jennett v.
Owens, 63 Tex. 261, 270 (1885) (orig. proceeding)); cf. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 66.001
(providing for a quo warranto cause of action). A writ of procedendo is an appellate “court’s order to
an inferior court to execute judgment.” See Cavazos v. Hancock, 686 S.W.2d 284, 285 n.1 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1985, orig. proceeding) (citing Houston & T.C. Ry. Co. v. Bounds, 277 S.W. 401, 402 (Tex.
App.—Waco 1925, no writ) (explaining the remedy of a writ of procedendo).
81. See Tilton, 925 S.W.2d at 676 n.4 (noting that the “same principles” control the use of writs
of mandamus and prohibition); see also Ex parte Chi, 256 S.W.3d 702, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008)
(applying a two-part test for the writ of prohibition); In re Lewis, 223 S.W.3d 756, 761 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2007, orig. proceeding) (recognizing the two-part test for the writ of prohibition).
82. See Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997) (noting Texas appellate courts use
the “abuse of discretion” standard to review many trial court decisions); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d
833, 839–40 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (distinguishing the “abuse of discretion” standard under
different circumstances).
83. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009)
(orig. proceeding); In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); In
re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
84. See In re E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 289 S.W.3d 861, 861–62 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding) (holding trial court abused its discretion without discussing whether the abuse was clear);
In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 210 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(concluding there was an abuse of discretion without finding clear error). Of note, the court in Van
Waters granted mandamus relief in a per curiam opinion, 145 S.W.3d at 206, while the court in Du Pont
granted mandamus relief without oral argument, 289 S.W.3d at 862. The court may not have described
the trial court’s abuse of discretion as “clear,” but the procedural posture and relief granted suggest a
contrary position.
85. E.g., Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446 (noting Texas has used the “abuse of discretion” standard in
reviewing various trial court decisions without any mention of the abuse being “clear”). Many courts,
however, will describe the trial court’s discretion as “broad,” which raises many of the same concerns
as those raised here regarding the necessity and usefulness of any adjective describing a court’s
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In a mandamus proceeding, it is clear—no pun intended—that the courts
do impose upon relators a more rigorous standard.86 Perhaps the courts
simply need to define why a heightened abuse of discretion standard is
required in mandamus proceedings and define that standard in more
concrete terms. Some federal appellate courts hold that a relator is entitled
to mandamus relief only where there is a strong showing of prejudice, and
the error “‘so infect[s] the process that it compels the court to consider the
issue[.]’”87 Under this standard, it is not the trial court’s error that compels
the reviewing court to grant mandamus relief; rather, the extraordinary
circumstances of the case compel mandamus relief.88 This statement of an
abuse of discretion seems to blend into the Texas Supreme Court’s most
recent test for determining whether an adequate remedy at law precludes
mandamus relief.89
2.

Adequate Remedy at Law

Texas courts and commentators alike have struggled to define when an
appeal is not adequate for purposes of mandamus relief.90 In a 1992
decision, Walker v. Packer,91 the Texas Supreme Court seemed to narrow the
inadequacy requirement by rejecting authorities that glossed over this
discretion. See Columbia, 290 S.W.3d at 210 (observing a trial court’s historically broad discretion to
grant a new trial); Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d 580, 598 (Tex. 2008) (describing a trial court’s
discretion to award fees under the Declaratory Judgment Act as broad).
86. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding),
abrogated in part by Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213; In re Acadia Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 777, 779
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, orig. proceeding).
87. 1 STEVEN ALAN CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW: FEDERAL
CIVIL CASES AND REVIEW PROCESS § 4.22, at 294 (1986) (quoting P. Davis, Tips for Obtaining a Civil
Writ, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1985, at 55, 55).
88. See Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 137 (reasoning whether there is an adequate remedy at law such
that mandamus relief is precluded depends upon the particular circumstances of each case); see also In
re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 464 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding) (discussing how a costbenefit analysis of interlocutory review is dependent upon the circumstances of the case rather than
the type of case).
89. See, e.g., McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 469 (noting public and private interests inherent in each case
inform whether appeal is adequate).
90. See id. at 465, 468 (setting out specific cases where appeal was found to be inadequate for
mandamus relief); Richard E. Flint, The Evolving Standard for Granting Mandamus Relief in the Texas Supreme
Court: One More “Mile Marker Down the Road of No Return,” 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 5–6, 96 n.359 (2007)
(describing when an appeal is an inadequate remedy in the context of discovery disputes); William E.
Barker, Comment, The Only Guarantee Is There Are No Guarantees: The Texas Supreme Court’s Inability to
Establish a Mandamus Standard, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 703, 709 (2007) (discussing when appeal is an
inadequate remedy entitling parties to mandamus relief).
91. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
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element.92 The court held that appeal was not “inadequate merely because
it might involve more delay or cost than mandamus[,]” and it outlined
several specific categories in the discovery context where mandamus relief
would be appropriate.93
The standard announced by Walker seemed to work well for two decades
until a sharply divided court issued two substantively related cases on the
same day in 2004: In re AIU Insurance Co.94 and In re Prudential Insurance Co.
of America.95 In Prudential, the court appeared to broaden the inadequacy
requirement by stating that “[a]n appellate remedy is ‘adequate’ when any
benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments. When the
benefits outweigh the detriments, appellate courts must consider whether
the appellate remedy is adequate.”96
The court observed that “adequate” defies “comprehensive definition; it
is simply a proxy for the careful balance of jurisprudential considerations
that determine when appellate courts will use original mandamus
proceedings to review the actions of lower courts.”97 The court noted that
mandamus should be reserved for:
[S]ignificant rulings in exceptional cases [when review] may be essential to
preserve important substantive and procedural rights from impairment or
loss, allow the appellate courts to give needed and helpful direction to the law
that would otherwise prove elusive in appeals from final judgments, and spare
private parties and the public the time and money utterly wasted enduring
eventual reversal of improperly conducted proceedings.98

92. Id. at 842.
93. Id. at 842–44.
94. In re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
95. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding). In both
cases, the majority consisted of Justices Hecht, Owen, Smith, Wainwright, and Brister, and the dissent
consisted of Chief Justice Phillips and Justices O’Neill, Jefferson, and Schneider. A third, unsigned
opinion that issued on September 3, 2004 also suggests that adequacy of appeal is a flexible concept.
See In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d 203, 211 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(holding in a per curiam opinion that mandamus relief is not typically available for a trial court’s
consolidation order, but nonetheless granting relief from one given the extraordinary circumstances
present in the case). See generally Pamela Stanton Baron, Texas Supreme Court Docket Analysis: September 1,
2010, in STATE BAR OF TEX., 24TH ANNUAL ADVANCED CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE,
ch. 3, at 8 (2010) (explaining that per curiam opinions require at least six votes).
96. Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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In the wake of this broad language, some commentators expressed a
concern the courts would be flooded with mandamus proceedings, which
did not materialize at that time.99
Four years later, in its 2008 McAllen opinion,100 the supreme court
instructed that “[w]hether a clear abuse of discretion can be adequately
remedied by appeal depends on a careful analysis of costs and benefits of
interlocutory review. As this balance depends heavily on circumstances, it
must be guided by analysis of principles rather than simple rules that treat
cases as categories.”101 The court insisted Prudential’s balancing test should
not “entangle appellate courts in incidental trial court rulings any more than
Walker’s ad hoc categorical approach.”102 According to the court, its
balancing analysis “merely recognizes that the adequacy of an appeal
depends on the facts involved in each case.”103 Similarly, whether the
legislature has determined that a type of order is subject to interlocutory
appeal is not dispositive in a case-by-case analysis.104
In McAllen, a hospital sought mandamus relief when the trial court denied
its motion to dismiss based on the plaintiffs’ failure to file expert reports
from a qualified expert as required by statute.105 The failure to dismiss was
contrary to the legislative findings about a crisis in healthcare that could be
addressed by requiring expert reports shortly after filing suit.106 With this
background, the Texas Supreme Court was willing to grant the hospital’s
mandamus petition despite previously denying similar petitions.107 The
99. See Jerry D. Bullard, Mandamus in a Post-Prudential World, in S. TEX. COLL. OF LAW, CIVIL
APPEALS FOR TRIAL LAWYERS, tab H, at H-9 (2006) (“[A]lthough the analysis is still continuing, it
does not appear that Prudential has had a significant effect on mandamus jurisprudence”); Richard E.
Flint, The Evolving Standard for Granting Mandamus Relief in the Texas Supreme Court: One More “Mile Marker
Down the Road of No Return,” 39 ST. MARY’S L.J. 3, 143–45 (2007) (predicting a significant impact flowing
from Prudential); Reagan W. Simpson & Aditi R. Dravid, Mandamus Update: The Aftermath of Prudential:
Much Ado About Nothing?, in STATE BAR OF TEX., 21ST ANNUAL ADVANCED CIVIL APPELLATE
PRACTICE COURSE, ch. 22, at 1 (2007) (explaining the impact of Prudential’s more lenient mandamus
standards has been mild despite predictions to the contrary).
100. In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
101. Id. at 464 (footnotes omitted) (citing Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136–37).
102. Id. at 469.
103. Id.
104. See In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex.
2009) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief to set aside motion for new trial despite the fact
the legislature had repealed a law allowing appeal of these orders).
105. McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 462. See infra Part IV(H)(4) for more information about this form
of dismissal.
106. McAllen, 275 S.W.3d at 461, 469.
107. Id. at 470 (Wainwright, J., dissenting, joined by Jefferson, C.J., & O’Neill, J.).
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court cautioned against automatic mandamus relief in future cases, noting a
number of factors that might defeat mandamus relief.108
One year after McAllen, the court revisited another category of cases
where it had previously held a trial court’s use of discretion was not
reviewable.109 In In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, Subsidiary,
L.P.,110 a sharply divided court concluded that “trial courts must give more
explanation than ‘in the interest of justice’ for setting aside a jury
verdict.”111 On its face, this ruling seems limited to the rare orders granting
a new trial in the interest of justice.112 However, it appears that the number
of mandamus proceedings being filed in appellate courts did expand in light
of Columbia, McAllen, and the supreme court’s willingness to find appeal
inadequate to categories of cases not previously subject to mandamus
review.113
In 2018, the supreme court held that when the trial court’s order would
“‘skew the proceedings, potentially affect the outcome of the litigation, and
compromise the presentation of [the relator’s] defense [or claims] in ways
unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record[,]’” mandamus is proper.114

108. Id. at 467; see In re Gladewater Healthcare Ctr., 279 S.W.3d 850, 852–53 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2009, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus relief from an order denying a motion to
dismiss because, on the facts of the case, appeal would be an adequate remedy).
109. Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213. But see Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals,
700 S.W.2d 916, 916 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (holding a trial court does not abuse its discretion
by granting a motion for new trial without explication of its finding when doing so is “in the interest
of justice”), abrogated in part by Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213.
110. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding).
111. Id. at 206. The dissent seemed to agree with the basic idea that explanations for granting
new trials in the interest of justice were preferable to no explanations, but the dissent rejected adopting
such “a rule by judicial fiat on interlocutory review.” Id. at 215 (O’Neill, J., dissenting, joined by
Jefferson, C.J., & Medina & Green, JJ.).
112. Id. at 206.
113. Kurt H. Kuhn, Mandamus Is Not a Four-Letter Word, in AUSTIN BAR ASS’N, “A WHOLE
NEW WORLD”: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TEXAS MANDAMUS PRACTICE, sec III, at 9–10 (2008)
(collecting statistics about the number of mandamus filings in Texas appellate courts, which are not
publicly available from the Texas Office of Court Administration). At the very least, we now know
that orders granting new trials in the interest of justice should provide detailed explanations. Columbia,
290 S.W.3d at 206. It remains to be seen whether orders containing detailed explanations may be
subject to mandamus relief and, if so, whether such orders will be subject to an abuse of discretion
standard of review or a sufficiency standard.
114. In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (first
alteration in original) (quoting In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam)).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

23

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4

1122

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1099

The history of mandamus proceedings in Texas shows that categorizing
orders for purposes of mandamus relief may make it easier to dispose of
these cases, but such categorization oversimplifies the role of the appellate
advocate and ignores the reality that each case is different.115 Regardless of
the type of order challenged in a mandamus proceeding, appellate advocates
should explain their rationale for seeking extraordinary relief,116 and
appellate courts should likewise articulate their rationale for granting it.117
For example, it is often said that if an order is void, the relator need not
show the lack of an adequate appellate remedy.118 It is probably more
accurate in light of recent precedent to say that when an order is void, appeal
is inadequate because the potential waste of party and judicial resources
weighs in favor of mandamus relief.119
D. The Sliding Scale of Abuse of Discretion
As this Article illustrates, a trial judge’s discretion may be applied to scores
of situations and in many different ways. Some trial court decisions are
inherently discretionary,120 while others involve construction of rules or
statutes and the consideration of facts that may be hotly contested.121
Because the concept of discretion or choice defies uniform application to
all situations, it is not surprising that the appellate courts’ review of
115. See In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136–37 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)
(explaining why categorization must give way to relevant circumstances in each case).
116. See In re Acadia Ins. Co., 279 S.W.3d 777, 779 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2007, orig.
proceeding) (recognizing it is complainant’s burden to establish how the trial court was unreasonable
or arbitrary in its decision).
117. See Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 206 (acknowledging that appellate courts should
explain their rulings).
118. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(holding it unnecessary for relator to show inadequate remedy on appeal when court’s order was void);
In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (pointing out that an
order issued by a judge who refused to recuse himself when he was constitutionally prohibited from
presiding over the trial entitled relator to mandamus without necessity of showing there was no
adequate appellate remedy).
119. See Dunn v. Street, 938 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(reasoning a visiting judge’s void order could result in unnecessary incarceration for the relator); Buttery
v. Betts, 422 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1967) (orig. proceeding) (holding relators were entitled to
mandamus relief without resorting to “needless retrial and an appeal”).
120. See Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985) (orig.
proceeding) (reiterating that matters of true discretion lie solely with the trial court), abrogated in part by
Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 213.
121. See In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 467 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding)
(holding mandamus proper where trial court abused its discretion for failing to follow a statute).
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discretion is not uniform. In the final analysis, appellate lawyers should not
be misled into concluding that appellate judges approach every review of a
trial judge’s discretion in the same manner or with the same level of interest,
deference, or analysis.
Often, reviewing courts simply refer to an “abuse” of discretion.122
Other times, reviewing courts refer to a “clear” or “manifest” abuse of
discretion.123 If “abuse of discretion” were a single standard, no advocate
could ever show a “clear” abuse of discretion. An “arbitrary, capricious, and
irrational” decision remains so, no matter how “clear” or “manifest” it may
be: zero times zero equals zero, just as one hundred times zero equals zero.
In either situation, the trial court abused its discretion—whether a “clear”
or “manifest” abuse or just an “abuse.”
Characterizing the abuse as clear or manifest—or merely as run-of-themill abuse—without more, is not useful or meaningful. The descriptive
types of abuse of discretion are perpetuated purely by habit rather than by
any meaningful distinction. If there are, in fact, varying degrees of the abuse
of discretion standard of review, then the courts should spell out any
intended differences or limitations.124 As Professor Rosenberg once
observed, “To tame the concept [of abuse of discretion] requires no less
than to force ourselves to say why it is accorded or withheld, and to say so
in a manner that provides assurance for today’s case and some guidance for
tomorrow’s.”125
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is typically
considered to apply following a trial on the merits to the ultimate trier of
fact, whether that is the jury or the judge. This standard may also apply to
pretrial rulings and may have specialized applications, as in family law
matters. The standard has a long, rich history in Texas jurisprudence, on

122. E.g., Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997) (utilizing the traditional abuse
of discretion standard in an appeal).
123. See City of Dallas v. Vanesko, 189 S.W.3d 769, 771 (Tex. 2006) (holding the standard of
review in a zoning case requires a “clear” abuse of discretion before reversing a zoning board’s
decision); Equitable Gen. Ins. Co. of Tex. v. Yates, 684 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Tex. 1984) (observing the
trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial will not be revised absent a “manifest abuse of discretion”).
124. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 764 (1982) (wanting
initially to apply a uniform definition, but concluding that “the differences are not only defensible but
essential”).
125. Rosenberg, supra note 33, at 185.
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both sides of the civil and criminal dockets, which should be considered by
an appellate advocate crafting a sufficiency challenge.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence in Jury Trials
In Texas, jury findings have long been the subject of appellate review to
determine the sufficiency of the evidence in support of those findings. In
addition to the “legal sufficiency” standard employed in most jurisdictions,
Texas is one of only three jurisdictions (in addition to New York and the
U.S. military courts) that also utilizes the less deferential “factual
sufficiency” standard, which permits the court to consider the weight of the
evidence.126
The standards and scope of legal and factual sufficiency review have not
remained static, but have slowly evolved. In particular, commentators
continue to assess the impact of the Texas Supreme Court’s 2005 decision
in City of Keller v. Wilson,127 which re-evaluated the standard for legal
sufficiency challenges in civil cases.128 After significant debate, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals recently eliminated the factual sufficiency
standard of review “in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to

126. See 10 U.S.C. § 866(c) (2012) (“The [Military] Court of Criminal Appeals may act only with
respect to the findings and sentence as approved by the convening authority. It may affirm only such
findings . . . it finds correct in law and fact . . . . In considering the record, it may weigh the evidence,
judge the credibility of witnesses, and determine controverted questions of fact, recognizing that the
trial court saw and heard the witnesses.”); People v. Bleakley, 508 N.E.2d 672, 673 (N.Y. 1987) (noting
the lower court’s error in failing to conduct statutorily required factual sufficiency review).
127. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005).
128. See generally William V. Dorsaneo, III, Evolving Standards of Evidentiary Review: Revising the Scope
of Review, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 225, 240–41 (2005) (illustrating differences between inclusive and exclusive
standards of review); W. Wendell Hall & Mark Emery, The Texas Hold Out: Trends in the Review of Civil
and Criminal Jury Verdicts, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 539, 549–52 (2008) (describing the standards of review in
Texas as they pertain to the roles of the judge and jury in both civil and criminal trials); W. Wendell
Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 234–47 (2006) (discussing legal sufficiency
challenges in light of the Texas Supreme Court decision in City of Keller); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of
Review in Texas, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1, 165–66 (2002) (suggesting contradictions in Texas case law with
regard to the jury’s role in determining sufficiency of the evidence); Lonny S. Hoffman, Harmar and the
Ever-Expanding Scope of Legal Sufficiency Review, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 611, 612 (2008) (arguing the court’s
Harmer decision “is an unwelcome attack on the finality of jury verdicts”); David E. Keltner et al., No
Evidence Review: The Scope and Standard of Legal Sufficiency Review After City of Keller, in STATE BAR OF
TEX., 22ND ANNUAL ADVANCED CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE, ch. 16, at 1–2 (2008)
(discussing how City of Keller defined exclusive and inclusive standards of review); Thomas R. Phillips
& Martha G. Newton, Evolving Notions of “No Evidence,” in STATE BAR OF TEX., PRACTICE BEFORE
THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT, ch. 12.3, at 2–6 (2007) (interpreting recent Texas Supreme Court
decisions regarding the no evidence standard of review).
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support each element of a criminal offense that the State is required to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt.”129
1.

Legal Insufficiency

As discussed throughout this Article, at various stages before, during, or
after a trial, a trial court may be asked to rule on the legal sufficiency of the
evidence.130 If properly preserved,131 challenges to the legal sufficiency of
the evidence for a jury’s verdict may also be brought as an issue in the courts
of appeals and the Texas Supreme Court.132
a.

City of Keller v. Wilson

In City of Keller, the Texas Supreme Court recognized both of the different
scopes of review applicable to no evidence cases.133 The court held,
however, that whether the legal sufficiency scope of review was all of the
evidence or only the evidence favorable to the jury’s verdict made no real
difference,134 and the difference between the inclusive and exclusive
standards was “more semantic than real.”135 Whether a reviewing court
129. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). See generally Hall & Emery,
supra note 128, at 580 (noting the court in Watson almost “ended the use of factual sufficiency review
in the bulk of cases”).
130. See infra Part IV(Y) (summary judgment); Part V(I) (directed verdict); Part VI(B) (motion
to disregard); Part VI(C) (JNOV).
131. In a jury trial, challenges to the legal insufficiency of the evidence are preserved by: “(1) a
motion for instructed verdict, (2) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (3) an objection
to the submission of the issue to the jury, (4) a motion to disregard the jury’s answer to a vital fact
issue[,] or (5) a motion for new trial” specifically raising the complaint. Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509,
510–11 (Tex. 1991) (citing Aero Energy, Inc. v. Circle C Drilling Co., 699 S.W.2d 821, 822 (Tex. 1985));
Salinas v. Fort Worth Cab & Baggage Co., 725 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tex. 1987); Aero Energy, 699 S.W.2d
at 822; accord TEX. R. CIV. P. 301 (“The judgment of the court shall conform to the pleadings, the
nature of the case proved and the verdict, if any, and shall be so framed as to give the party all the relief
to which he may be entitled . . . . Provided, that upon motion and reasonable notice the court may
render judgment non obstante veredicto if a directed verdict would have been proper, and provided
further that the court may, upon like motion and notice, disregard any jury finding on a question that
has no support in the evidence.”).
132. See Choate v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co., 44 S.W. 69, 69–70 (1898) (recognizing the
courts of appeals and the supreme court have jurisdiction to review challenges to the legal sufficiency
of the evidence).
133. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 809 (Tex. 2005) (acknowledging both
“exclusive” and “inclusive” standards for review of legal sufficiency have been used).
134. Id. at 821–22.
135. See id. at 825–27 (discussing the holding in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S.
133, 149–51 (2000), and noting the different scopes of review are “more semantic than real” and that
reviewing courts should review all of the evidence in the record).
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reviews all of the evidence or only part of the evidence in a legal sufficiency
review, “there can be no disagreement about where that review should
end[:]”136
The final test for legal sufficiency must always be whether the evidence at trial
would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under
review. Whether a reviewing court begins by considering all the evidence or
only the evidence supporting the verdict, legal-sufficiency review in the proper
light must credit favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, and disregard
contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.137

“A reviewing court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trier-offact, so long as the evidence falls within this zone of reasonable
disagreement.”138
The supreme court did not appear to view City of Keller as a sharp change
in doctrine, but rather an incremental change that reflected the standards of
review in practice.139 The court stated: “[T]he traditional rule in Texas has
never been that appellate courts must reject contrary evidence in every noevidence review.”140 The traditional scope of review does not disregard
contrary evidence if: (1) there is no favorable evidence;141 (2) contrary
evidence renders supporting evidence incompetent;142 or (3) “the evidence
establishes conclusively the opposite of [a] vital fact.”143
i.

Types of Evidence that Cannot Be Disregarded

In City of Keller, the court outlined several kinds of evidence that cannot
be disregarded when reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence:144
136. Id. at 822.
137. Id. at 827.
138. Id. at 822 (citing William Powers, Jr. & Jack Ratliff, Another Look at “No Evidence” and
“Insufficient Evidence,” 69 TEX. L. REV. 515, 517–20 (1991)).
139. Id. at 827–28; see Phillips & Newton, supra note 128, at 6 (suggesting the “[t]he uproar over
the . . . City of Keller decision[ ] has been disproportional to the incremental nature of [the] opinion[ ],”
as City of Keller was “more about clarifying existing law than inventing new law”).
140. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 810.
141. See id. (noting the court must sustain a no evidence point when there is a “complete absence
of evidence of a vital fact” (quoting Robert W. Calvert, “No Evidence” and “Insufficient Evidence” Points of
Error, 38 TEX. L. REV. 361, 362–63 (1960))).
142. See id. (recognizing the court must also sustain a no evidence point when “the court is
barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital
fact” (quoting Calvert, supra note 141, at 362–63)).
143. Id. (quoting Calvert, supra note 141, at 362–63).
144. See id. at 811–12 (describing when courts may not disregard contrary evidence).
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Contextual evidence. The court cited the following as examples: defamation
cases, where the entire publication must be considered;145 contract cases,
where the entire contract is reviewed;146 and intentional infliction of
emotional distress cases, where “‘the context and the relationship between
the parties’” is considered.147 Accordingly, as noted by the court:
[I]f evidence may be legally sufficient in one context but insufficient in
another, the context cannot be disregarded even if that means rendering
judgment contrary to the jury’s verdict. Either “evidence contrary to the
verdict” must be defined to exclude material contextual evidence, or it must
be an exception to the general rule.148

Competency evidence. Incompetent evidence has always been “insufficient
to support a judgment, even if admitted without objection.”149 The court
in City of Keller stated that “evidence showing it to be incompetent [evidence]
cannot be disregarded, even if the result is contrary to the verdict.”150 For
instance, “if an eyewitness’s location renders a clear view of an accident
‘physically impossible,’ it is no evidence of what occurred,” regardless of the
witness’s testimony to the contrary.151 This rule also applies “[w]hen expert
testimony is required[;] lay evidence supporting liability is legally
insufficient.”152 Additionally, when an expert’s opinion fails to meet the
reliability standards, a review of the expert’s testimony cannot disregard his
testimony that demonstrates that his opinion does not meet the reliability
standards.153 As the court observed, the evidence at issue might be some

145. Id. at 811.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 811 (quoting Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 714 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); then
citing Tex. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Cos. v. Sears, 84 S.W.3d 604, 610–11 (Tex. 2002); GTE Sw., Inc. v.
Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 612 (Tex. 1999)).
148. Id. at 812.
149. Id. at 812 (citing Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227,
232 n.1 (Tex. 2004)).
150. Id.
151. Id. (quoting Tex. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ball, 75 S.W. 4, 6 (1903)).
152. Id. (citing Bowles v. Bourdon, 219 S.W.2d 779, 782–83 (Tex. 1949)).
153. See id. at 813 (“[R]eview of an expert’s damage estimates cannot disregard the expert’s
admission on cross-examination that none can be verified.” (citing Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton,
133 S.W.3d 245, 254–57 (Tex. 2004), abrogated in part by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr.,
268 S.W.3d 1, 18–19 (Tex. 2008))); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714,
720 (Tex. 1997) (adhering to the notion that courts should examine more than an expert’s bare opinion
to determine if the evidence is reliable).
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evidence in isolation, but it is no evidence when contrary evidence
demonstrates that it is incompetent.154
Circumstantial evidence.
When inferences must be considered in
determining a no evidence challenge, the reviewing court must “view each
piece of circumstantial evidence, not in isolation, but in light of all the
known circumstances.”155 Again, the court provided examples: (1) one
fact-finder “might infer from [grocery] cart tracks in spilled macaroni salad
that it had been on the floor a long time, but” another might conclude that
it just occurred;156 and (2) when there is an “injury or death[,] . . . [no
eyewitnesses,] and only meager circumstantial evidence” suggesting an
explanation, the court “cannot disregard other meager evidence of equally
likely causes.”157 Therefore, “when the circumstantial evidence of a vital
fact is meager, [the] reviewing court must . . . [review] all the circumstantial
evidence . . . and competing inferences[,]” not just the favorable
evidence.158
Conclusive evidence. The court noted Justice Calvert’s observation that, in a
no evidence review, “Texas courts . . . do not disregard contrary evidence
that conclusively establishes the opposite of a vital fact.”159 There are many
forms of conclusive evidence.160 One form of conclusive evidence is found
when the evidence is undisputed. As the court explained, a reviewing court
“cannot ‘disregard undisputed evidence that allows of only one logical
inference[,]’”161 and “[b]y definition . . . [leaves] reasonable jurors [to] reach
only one conclusion from it.”162 The court then noted that “undisputed
contrary evidence [generally] becomes conclusive . . . when it concerns
physical facts that cannot be denied.”163 The court provided the following
examples: (1) “no evidence supports an impaired-access claim if it is
undisputed that access remains along 90 percent of a tract’s frontage”;164
154. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 813 (recognizing evidence may seem to be competent when
viewed alone, but not when viewed in light of other evidence).
155. Id. at 813–14 (quoting Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 167 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam)).
156. Id. at 814 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tex. 1998)).
157. Id. (citing Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); W.
Tel. Corp. of Tex. v. McCann, 99 S.W.2d 895, 900 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 814 (citing Calvert, supra note 141, at 363–64).
160. Id.
161. Id. (quoting St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 519–20 (Tex. 2002) (plurality
opinion)).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 815.
164. Id. (citing County of Bexar v. Santikos, 144 S.W.3d 455, 460–61 (Tex. 2004)).
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(2) “[e]vidence that a buyer believed a product had been repaired is
conclusively negated by a[ ] . . . letter to the contrary”;165 and (3) “an
insured’s liability has not been determined by an ‘actual trial’ if the insured
did not appear, present evidence, or challenge anything presented by his
opponent.”166 Undisputed conclusive evidence may also be conclusive
when a party admits that the evidence of a vital fact is true.167
The second form of conclusive evidence arises when “the evidence is
disputed.”168 The court observed that “[u]ndisputed evidence and
conclusive evidence are not the same—undisputed evidence may or may not
be conclusive, and conclusive evidence may or may not be undisputed.”169
For example, a mother may testify that she had sex with only one man
during the relevant time that she became pregnant, even though the
purported father’s “blood test[ ] conclusively proved he was not the . . .
father” of the child.170 Because the blood test is conclusive, “there [would
be] no evidence to support the paternity verdict” against the purported
father.171 The court concluded that while “reviewing courts [cannot]
substitut[e] their opinions on credibility for those of the jurors, . . . jurors
[likewise cannot] substitut[e] their opinions for [the] undisputed truth.”172
Clear and convincing evidence. In cases such as “parental termination,
defamation, and punitive damages[,]” where there is an elevated standard of
proof, the reviewing court must consider all of the evidence, not just the
evidence favoring the verdict, in reviewing those judgments.173
Consciousness evidence. In cases involving an issue of “what a party knew or
why it took a” particular action, such as assessing conscious indifference,
bad faith denial of insurance coverage, employment discrimination, the right
to governmental immunity, and the running of limitations under the

165. Id. (citing PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Ctrs. Partners Ltd. P’ship, 146 S.W.3d 79,
97–98 (Tex. 2004)).
166. Id. (citing State Farm Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Maldonado, 963 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. 1998)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 816.
169. Id.
170. Id. (citing Murdock v. Murdock, 811 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. 1991)).
171. Id. (citing Murdock v. Murdock, 811 S.W.2d 557, 560 (Tex. 1991)).
172. Id. at 816–17.
173. Id. at 817 (footnotes omitted) (first citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); then
citing Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 596 (Tex. 2002); Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc.,
38 S.W.3d 103, 120 (Tex. 2000); and then citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex.
2004)).
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discovery rule, the reviewing court must consider all of the evidence, not
just the evidence favoring the verdict, in reviewing those judgments.174
ii.

Types of Evidence that Must Be Disregarded

In City of Keller, the court also noted three kinds of evidence that must be
disregarded:175
Credibility evidence. Because “[j]urors are the sole judges of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony[,]”176 jurors are free
“to believe one witness and disbelieve another[,]”177 and “[r]eviewing
courts [may not] impose their own opinions to the contrary.”178
Accordingly, “reviewing courts must assume [that] jurors decided all
[credibility questions] in favor of the verdict if reasonable human beings
could do so.”179 The court emphasized “[t]he jury’s decisions regarding
credibility must be reasonable.”180 For example, “[j]urors cannot
[disregard] undisputed testimony that is . . . free from contradictions and
inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted.”181 Similarly,
jurors “are not free to believe testimony that is conclusively negated by
undisputed facts.”182 However, if “reasonable jurors could decide what
testimony to [disbelieve, the] reviewing court must assume they did so in
favor of their verdict,” and affirm the jury’s finding.183
Conflicting evidence. The court noted that it is within the jury’s province “to
resolve conflicts in the evidence.”184 Consequently, when “reviewing all
174. Id. at 817–18.
175. See id. at 818–21 (describing evidence that should always be disregarded).
176. Id. at 819 (citing Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003);
Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. 1993); McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694,
697 (Tex. 1986); Edrington v. Kiger, 4 Tex. 89, 93 (1849)).
177. Id. (citing McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 697; Silcott v. Oglesby, 721 S.W.2d 290, 293 (Tex.
1986); Ford v. Panhandle & Sante Fe Ry. Co., 252 S.W.2d 561, 563 (Tex. 1952); Houston, E. & W.T.
Ry. Co. v. Runnels, 47 S.W. 971, 972 (Tex. 1898)).
178. Id. (citing Turner, 38 S.W.3d at 120).
179. Id.
180. See id. at 820 (quoting Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 599 (Tex. 2002))
(reiterating the reasonableness standard for jury decisions regarding credibility).
181. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece, 81 S.W.3d 812, 817 (Tex.
2002); In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 322, 325 (Tex. 2000); WFAA-TV, Inc. v. McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568,
574 (Tex. 1998)).
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Lee, 880 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. 1993); Lyons v. Millers
Cas. Ins. Co. of Tex., 866 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tex. 1993); Biggers v. Cont’l Bus Sys., Inc., 303 S.W.2d
359, 365 (Tex. 1957); Howard Oil Co. v. Davis, 13 S.W. 665, 667 (Tex. 1890)).
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the evidence in a light favorable to the verdict[, the court] must assume that
[the jury] resolved all conflicts” in the evidence consistent with the jury’s
verdict.185 The court concluded that where “reasonable jurors could
resolve conflicting evidence either way, [the] reviewing court[ ] must
presume [that the jury] did so in favor of the [jury verdict], and disregard the
conflicting evidence in their legal sufficiency review.”186
Conflicting inferences. The court held that “[e]ven if [the] evidence is
undisputed, it is [within] the province of the jury to draw . . . whatever
inferences they [choose], so long as more than one is possible and the jury”
is not required to guess.187 Therefore, when the court reviews “all the
evidence in a light [most] favorable to the [jury’s] verdict[,]” the reviewing
court “must assume jurors made all inferences in favor of their verdict if
reasonable minds could [do so], and disregard all other inferences in their
legal sufficiency review.”188
iii. The Reasonable Verdict Standard
Despite the court’s detailed tour of evidence that cannot be disregarded
and evidence that must be disregarded, the court’s decision in City of Keller is
not as remarkable for defining the scope of review in legal sufficiency review
as it is for repeatedly reminding the reviewing courts that regardless of the
quantity and quality of the evidence presented, the jury’s verdict must be
reasonable.189 The impact of City of Keller’s reformulation is readily apparent
in the manner in which legal sufficiency standards are commonly stated in
opinions.190 Additionally, in its emphasis on the reasonable juror standard,
185. Id. (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 592 (Tex. 1999); Caller-Times
Publ’g Co. v. Triad Commc’ns, Inc., 826 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex. 1992); Bendalin v. Delgado, 406 S.W.2d
897, 899 (Tex. 1966)).
186. Id. at 821.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See generally id. at 807–30 (using the word “reasonable” forty-two times and the phrase
“reasonable jurors” fifteen times).
190. For example, in one case the Texas Supreme Court stated the standard of review simply
as “[w]e review a summary judgment for evidence that would enable reasonable and fair-minded jurors
to differ in their conclusions.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Spates, 186 S.W.3d 566, 568 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (citing id. at 822–23). City of Keller’s influence is also apparent in the many appellate court
opinions citing to it. See Envtl. Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 626 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (applying the reasonable and fair-minded juror standard established in
City of Keller); Canal Ins. Co. v. Hopkins, 238 S.W.3d 549, 557 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2007, pet. denied)
(“When reviewing a finding of fact for legal sufficiency, we may set aside a finding of fact only if the
evidence at trial would not enable a reasonable and fair minded finder of fact to make the finding under
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City of Keller appears to bring Texas more closely in line with federal
standards for legal sufficiency review.191 The test is not so much whether
there is a scintilla of evidence to support the verdict, but whether the
reviewing court believes that the evidence at trial would allow reasonable
and fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review.192 Under the
new standard, as the court says, it really does not matter whether one reviews
the entire record or only that evidence that supports the verdict because the
reviewing court may set aside the jury’s decision if a majority of the
reviewing court finds that “reasonable and fair-minded people” could not
have reached the verdict which is the subject of the appeal.193
While the Texas Supreme Court has not yet repudiated the traditional
“scintilla rule” or the “matter of law” rule, City of Keller’s use of the
reasonable and fair-minded juror standard seems likely over time to erode
those standards and the frame of reference through which a judge is required
to consider the record evidence. This raises the continuing possibility that
the appellate courts may not as rigorously separate out evidence and may
review.” (citing id. at 827)); Rosenblatt v. Freedom Life Ins. Co. of Am., 240 S.W.3d 315, 319 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (“In applying the legal-sufficiency standard, we must credit
evidence that supports the judgment if reasonable jurors could credit that evidence, and we must
disregard contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not disregard that evidence.” (citing id.
at 827)).
191. See W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 253–55 (2006)
(comparing the comprehensive standard of review adopted by the Fifth Circuit and the standard of
review in Texas). In the Fifth Circuit’s 1969 decision in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir.
1969) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., 107 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1997),
the court adopted the inclusive, whole record approach to review of jury verdicts:
[T]he Court should consider all of the evidence—not just that evidence which supports the nonmover’s case—but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party
opposed to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor
of one party that the Court believes that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict,
granting of the motions [for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict] is proper.
On the other hand, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of
such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted to the
jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a question for the jury.
Id. at 374. The key inquiry in both City of Keller and Shipman was whether fair-minded jurors could
render a verdict on the evidence presented at trial. See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Judges, Juries, and
Reviewing Courts, 53 SMU L. REV. 1497, 1504 (2000) (noting Shipman does not explain how the analytical
process of reviewing all of the evidence “‘in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable
to the party’” works (quoting Shipman, 411 F.2d at 374)).
192. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986) (affirming the notion that
the true inquiry is whether a fair-minded jury could find for a party by utilizing the evidence presented).
193. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 822.
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simply ask more generally whether a verdict is “reasonable.” This poses the
problem that the appellate courts may weigh conflicting evidence and
inferences on legal sufficiency review. But, unlike most jurisdictions, Texas
has a separate standard of review that permits the courts of appeal to engage
in just such weighing of the evidence.
2.

Factual Insufficiency

A “[f]actual sufficiency . . . [challenge] concede[s] conflicting evidence on
an issue” (which made it appropriate for the jury to consider), “yet
maintain[s] that the evidence against the jury’s finding is so great[,]” or the
evidence for the jury’s finding is so weak, “as to make the finding
erroneous.”194 Constitutionally, only the intermediate courts of appeals
have jurisdiction to review for factual sufficiency.195
When reviewing a challenge to the factual sufficiency of the evidence in
a civil case, “the court of appeals must weigh all of the evidence in the
record.”196 The court must “keep[ ] in mind that it is the jury’s role, not
[the court’s], to judge the credibility of the evidence, to assign the weight to
be given to testimony, and to resolve inconsistencies within or conflicts
among the witnesses’ testimony.”197 “[T]he court . . . may not pass upon
the witnesses’ credibility or substitute its judgment for that of the jury [or
fact finder], even if the evidence would clearly support a different result.”198
194. See Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Expl. Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1988, writ denied) (explaining the factual sufficiency standard).
195. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a).
196. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (citing Burnett v. Motyka,
610 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Tex. 1980) (per curiam)); see Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442,
445 (Tex. 1989) (emphasizing that in a factual sufficiency review the court of appeals is required to
consider all evidence in the record, not just evidence contrary to the verdict); Lofton v. Tex. Brine
Corp. (Lofton I), 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (holding the courts of appeals “must
review all of the evidence” in their decision on a review of factual sufficiency (citing Garza v. Alviar,
395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965))); Burnett, 610 S.W.2d at 736 (remanding the case back to the court of
appeals for its failure to “consider and weigh all the evidence” in a factual sufficiency review).
197. Walker v. Ricks, 101 S.W.3d 740, 749 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (citing
Reyna v. First Nat’l Bank in Edinburg, 55 S.W.3d 58, 73 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.));
see Corpus Christi Area Teachers Credit Union v. Hernandez, 814 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1991, no writ) (“[I]n considering an ‘insufficient evidence’ point, we must remain cognizant
of the fact that it is for the jury, as the trier of fact, to judge the credibility of the witnesses, to assign
the weight to be given their testimony, and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the testimony.”
(quoting Tex. Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n v. Jackson, 719 S.W.2d 245, 249–50 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, writ
ref’d n.r.e.))).
198. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998) (citing Pool v. Ford Motor
Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 634 (Tex. 1986)); see Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 634–35 (disapproving of decisions by
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A court of appeals must “detail the evidence . . . and clearly state why the
jury’s finding is factually insufficient” when reversing a jury verdict,199 but
it need not do so when affirming a jury verdict.200 However, when a court
of appeals reviews a factual insufficiency challenge to a punitive damage
award, the court must “detail the relevant evidence in its opinion, explaining
why that evidence either supports or does not support the punitive damages
award[.]”201
“Factual sufficiency points of error are designated as ‘insufficient
evidence points’ or ‘great weight and preponderance points,’ depending
upon whether the complaining party had the burden of proof.”202
a.

Insufficient Evidence

If a party is attacking the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an
issue to which the other party had the burden of proof, the attacking party
must demonstrate that there is insufficient evidence to support the adverse
finding.203 In reviewing an insufficiency of the evidence challenge, the
appellate courts that merely substituted their own judgment for that of the jury without detailing the
courts’ mental processes in arriving at their opinions). Confusion has arisen regarding the validity of
Pool. The Eighth Court of Appeals has stated that the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Pool was
overruled on other grounds by Crown Life Insurance Co. v. Casteel. Rusty’s Weigh Scales & Serv., Inc. v.
N. Tex. Scales, Inc., 314 S.W.3d 105, 110 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.). However, Crown Life
overruled the holding of the Sixth Court of Appeals in Ford Motor Co. v. Pool, 688 S.W.2d 879 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1985), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 715 S.W.2d 269 (Tex. 1986), not the
Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Ford Motor Co. v. Pool, 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986). Crown Life Ins.
Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 389 (Tex. 2000). Therefore, the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Pool
is still “good law.” See Crosstex N. Tex. Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 615 (Tex. 2016)
(stating that court of appeals announced the correct standard and citing Pool).
199. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635 (requiring the court of appeals to explain its reasons for
reversing a trial court’s judgment if the reversal is based on factual insufficiency); see also Citizens Nat’l
Bank in Waxahachie v. Scott, 195 S.W.3d 94, 96 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (“When a court of appeals
disturbs the judgment of a lower tribunal, merely saying that the court has reviewed all the evidence
and reaching a conclusion contrary to that of the trier of fact is not enough. Instead, the court should
explain, with specificity, why it has substituted its judgment for that of the trial court.”).
200. See Ellis Cty. State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. 1994) (declining to extend
the requirement in Pool to cases where the appellate court affirms the trial court’s judgment).
201. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994), superceded by statute, TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118,
140 (Tex. 2012); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011 (providing factors that must be
considered in reviewing the damages award).
202. Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Expl. Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
1988, writ denied).
203. See Hickey v. Couchman, 797 S.W.2d 103, 109 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, writ
denied) (indicating that a showing of insufficient evidence is appropriate when the party challenging a
finding of fact does not have the burden of proof); see also id. at 275–76 (explaining that an insufficient
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court of appeals must first consider, weigh, and examine all of the evidence
that supports and that is contrary to the jury’s determination.204 A court
must sustain an insufficient evidence point when the “evidence adduced to
support the vital fact, even if it is the only evidence adduced on an issue, is
factually too weak alone to support it.”205 The court sets aside the
judgment if the evidence is so weak “as to be clearly wrong and unjust.”206
b.

Great Weight and Preponderance

If a party is challenging a jury finding regarding an issue upon which that
party had the burden of proof, the complaining party must demonstrate that
“the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence.”207 In reviewing a challenge that the jury finding is against the
“great weight and preponderance of the evidence,” the court of appeals
must first examine the record to determine if there is some evidence to
support the finding.208 If such is the case, then the court of appeals must
determine, in light of the entire record, whether “the finding is so contrary
to the overwhelming weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be
clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or if the great preponderance of the
evidence supports its non-existence.”209 Whether the great weight
challenge is to a finding or a nonfinding, “[a] court of appeals may reverse
and remand a case for new trial [only] if it concludes that the jury’s ‘failure

evidence point is the appropriate challenge to a jury finding when the attacking party does not have
the burden of proof).
204. Plas-Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 445 (Tex. 1989); see Cropper v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 648–49 (Tex. 1988) (detailing the history of the appellate
courts’ power to review jury verdicts on factual issues); Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex.
1988) (promoting the conclusive ability of appellate courts to make factual sufficiency determinations
so long as the correct test is applied in evidentiary review).
205. Ritchey v. Crawford, 734 S.W.2d 85, 87 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ)
(citing Calvert, supra note 141, at 366).
206. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Dyson v. Olin Corp.,
692 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Tex. 1985); In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. 1951) (per curiam)).
207. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (citing Croucher
v. Croucher, 660 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. 1983)).
208. Id. at 241–42.
209. Castillo v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 953 S.W.2d 470, 473 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1997, no writ)
(citing Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176); see id. at 242 (“The court of appeals must consider and weigh all of the
evidence, and can set aside a verdict only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust.” (citing Pool v.
Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 351, 484 (1998))).
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to find’ is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.”210
3.

The Development of the Legal and Factual Sufficiency Standards

While City of Keller established the standards for legal sufficiency review in
Texas, it did not address the Texas constitutional provision that “the
decision of [the courts of appeals] shall be conclusive on all questions of
fact brought before them on appeal or error.”211 An ongoing question in
the development of legal and factual sufficiency review in Texas is whether
these two standards will be applied separately and consistently, or whether
City of Keller’s “reasonable and fair-minded person” standard will, little by
little, subsume factual sufficiency in practice, even if not in doctrine.
a. An Overview of the Constitutional Conflict Between the
Right to Trial by Jury and the Court of Appeals’ Jurisdiction over
Issues of Fact
“Texas is still one of the most jury-deferential states in the United
States[,]”212 and makes broad use of juries.213 The Texas Constitution
provides that “[t]he right of a jury trial shall remain inviolate” and be
210. Ames v. Ames, 776 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1989) (citing Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
754 S.W.2d 646, 651 (Tex. 1988)).
211. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a).
212. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 429 n.47 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), overruled in part on other
grounds by Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 911–12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010); see William Powers, Jr.,
Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1699, 1699 n.3 (1997) (“A hallmark of this
entire body of law [regarding legal and factual sufficiency], however, is extraordinary deference to
juries.”).
213. Texas makes wider uses of jury trials than most jurisdictions. Texas has always permitted
a right to a jury trial for cases in equity (which the Seventh Amendment does not require), commitment
proceedings for the mentally ill, and disbarment for lawyers. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15 (“The right
of trial by jury shall remain inviolate. . . . Provided, that the Legislature may provide for the temporary
commitment . . . of mentally ill persons . . . without the necessity of a trial by jury.”); id. art. I, § 15-a
(noting the legislature may allow for a waiver of a jury trial in some cases involving commitment of
“persons of unsound mind[,]” but confirming that despite possible waiver, the “person under inquiry
[can] . . . demand a trial by jury”); id. art. V, § 10 (“In the trial of all causes in the District Courts, the
plaintiff or defendant shall, upon application made in open court, have the right of trial by jury . . . .”
(emphasis added)); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 81.077(a) ( “The supreme court may not adopt or
promulgate any rule abrogating the right of trial by jury of an accused attorney in a disbarment
action . . . .”). Texas also permits sentencing by jury in all criminal trials and forbids the trial judge
from commenting on the weight of the evidence. See TEX CONST. art. I, § 10 (“In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.”); TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 38.05 (forbidding judges from commenting upon the weight of the evidence and
prohibiting a judge from “mak[ing] any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion of the
case”).
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available in all cases,214 and the Texas Supreme Court has cautioned that
the “courts must not lightly deprive our people of this right by taking an
issue away from the jury.”215 There are express directives in the statutes
and rules regarding the roles of judge and jury, requiring trial judges to
admonish the jury that they “are the sole judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.”216
Unlike most jurisdictions, courts of appeals in Texas are granted
jurisdiction over questions of fact.217 The purpose of this power, as the
Texas Supreme Court held more than 100 years ago, “was not to enlarge
[the courts of appeals’] power over questions of fact, but to restrict, in
express terms, the jurisdiction of the supreme court, and to confine it to
questions of law.”218 The Texas Government Code provides that “[a]
judgment of a court of appeals is conclusive on the facts of the case in all
civil cases.”219
In 1951, the Texas Supreme Court established that it might accept
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the factual conclusivity clause, to determine if
a correct legal standard had been applied by the courts of appeals.220 Since
then, members of the supreme court in several decisions have expressed
concern that the court has assumed overly broad power to review fact issues,
even though it is constitutionally restricted to legal issues.
In Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,221 the supreme court reaffirmed the courts of
appeals’ jurisdiction to review cases for factual insufficiency of the
evidence,222 but also held that the supreme court had the authority to
review courts of appeals’ opinions to determine if the appellate court applied
the correct standard of review to the facts.223 In effect, Pool further clarified
the supreme court’s power to review a court of appeals’ application of the
214. TEX. CONST. art. I, §§ 10, 15-a; id. art. V, §§ 10, 13, 17.
215. Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 56 (Tex. 1997) (citing Young v. Blain,
245 S.W. 65, 67 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1922)).
216. TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a.
217. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6(a).
218. Choate v. San Antonio & A.P. Ry. Co., 44 S.W. 69, 69 (Tex. 1898).
219. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.225(a).
220. See In re King’s Estate, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661–62 (Tex. 1951) (per curiam) (setting forth the
circumstances in which the supreme court may accept jurisdiction to review an appellate order
regarding weight of the evidence).
221. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
222. See id. at 633 (determining the correct standard of review and remanding to the court of
appeals for application of the proper standard).
223. See id. at 634–35 (concluding the supreme court may take jurisdiction over a final judgment
of the court of appeals on a fact question to determine if the appropriate standard was applied).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

39

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4

1138

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1099

correct legal standard to the facts, instead of only determining whether the
correct legal standard was utilized. Notably, Justice Gonzalez’s concurrence
expressed a fear that this holding may “be used to allow this court to second
guess the courts of appeal[s].”224
In Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,225 the Texas Supreme Court rejected a
challenge to the court of appeals’ constitutional obligation to review fact
questions, reasoning that the constitutional right to a jury trial and the
appellate courts’ constitutional authority to review fact questions “have
peacefully co-existed for almost one hundred and fifty years, and are
thoroughly rooted in our constitution and judicial system.”226 While the
court recognized the “inescapable fact” that it could not amend the
Constitution to remove the conflict, it concluded that even if the court was
so empowered, it was “not prepared to sacrifice either [constitutional
provision] for the benefit of the other.”227
In Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp. (Lofton I),228 the conflict appeared again,
when the court was called upon to apply Pool to a court of appeals’
opinion.229 In Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp. (Lofton II),230 a 5–4 decision, the
majority “briefly present[ed] a review of why the lower court’s [factual
sufficiency] analysis [was] incorrect.”231 Justice Gonzalez’s dissent noted

224. Id. at 637 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
225. Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. 1988).
226. Id. at 652.
227. Id.
228. Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. (Lofton I), 720 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam). In Lofton
I, the Texas Supreme Court found that the court of appeals failed to apply the proper standard for
factual sufficiency by failing to “fully consider” all of the evidence and failing to clearly “state in what
regard the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence supporting the jury’s verdict.” Id. at 805
(citing Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635; Alm v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 717 S.W.2d 588, 594–95 (Tex. 1986)).
On remand, a divided Fourteenth Court of Appeals again held that the evidence was factually
insufficient to support the proximate cause finding. Tex. Brine Corp. v. Lofton, 751 S.W.2d 197, 204
(Tex. App.—Houston [14 Dist.] 1988), rev’d, 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. 1989). However, the Texas
Supreme Court again reversed, ruling that the court could permit interested witness testimony to
establish the lack of proximate cause as a matter of law, and that the court of appeals was not permitted
to “substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact” by holding the evidence factually
insufficient. Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. (Lofton II), 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. 1989).
229. See Lofton I, 720 S.W.2d at 805 (recognizing the standard established in Pool that “when
reversing a trial court’s judgment after concluding the supporting evidence is insufficient, the court of
appeals must detail the relevant evidence introduced at trial and clearly state why the jury’s finding is
factually insufficient” (citing Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 635)).
230. Lofton II, 777 S.W.2d 384 (Tex. 1989).
231. Id. at 386–87.
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that the fear he expressed in Pool had been realized in Lofton II.232 As the
court of appeals had twice found the evidence factually insufficient,
Justice Gonzalez concluded “we have no jurisdiction to review it.”233 He
added that the court was “now swamped with requests to second guess the
courts of appeals . . . to make rulings on sufficiency grounds[,]” as “[t]he
losing party will always allege that the court of appeals erred in reversing a
jury verdict or[,] if it refuse[d] to reverse on sufficiency grounds, that the
court of appeals used the wrong standard.”234 In a separate dissent,
Justice Hecht echoed Justice Gonzalez’s concern, concluding that the Lofton
II decision was an unconstitutional review by the supreme court of the
factual sufficiency of the evidence, and an affront to the courts of appeals’
constitutional prerogative to judge the factual sufficiency of the evidence in
a case. He explained:
Stymied by the constitution, the Court cannot decree the result it rather
plainly wants to see in this case. To accomplish the desired end, the Court
must keep reversing the judgment of the court of appeals until it reaches a
result that the Court approves. Always the ground for reversal is that the
appeals court either cannot or will not follow the law. For this Court to hold
that an appeals court has not conducted its factual insufficiency analysis in a
lawful manner, simply to coerce that court into changing its conclusion, is to
usurp the constitutional prerogative of the court of appeals. That is what I
believe is happening in this case.235

Justice Hecht further noted that the court should avoid playing ping-pong
with the court of appeals when a majority of the court “keep[s] reversing
the judgment of the court of appeals until it reaches a result that the
[majority] approves.”236

232. See id. at 387 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (“The court of appeals has twice found the evidence
factually insufficient; we have no jurisdiction to review it.”); cf. Pool, 715 S.W.2d at 637 (Gonzalez, J.,
concurring) (noting “the [majority] court is implicitly trying to prevent the court of appeals from second
guessing the jury[,]” and expressing fear “that this opinion may in turn be used to allow this court to
second guess the courts of appeal”).
233. Lofton II, 777 S.W.2d at 387 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 387–88.
235. Id. at 388 (Hecht, J., dissenting).
236. Id.; see Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 533–34 (discussing the concern expressed by
Justices Hecht and Gonzalez that the supreme court should not reverse an appeals court simply to get
the lower court to reach a result with which the supreme court approves).
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In Aluminum Co. of America v. Alm,237 the supreme court circumvented
the court of appeals’ conclusion that the jury’s finding of gross negligence
was supported by factually insufficient evidence.238 In another 5–4
decision, a deeply divided court reversed and held that defendant Aluminum
Co. of America (Alcoa) was grossly negligent as a matter of law.239 Ignoring
the evidence of care introduced by Alcoa,240 the supreme court refused to
accept the court of appeals’ analysis of the factual sufficiency of the evidence
and concluded that gross negligence as a matter of law is a legal issue over
which the supreme court has jurisdiction.241 The dissenters summarized
the real meaning of the court’s decision: Whenever a majority of the court
is dissatisfied with a court of appeals’ conclusion on a factual sufficiency
point, it may impose any result it chooses “merely by holding that a party
proved the necessary facts conclusively, i.e., as a matter of law.”242
In Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc.,243 Justice Gonzalez, in a concurring
opinion, reasoned that the denial of supreme court review was proper
because “to take jurisdiction of this case again” would have been the
equivalent of “second-guess[ing] the court of appeals’ review of the factual
sufficiency of the evidence.”244 He added that to otherwise take jurisdiction
“would require us to continue to send the case back to the court of appeals
until they ‘get it right,’ i.e., until the court of appeals reaches a result in
accord with [the supreme court’s] view of the evidence.”245 Because the
court of appeals properly reviewed the factual sufficiency challenges,
Justice Gonzalez observed that the court must avoid the “yo-yo effect when
a majority of the court keeps reversing the judgment of the court of appeals
until it reaches a result that the majority approves.”246
In 1994, the Texas Supreme Court’s movement toward the reasonable
and fair-minded person standard gained traction in Transportation Insurance
237. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Alm, 785 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. 1990).
238. Id. at 140–41 (Gonzalez, J., dissenting) (“[T]his is the first time in the history of American
jurisprudence that a court has held that a jury could not disbelieve a plaintiff’s case as to gross negligence
when the issue is disputed, and that a court should determine this issue as a matter of law.”).
239. Id. at 140.
240. Id. at 143.
241. Id. at 141–42.
242. Id. at 143.
243. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1993).
244. Id. at 286 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
245. Id. (emphasis omitted).
246. Id. at 287 (citing Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. (Lofton I), 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986)
(per curiam); Lofton v. Tex. Brine Corp. (Lofton II), 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex. 1989); Powers & Ratliff,
supra note 138, at 533).
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Co. v. Moriel,247 the court’s seminal punitive damages decision. In Moriel,
the court took the significant step of permitting the review of the evidence
supporting the punitive damages award itself, rather than reviewing the
jury’s gross negligence finding.248 Years later, in a notable use of its power
to reverse factual sufficiency determinations, the supreme court twice
reversed the damages awarded in Bunton v. Bentley.249 Justice Baker,
dissenting in the 2002 decision, argued that the supreme court had
“overstep[ped] its constitutional appellate review boundaries to conduct
what effectively results in a factual sufficiency review of the mental anguish
damages award and issue[d] a wholly advisory opinion to the court of
appeals about those damages.”250 The court was evaluating the
“reasonableness” of the mental anguish award as “a proxy for factual
sufficiency review.”251
When the supreme court decided City of Keller in 2005, many debated
whether the court’s embrace of the reasonable and fair-minded person
standard might once and for all “collapse [the] distinction between factual
sufficiency review and the high court’s review of whether courts of appeals
applied the correct factual sufficiency standard.”252 Rather than sending a
case back to the court of appeals for factual sufficiency review, the
reasonable and fair-minded person standard might obviate the need to
reverse and remand to the court of appeals for further consideration of the
247. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994), superceded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140
(Tex. 2012).
248. Id. at 30.
249. Bunton v. Bentley (Bentley II), 153 S.W.3d 50, 54 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Bentley v.
Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 607 (Tex. 2002).
250. Bentley I, 94 S.W.3d at 624 (Baker, J., dissenting).
251. Id.
252. Hall & Emery, supra note 128, at 562; see W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas,
38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 276 (2006) (posing the question, “[I]s there any difference between reviewing
the factual and legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury’s verdict under the supreme court’s
holding in City of Keller[,]” and suggesting that “it may be argued that the two standards of review have
collapsed into one standard of review—the ‘reasonable and fair-minded’ juror standard articulated in
City of Keller”). See generally William V. Dorsaneo, III, Evolving Standards of Evidentiary Review: Revising the
Scope of Review, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 225, 233–36 (2005) (discussing the effect of City of Keller on “the
scope of legal sufficiency review for civil cases”); David E. Keltner et al., No Evidence Review: The Scope
and Standard of Legal Sufficiency Review After City of Keller, in STATE BAR OF TEX., 22ND ANNUAL
ADVANCED CIVIL APPELLATE PRACTICE COURSE, ch. 16, at 10–12 (2008) (discussing whether “City
of Keller’s reasonable juror standard departs from traditional legal sufficiency standards, and allows the
[Texas] Supreme Court (and other appellate courts) to supplant their own decision for that of the jury
in a legal sufficiency review”).
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facts, consistent with the supreme court’s opinion. Instead, the court could
simply review the evidence in issue, and if five members of the court agree,
it may conclude that no reasonable and fair-minded juror could reach a
certain verdict and render judgment accordingly.
b.

Applications of City of Keller

Despite more than ten years of case law to help assess City of Keller’s effect,
the results remain developing and inconclusive, particularly with respect to
the effect of the “final” test of whether a reasonable juror could make the
challenged finding. The supreme court has upheld jury verdicts, but it has
also shown no reluctance in reversing them even where there were sharp
differences of opinion in the court of appeals and in the supreme court itself.
We will examine a few of these cases.
In a 5–4 decision in Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co.,253 the supreme
court reversed a jury’s verdict and rendered judgment for The Coca-Cola
Company (Coke) in an anti-trust case.254 Specifically, plaintiff soft drink
bottlers sued Coke and several of its distributors for entering into calendar
marketing agreements (CMAs) with retailers.255 The plaintiffs claimed that
these CMAs unreasonably restrained trade by monopolizing the market in
violation of state antitrust laws.256 “The district court rendered judgment
on the jury’s verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding damages incurred
throughout the region and permanently enjoining [Coke], in specified
counties in . . . four states, [based on] certain conduct that it determined to
be anticompetitive.”257 The court of appeals found “sufficient evidence for
the jury to find monopolization” based on testimony presented at trial.258
With respect to liability issues, the court of appeals rejected Coke’s argument
that there was no evidence showing a foreclosure of competition in any
relevant market. Liability, the court of appeals reasoned, could be based on
evidence that enforcement of several CMA provisions could be read to
“restrict trade and impact competition[.]”259 The court of appeals stated,
“Although any one of the factors set out [in the case] might be insufficient
253. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006).
254. Id. at 675.
255. Id. at 675–76.
256. Id. at 678.
257. Id. at 674.
258. See id.at 679 (detailing the testimony upon which the court of appeals based its finding).
259. Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 111 S.W.3d 287, 304 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2003), rev’d, 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006).
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to allow the jury to conclude Coke had acted to restrain trade, due to the
numerous factors presented in evidence, it is not appropriate to take this
determination out of the hands of the jury.”260 The supreme court reversed
the court of appeals, with the majority holding that there was no evidence
that Coke’s practices restrained trade.261
Justice Brister dissented, joined by Chief Justice Jefferson, and
Justices O’Neill and Medina. Justice Brister opined that, in holding there
was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that Coke harmed
competition, the majority had drawn an inference contrary to the finding
that the jury was entitled to draw.262 He stated that “several of Coke’s
activities in the Ark-La-Tex market were so anticompetitive that federal
courts would not require such proof, and we should not either.”263
Justice Brister asserted, “There is a line between competing and bullying,
and the jury found that Coke crossed it. As evidence in the record would
allow reasonable jurors to reach that conclusion, I would not render
judgment to the contrary . . . .”264
In an amicus brief submitted to the supreme court on motion for
rehearing, a group of seven prominent Texas law professors urged the court
“to consider seriously the impact that allowing its decision to stand will have
in the future with respect to how courts, litigants, and the public in general
regard the legitimacy of jury verdicts rendered in this state.”265 The
professors argued:
Our central concern, stated plainly and emphatically, is that it is troubling
to see the Court reject a verdict in which the jury found it to be (at least) more
260. Id. at 305.
261. Harmar, 218 S.W.3d at 689–91.
262. See id. at 699–700 (Brister, J., dissenting, joined by Jefferson, C.J., & O’Neill & Medina, JJ.)
(noting the court cannot ignore what a jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence supporting a
verdict under a per-se or rule-of-reason analysis).
263. Id. at 699.
264. Id. at 693. Notably, Justice Brister’s dissenting opinion did not cite the court’s opinion in
City of Keller, which he authored. Id. at 693–706.
265. Brief for Texas Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 5, Coca-Cola
Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2006) (No. 03-0737). In addition, commentators
outside of Texas noticed Harmar’s anti-jury effect. See Andrew Cohen, Texas Supreme Court to Juries: Get
Bent, THE WASH. POST (May 8, 2007, 8:44 AM), http://blog.washingtonpost.com/benchconference/
2007/05/three_degrees_of_ separation_an.html (opining “anti-jury rulings” from the supreme court
in Texas are becoming more common, especially as compared to other states that typically give much
more respect to jury verdicts); see also Lonny S. Hoffman, Harmar and the Ever-Expanding Scope of Legal
Sufficiency Review, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 611, 612 (2008) (arguing Harmar is an “unwelcome attack on the
finality of jury verdicts”).
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likely than not that Petitioners had violated the antitrust laws when the Court
does not declare the evidence on which this verdict was based to be legally
inadmissible. In the absence of a more searching inquiry, the majority’s
opinion seems merely to have substituted its judgment for that of the jury.266

They further contended that the judgment against the bottling companies
was concerning for two reasons: “(i) the standard for review for legal
sufficiency has traditionally been—appropriately so—far more respectful of
the jury’s verdict than is the majority’s opinion; and (ii) even on the
majority’s reading of the factual evidence adduced, it appears that a
reasonable jury could have” found for the bottling companies.267 The amici
further stated, “We believe the majority’s decision in this case portends
troubling consequences in terms of the legitimacy of verdicts rendered by
juries in this state.”268 Following the Harmar decision, one article noted
that the opinion, while not rendering the City of Keller decision incorrect,
demonstrated that the standards articulated in City of Keller “carry the
potential for abuse.”269
Yet in Tanner v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,270 the supreme court
reinstated a judgment on a jury’s verdict after the trial court had granted
JNOV.271 The case involved “[a] high-speed police chase resulting in a
traffic accident [that] sparked a personal-injury lawsuit against the fleeing
driver by the family injured in the crash.”272 In dispute was whether the
driver’s attempts to elude police forfeited coverage under an intentionalinjury exclusion in his automobile liability insurance policy.273 The court
held “that the insurer did not establish as a matter of law that its insured
intentionally caused the family’s injuries[,]” and therefore reversed the
district court’s JNOV and “render[ed] judgment on the jury’s verdict in
favor of the injured family.”274

266. Brief for Texas Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 1, Harmar,
218 S.W.3d 671 (No. 03-0737).
267. Id. at 10.
268. Id. at 11.
269. Phillips & Newton, supra note 128, at 6.
270. Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828 (Tex. 2009).
271. Id. at 829; cf. Jackson v. Axelrad, 221 S.W.3d 650, 652–53 (Tex. 2007) (upholding jury
verdict in favor of defense).
272. Tanner, 289 S.W.3d at 829.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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Justice Brister dissented, challenging the majority’s conclusion that a
reasonable juror could not find that the driver’s conduct caused intentional
damage to the family.275 Insisting that “[t]here will never be a more extreme
case than this[,]” Justice Brister found it difficult to understand how
reasonable jurors could fail to conclude that the driver could not have
intended the damage to the family resulting from his conduct.276
Accordingly, he rejected the majority’s conclusion that the driver could have
believed the chase would end with the driver “rolling his vehicle” or “hitting
a fixed object,” or with the police “discontinu[ing] the pursuit” rather than
risk him injuring someone.277 Justice Brister suggested that the majority
avoided the policy exclusion by focusing narrowly on what the driver knew
split seconds before the crash, rather than on what the driver might have
known about his conduct during the course of the entire chase.278 As
Justice Brister surmised, a driver “ought to know” that driving a large truck
at high speeds while chased by police would result in harm to others.279 He
also pointed to City of Keller for the principle that “if evidence may be legally
sufficient in one context but insufficient in another, the context cannot be
disregarded even if that means rendering judgment contrary to the jury’s
verdict.”280 Essentially, Tanner demonstrates the importance of the factual
“context” that the court chooses to include in its legal sufficiency review.
The majority and dissent differed, in effect, on how wide the camera lens of
the court should be when reviewing for sufficiency of the evidence.
The supreme court was also divided in Providence Health Center v. Dowell,281
where the court reversed a judgment based on a jury verdict and rendered
judgment based on legally insufficient evidence of proximate causation.282
Plaintiffs alleged an emergency room physician and nurse acted negligently
by releasing Lance, a suicidal twenty-one year old, into the care of his family
275. See id. at 834 (Brister, J., dissenting) (“Anyone who drives a huge 4-ton pickup at 100 miles
an hour through city streets during rush hour ‘ought to know’ that someone is going to get hurt.”).
276. Id. at 834–35.
277. Id. at 834–35.
278. Id. at 835.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 835 n.4 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 812 (Tex. 2005)). In
Autozone, Inc. v. Reyes, 272 S.W.3d 588 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam), the court also addressed the “context”
issue, stating that “[e]ven though the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, it
cannot be considered in isolated bits and pieces divorced from its surroundings; it must be viewed in
its proper context with other evidence.” Id. at 592.
281. Providence Health Ctr. v. Dowell, 262 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2008).
282. Id. at 330.
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because the individual killed himself “thirty-three hours after his
release[.]”283 The majority reasoned, “[T]he evidence is undisputed that if
Lance had stayed with his family as instructed, he would not have hanged
himself when he did. But there is no evidence that” the hospital, physician,
and nurse “caused [his] suicide to occur when it did.”284 The majority
further noted that there was “no evidence that Lance could have been
hospitalized involuntarily, that he would have consented to hospitalization,
that a short-term hospitalization would have made his suicide unlikely, that
he exhibited any unusual conduct following his discharge, or that any of his
family or friends believed further treatment was required[.]”285 Therefore,
the majority concluded that “the defendants’ negligence was too attenuated
from the suicide to have been a substantial factor in bringing it about.”286
But three dissenting justices asserted that the majority “misapplie[d] the
law” and “disregard[ed] relevant evidence[.]”287 In particular, the dissent
objected that the majority required proof that Lance “would have
voluntarily submitted to hospitalization or could have been involuntarily
retained[,]” evidence that (in the opinion of the dissent) would have been
inadmissible as it was speculative.288 The dissent reasoned, “Because Lance
was never properly advised” regarding post-release care, there was no
evidence as to “whether he would have consented to treatment[.]”289
Additionally, the dissent referred to expert testimony indicating that
hospitalization would have lowered the risk of suicide, which constituted
“some evidence” that the healthcare provider’s negligence caused the
suicide.290 Notable in this case are the sharp splits in the court of
appeals291 and in the supreme court; however, the supreme court rendered
judgment despite disagreeing over what evidence was “undisputed.”292
283. Id. at 325.
284. Id. at 330.
285. Id. at 329–30.
286. Id. at 330.
287. Id. at 333 (O’Neill, J., dissenting, joined by Jefferson, C.J., & Medina, J.).
288. Id. at 334.
289. Id. at 335.
290. Id.
291. Compare Providence Health Ctr. v. Dowell, 167 S.W.3d 48, 54 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005)
(determining that “some evidence” was contained in the record proving proximate cause), rev’d,
262 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2008), with id. at 60–61 (Gray, C.J., dissenting) (stating no evidence was present
that defendants were a substantial cause of death), rev’d, 262 S.W.3d 324 (Tex. 2008).
292. Other supreme court decisions have also turned on the characterization of undisputed
evidence. The supreme court’s per curiam decision in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d
754 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam), may have indicated another call to ensure that the lower courts credit
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In Minnesota Life Insurance Co. v. Vasquez,293 the supreme court reversed a
jury’s verdict against an insurance company.294 The issue was whether there
was “any evidence that Minnesota Life knowingly committed an unfair
settlement practice.”295 The court of appeals upheld the jury’s finding that
Minnesota Life failed to pay a “claim after coverage . . . [became] reasonably
clear.”296 In an opinion by Justice Brister, the supreme court held that the
court of appeals considered only the evidence in support of the jury’s
finding.297 In effect, the court of appeals had found some evidence of an
unfair settlement practice in the fact that Minnesota Life failed to pay a claim
for six months after it learned of the cause of death even though it had a
policy of paying within ten days.298 The supreme court, however,
concluded that the court of appeals failed to follow City of Keller’s
requirement that a court review all of the evidence, which the supreme court
found to contain “undisputed” documentary evidence that coverage was not
reasonably clear.299 This case presents an unusually transparent instance of
the differences between two courts attempting to apply the same standard
(City of Keller), but reaching different results.300

undisputed evidence and do not simply look at the evidence in favor of the non-movant on summary
judgment. See id. at 756 (stating the First Court of Appeals “failed to apply the proper standard of
review”). In Goodyear, while off-duty, a Goodyear employee drove a company tire delivery truck to a
store at 3:00 a.m. to buy cigarettes. Id. While en route, the driver fell asleep at the wheel, crossed the
centerline and collided with another vehicle, injuring the driver. Id. The supreme court reversed and
rendered judgment for Goodyear, holding that “[t]he court of appeals erred in considering only the
evidence favorable” to the plaintiff, and “ignoring undisputed evidence in the record” that the driver
was on a “personal errand” at the time of the accident. Id. at 757. In Trammell Crow Central Texas, Ltd.
v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2008), a block of concurring justices found a threat to City of Keller’s
framework in the court of appeals’ refusal to credit undisputed evidence. Id. at 19 (Jefferson, C.J.,
concurring, joined by Hecht, Brister, & Johnson, JJJ.).
293. Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 192 S.W. 3d 774 (Tex. 2006).
294. Id. at 776–77.
295. Id. at 776.
296. Id. at 776–77.
297. Id. at 777.
298. See Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 133 S.W.3d 320, 328–29 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2004) (sustaining the jury’s finding that the insurance company failed to pay the claim after learning
the cause of death), rev’d, 192 S.W.3d 774 (Tex. 2006).
299. Minn. Life, 192 S.W. 3d at 777–78 (holding there was “no evidence that the insurer failed
to pay the claim after coverage had become reasonably clear”).
300. Compare Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 133 S.W.3d 320, 324 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2004) (interpreting City of Keller to mean that the reviewing court should disregard all contrary evidence),
with Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 192 S.W. 3d 774, 777 (Tex. 2006) (asserting City of Keller means
that a reviewing court should look at all of the evidence, including contrary evidence).
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In Jelinek v. Casas,301 the Texas Supreme Court may have inadvertently
suggested that courts consider the “credibility” of testimony when reviewing
for the legal sufficiency of the evidence.302 In this case, decedent Casas, a
cancer patient, was admitted to the hospital for abdominal pain and placed
on antibiotics used for the prevention and treatment of intra-abdominal
infections.303 Two days following her admission, major abdominal surgery
was performed on Casas.304 She continued the antibiotic regimen for an
additional five days, but the hospital mistakenly permitted a four-and-a-half
day lapse of antibiotic treatment.305 The hospital subsequently admitted
that the antibiotic treatment should have been continued; however, the
hospital refused to admit that the lapse in treatment was the cause of
additional abdominal pain to Casas.306 The court noted that Casas’ expert
admitted there was no direct evidence of an anaerobic infection, leaving the
jury to consider the circumstantial evidence of infection, such as fever and
changed heart rate, but also admitted on cross examination that those signs
“were equally consistent with two other infections cultured from Casas’s
incision and blood[.]”307
The Jelinek court held that “when the facts support several possible
conclusions, only some of which establish that the defendant’s negligence
caused the plaintiff’s injury, the expert must explain to the fact finder why
those conclusions are superior based on verifiable medical evidence, not
simply the expert’s opinion.”308 “Because there [was] no direct evidence of
the infection and the circumstantial evidence [was] meager,” the court held
that it “must consider not just favorable but all the circumstantial evidence,
and competing inferences as well.”309 The court wrote that “[c]ourts
should not usurp the jury’s role as fact finder, nor should they question the
jury’s right to believe one witness over another.”310 The court then stated
that “when reviewing a verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, courts need
not—indeed, must not—defer to the jury’s findings when those findings are
301. Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526 (Tex. 2010).
302. Id. at 532–38.
303. Id. at 530.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 532.
307. Id. at 535.
308. Id. at 536 (citing Lenger v. Physician’s Gen. Hosp., Inc., 455 S.W.2d 703, 707 (Tex. 1970);
Hart v. Van Zandt, 399 S.W.2d 791, 792 (Tex. 1965)).
309. Id. at 538 (citing City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 814 (Tex. 2005)).
310. Id.
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not supported by credible evidence.”311 Unless the court intended to depart
from City of Keller’s position that “[j]urors are the sole judges of the credibility
of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony[,]”312 the court
probably used the term “credible” as short-hand for City of Keller’s additional
view that “[t]he jury’s decisions regarding credibility must be
reasonable[,]”313 that is, “creditable.”
Two subsequent cases indicate that the supreme court does not intend to
require reviewing courts to make further inquiries into credibility. In Gunn
v. McCoy314 and Thota v. Young,315 the court reaffirmed that “jurors are the
sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their
testimony.”316 “It is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the
evidence, and when reasonable jurors could resolve conflicting evidence
either way, we presume they did so in accordance with the verdict.”317 Both
cases involved conflicting expert testimony and the court concluded in both
cases that that jury could have reasonably believed one expert over the
other.318 As a result, the legal sufficiency challenge failed.319 Assuming
that the experts are both “creditable,” meaning their opinion testimony is
competent and thus admissible, it is left to the jury to determine which
expert is more “credible.”
311. Id. (emphasis added).
312. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819 (citing Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d
757, 761 (Tex. 2003); Jaffe Aircraft Corp. v. Carr, 867 S.W.2d 27, 28 (Tex. 1993); McGalliard v.
Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986); Edrington v. Kiger, 4 Tex. 89, 93 (1849)).
313. Id at 820 (quoting Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 599 (Tex. 2002)); see id.
at 813–14 (“In claims or defenses supported only by meager circumstantial evidence, the evidence does
not rise above a scintilla (and thus is legally insufficient) if jurors would have to guess whether a vital
fact exists. ‘When the circumstances are equally consistent with either of two facts, neither fact may
be inferred.’” (footnote omitted) (first citing Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgeway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 601 (Tex.
2004); Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724, 729 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Hammerly Oaks, Inc.,
v. Edwards, 958 S.W.2d 387, 392 (Tex. 1997); W. Tel. Corp. of Tex. v. McCann, 99 S.W.2d 895, 900
(Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1937); Calvert, supra note 141, at 365; then citing Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v.
Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 1984); and then quoting Tubelite, a Div. of Indal, Inc. v. Risica
& Sons, Inc., 819 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Tex. 1991))); Lozano v. Lozano, 52 S.W.3d 141, 148 (Tex. 2001)
(per curiam) (“The equal inference rule provides that a jury may not reasonably infer an ultimate fact
from meager circumstantial evidence ‘which could give rise to any number of inferences, none more
probable than another.’” (quoting Hammerly Oaks, 958 S.W.2d at 392)).
314. Gunn v. McCoy, 554 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2018).
315. Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d 678 (Tex. 2012).
316. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 665 (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819); Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 695
(quoting City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819).
317. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 665 (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 820).
318. Id.; Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 695–96.
319. Gunn, 554 S.W.3d at 665–66; Thota, 366 S.W.3d at 695–96.
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The court’s recent decision in Alamo Heights Independent School District v.
Clark320 provides an interesting analysis of contextual evidence and its
effect on the inferences that a reasonable juror can draw. In Clark, the court
reviewed the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting Clark’s claim that
she was sexually harassed by another female teacher at the school.321 While
the majority and the dissent recited the same standard of review and
identified the same acts allegedly giving rise to the harassment claim, their
respective analyses demonstrate an apparent lack of consensus as to how
the contextual evidence should be employed in conducting the review.322
The majority criticizes the dissent for failing to consider the entire context
of the alleged harasser’s acts in determining whether the alleged harasser’s
admittedly vulgar conduct was sexually motivated.323 While acknowledging
that legal sufficiency reviews require the court to “view the evidence and its
inferences in the light most favorable to Clark,” the majority further notes
“we cannot disregard unfavorable evidence and inferences that reasonable
jurors could not[,]” which “includes evidence showing the context in which
events occurred, regardless of whether it is favorable to Clark.”324 The
majority accuses the dissent of failing “to credit evidence a reasonable juror
could not disregard and by ignoring City of Keller’s admonitions regarding
contextual evidence” because such evidence “winnows the inferences a
reasonable juror could credit[.]”325 “Ignoring context is impermissible
because it perverts the legal inquiry, much the same way isolating words and
phrases from context contorts the meaning and intent of a statute.”326
Referencing its prior review of mental anguish claims, the majority explains,
“[I]n our no-evidence reviews of successful claims, we have invariably
reviewed not just evidence showing the conduct was outrageous, but also
evidence showing that, in context, it was not.”327 The majority criticizes
the dissent’s evaluation of the contextual evidence, explaining “[t]hough
purporting to analyze context, the dissent actually distorts it” and that its
“focus on raunchy details rather than the full context of Clark’s allegations
320. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018).
321. Id. at 763–69.
322. See id. at 793 (“Though citing the legal-sufficiency standard, the dissent contravenes it by
failing to credit evidence a reasonable juror could not disregard and by ignoring City of Keller’s
admonitions regarding contextual evidence.”).
323. Id. at 794–95.
324. Id. at 792–93 (citing City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 807, 811–12, 822).
325. Id. at 793.
326. Id.
327. Id. (quoting City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 812).
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distorts the legal-sufficiency analysis.”328 “Myopic focus on select details
of offending behavior ignores the reason for it, and the reason is what
Ultimately, while the majority
matters under the TCHRA.”329
acknowledges that “[t]he dissent is at least making a limited effort to
consider context, but it still fails to consider all the context, and the
inferences it attempts to draw from incomplete context are illogical.”330
In its evaluation of the contextual evidence, the majority appears to place
particular emphasis on the evidence that “Monterrubio enjoyed being crass
and profane and telling dirty jokes and stories to all the coaches, male and
female, not just Clark[,]” as “[t]his treatment of co-workers of both genders
provides crucial context that Monterrubio’s motives were based on factors
other than gender.”331 Given the context, the majority concludes that no
reasonable juror could infer, and thus the evidence is legally insufficient to
establish, that Monterrubio’s actions were sexually motivated.332
The dissent, for its part, accuses the majority of failing to follow the
controlling standard of review, explaining:
To determine whether the record contains some evidence to support the
plaintiff’s claims, we must consider the record “in the light most favorable”
to the plaintiff, “indulging every reasonable inference” in her favor, and
“resolving any doubts against” the defendant. . . . And although a jury can
reject her effort to portray true facts in a light that favors her, we must review
the record exactly in that light. In short, we must accept these facts as the
facts of this case.333

After listing the multitude of incidents brought forth by the plaintiff to
support her claim, the dissent finds that “the evidence would permit a
reasonable juror to find that Monterrubio harassed Clark ‘because of’ her
328. Id. at 793–94.
329. Id. at 775.
330. Id. at 798.
331. Id. at 775–76 (emphasis omitted) (citing Smith v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 622 F.3d 904, 908 (8th Cir.
2010) (per curiam); Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 261 (4th Cir. 2001); Collins v. TRL,
Inc., 263 F.Supp.2d 913, 920 (M.D. Pa. 2003)); see id. at 798 (“Monterrubio was rude, crass, and hostile
towards seemingly everyone at work, male or female. The dissent misanalyzes the significance of this
evidence. How she treats not just Clark but everyone else at work provides important context regarding
Monterrubio’s motives.”).
332. Id. at 778.
333. Id. at 803 n.1 (Boyd, J., dissenting, joined by Lehrmann, J.) (internal citation omitted) (citing
City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005)); see id. at 811 (“[T]he [majority] Court
distorts the applicable standard of review.”).
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gender because (1) Monterrubio was ‘motivated by sexual desire’ for Clark,
or (2) Monterrubio’s harassment of Clark focused on Clark’s gender-specific
anatomy and characteristics.”334 The dissent further notes “[a]lthough the
evidence certainly would not require a juror to reach that finding, it is at least
sufficient to permit a reasonable juror to reach it[.]”335
The court’s apparent divergent views regarding the role of contextual
evidence in legal sufficiency analysis is readily apparent in the discussion
regarding one particular incident. During a meeting between Clark and her
supervisor, Monterrubio continually entered the office, including one
interruption in which she “us[ed] her tongue to lick seductively the cupcake
icing off of a cupcake.”336 The dissent identified the incident as capable of
being inferred by a reasonable juror as sexually motivated.337 In contrast,
the majority interpreted the incident as incapable of being reasonably
inferred as sexual. “[N]otwithstanding Clark’s subjective view of its
‘seductive[ness],’ Monterrubio’s licking a cupcake cannot reasonably be
equated with a genuine sexual proposition.”338 “Considered in isolation or
in the context of Clark’s other complaints, these comments do not indicate
sexual attraction to Clark but, consistent with her other behavior, a desire
to tease Clark and make her feel uncomfortable.”339 Whereas the majority
holds that the conduct is incapable of being reasonably interpreted as sexual
due to other possible explanations, the dissent argues “‘it is the province of
the jury to draw from it whatever inferences they wish, so long as more than
one is possible and the jury must not simply guess.’”340 Thus, the majority
cites to the context evidence to find alternative motivations for
Monterrubio’s behavior and holds that the possible alternative explanations
preclude the jury from inferring that she was motivated by sexual desire,
whereas the dissent holds that it is the jury’s prerogative to judge the
possible explanations and to choose from any explanation it finds credible.
The two opinions present an interesting demonstration of the respective
justices’ views of the effect of evidentiary doctrines on a legal sufficiency
review. The majority appears to elevate contextual evidence above the
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
2016)).
340.

Id. at 807.
Id.
Id. at 777.
Id. at 808–09.
Id. at 777 (second alteration in original).
Id. at 777–78 (citing Lord v. High Voltage Software, Inc., 839 F.3d 556, 560, 562 (7th Cir.
Id. at 812 (quoting City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 821 (Tex. 2005)).
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requirement that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the factfinder’s decision, insisting that all contextual evidence must be
considered and applying that evidence to limit the range of inferences that
the factfinder can reasonably derive. The dissent, in contrast, appears to
favor considering the entire record of contextual evidence but interpreting
it, like other evidence, in the light most favorable to the factfinder. The
extent to which the majority’s approach becomes a mechanism for
removing certain decisions from the factfinder remains to be seen.
The 2006 edition of this Article traced the “[o]rigins of the ‘[r]easonable
and [f]air-[m]inded [j]uror [s]tandard” embraced by City of Keller,341 and
raised the question of whether City of Keller’s articulation of that standard
might exacerbate the longstanding conflict in Texas law between the right
to trial by jury and the power of the courts of appeals and the supreme court
to review for the sufficiency of the evidence.342 That version noted that,
even though only the courts of appeals have jurisdiction over factual
disputes and the power to review for factual sufficiency, the supreme court
had arguably blurred the lines between legal and factual sufficiency in
reversing and rendering judgments for “no evidence” where there may have
been legally sufficient evidence but the supreme court sought a different
result.343 It was suggested that City of Keller’s “final test” for legal
sufficiency—“whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and
fair-minded people to reach the verdict under review”344—might further
such blurring of the lines by encouraging the courts to simply review a
verdict’s reasonableness, rather than employing clear and consistent rules to
determine legal and factual sufficiency.345
On this point, the verdict is still out. Generally, it can be said that City of
Keller has not unleashed a firestorm of reversals of jury verdicts. But neither
has doubt been dispelled about whether the reasonable and fair-minded
person standard has developed into a predictable and stable standard in
Texas law.346 The supreme court’s decisions in Harmar, Tanner, Dowell,
Minnesota Life, Clark, and others have turned on such factors as whether
341. W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 255–60 (2006).
342. See id. at 266–78 (showing various supreme court opinions that feature strong dissents that
question the majority’s scope of review).
343. Id. at 274–76.
344. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827.
345. W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 38 ST. MARY’S L.J. 47, 274–76 (2006).
346. See id. at 276–78 (warning practitioners should be wary of the finality of the City of Keller
standard).
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particular evidence is disputed, what evidence is “relevant,” or what
evidentiary “context” was appropriate.347 City of Keller does not appear to
have sufficiently resolved such underlying questions. For example, City of
Keller stated that it was not possible “to define precisely when undisputed
evidence becomes conclusive.”348 And “[e]vidence is conclusive only if
reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions,” a determination
that will depend upon “the facts of each case.”349 Thus, the verdict
reasonable and fair-minded people could reach involves, like Chinese
boxes,350 additional reasonableness determinations about specific pieces of
evidence. At what point do disagreements between members of the court
over the disputed nature, the proper context, or relevancy of particular facts
overtake the jury’s task of reweighing the evidence?
One question notably left open by City of Keller, and not recently addressed
by the supreme court, is the status of factual sufficiency review in civil cases.
While the courts of appeals continue on occasion to reverse for factual
sufficiency,351 the supreme court has not decided a major case that
347. See Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 793 (Tex. 2018) (“[C]ontext
is critical in a legal-sufficiency review . . . .”); Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828,
831 (Tex. 2009) (holding the context of the evidence—an insurance contract—allowed for a reasonable
jury to find for the petitioner); Providence Health Ctr. v. Dowell, 262 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex. 2008)
(explaining the majority and dissenting opinions turn on undisputed evidence); Coca-Cola Co. v.
Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 689–91 (Tex. 2006) (dismissing the claim based on no evidence
of harm in any relevant market); Minn. Life Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 192 S.W.3d 774, 777 (Tex. 2006)
(finding the court of appeals reviewed the evidence in the incorrect context by only looking at the
favorable evidence).
348. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 815.
349. Id. at 816 (citing Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 340 (Tex. 1998);
Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v. Marine Contractors & Supply, Inc., 644 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex. 1982)).
350. A “Chinese box” refers to “a set of boxes graduated in size so that each fits into the next
larger one[.]” Chinese Boxes, MERRIAM WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
Chinese%20boxes [https://perma.cc/VAU4-4LUV].
351. See Elijah Ragira/VIP Lodging Grp., Inc. v. VIP Lodging Grp., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 747, 759
(Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (finding jury’s determination of no slander of title against the
great weight of the evidence); Fluor Enters., Inc. v. Conex Int’l Corp., 273 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. denied) (determining the evidence was factually insufficient to establish
that criticisms of contractor’s welds by consultant’s engineer were made maliciously or fraudulently, as
required for contractor to prevail on business disparagement claim against consultant); Ayala v.
Valderas, No. 02-07-134-CV, 2008 WL 4661846, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct. 23, 2008, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (holding evidence in a conversion case was factually insufficient where jury award reflected
replacement value of property, but legal standard in such cases was fair market value); RePipe, Inc. v.
Turpin, 275 S.W.3d 39, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (finding some evidence of
damage rendered evidence legally sufficient, but where evidence clearly showed damages were
$49,360.86 less than the jury’s award, evidence was factually insufficient); Hawkins v. Walker,
238 S.W.3d 517, 525–27 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007, no pet.) (concluding the evidence was factually
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addressed the line between legal and factual sufficiency standards since
2006, and then only in the specialized context of punitive damage
awards.352 On the other hand, over the past decade, the Court of Criminal
Appeals has engaged in a series of reversals and adjustments of its factual
sufficiency standard, and in Brooks v. State353 eliminated that standard
altogether in favor of relying solely on the Federal Constitution’s minimum
for legal sufficiency.354 It remains to be seen whether the Texas Supreme
Court will revitalize factual sufficiency review in the civil context as a way
to restore the power of juries and to discipline the use of the powerful legal

insufficient to support either the jury’s award of $1 million in damages to the mother for past and
future loss of society and companionship or the jury’s award of $700,000 in damages to the mother for
past and future mental anguish damages); Bay, Inc. v. Ramos, 139 S.W.3d 322, 330–31 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) (holding evidence was factually insufficient to support jury’s finding
that the mother bore zero responsibility for an eighteen-month-old child’s injuries caused by
deployment of an air bag where the mother, despite her knowledge that the backseat was the safest
place for a young child, placed the child in the front passenger seat).
352. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tex. 2006); id. at 319 (O’Neill,
J., dissenting) (“Our courts of appeals in Texas have long been empowered to suggest a remittitur of
excessive awards when the evidence is factually insufficient to support them. The court of appeals
assiduously exercised that power in this case. It is, of course, appropriate for this Court to intervene
if the appeals court allows a constitutionally offensive award to stand. But when the Court chooses a
marginal case like this in which to intervene, it risks intruding upon an area that has traditionally been
the well-patrolled province of our courts of appeals.” (internal citations omitted) (citing Transp. Ins.
Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994), superceded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012); TEX. R. APP.
P. 46.3)); see Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 624 (Tex. 2002) (Baker, J., dissenting)
(indicating that the court oversteps its boundaries when conducting a factual sufficiency review on
mental anguish).
353. Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
354. See id. at 894 (stating there was “no meaningful distinction” between Texas’s criminal
factual sufficiency standard and the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), legal sufficiency standard);
cf. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 421 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (Cochran, J., dissenting, joined by
Keller, P.J., & Keasler & Hervey, JJ.) (suggesting a “return to the single standard of review for
sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case as set out by the United States Supreme Court”), overruled
in part on other grounds by Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 911–12; Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 132 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1996) (recognizing the Supreme Court sets a minimum standard of review for criminal
convictions and that states are free to heighten this standard), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks,
323 S.W.3d at 904, 911–12. See generally Jackson, 443 U.S. at 316–20 (1979) (“[T]he relevant question is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Once a
defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence
is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in
the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon ‘jury’ discretion only to
the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.” (footnote
omitted) (internal citation omitted) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 362 (1972))).
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sufficiency standard by concluding that certain legal sufficiency challenges
should be properly brought as factual sufficiency challenges.355 But doing
so would involve curtailing the court’s own jurisdiction to hear such cases.
The differences in potential appellate relief are considerable: when deciding
a case under the legal sufficiency challenge, a court may reverse and render
judgment, effectively negating a jury’s verdict, whereas a reversal for factual
sufficiency keeps the issue in the jury’s hands for a new trial.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence in Nonjury Trials
In any case or issue tried without a jury, a “party may request [that] the
court” prepare “findings of fact and conclusions of law.”356 The trial
court’s findings of fact “shall not be recited in a judgment[,]”357 and oral
comments from the bench will not constitute findings of fact and
conclusions of law.358 It is, however, permissible for a trial court to list its
findings in a letter to the respective attorneys, as long as the letter is filed of
record.359 “The filing of a request for findings of fact, in most
circumstances, extends the appellate timetable.”360 “The time frame for
filing the findings envisions that a party will receive the findings before the
deadline for perfecting appeal[,]” allowing “a potential appellant the
opportunity to review the findings so as to make an intelligent decision as
to the likelihood of success on appeal prior to investing in an expensive
reporter’s record.”361
Although the rules do not require, or even authorize, a party to request
findings of facts and conclusions of law in connection with other trial court
rulings, the careful practitioner will ask the trial court to prepare findings
355. See Hall & Emery, supra note 128, at 597–610 (advocating for a return to factual sufficiency
review in certain situations).
356. TEX. R. CIV. P. 296.
357. TEX. R. CIV. P. 299a.
358. In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d 716, 716 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam); G.T. Mgmt., Inc. v. Gonzalez,
106 S.W.3d 880, 883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.); Tate v. Tate, 55 S.W.3d 1, 7 n.4 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2000, no pet.); Sharp v. Hobart Corp., 957 S.W.2d 650, 652 n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no
pet.). Also, a court’s oral statements may not be prepared as a reporter’s record and filed as findings
of fact and conclusions of law. Nagy v. First Nat’l Gun Banque Corp., 684 S.W.2d 114, 115–16 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
359. See Villa Nova Resort, Inc. v. State, 711 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1986,
no writ) (affirming the ability of judges to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in a letter
filed with the clerk as part of the record).
360. Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 437 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.) (citing TEX.
R. APP. P. 26.1(a)(4)).
361. Id. at 437–38.
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and conclusions whenever the trial court acts as a fact finder.362 “When no
findings of fact or conclusions of law are filed, the trial court judgment [will]
be upheld on any legal theory supported by the record.”363 “When the trial
court acts” as a fact finder, its findings are reviewed under the same legal
and factual sufficiency standards as those in a jury trial.364
1.

Findings of Fact Filed
a.

With Reporter’s Record

“Findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and
dignity as a jury’s verdict upon [jury] questions”;365 however, they are not
conclusive when a complete reporter’s record appears in the appellate
record.366 The trial court’s fact findings are reviewed for legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence,367 which is the same standard applied when
reviewing evidence supporting jury findings.368 “When the appellate record
362. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 33 (Tex. 1994) (emphasizing findings would
be helpful with respect to a trial court’s review of punitive damages awards), superceded by statute, TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d
118, 140 (Tex. 2012); TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 919 n.9 (Tex. 1991)
(orig. proceeding) (noting findings would be helpful with respect to sanction orders); Fish v. Tandy
Corp., 948 S.W.2d 886, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied) (concluding upon denial
of special appearance, defendant should request findings of fact pursuant to Rule 296).
363. In re Pirelli Tire, L.L.C., 247 S.W.3d 670, 686 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (citing Davis
v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978); Seaman v. Seaman, 425 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1968)).
364. In re Doe, 19 S.W.3d 249, 253 (Tex. 2000).
365. Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991) (citing L.R. French v.
Diamond Hill-Jarvis Civic League, 724 S.W.2d 921, 922 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ ref’d
n.r.e.); Reyes-Retana v. PTX Food Corp., 709 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1986, writ
ref’d n.r.e.)); see Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex. 1994) (stating findings by a trial court
have the same standards of review as evidence supporting a jury verdict).
366. See Nipp v. Broumley, 285 S.W.3d 552, 555 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) (“[F]indings
[of fact] are not conclusive on the appellate court if there is a complete reporter’s record . . . .”);
Stephenson v. Perlitz, 537 S.W.2d 287, 289 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“Findings
of fact are not conclusive on appeal when . . . a statement of facts appears in the record.” (citing
Swanson v. Swanson, 228 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex. 1950); Rosetta v. Rosetta, 525 S.W.2d 255, 260 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 1975, no writ))). When a trial court is late in filing its findings of fact, the error is
considered “harmless absent some showing that the late filing injured” the complaining party. Ford v.
Darwin, 767 S.W.2d 851, 856 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied).
367. Catalina, 881 S.W.2d at 297.
368. See Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (clarifying the same legal
standards are used to review for factual sufficiency whether it is a trial court’s finding or a jury’s verdict
at issue); id. (recognizing the same standard is used whether reviewing jury verdicts or trial court
findings); Nelkin v. Panzer, 833 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ dism’d
w.o.j.) (“Findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and dignity as a jury’s verdict
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contains a reporter’s record[,] . . . findings of fact are not conclusive on
appeal if the contrary is established as a matter of law or if there is no
evidence to support the findings.”369 Although a trial court’s conclusions
of law may not be challenged for factual insufficiency, the appellate court
may review the conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their
correctness.370
b.

Without Reporter’s Record

If no reporter’s record is made part of the record on appeal, the reviewing
court presumes that sufficient evidence was introduced to support the trial
court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the judgment was based
upon those findings and conclusions.371
2.

Findings of Fact Not Requested and Not Filed
a.

With Reporter’s Record

“If findings of fact [or] conclusions of law are neither filed nor requested,
the judgment of the trial court implies all necessary finding[s] of fact to
support it[,]”372 “provided: (1) the proposition is one raised by the pleadings
and supported by the evidence; and (2) the trial judge’s decision can be
sustained on any reasonable theory that is consistent with the evidence and
upon special issues.” (citing City of Clute v. City of Lake Jackson, 559 S.W.2d 391, 395 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.))).
369. Ramsey v. Davis, 261 S.W.3d 811, 815 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (citing
Material P’ships, Inc. v. Ventura, 102 S.W.3d 252, 257 (Tex. App—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet.
denied)).
370. Ashcraft v. Lookadoo, 952 S.W.2d 907, 910 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, writ denied) (en
banc); see Tigner v. City of Angleton, 949 S.W.2d 887, 889 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no
writ) (“[C]onclusions of law are reviewable when attacked as a matter of law, but not on grounds of
factual sufficiency.” (citing Buzbee v. Castlewood Civic Club, 737 S.W.2d 366, 368 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ); Mercer v. Bludworth, 715 S.W.2d 693, 697 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.), abrogated in part by Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890,
894 (Tex. 1991))).
371. Nelkin, 833 S.W.2d at 268 (stressing “[i]f no statement of facts [or reporter’s record] is
made a part of the record on appeal” then the court will assume the evidence was sufficient to sustain
the trial court’s judgment).
372. Schoeffler v. Denton, 813 S.W.2d 742, 745 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no
writ) (citing Lemons v. EMW Mfg. Co., 747 S.W.2d 372, 373 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); In re W.E.R.,
669 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. 1984) (per curiam)); accord BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand,
83 S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. 2002) (“When a trial court does not issue findings of fact and conclusions of
law . . . all facts necessary to support the judgment and supported by the evidence are implied.” (citing
Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Zac Smith & Co. v. Otis Elevator
Co., 734 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Tex. 1987); In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717)).
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the applicable law, considering only the evidence favorable to the
decision.”373 To prevail, “‘the appellant may show that the undisputed
evidence’” negates at least one of the essential elements of the decision, or
the appellant “‘may show that the appellee’s pleadings omit one or more of
the essential elements . . . [to the decision] and that the trial was confined to
the pleadings.’”374
However, when a reporter’s record is included as part of the record, the
legal and factual sufficiency of the implied findings may be challenged on
appeal.375 The applicable “standard of review is the same as that applied”
in the review of jury findings or “a trial court’s findings of fact.”376
Therefore, when the implied findings of fact are supported by the evidence,
“the appellate court must uphold the judgment on any theory of law
applicable to the case.”377 To determine whether the evidence supports the
implied factual findings, the appellate court will “‘consider only that
evidence most favorable to’” the implied factual findings and will disregard
all opposing or contradictory evidence.378
b.

Without Reporter’s Record

When there are “no findings of fact or conclusions of law” and no
reporter’s record included in the record on appeal, the reviewing court
presumes “that all facts necessary to support the judgment have been
373. Franklin v. Donoho, 774 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, no writ), overruled on
other grounds by Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000); see Austin Area Teachers Fed.
Credit Union v. First City Bank-Nw. Hills, N.A., 825 S.W.2d 795, 801 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, writ
denied) (applying the two-part test from Franklin).
374. Brodhead v. Dodgin, 824 S.W.2d 616, 620 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied) (quoting
Franklin, 774 S.W.2d at 311).
375. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex. 1992); Roberson v. Robinson,
768 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam); see Las Vegas Pecan & Cattle Co. v. Zavala County,
682 S.W.2d 254, 256 (Tex. 1984) (stating reviewing courts may imply factual findings, which would
sustain the judgment when “the judgment is supported by evidence in the record”).
376. Wade v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 961 S.W.2d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1997, no writ) (per curiam) (citing Celanese Chem. Co. v. Burleson, 821 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ)).
377. Giangrosso v. Crosley, 840 S.W.2d 765, 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no
writ) (citing In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717; M.R.S. Datascope Inc. v. Exchange Data Corp., Inc.,
745 S.W.2d 542, 544 260 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ), abrogated on other grounds by
B.J. Software Sys., Inc. v. Osina, 827 S.W.2d 543, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ));
Point Lookout W., Inc. v. Whorton, 742 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam); Allen v. Allen,
717 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. 1986); In re W.E.R., 669 S.W.2d at 717.
378. Renfro Drug Co. v. Lewis, 235 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Tex. 1950) (quoting Austin v. Cochran,
2 S.W.2d 831, 832 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1928)).
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found.”379 “Only in an exceptional case, i.e. where fundamental error is
presented, is an appellant entitled to a reversal of the trial court’s
judgment.”380
3.

Findings of Fact Properly Requested but Not Filed
a.

With Reporter’s Record

When properly requested, the trial court has a mandatory duty to file
findings of fact.381 If the trial court fails to do so, harmful error is
presumed.382 However, this presumption is rebutted “if the record before
the appellate court affirmatively shows that the complaining party suffered
no injury[.]”383 The test of whether harm exists “depends on whether the
circumstances of the particular case would require an appellant to” speculate
as to why the trial judge ruled against the appellant or whether those reasons
are obvious.384 “‘In factually complicated situations in which there are two
or more possible grounds for recovery or defense, an undue burden . . . [is]
379. Trevino & Gonzalez Co. v. R.F. Muller Co., 949 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1997, no writ) (citing Roberson, 768 S.W.2d at 281; Guthrie v. Nat’l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495
(Tex. 1965); Bard v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 767 S.W.2d 839, 845 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ
denied)); Guthrie, 394 S.W.2d at 495; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Smith, 187 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex.
1945).
380. Ette v. Arlington Bank of Commerce, 764 S.W.2d 594, 595 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989,
no writ) (citing Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 260 S.W.2d 600, 603–04 (Tex. 1953); White v.
Corpus Christi Little Misses Kickball Ass’n, 525 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1975,
no writ)); Trevino, 949 S.W.2d at 41; Carns v. Carns, 776 S.W.2d 603, 604 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1989, no
writ) (per curiam). See infra Part VIII(H)(4) for a discussion of fundamental error.
381. Nev. Gold & Silver, Inc. v. Andrews Indep. Sch. Dist., 225 S.W.3d 68, 77 (Tex. App.—El
Paso 2005, no pet.); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 296 (providing the procedure for a proper request of the trial
court to file findings of fact); TEX. R. CIV. P. 297 (providing the court shall file findings of fact within
twenty days of a proper request).
382. See Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Magallanes, 763 S.W.2d 768, 772 (Tex. 1989) (noting harmful
error is presumed when the complaining party made the proper requests); Wagner v. Riske, 178 S.W.2d
117, 119–20 (Tex. 1944) (interpreting Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 296 to mean that a court’s failure
to comply constitutes reversible error “where the party complaining complied with statutory
requirements” unless “the record before the appellate court affirmatively shows that the complaining
party has suffered no injury” (citing San Antonio Water Works Co v. Maury, 12 S.W.166, 166–67 (Tex.
1888) (per curiam))).
383. Wagner, 178 S.W.2d at 120 (citing San Antonio Water Works Co v. Maury, 12 S.W.166,
166–67 (Tex. 1888) (per curiam)); Sheldon Pollack Corp. v. Pioneer Concrete of Tex., Inc., 765 S.W.2d
843, 845 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied).
384. Sheldon Pollack, 765 S.W.2d at 845; see Elizondo v. Gomez, 957 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (restating the test for harm set forth in Fraser v. Goldberg,
552 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.), and noting that no harm exists
where the trial court makes a statement that gives the appellant notice of why he was ruled against).
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placed upon an appellant.’”385 This burden prevents the appellant from
making a proper presentation of the case to the appellate court.386
If an appellant is harmed by the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact,
the appellate court should not reverse the case if the trial court can correct
the failure to act.387 If the trial court can correct its failure to act, the
appellate court should abate the appeal, order the trial court to make the
appropriate findings and certify those findings to the appellate court, and
“then proceed as if the . . . failure to act had not occurred.”388 If the
original judge is no longer available to prepare findings and conclusions, a
successor judge may prepare them.389
b.

Without Reporter’s Record

When a party fails to properly request the trial court to file findings of
fact and conclusions of law, or call the court’s attention to the omission after

385. Humphrey v. Camelot Ret. Cmty., 893 S.W.2d 55, 61 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994,
no writ) (quoting Fraser, 552 S.W.2d at 594); see Guzman v. Guzman, 827 S.W.2d 445, 446–47 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (holding the appellant was not harmed because the trial
court’s failure to file findings of fact did not deprive appellant of “the opportunity to properly present
her case” to the appellate court when only one issue was disputed).
386. See In re O.L., 834 S.W.2d 415, 418–19 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (stating
a question to consider in determining whether harm exists is whether the appellant was prevented from
making a proper presentation of the issues in the case); Anzaldua v. Anzaldua, 742 S.W.2d 782, 784
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied) (holding the trial court’s error was harmful because it
prevented the appellant “from making a proper presentation of the issues in this case on appeal”); see
also Humphrey, 893 S.W.2d at 61 (noting an appellant should not have to guess why the court ruled
against him).
387. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.4(a).
388. Id. 44.4(b); see Roberts v. Roberts, 999 S.W.2d 424, 441–42 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no
pet.) (stating abatement is appropriate where the trial court’s failure to file findings of fact is remedial,
but reversing and remanding the case because the trial judge was unable to make the findings); Los
Fresnos v. Gonzalez, 830 S.W.2d 627, 630 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (abating the
appeal and ordering the trial court to “enter findings of fact and conclusions of law” where the appellate
court was “unable to say whether error was committed and whether appellant has been deprived the
opportunity to effectively assert his case on appeal”); Elec. Power Design, Inc. v. R.A. Hanson Co.,
821 S.W.2d 170, 171–72 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (per curiam) (ordering the
trial court to enter findings of fact “within 30 days of the date of this opinion” where the trial judge
still served on the court), overruled on other grounds by In re Gillespie, 124 S.W.3d 699, 704 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
389. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 30.002(b); Ikard v. Ikard, 819 S.W.2d 644, 651
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, no writ). Contra FDIC v. Morris, 782 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1989, no writ) (holding the remedy of abatement was not available because the original judge was “no
longer on the court”).
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having timely requested them,390 and a reporter’s record is not presented to
the appellate court for review, the appellate court presumes that “the
evidence was sufficient and that every fact necessary to support the findings
and judgment within the scope of the pleadings was prove[n] at trial.”391
4.

Mixed Questions of Law and Fact

When the trial court’s findings involve questions of law and fact, the
appellate court reviews the trial court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion.392 In applying the standard, the reviewing court defers “to the
trial court’s factual determinations” if supported by the evidence and
reviews “its legal determinations de novo.”393 This standard permits the
appellate court to review “de novo that part of the decision involving the
law and its application while recognizing the trial court’s authority to weigh
and interpret the evidence.”394 Accordingly, “the trial court abuses its
discretion [if] it fails to properly apply the law to the undisputed facts, [if] it
acts arbitrarily or unreasonably, or [if] its ruling is based on factual assertions

390. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 297 (“If the court fails to file timely findings of fact and conclusions of
law, the party making the [timely] request shall, within thirty days after filing the original request, file
with the clerk and serve on all other parties . . . a ‘Notice of Past Due Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law . . . .’”).
391. See Saenz v. Saenz, 756 S.W.2d 93, 95 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (citing
Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987); Patrick v. Patrick, 728 S.W.2d
864, 868 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.)) (stating the appellant has the burden of
presenting a sufficient record to the appellate court to determine whether there was an error requiring
reversal). Without a reporter’s record or findings of fact filed, the appellate court will presume that the
evidence at trial was sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment. See id. (holding a trial court’s
judgment will be upheld in the absence of a record). Similarly, if only a partial reporter’s record is
properly before an appellate court, the presumption of sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s
judgment will apply. See Bennett v. Cochran, 96 S.W.3d 227, 229–30 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam) (asserting
although a judgment on the merits is sought, an appellate court will presume the trial court’s findings
were supported by facts if the record is insufficient to establish otherwise).
392. See El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Minco Oil & Gas Co., 964 S.W.2d 54, 60–61 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1997) (applying abuse of discretion standard to a finding of unconscionability), rev’d on other
grounds, 8 S.W.3d 309 (Tex. 1999); Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris, 921 S.W.2d 817, 820 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ) (stating because unconscionability involves both questions of law
and fact, the abuse of discretion standard is the applicable standard of review)); see also Remington
Arms Co. v. Luna, 966 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (applying abuse
of discretion standard to class certification findings).
393. Remington Arms, 966 S.W.2d at 643 (citing Pony Express, 921 S.W.2d at 820); Pony Express,
921 S.W.2d at 820.
394. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 964 S.W.2d at 61 (emphasis omitted) (citing Pony Express, 921 S.W.2d
at 820).
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unsupported by the record.”395
C. Other Evidentiary Standards
1.

Clear and Convincing Evidence

Clear and convincing evidence is “that measure or degree of proof which
will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to
the truth of the allegations sought to be established.”396 The clear and
convincing standard “is an intermediate standard, falling between the
preponderance standard of ordinary civil proceedings and the reasonable
doubt standard of criminal proceedings.”397 The Texas Supreme Court
held in In re J.F.C.:398
In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light
most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact
could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. To
give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a
court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light
most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume
that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable
factfinder could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should
disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or
found to have been incredible. This does not mean that a court must disregard
all evidence that does not support the finding. Disregarding undisputed facts
that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is
clear and convincing evidence.
If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of the record evidence, a
court determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or

395. Remington Arms, 966 S.W.2d at 643 (citing Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602,
607 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1995, writ dism’d), abrogated in part on other grounds by Citizens Ins. Co. of
Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 452 (Tex. 2007)).
396. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 23 (Tex. 2002) (quoting State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570
(Tex. 1979) (per curiam)); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 31 (Tex. 1994), superceded by statute,
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip,
380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.007 (defining “clear and convincing
evidence” as “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm
belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established”).
397. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980).
398. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002).
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conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then that court must
conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.399

The supreme court emphasized that witness credibility issues, which
necessarily “depend on appearance and demeanor[,] cannot be weighed by
the” reviewing court.400 While the court stated that even when witness
“credibility issues are reflected in the” record on appeal, “the appellate court
must defer to the jury’s determinations . . . so long as those determinations are not
themselves unreasonable.”401 The court also observed that it must consider
undisputed evidence that does not support the jury’s finding.402
Accordingly, the reviewing court may set aside the jury’s determination if it
finds either that the jury’s decision is unreasonable or that the undisputed
evidence does not support the jury’s decision.403
The clear and convincing evidence standard is limited to
the following situations: (1) exemplary damages,404 (2) actual
malice,405 (3) public-figure defamation,406 (4) termination of parental

399. Id. at 266. The supreme court has since followed its holding from the In re J.F.C. case.
Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia Healthcare Co., 520 S.W.3d 848, 866 (Tex. 2017); Diamond Shamrock
Ref. Co., L.P. v. Hall, 168 S.W.3d 164, 170 (Tex. 2005); Qwest Int’l Commc’ns, Inc. v. AT&T Corp.,
167 S.W.3d 324, 326 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); Romero v. KPH Consolidation, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212,
220 n.27 (Tex. 2005); Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 627 (Tex. 2004).
400. Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 625.
401. Id. (emphasis added).
402. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (distinguishing evidence a reasonable person could
disbelieve from undisputed facts that do not support the jury’s findings, and stating that disregarding
this evidence “could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence”).
403. See Diamond Shamrock, 168 S.W.3d at 170 (applying the elevated standard of review where
the court determines whether a reasonable person “could . . . form[ ] a firm belief or conviction” that
a matter is true (quoting id.)); Garza, 164 S.W.3d at 628–29 (holding that where some evidence indicates
termination with malice and other evidence is contradictory, the evidence as a whole does produce a
clear conviction); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (describing the elevated standard of review as one where
a “court must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient” when “no reasonable factfinder could
form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true”).
404. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b); Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Silva,
148 S.W.3d 370, 372–73 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam); Lundy v. Masson, 260 S.W.3d 482, 496 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied).
405. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003).
406. Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Tex. 2000); Huckabee v. Time
Warner Entm’t Co. L.P., 19 S.W.3d 413, 420 (Tex. 2000); see Fox Entm’t Grp., Inc. v. Abdel-Hafiz,
240 S.W.3d 524, 532 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. denied) (“To prevail at trial, a public figure
plaintiff must establish actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, but the Texas Supreme Court
has declined to adopt the clear-and-convincing standard at the summary judgment stage.” (citing
Huckabee, 19 S.W.3d at 420–21)).
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rights,407 and (5) because they are constitutionally protected,408 civil
involuntary commitments.409
2.

Administrative Agency Rulings

“Texas has recognized four types of review [for] an administrative
[agency] decision: (1) pure trial de novo; (2) pure substantial evidence;
(3) substantial evidence de novo; and (4) . . . ‘de novo fact trial.’”410 The
de novo fact trial standard “is similar to pure trial de novo review except the
agency’s decision is admissible at trial.”411 This standard, however, has not
been applied outside utility rate cases.412
Generally, judicial review of an administrative agency’s decision is
governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which addresses
contested cases.413 The reviewing court may reverse the agency’s decision
only if it violates one of the six distinct bases for reversal set forth in the
APA.414 Administrative rulings under the APA are subject to two standards

407. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 261; In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d
17, 23 (Tex. 2002); In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980); see In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 572
(Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (citing to subsections 161.001(1)–(2) of the Texas Family Code).
408. Ellis Cty. State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 792 n.5 (Tex. 1994); In re G.M.,
596 S.W.2d at 847.
409. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a); see Geeslin v. State Farm Lloyds,
255 S.W.3d 786, 796 n.3 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (emphasizing a clear and convincing
evidentiary standard applies in civil matters involving extraordinary circumstances such as civil
involuntary commitments).
410. G.E. Am. Commc’n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (citing James R. Eissinger, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact in Contested
Cases Under APTRA, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 11 (1990)).
411. Id. (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 571 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex. 1978); Lone
Star Gas Co. v. State, 153 S.W.2d 681, 695 (Tex. 1941)).
412. See id. (discussing the usage of de novo fact trial in rate-making decisions).
413. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 2001.001–.902; Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett, 35 S.W.3d 12,
17 (Tex. 2000). A contested case means “a proceeding, including a ratemaking or licensing proceeding,
in which the legal rights, duties, or privileges of a party are to be determined by a state agency after an
opportunity for adjudicative hearing.” TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.003(1). It is not always clear,
however, which standard applies when an administrative procedure is not a contested case. See TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. § 11.31(e) (explaining an appeal from an agency decision that certain property is not
a “facility, device, or method for the control of . . . pollution[,]” and therefore not entitled to an ad
valorem property tax exemption, is not considered a contested case under chapter 2001 of the
Government Code).
414. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(A)–(F). The statute provides:
If the law authorizes review of a decision in a contested case under the substantial evidence
rule or if the law does not define the scope of judicial review, a court may not substitute its
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of review: pure trial de novo and pure substantial evidence.415 The standard
of review to apply depends upon what law is at issue, as the standard should
be spelled out in the governing statute.416 In limited circumstances, both
standards of review will be used in reviewing the same agency decision.417
a.

Pure Trial De Novo

“If the manner of review . . . is by trial de novo,” the agency decision is
vacated and “the reviewing court shall try each issue of fact and law in the
manner that applies to other civil suits.”418 The appeal is handled by the
judgment for the judgment of the state agency on the weight of the evidence on questions
committed to agency discretion but:
(1) may affirm the agency decision in whole or in part; and
(2) shall reverse or remand the case for further proceedings if substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences,
conclusions, or decisions are:
(A) in violation of a constitutional or statutory provision;
(B) in excess of the agency’s statutory authority;
(C) made through unlawful procedure;
(D) affected by other error of law;
(E) not reasonably supported by substantial evidence considering the reliable and
probative evidence in the record as a whole; or
(F) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion.
Id. § 2001.174.
415. Id. §§ 2001.173–.174; see Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 571 S.W.2d 503, 508 (Tex.
1978) (“A complete reading of the [relevant] section [of the APA] reveals that in contested cases there
are now provided only two types of review[:] pure trial de novo or review confined to the agency
record.”).
416. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.172; see TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 410.255(b) (stating the
Workers’ Compensation Act provides for substantial evidence review under the APA); Tex. Emp’t
Comm’n v. Remington York, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 352, 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ) (noting
judicial review of administrative agency actions under the Labor Code is de novo); Dickerson-Seely &
Assocs., Inc. v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 784 S.W.2d 573, 574 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ)
(explaining the proper scope of review “is the one provided by the law pursuant to which the action is
instituted”), abrogated on other grounds by Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 504, 531
& n.28 (Tex. 1995) (disapproving the holding in Dickerson-Seely that the Texas Workers’ Compensation
Act “establish[ed] an impermissible hybrid system of judicial review”).
417. See Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 530–31 (affirming a hybrid judicial review scheme for decisions
of Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission in contested cases, which requires de novo review of
some issues, but substantial evidence review of others).
418. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a); G.E. Am. Commc’n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal
Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). The Third Court of
Appeals has held that the right to trial de novo must be specifically stated in the statute conferring
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trial court “as though there had not been an intervening agency action[,]”419
and in line with this principle, the reviewing court cannot admit the agency’s
decision into evidence.420 The reviewing court bases its decision on its own
determination of the issues of law and fact in the case,421 and it may
consider new evidence not presented before the agency.422 As in other civil
cases, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.423 Finally,
a party may request a jury trial on each issue of fact.424
b.

Pure Substantial Evidence

“‘Pure substantial evidence’ review is at the opposite end of the
spectrum” from trial de novo.425 “Under this standard, the agency’s
decision is not automatically vacated.”426 Instead, the reviewing court
considers only the factual “record made before the [administrative body] . . .
and determines whether the agency’s findings are reasonably supported by
substantial evidence.”427 “The agency’s decision carries a presumption
of . . . validity that may” be set aside only if the appellant can demonstrate
“that reasonable minds could not have reached the [same] conclusion” as
the agency.428 One endeavoring to reverse administrative findings,
jurisdiction in the trial court. Pretzer v. Motor Vehicle Bd., 125 S.W.3d 23, 40 (Tex. App.—Austin
2003), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 138 S.W.3d 908 (Tex. 2004).
419. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a); see Dickerson-Seely, 784 S.W.2d at 575 (noting filing
a petition for trial de novo vacates the agency’s decision).
420. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a); Dickerson-Seely, 784 S.W.2d at 574. The fact that
the decision has been made, however, can be used for the purpose of showing that the reviewing court
has been properly vested with jurisdiction to act on the matter. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173.
421. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(a) (“[T]he reviewing court shall try each issue of
fact and law in the manner that applies to other civil suits in this state . . . .”); see also Dickerson-Seely,
784 S.W.2d at 575 (“Our courts have long held that the power to try a case de novo vests the court
with full power to determine the facts anew and to decide all matters in issue.”).
422. See Gilder v. Meno, 926 S.W.2d 357, 365 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied) (“Under
a ‘pure trial de novo’ review, the decision of the lower agency or board is automatically vacated upon
the taking of an appeal, and the reviewing tribunal not only hears new evidence, but also substitutes its
discretion and judgment for that of the lower body.”).
423. Dickerson-Seely, 784 S.W.2d at 574–75.
424. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.173(b).
425. G.E. Am. Commc’n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.).
426. Id. (citing Gilder, 926 S.W.2d at 366).
427. Id. (citing Imperial Am. Res. Fund, Inc. v. R.R. Comm’n, 557 S.W.2d 280, 285 (Tex. 1977)).
428. Id. (citing Mercer v. Ross, 701 S.W.2d 830, 831 (Tex. 1986)); see City of El Paso v. Pub.
Util. Comm’n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 186 (Tex. 1994) (advising the court’s role in a substantial evidence
review is to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in its entirety, would lead reasonable minds
to agree in their conclusions concerning the disputed action). “Substantial evidence” is a term of art,
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conclusions, or decisions because of a lack of substantial evidence will face
a difficult task.429
“At its core, the substantial evidence rule is a reasonableness test or a
rational basis test.”430 If the agency decision is not “supported by
substantial evidence in the record[,]”431 or if the decision is “arbitrary or
capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
exercise of discretion[,]” the decision must be reversed.432 The scope of
review is based upon “the reliable and probative evidence in the record as a
whole.”433 However, the agency’s decision should be affirmed if: “(1) the
findings of [the] underlying fact[s] in the order fairly support the [agency’s]
findings of ultimate fact[s] and conclusions of law, and (2) the evidence
presented at the hearing reasonably supports the findings of underlying
fact[s].”434 Resolution of factual inconsistencies and ambiguities is within
the realm of the agency and the goal of the substantial evidence rule is to
guard that function.435 Therefore, the reviewing court is only concerned
with the reasonableness of the agency’s order and “not the correctness of the
which means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion” of fact. Lauderdale v. Tex. Dep’t of Agric., 923 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. App.—Austin
1996, no writ) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564–65 (1988)).
429. See Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex.
1984) (permitting reversal of agency decisions for “absence of substantial evidence only if such absence
has prejudiced substantial rights of the litigant”); Fetchin v. Meno, 922 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1995) (requiring the record to show error that warrants reversal), rev’d on other grounds, 916 S.W.2d
961 (Tex. 1996).
430. R.R. Comm’n v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 817 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tex. 1991) (citing Charter
Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 453); see Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 452−53 (noting the “true test” is
“whether some reasonable basis exists” for the agency’s action and whether “reasonable minds could
have reached the conclusion” the agency did); Tex. Health Enters., Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Health,
954 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.) (summarizing the various articulations of the
substantial evidence rule); William H. Chamblee, Comment, Administrative Law: Journey Through the
Administrative Process and Judicial Review of Administrative Actions, 16 ST. MARY’S L.J. 155, 179–82 (1984)
(discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s decision in Charter Med.–Dallas).
431. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 809 S.W.2d 201, 210–11 (Tex. 1991).
432. State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 344 S.W.3d 349, 356 (Tex. 2011) (quoting TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(F)); accord Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage
Comm’n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 325 (Tex. 2017) (“The APA provides that cases should be reversed or
remanded if the administrative decision is ‘in violation of a constitutional . . . provision . . . .’” (quoting
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.174(2)(F))).
433. Gulf States, 809 S.W.2d at 211 (citing Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 452).
434. Tex. Water Comm’n v. Customers of Combined Water Sys., Inc., 843 S.W.2d 678, 681
(Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (citing United Res. Recovery, Inc. v. Tex. Water Comm’n,
815 S.W.2d 797, 801(Tex. App.—Austin 1991, writ denied)).
435. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n v. Mini, Inc., 832 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
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order.”436 In applying this test, the reviewing “‘court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence[.]’”437 The
review is limited in that it requires “‘only more than a mere scintilla,’ to
support an agency’s determination.”438 “As such, “the evidence in the
record actually may preponderate against the decision of the agency and
nonetheless amount to substantial evidence.”439 Finally, the question of
whether the administrative decision is supported by substantial evidence is
a question of law, “and a trial of the fact issues by a judge or jury is
avoided.”440
“Substantial evidence” and “arbitrary and capricious” may at first appear
to be “two sides of the same coin.”441 If an agency’s decision is not
supported by substantial evidence, then the order is deemed to be arbitrary
and capricious.442 However, a decision may be supported by substantial
evidence yet still be arbitrary and capricious, therefore, justifying reversal.443
436. R.R. Comm’n v. Pend Oreille Oil & Gas Co., 817 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Tex. 1991) (citing Tex.
State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. Sizemore, 759 S.W.2d 114, 117 (Tex. 1988); Firemen’s & Policemen’s
Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984)); see State v. Pub. Util. Comm’n
of Tex., 344 S.W.3d 349, 355–56 (Tex. 2011) (“Under substantial evidence review of fact-based
determinations, ‘[t]he issue for the reviewing court is not whether the agency’s decision was correct,
but only whether the record demonstrates some reasonable basis for the agency’s action.’” (alteration
in original) (quoting Mireles v. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 9 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)));
Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n v. Charter Med.-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446, 452 (Tex. 1984) (“The
true test is not whether the agency reached the correct conclusion, but whether some reasonable basis
exists in the record for the action taken by the agency.” (citing Gerst v Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350, 354
(Tex. 1966))).
437. Pend Oreille, 817 S.W.2d at 40 (quoting Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act,
64th Leg., R.S., ch. 61, § 19(e), 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 136, 147, repealed by Administrative Procedure Act,
73d Leg., R.S., ch. 268, § 1, sec. 2001.174, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 583, 749); accord Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d
at 956 (“[T]he agency itself is the primary fact-finding body, and the question to be determined by the
trial court is strictly one of law.” (citing Bd. of Firemen’s Relief & Ret. Fund Trs. of Houston v. Mark,
242 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1951))).
438. City of Dallas v. Stewart, 361 S.W.3d 562, 566 (Tex. 2012) (quoting Montgomery Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 566 (Tex. 2000)).
439. Id. (quoting Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 452).
440. In re Edwards Aquifer Auth., 217 S.W.3d 581, 587 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.)
(citing Dallas Cty. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Warren, 988 S.W.2d 864, 870 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999,
no pet.); Bank of N. Am. v. State Banking Bd., 492 S.W.2d 458, 459 (Tex. 1973)); Davis, 34 S.W.3d
at 566; Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d at 956.
441. Charter Med.-Dallas, 665 S.W.2d at 454 (citing Benson v. San Antonio Sav. Ass’n,
374 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tex. 1963); City Sav. Ass’n v. Security Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Dickinson,
560 S.W.2d 930, 932 (Tex. 1978)).
442. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Gulf States Utils. Comm’n, 809 S.W.2d 201, 211 (Tex. 1991); id.
443. See Lewis v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 550 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1977) (holding an order
of the Savings and Loan Commission was invalid, despite the fact that “the order may be said to have
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“An agency’s decision is arbitrary . . . if the agency: (1) fail[s] to consider a
factor the legislature direct[ed] it to consider; (2) considers an irrelevant
factor; or (3) weighs only relevant factors that the legislature direct[ed] it to
consider but still reaches a completely unreasonable result.”444 The
arbitrary and capricious test is a permutation of the abuse of discretion
standard by focusing on the process of decision making rather than the
decision itself.445
c.

Substantial Evidence De Novo

Substantial evidence de novo review, a hybrid standard, allows the
reviewing court to hear additional “evidence in existence at the time of the
administrative hearing[,] regardless of whether it was [actually] introduced at
the administrative hearing.”446 Under the substantial evidence de novo
rule, “an appealing party has the right to petition the reviewing court to
remand the case so that additional evidence may be taken before the
administrative body.”447 “If the court is satisfied that the additional
evidence is material and that there were good reasons for the failure to
present it in the proceeding before the state agency, the court may order that
the additional evidence be taken before the agency on conditions
determined by the court.”448 The only instance in which a reviewing court
reasonable factual support under the precepts of the substantial evidence rule”); R.R. Comm’n of Tex.
v. Alamo Express, Inc., 308 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. 1958) (stressing when the agency totally fails to
make findings of fact and bases its decision on findings in another case, it can be reversed); Pub. Util.
Comm’n v. S. Plains Elec. Coop., Inc., 635 S.W.2d 954, 957 (Tex. App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.)
(ignoring the question of whether substantial evidence existed because improper standards were used
by the agency in making its determination); Starr Cty. v. Starr Indus. Servs., Inc., 584 S.W.2d 352, 356
(Tex. App.—Austin 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (finding a lack of notice justified a reversal of the agency
decision without any consideration of the substantial evidence question).
444. City of El Paso v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 883 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Tex. 1994) (citing Gerst v
Nixon, 411 S.W.2d 350, 360 n.8 (Tex. 1966)).
445. See Starr Indus., 584 S.W.2d at 355 (explaining an arbitrary decision-making process by an
agency that denies a person due process of the law is an abuse of discretion and cannot stand).
446. G.E. Am. Commc’n v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist., 979 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (emphasis omitted) (citing Bd. of Trs. of Big Spring Firemen’s
Relief & Ret. Fund v. Firemen’s Pension Comm’r, 808 S.W.2d 608, 612 (Tex. App.—Austin 1991, no
writ)).
447. In re Edwards Aquifer Auth., 217 S.W.3d 581, 589 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.)
(citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(c)); see TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(c) (“A party
may apply to the court to present additional evidence. If the court is satisfied that the additional
evidence is material and that there were good reasons for the failure to present it in the proceeding
before the state agency, the court may order that the additional evidence be taken . . . .”).
448. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(c); Occidental Permian Ltd. v. R.R. Comm’n of Tex.,
47 S.W.3d 801, 810 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.).
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may admit new evidence is when the administrative record fails to reflect
procedural irregularities alleged to have occurred in the administrative
hearing.449 “‘Substantial evidence de novo’ review resembles ‘pure
substantial evidence’ review in virtually all other respects.”450 The
administrative order may be set aside only “if it is arbitrary, capricious,
unlawful[,] or not reasonably supported by substantial evidence.”451
Although new evidence is introduced at trial, the review is considered a
question of law.452
IV. PRETRIAL RULINGS
The bulk of pretrial rulings listed below in alphabetical order by topic are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion, either on appeal or by writ of
mandamus.453 There are, however, a number of deviations from this
general rule.454 See Part II supra for a more complete discussion of how
the abuse of discretion standard operates as a standard of review in appeals
and original proceedings.
A. Abatement
A motion or plea in abatement alleges that there is some obstacle to
prosecuting the case.455 Perhaps the most common plea involves dominant
jurisdiction, which occurs when “two lawsuits concerning the same
449. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2001.175(e) (“[T]he court may receive evidence of
procedural irregularities alleged to have occurred before the agency that are not reflected in the
record.”).
450. Galveston Cent., 979 S.W.2d at 765.
451. Id. (citing Gilder v. Meno, 926 S.W.2d 357, 371 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, writ denied)
(Jones, J., dissenting)).
452. Id.
453. For example, the trial court’s order granting or denying discovery is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr. v. Schild, 828 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1992, orig. proceeding).
454. An example of this deviation from the general rule is that an appellate court reviews a trial
court’s denial of a motion to transfer venue de novo. Wilson v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t,
886 S.W.2d 259, 260–62 (Tex. 1994). In reviewing a special appearance, an appellate court may review
the fact findings for both legal and factual sufficiency, although the ultimate question of whether the
court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law reviewed de novo. BMC Software
Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); see Zinc Nacional, S.A. v. Bouche Trucking,
Inc., 308 S.W.3d 395, 397 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (“Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant is a question of law, which we review de novo.” (citing id.)).
455. Speer v. Stover, 685 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam), abrogated in part on other grounds
by Thomas v. Long, 207 S.W.3d 334, 338–39 (Tex. 2006); Garcia-Marroquin v. Nueces Cty. Bail Bond
Bd., 1 S.W.3d 366, 374 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, no pet.).
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controversy and parties are pending in courts of coordinate
jurisdiction[.]”456 A motion to abate may also be used to raise a defect in
parties.457
Typically, if the plea is sustained, the action is suspended until the obstacle
is removed.458 There are cases, however, holding that if a party calls the
trial court’s attention to the pendency of a prior suit involving the same
parties and same controversy, the subsequent case “must be
dismissed[.]”459 The Texas Supreme Court has noted the split in authority
but has not resolved it.460
A plea in abatement is generally an incidental ruling appealed from a final
judgment,461 but rare exceptions exist.462 The appellate court will review
the trial court’s abatement decision with an abuse of discretion standard.463
456. Flores v. Peschel, 927 S.W.2d 209, 212 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, orig.
proceeding); see Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1988) (noting when a lawsuit
“is proper in more than one county,” the court in which the lawsuit was first filed obtains dominant
jurisdiction), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex.
2016).
457. Truong v. City of Houston, 99 S.W.3d 204, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no
pet.).
458. Speer, 685 S.W.2d at 23; Life Ass’n of Am. v. Goode, 8 S.W. 639, 640 (Tex. 1888).
459. Mower v. Boyer, 811 S.W.2d 560, 563 n.2 (Tex. 1991).
460. See Miles v. Ford Motor Co., 914 S.W.2d 135, 139 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (indicating that,
at the trial court level, some courts have dismissed the second suits while others have merely abated
them).
461. See Hall v. Lawlis, 907 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (“In
the absence of [direct] interference, the refusal to abate can be adequately reviewed on appeal.” (citing
Hooks v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 808 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1991))).
462. See Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex. 1974) (orig. proceeding) (issuing mandamus
relief when a second court incorrectly denied a plea in abatement); Virani v. Cunningham, No. 14-0801166-CV, 2009 WL 2568349, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 20, 2009, pet. denied)
(mem. op.) (affirming an order denying a plea in abatement that was combined with an appealable
motion to compel arbitration); Epernay Cmty. Ass’n, Inc. v. Shaar, No. 14-09-00422-CV, 2009 WL
1796062, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (per curiam)
(dismissing an interlocutory appeal from an order denying appellant’s plea in abatement); In re Ayala,
No. 13-07-140-CV, 2007 WL 1238572, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi April 27, 2007, orig.
proceeding) (mem. op.) (granting mandamus relief from an order denying a plea in abatement based
on dominant jurisdiction).
463. Wyatt v. Shaw Plumbing Co., 760 S.W.2d 245, 248 (Tex. 1998), abrogated in part on other
grounds by In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. 2016); see Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d
564, 567 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (declining to grant mandamus relief because the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in denying relator’s plea in abatement and the relator had an adequate remedy
by appeal), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re Houston Specialty Ins. Co., No. 17-1060, 2019 WL
321152, at *3 (Tex. January 25, 2019) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam); Dolenz v. Cont’l Nat’l Bank of
Fort Worth, 620 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. 1981) (holding the trial court “did not act arbitrarily or
unreasonably in denying [the] plea in abatement”).
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Whether the trial court properly sustained or overruled a plea in abatement
depends upon the evidence offered at the hearing on the plea; a reporter’s
record is required to attack the trial court’s actions following the hearing.464
If the plea is sustained without hearing evidence, the appellate court must
accept “allegations of fact in the petition as true and indulge every
reasonable inference in support [of them].”465
B. Arbitration
The parties to a lawsuit might have previously agreed to arbitrate disputes,
or the parties may be statutorily required to arbitrate.466 The first step to
engage this method of alternative dispute resolution is to file a motion to
compel arbitration. Once the arbitration is complete, the trial court may
confirm the award.
1.

Motion to Compel Arbitration

A motion to compel arbitration should specify whether the arbitration is
sought under the Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) or the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA) or both. Texas courts favor arbitration agreements.467
a.

Texas Arbitration Act

In determining whether to compel an arbitration agreement under the
TAA, a trial court must consider: “(1) whether a valid arbitration agreement
exists, and (2) if so, whether the claims asserted fall within the scope of the

464. See Vestal v. Jackson, 598 S.W.2d 724, 725–26 (Tex. App.—Waco 1980, no writ) (refusing
to hold that the trial court abused its discretion for failing to abate the case in the absence of a reporter’s
record, then known as a statement of facts).
465. Jenkins v. State, 570 S.W.2d 175, 177 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ)
(citing Longoria v. Alamia, 230 S.W.2d 1022, 1022 (Tex. 1950)). The supreme court subsequently
disapproved of the Jenkins court’s definition on an unrelated issue. See Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch at
Galveston v. York, 871 S.W.2d 175, 179 & n.7 (Tex. 1994) (disapproving of the appellate court’s
inclusion of a patient’s medical records as tangible personal property).
466. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 143.057(d) (illustrating statutory arbitration for certain
matters affecting firefighters and police officers); In re Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 235 S.W.3d 206,
206–08 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (illustrating a contractual agreement to arbitrate);
see also L.H. Lacy Co. v. City of Lubbock, 559 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1977) (noting common law
arbitration is an alternative to statutory arbitration); Riha v. Smulcer, 843 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (recognizing common law arbitration).
467. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); Brazoria
County v. Knutson, 176 S.W.2d 740, 743 (Tex. 1943).
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agreement.”468 If the court determines that a valid agreement exists, “the
burden shifts to the party opposing arbitration to raise an affirmative
defense to enforcing arbitration.”469 “Once the trial court concludes that
the arbitration agreement encompasses the claims, and that the party
opposing arbitration has failed to prove its defenses, the trial court has no
discretion but to compel arbitration and stay its own proceedings.”470
Whether arbitration is required is a matter of contract interpretation, and
the enforceability of an arbitration provision is a question of law for the
court.471 However, the decision to compel arbitration or not is subject to
review for an abuse of discretion.472 An appeal may be taken from an order
“denying an application to compel arbitration[,]” or from an order “granting
an application to stay arbitration[,]” but relief from an order compelling
arbitration is generally only available on final appeal.473 In rare
circumstances, mandamus relief is available for an order compelling
arbitration.474
b.

Federal Arbitration Act

The Federal Arbitration Act applies to contracts affecting interstate
commerce.475 “There is a presumption favoring agreements to arbitrate

468. See Nationwide of Fort Worth, Inc. v. Wigington, 945 S.W.2d 883, 884 (Tex. App.—Waco
1997, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874,
878 (Tex. App.—Waco 1992, writ denied)) (resolving doubts in favor of arbitration).
469. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003) (citing In re Oakwood
Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam), abrogated in part
on other grounds by In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 571–72 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)).
470. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753–54 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding)
(footnote omitted) (citing In re Oakwood, 987 S.W.2d at 573; Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d
943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)).
471. See In re Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 198 S.W.3d 778, 781 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam) (holding enforceability is a “question of law”); J.M. Davidson, Inc., 128 S.W.3d at 227
(interpreting arbitration agreements under “traditional contract principles”).
472. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d at 271.
473. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.098(a)(1)–(2); Materials Evolution Dev. USA,
Inc. v. Jablonowski, 949 S.W.2d 31, 33 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ); Lipshy Motorcars,
Inc. v. Sovereign Assocs., 944 S.W.2d 68, 69 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ); Burlington N. R.R.
Co. v. Akpan, 943 S.W.2d 48, 49–50 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
474. In re Gulf Expl., LLC, 289 S.W.3d 836, 841–43 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); In re PolyAm., L.P., 262 S.W.3d 337, 345–46 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding); see Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d
580, 586 (Tex. 2008) (noting when an appeal is an adequate remedy for an order compelling arbitration,
mandamus must be denied).
475. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987); In re Nexion Health at
Humble, Inc., 173 S.W.3d 67, 69 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
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under the federal act[,]”476 and the court should resolve any doubts in favor
of arbitration.477 Under the FAA, unless there is “unmistakable evidence
that the parties intended the contrary, it is the courts . . . that must decide
‘gateway matters’ such as whether a valid arbitration agreement exists[,]”478
and whether the agreement is binding on a nonparty.479 Pending a clear
answer from the United States Supreme Court, under the FAA, the Texas
Supreme Court holds that state law governs whether a nonparty agreed to
arbitrate480 and “federal law governs the scope of an arbitration
[agreement][,]”481 noting that the state courts should try “to keep it as
consistent as possible with federal law.”482
“[A] party seeking to compel arbitration under the FAA must establish
that: (1) there is a valid arbitration agreement, and (2) the claims raised fall
within that agreement’s scope.”483 “An agreement to arbitrate is valid [and
enforceable] unless grounds exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract, such as fraud or unconscionability.”484 If the movant makes
this showing, and the opposing party fails to demonstrate an affirmative
476. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Mack, 945 S.W.2d 330, 333 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1997, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (citing Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam)); accord In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005)
(orig. proceeding) (affirming the presumption in favor of arbitration); Cantella, 924 S.W.2d at 944
(stating both state and federal law favor arbitration).
477. In re Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 737; In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001)
(orig. proceeding).
478. In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (quoting
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003); PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book,
538 U.S. 401, 407 n.2 (2003)).
479. Id.
480. Id. (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996); First Options
of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); Perry, 482 U.S. at 492 n.9).
481. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
482. Id. at 131 (citing In re Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 739).
483. In re Kellogg, 166 S.W.3d at 737 (citing In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex.
2001) (orig. proceeding); In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1999) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d 566, 571–
72 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding)); accord In re AdvancePCS Health L.P., 172 S.W.3d 603, 605 (Tex.
2005) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (listing the two requirements a party must establish to compel
arbitration).
484. Emerald Tex., Inc. v. Peel, 920 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no
writ) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.001); see 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (addressing the
“[v]alidity, irrevocability, and enforcement of” arbitration agreements); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995) (detailing the protections 9 U.S.C. § 2 provides consumers against
unwanted arbitration provisions); see also In re McKinney, 167 S.W.3d 833, 835 (Tex. 2005) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam) (explaining “[a]bsent fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit,” parties are bound
to the arbitration agreement).
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defense to arbitration,485 the trial court is obligated to compel
arbitration.486
The trial court’s determination of the validity of an arbitration agreement
is a legal question reviewed de novo.487 A trial court’s order denying a
motion to compel arbitration under the federal act is reviewable by appeal
for an abuse of discretion, while a trial court’s order granting a motion to
compel arbitration under the federal act is reviewable by mandamus for
abuse of discretion.488
2.

Motion to Confirm or Vacate an Arbitration Award

To set aside an arbitration award, the complaining party “must allege a
statutory or common law ground to vacate the award.”489 An arbitration
award under the common law may be set aside by a court only if the decision
is tainted by “fraud, misconduct, or such gross mistake as would imply bad
faith or failure to exercise an honest judgment.”490 In addition to the
common law grounds for setting aside an arbitration award, the TAA also
authorizes a court to vacate an award if: (1) the arbitrators “exceed[ ] their
powers;” (2) the arbitrators “refuse[ ] to postpone [a] hearing” when a party
shows “sufficient cause for the postponement;” (3) the arbitrators “refuse[ ]
to hear evidence material to the controversy” or conduct the hearing in a
manner that “substantially prejudice[s] the rights of a party;” or (4) “there
was no [arbitration] agreement . . ., the issue was not adversely determined
485. AdvancePCS, 172 S.W.3d at 607.
486. Cantella & Co. v. Goodwin, 924 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam).
487. In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding); In re
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 186 S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam).
488. See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.016 (“In a matter subject to the Federal
Arbitration Act, a person may take an appeal or writ of error to the court of appeals from the judgment
or interlocutory order of a district court, county court at law, or county court . . . .” (internal citation
omitted)). But see In re Wood, 140 S.W.3d 367, 370 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(illustrating FAA decisions were formerly not appealable and were subject to mandamus relief).
489. HISAW & Assocs. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cornerstone Concrete Sys., Inc., 115 S.W.3d
16, 18–19 (Tex. App.—Ft. Worth 2003, pet. denied) (per curiam) (citing Anzilotti v. Gene D. Liggin,
Inc., 899 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ)); Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d
at 266.
490. Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); accord
Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266 (affirming the test outlined in Nuno “for determining whether or not an
arbitration award must be vacated”); see Emerald Tex., Inc. v. Peel, 920 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ) (noting “an agreement to arbitrate is valid unless” legal or equitable
grounds exist for its revocation “such as fraud or unconscionability” (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 171.001)).
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in a proceeding” to compel or stay arbitration, “and the party did not
participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection.”491
Under the TAA, an award shall be modified by a court if there was: (1) a
miscalculation of figures; (2) a mistaken “description of a person, thing, or
property”; (3) the arbitrators made an award of an issue “not submitted to
them and the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the”
issues submitted; or (4) the award is imperfect in form only.492
Review of a trial court’s decision as to vacatur or confirmation of an
arbitration award is de novo.493 Because courts favor arbitration awards to
resolve disputes,494 the courts “indulge every reasonable presumption” in
favor of upholding the awards.495 “A mere mistake of fact or law is
insufficient to set aside an arbitration award[.]”496 An arbitration award is
to be given the same weight as a trial court’s judgment, and the reviewing
court “may not substitute [its] judgment for the arbitrator’s merely because

491. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.088(a)(3)–(4). Like the common law,
subsection (a)(1) provides that an award may be vacated if “obtained by corruption, fraud, or other
undue means[,]” and subsection (a)(2) provides that an award may be vacated if any party’s rights are
prejudiced because an arbitrator was not impartial, was corrupt, or was guilty of misconduct or willful
misbehavior. Id. § 171.088(a)(1)–(2); see Holk v. Biard, 920 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (identifying the grounds on which a court may vacate an
arbitration award).
492. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.091(a)(1)–(3); accord Riha v. Smulcer,
843 S.W.2d 289, 292 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (summarizing when an
arbitration award may be modified).
493. See Forsythe Int’l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Tex., 915 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990)
(stating review of a trial court’s decision to vacate an arbitration award is de novo); Kreit v. Brewer &
Pritchard, P.C., 530 S.W.3d 231, 237 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (noting a
trial court’s decision to affirm or vacate an arbitration award is reviewed under a de novo standard of
review); Statewide Remodeling, Inc. v. Williams, 244 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no
pet.) (noting appellate courts review an arbitration confirmation decision de novo).
494. In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding); Riha,
843 S.W.2d at 292–94; House Grain Co. v. Obst, 659 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
495. Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266; see FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 753 (“[C]ourts must
resolve any doubts about an arbitration agreement’s scope in favor of arbitration.” (citing Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985); Prudential Sec. Inc. v.
Marshall, 909 S.W.2d 896, 899 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam))); Nuno, 946 S.W.2d at 452
(emphasizing any doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration).
496. Nuno v. Pulido, 946 S.W.2d 448, 452 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ); Powell
v. Gulf Coast Carriers, Inc., 872 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ); see
Anzilotti, 899 S.W.2d at 266 (affirming a “mere” mistake is insufficient, but implying a “gross” mistake
would likely suffice).
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[it] would have reached a different” result.497 The scope of review is the
entire record.498
C. Class Action Certification
The purpose of class certification is to provide “‘meaningful recompense
to groups of injured parties whose injuries would be too small to make it
cost-effective to prosecute them individually.’”499 Whether or not to certify
a class action presents the court with several challenging and complicated
decisions because “[o]n one hand, the class-action device affords an avenue
for relief to large numbers of people who might not otherwise be able to
pursue individual claims; on the other hand, the decision to certify a class
can have staggering economic consequences.”500 To obtain certification of
a class, the representative party or parties must meet the requirements of
Rule 42 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, which is patterned after its
federal counterpart, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.501 As
a result, the supreme court looks to federal decisions and authorities
interpreting federal class action requirements.502 Pursuant to Rule 42(a):
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members
is impracticable [(numerosity)], (2) there are questions of law, or fact common
to the class [(commonality)], (3) the claims or defenses of the representative

497. Holk v. Biard, 920 S.W.2d 803, 806 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]) (citing City of Baytown v. C.L. Winter, Inc., 886 S.W.2d 515, 518 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1994, writ denied); Riha, 843 S.W.2d at 293–94); accord City of Baytown, 886 S.W.2d at 518
(showing deference to the arbitrator’s award); see Nuno, 946 S.W.2d at 452 (“Arbitration awards are
favored by the courts to dispose of pending disputes; therefore, every reasonable presumption will be
indulged to uphold the arbitration proceeding.” (citing House Grain, 659 S.W.2d at 905–06))
498. See Riha, 843 S.W.2d at 294 (reviewing the record as a whole).
499. Wood v. Victoria Bank & Trust Co., 69 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001,
no pet.) (quoting Northrup v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 72 S.W.2d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no
pet.)); accord Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 952 (Tex. 1996) (“Class action suits furnish
an efficient means for numerous claimants with a common complaint to obtain a remedy ‘[w]here it is
not economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework . . . .’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980))); see Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 616–18 (1997) (discussing the underlying goals and requirements to qualify as
a class action suit under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
500. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 701 (Tex. 2002) (O’Neill, J., dissenting,
joined by Enoch & Hankinson, JJ.). Not surprisingly, a trial court’s ruling certifying or refusing to
certify a class is subject to interlocutory appeal. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(3).
501. Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000).
502. See id. (explaining that such authority is persuasive to Texas class action certification).
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parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class [(typicality)], and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of
the class [(adequacy of representation)].503

In addition to these four requirements, class actions must satisfy one of
the four subdivisions of Rule 42(b).504
The supreme court requires the trial court to pursue a rigorous analysis
before ruling on a motion for class certification “‘to determine whether all
prerequisites to certification have been met.’”505 The court has “rejected
the ‘certify now and worry later’ approach to class certification[.]”506 While
it “may not be an abuse of discretion to certify a class that could later fail,”
the court stated that a “cautious approach to class certification is
essential.”507 Accordingly, it is improper for a trial court “‘to certify a class
without knowing how the claims can and will likely be tried.’”508 The trial
court’s order must set forth a plan as to how the claims will be tried so that
the appellate court can meaningfully review the trial court’s compliance with
Rule 42.509 “The formulation of a trial plan assures that a trial court has
fulfilled its obligation to rigorously analyze all certification prerequisites and
‘understand the claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive
503. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(a); Schein, 102 S.W.3d at 692; accord Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 433
(summarizing the threshold requirements for a class action lawsuit).
504. TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(b). Rule 42(b) allows an action to proceed as a class action if, in addition
to satisfying 42(a) prerequisites, one of the following elements is met: (1) maintaining separate actions
“would create a risk of . . . inconsistent or varying adjudications” of individual class members, or
prosecuting individual class members would either “be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their
interests;” (2) the opposing party “has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole;” or (3) “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members” so that the class action is the most
“fair and efficient” method of adjudication. Id.; accord Union Pac. Res. Grp., Inc. v. Hankins,
111 S.W.3d 69, 73 (Tex. 2003) (quoting the requirements found in TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(b)); see Compaq
Comput. Co. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 671 (Tex. 2004) (noting the Rule 42(b)(2) requirements must
be “rigorously analyze[d]” by the trial court before ruling on class certification).
505. BMG Direct Mktg., Inc. v. Peake, 178 S.W.3d 763, 777 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Bernal,
22 S.W.3d at 435); see Nat’l W. Life Ins. Co. v. Rowe, 164 S.W.3d 389, 392–93 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam)
(noting the trial court’s failure to rigorously analyze class certification requirements).
506. Peake, 178 S.W.3d at 776–77 (quoting Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435).
507. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435.
508. Peake, 178 S.W.3d at 777 (quoting id.); accord State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lopez,
156 S.W.3d 550, 555 (Tex. 2004) (restating the standard set forth in Bernal).
509. Peake, 178 S.W.3d at 777; N. Am. Mortg. Co. v. O’Hara, 153 S.W.3d 43, 44 (Tex. 2004)
(per curiam).
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law in order to make a meaningful determination of the certification
issues.’”510 If it cannot be determined “from the outset that the individual
issues can be considered in a manageable, time-efficient, yet fair manner,
then certification is not appropriate.”511
Whether a party is a proper representative of a class and whether a suit
should be certified as a class action is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.512 However, the reviewing court does not indulge every
presumption in favor of the order because “compliance with class action
requirements must be demonstrated rather than presumed.”513
D. Consolidation
The trial court may consolidate cases pursuant to Rule 174.514 The
express purpose of Rule 174 “is to further convenience and avoid prejudice,
and thus promote the ends of justice.”515 “The trial court may consolidate
actions that “relate to substantially the same transaction, occurrence, subject
matter, or question.”516 The actions must “‘be so related that evidence
presented will be material, relevant, and admissible in each case.’”517 “[T]he
trial court must balance the judicial economy and convenience . . . gained by
consolidation against the risk of an unfair outcome because of prejudice or

510. Peake, 178 S.W.3d at 778 (quoting State Farm, 156 S.W.3d at 556).
511. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 436 (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 959 (Tex.
1996)).
512. Compaq Comput. Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 671 (Tex. 2004); see Nat’l W. Life Ins.
Co. v. Rowe, 164 S.W.3d 389, 392 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (discussing the deference given to courts
in class action certifications).
513. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d at 671 (citing Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 691
(Tex. 2002)).
514. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(a) (allowing a court to “order a joint hearing or trial of any or all
the matters in issue[,] . . . order all the actions consolidated[,] and . . . make such orders . . . as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay”); Allison v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1981)
(per curiam) (recognizing a trial court’s broad discretion in determining joinder and consolidation); see
In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 614–17 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (listing factors for
consolidated trials in mass tort litigation).
515. Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Tex. 1956) (orig. proceeding).
516. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin, 942 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997,
no writ) (citing Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. McCormick, 838 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1992, writ denied)); Crestway Care Ctr., Inc. v. Berchelmann, 945 S.W.2d 872, 873–74 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding [leave denied]) (en banc) (quoting Excel Corp. v. Valdez,
921 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, orig. proceeding [leave denied])).
517. Crestway Care Ctr., 945 S.W.2d at 874 (quoting Valdez, 921 S.W.2d at 448); Martin,
942 S.W.2d at 716 (citing Lone Star Ford, 838 S.W.2d at 737).
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jury confusion.”518 If “‘the facts and circumstances of the case
unquestionably require . . . separate trial[s] to prevent a manifest injustice,
and there [are] no fact[s] or circumstance[s] supporting or tending to
support a contrary conclusion,’ the trial court does not have any discretion
to order consolidation.”519 The trial court’s ruling on a motion to
consolidate is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.520
E. Continuance
Pursuant to Rule 251, a trial court may grant a continuance on sufficient
cause “supported by affidavit, or by consent of the parties, or by operation
of law.”521 Whether the trial court grants or denies a motion for
continuance is within its sound discretion.522 Therefore, the trial court’s
ruling is reviewed by an appellate court for an abuse of discretion.523
518. Crestway Care Ctr., 945 S.W.2d at 874 (quoting Valdez, 921 S.W.2d at 448); Martin,
942 S.W.2d at 716 (citing Dal-Briar Corp. v. Baskette, 833 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992,
orig. proceeding), abrogated in part on other grounds by In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d 451, 453–54 (Tex. 2009)
(orig. proceeding)).
519. Martin, 942 S.W.2d at 716 (quoting Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 683).
520. In re Gulf Coast Bus. Dev. Corp., 247 S.W.3d 787, 794 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig.
proceeding); see, e.g., Pilgrim Enters., Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 24 S.W.3d 488, 491 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (indicating the trial court has discretion in deciding whether to consolidate an
action). Mandamus review may also be available. See, e.g., In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 145 S.W.3d
203, 206 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (granting mandamus relief from a court’s decision
to consolidate several claims).
521. TEX. R. CIV. P. 251; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 252 (granting continuance based on want of
testimony); TEX. R. CIV. P. 254 (granting continuance based on absence of counsel when absence was
caused by attendance in legislature). The mere absence of counsel does not entitle the party to a
continuance. TEX. R. CIV. P. 253; see Vickery v. Vickery, No. 01-94-01004-CV, 1997 WL 751995,
at *20 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 4, 1997, pet. denied) (mem. op., not designated for
publication) (explaining absence of a party is not itself grounds for continuance and that “[t]he absent
party must show that he had a reasonable excuse for not being present, and that he was prejudiced by
his absence” (citing Green v. State, 589 S.W.2d 160, 163 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1979, no writ); Erback v.
Donald, 170 S.W.2d 289, 291-92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1943, no writ))). For the continuance to be
granted for necessity of testimony of the absent party, the movant must show “the testimony is material
and what is expected to be proved by the testimony.” Id. (citing Green, 589 S.W.2d at 163; Erback,
170 S.W.2d at 291–92).
522. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex. 2002); Gen. Motors
Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding).
523. Joe v. Two Thirty Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 161 (Tex. 2004); Tri-Steel
Structures, Inc. v. Baptist Found. of Tex., 166 S.W.3d 443, 447 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet.
denied). In In re North American Refractories Co., the Ninth Court of Appeals granted mandamus relief
against a trial judge who refused to grant a motion for continuance filed pursuant to a lawyer’s vacation
letter filed in compliance with the local rule. In re N. Am. Refractories Co., 71 S.W.3d 391, 394 (Tex.
App.—Beaumont 2001, orig. proceeding). Because a local rule allowing attorneys to designate vacation
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A trial court may grant a continuance if the affidavits of the party seeking
the continuance show that the party seeking the continuance cannot present
necessary facts in response to a summary judgment motion.524 The trial
court should consider the following list of nonexclusive factors in ruling on
a motion for continuance of a summary judgment hearing to conduct more
discovery: “the length of time the case has been on file, the materiality and
purpose of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the
continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought.”525
F. Default Judgment
The rules governing a no answer and post-answer default judgment differ
greatly.526 “For a no-answer default judgment, the non-answering party is
deemed to have admitted all the facts properly pleaded in the petition.”527
On the other hand, in a post-answer default judgment, “non-appearance at
trial does not constitute an abandonment of the defendant’s answer and it
is not an implied confession of any issues joined by the answer.”528
If a defendant fails to file a timely answer after properly being served, the
defendant may suffer a default judgment.529 A post-answer default takes
place when a defendant initially answers, but fails to make an appearance at
trial.530 “[W]hen a default judgment is attacked by motion for new trial[,]”
the parties may introduce evidence such as “affidavits, depositions,
testimony, and exhibits” that demonstrate why the default judgment should
weeks was mandatory, the trial court’s refusal to grant the continuance was an abuse of discretion for
which there was no adequate remedy at law. Id. at 393–94. In practical terms, appellate courts only
review orders denying continuances, perhaps because it would be impossible to show harm from an
order granting a continuance.
524. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(g); Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161.
525. Joe, 145 S.W.3d at 161 (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 800; Tenneco Inc. v. Enter.
Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex. 1996); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Indus.,
Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 521–22 (Tex. 1995); State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex.
1988); Perrotta v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 47 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no
pet.)).
526. Rouhana v. Ramirez, 556 S.W.3d 472, 476 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.).
527. Id. at 476–77 (citing Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 682 (Tex. 1979)).
528. Id. at 477 (citing Sedona Pac. Hous. P’ship v. Ventura, 408 S.W.3d 507, 512 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2013, no pet.); Mountain Corp. v. Rose, 737 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1987, writ
denied)).
529. TEX. R. CIV. P. 239; Michael A. Pohl & David Hittner, Judgments by Default in Texas, 37 SW.
L.J. 421, 422 (1983); see Aguilar v. Alvarado, 39 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. denied)
(stating the trial court may not award a default judgment once the defendant files an answer).
530. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam); Stoner,
578 S.W.2d at 682.
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be set aside.531 Different rules apply to set aside a default judgment
depending on whether the judgment was proper (secured in accordance with
the statutes and rules for issuance, service, and return of citation) or
defective (not secured in accordance with the statutes and rules for issuance,
service, and return of citation).
1.

Proper Default Judgment

A three-part test for determining whether a court should grant a motion
for new trial to set aside a proper default judgment was established in the
leading case of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc.532 The purpose of
Craddock is to “alleviate unduly harsh and unjust results . . . when the
defaulting party has no other remedy available.”533 It “is based upon
equitable principles and ‘prevents an injustice to the defendant without
working an injustice on the plaintiff.’”534 Under this test, a trial court may
set aside a default judgment and order a new trial in any case in which:
the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment was not intentional,
or the result of conscious indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake
or an accident;535 provided the motion for a new trial sets up a meritorious
531. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573–74 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (citing Gold v. Gold, 145 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)). If it is too late to file a
motion for new trial, other options for challenging a default judgment include a regular appeal,
restricted appeal (formerly known as a writ of error), and bill of review. See generally Jordan v. Jordan,
36 S.W.3d 259, 263–65 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001, pet. denied) (delineating alternative legal
remedies available after a default judgment has been entered).
532. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1939); see
Holt Atherton Indus. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Tex. 1992) (reaffirming the three-part Craddock test).
But see Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Fin. Leasing Servs., Inc. v. Stanfield, 71 S.W.3d 351, 356–57 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2001, pet. denied) (expanding Craddock’s three-part test to four parts by separating the
mistake or accident element from the conscious indifference element).
533. Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 2002) (citing
Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126).
534. Id. at 685 (quoting Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126).
535. Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126. A valid excuse does not have to be a good excuse to satisfy
this burden. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 186 S.W.3d at 576. A slight excuse will suffice, particularly when
not resulting in delay or prejudice. Harmon Truck Lines, Inc. v. Steele, 836 S.W.2d 262, 265 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1992, writ dism’d); Gotcher v. Barnett, 757 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1988, no writ); cf. Coastal Banc SSB v. Helle, 48 S.W.3d 796, 800–01 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2001, pet. denied) (determining not being advised of the hearing date is a sufficient excuse for
failure to appear). The standard, however, is not negligence but “‘is one of intentional or conscious
indifference—that the defendant knew it was sued but did not care.’” Levine v. Shackelford, Melton
& McKinley, L.L.P., 248 S.W.3d 166, 168 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam) (quoting Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 186
S.W.3d at 575–76); see Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Tex. 1984) (looking to the defendant’s
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defense[,]536 and is filed at a time when the granting thereof will occasion no
delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff.537

When the first element is established with proof that the defaulted party
did not receive notice of a trial setting or other dispositive hearing, due
process alleviates the burden of proving the second element of the Craddock
test regarding a meritorious defense.538 It is likely that the third element
regarding prejudice to plaintiff would not have to be proved in the same
circumstances for the same due process reasons.539
The Craddock test applies to both no-answer and post-answer default
judgments.540 The Craddock test can also apply to summary judgments,541
unless the “motion for new trial [is] filed after judgment has been granted
knowledge and acts to determine intent); Konkel v. Otwell, 65 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. App.—Eastland
2001, no pet.) (distinguishing an intentional action from a mistake). If there is controverting evidence
on this issue, the court may judge the witnesses’ credibility and determine the weight to be given to the
testimony. Harmon Truck Lines, 836 S.W.2d at 265.
536. Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126; see Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966) (requiring
the defendant to allege facts constituting a defense to the plaintiff’s claim that is supported by
evidence); Cragin v. Henderson Cty. Oil Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 555–56 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1926,
holding approved) (determining allegations of meritorious defense are to be taken as true if properly
supported, but that allegations of excuse for failure to appear may be controverted and determined by
the trial court). A meritorious defense is one that if proved would cause a different result upon retrial
of the case, although not necessarily a totally opposite result. Holliday v. Holliday, 10 S.W. 690, 692
(Tex. 1889).
537. Craddock, 133 S.W.2d at 126; accord Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 685 (outlining the three-part
Craddock test); Angelo v. Champion Rest. Equip. Co., 713 S.W.2d 96, 97–98 (Tex. 1986) (expounding
upon the delay or injury requirement under the Craddock test).
538. Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); see Mathis v. Lockwood,
166 S.W.3d 743, 744 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (re-affirming Lopez); Shull v. United Parcel Serv.,
4 S.W.3d 46, 52 n.1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, pet. denied) (explaining when a party shows he
had no notice of the trial setting, he does not have to prove a meritorious defense).
539. Mathis, 166 S.W.3d at 744; Mahand v. Delaney, 60 S.W.3d 371, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
540. See LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 778 S.W.2d 865, 865 (Tex. 1989) (providing that Craddock has
“general application to all judgments of default”).
541. Huffine v. Tomball Hosp. Auth., 979 S.W.2d 795, 798–99 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1998, no pet.), overruled in part by Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686 (“[W]e disapprove of . . . court of
appeals decisions to the extent that they can be read to hold that all of the Craddock factors must be
met when a nonmovant is aware of its mistake at or before the summary-judgment hearing and thus
has an opportunity to apply for relief under our rules.”); Washington v. McMillan, 898 S.W.2d 392, 396
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ), overruled in part by Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686. But see Rabe v.
Guar. Nat’l Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 575, 579 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (refusing
to apply Craddock in the summary judgment context); Enernational Corp. v. Exploitation Eng’rs, Inc.,
705 S.W.2d 749, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (ruling that the Craddock
test is inappropriate in summary judgment cases).
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on a summary-judgment motion to which the nonmovant failed to timely
respond when the” nonmovant had the opportunity to do so.542
The trial court’s ruling on a motion for new trial based on Craddock is
reviewed on appeal with the abuse of discretion standard.543 “The
historical trend in default judgment cases is toward the liberal granting of
new trials.”544 Accordingly, when the guidelines established in Craddock
have been met, it is an abuse of discretion to deny a new trial.545
2.

Defective Default Judgment

A motion for new trial following a defective default judgment does not
have to meet the Craddock requirements and should not be confused with a
motion for new trial after a proper default judgment.546 Personal
jurisdiction over a defendant to a suit is “dependent upon citation issued
and served in a manner provided for by law.”547 “If a default judgment is
not rendered in compliance with the statutes and rules[,] . . . the default
judgment may be set aside by a motion to set aside, a motion for new trial,
an appeal, or” a restricted appeal.548
In reviewing a default judgment under these remedies, both trial and
reviewing courts may only consider errors that appear on the face of the
record.549 “[I]t is imperative . . . that the record affirmatively show a strict
542. Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 685–86. The Texas Supreme Court in Carpenter did not expressly
hold that Craddock does apply to summary judgments; however, the court stated that “Craddock does not
apply to a motion for new trial filed after summary judgment is granted on a motion to which the
nonmovant failed to timely respond when the respondent had notice of the hearing and an opportunity
to employ the means” provided by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 683–84(emphasis added).
543. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2009); Cliff v. Huggins,
724 S.W.2d 778, 778 (Tex. 1987); Grissom v. Watson, 704 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Tex. 1986).
544. Norton v. Martinez, 935 S.W.2d 898, 901 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ).
545. Dolgencorp, 288 S.W.3d at 926.
546. See Dan Edge Motors, Inc. v. Scott, 657 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1983, no
writ) (holding that when “the record fails to show a valid issuance and service of citation to the
defendant, or a voluntary appearance prior to rendition of the default judgment, the judgment must be
reversed” without the defendant having to “excuse his failure to appear, and set up a meritorious
defense”).
547. See Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990) (noting that a default judgment
against a defendant that was never properly served cannot stand because jurisdiction is dependent on
proper service).
548. Bagel v. Mason Rd. Bank, N.A., No. B14-91-00548-CV, 1992 WL 43953, at *1 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 27, 1992, no writ) (not designated for publication); see Jordan v.
Jordan, 890 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994) (holding that courts may look to the face
of the record to determine appellate error), rev’d on other grounds, 907 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. 1995).
549. Quaestor Invs., Inc. v. Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1999); Stubbs v. Stubbs,
685 S.W.2d 643, 644 (Tex. 1985).
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compliance with the provided mode of service” for a default judgment to
withstand attack.550 Accordingly, this showing must be made from the
record as it existed before the trial court when the default judgment was
signed, unless the record is amended pursuant to Rule 118 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.551
A defendant against whom a defective default judgment has been taken
may urge the error for the first time on appeal, unless the nature of the error
requires that evidence be presented and a finding of fact be made by the trial
court.552 Absent a need for evidence, on appeal, the default judgment is
reviewed de novo to determine whether it was rendered in compliance with
the statutes and rules.553
G. Discovery Rulings
“Under Texas law evidence is presumed discoverable.”554 The party
seeking to limit discovery has the burden of proving the exemption from
discovery.555
550. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); accord Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver,
884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994); Wilson, 800 S.W.2d at 836; Uvalde Country Club v. Martin Linen
Supply Co., 690 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Tex. 1985); see In re Ramirez, 994 S.W.2d 682, 683 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1998, orig. proceeding) (concluding that courts must consider sufficiency of process when
determining whether to grant a default judgment); Seib v. Bekker, 964 S.W.2d 25, 27–28 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1997, no writ) (“The Supreme Court requires that strict compliance with the rules for service of
citation affirmatively appear on the record in order for a default judgment to withstand direct attack.”
(citing Primate Constr., 884 S.W.2d at 152)).
551. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 118 (authorizing a court to allow an amendment of service of process
as long as it would not prejudice the other party); see also Higginbotham v. Gen. Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 796 S.W.2d 695, 697 (Tex. 1990) (finding a trial court’s order recognizing service as proper was,
itself, “tantamount to formal amendment of the return of citation”); Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v.
Wallace, 944 S.W.2d 72, 73–75 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied) (holding that service of citation
failed to strictly comply with civil procedure rules and did not support a default judgment).
552. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1) (stating that a motion for new trial is required to complain
on appeal about the failure to vacate a default judgment); Bronze & Beautiful, Inc. v. Mahone,
750 S.W.2d 28, 29 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, no writ) (asserting that in a motion for new trial, “a
party need not complain about invalid service . . . because it is not a complaint on which evidence must
be heard, within the meaning of Rule 324”).
553. Furst v. Smith, 176 S.W.3d 864, 868–69 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.);
Coronado v. Norman, 111 S.W.3d 838, 841–42 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet. denied); see also Bronze
& Beautiful, 750 S.W.2d at 29 (requiring strict compliance with the rules for a default judgment to be
upheld).
554. Oyster Creek Fin. Corp. v. Richwood Invs. II, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 640, 645 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1997, pet. denied) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(2)(a) (repealed 1999)); Arkla, Inc. v. Harris,
846 S.W.2d 623, 629 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ) (citing Loftin v, Martin, 776
S.W.2d 145, 147 (Tex. 1989); TEX. R. CIV. P. 166b(4)).
555. In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 136 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tex. 2004).
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The cornerstone of discovery is to “seek the truth, so that disputes may
be decided by what the facts reveal, not by what facts are concealed.”556 In
line with this principle, the discovery process serves a number of important
purposes: (1) it promotes “the administration of justice by allowing the
parties to obtain the fullest knowledge of issues and facts prior to trial;”557
(2) it helps prevent trial by ambush;558 (3) it insures that a trial is based upon
“the parties’ claims and defenses rather than on an advantage obtained by
one side through a surprise attack;”559 and (4) it provides a mechanism to
resolve disputes by the facts rather than by the facts a party fails to reveal.560
In summary, the “modern discovery rules were designed to ‘make a trial less
a game of blindman’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and
facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.’”561
Trial courts tend to liberally construe the discovery rules to achieve these
underlying policy goals.562 In turn, trial courts enjoy discretion in ruling on
the discovery disputes outlined in this Article, and those rulings are usually
reviewed on appeal only after final judgment, subject to the usual rules of
error preservation and harm analysis.563 Nonetheless, the trial court’s
discovery ruling may so alter the fundamental nature of the litigation that
review by writ of mandamus is available.564
556. Garcia v. Peeples, 734 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. 1987) (orig. proceeding); In re Striegler,
915 S.W.2d 629, 641 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) (citing Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d
569, 573 (Tex. 1984)); accord In re Alford Chevrolet-Geo, 997 S.W.2d 173, 180 (Tex. 1999) (orig.
proceeding).
557. West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1978) (orig. proceeding).
558. Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1989).
559. Smith v. Sw. Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1992).
560. Tom L. Scott, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 556, 559 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding).
561. Garcia, 734 S.W.2d at 347.
562. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 1 (requiring rules to be liberally construed); Jordan v. Fourth Court of
Appeals, 701 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding) (observing the liberal nature of the rules).
563. See Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1996) (recognizing a trial court’s discretion
over discovery rulings and explaining the purposes of the discovery rules applied by the trial court); see
also Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 667 (Tex. 2009) (holding that a party complaining
about a discovery ruling on appeal must still show harm to obtain reversal); Garcia v. Allen, 751 S.W.2d
236, 237 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied) (ruling that a complaint that interrogatories were
too broad cannot be raised for the first time on appeal). See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.2 (setting forth
provisions dealing with the scope of discovery).
564. Compare Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Tex. 2005) (“[W]e have held for all other
forms of discovery [depositions, interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for disclosure]
that absent flagrant bad faith or callous disregard for the rules, due process bars merits-preclusive
sanctions . . . .” (citations omitted)), and In re Rozells, 229 S.W.3d 757, 764 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2007, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief where deemed admissions had “merits-preclusive
effect”), with Sutherland v. Moore, 716 S.W.2d 119, 120–21 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986, orig.
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In a mandamus proceeding challenging a trial court’s ruling on discovery,
the relator or complaining party may obtain mandamus relief if “(1) the trial
court clearly abused its discretion and (2) the [relator] has no adequate
remedy by appeal.”565 The degree to which an abuse of discretion may be
“clear” or not is discussed in Part II supra. Likewise, as detailed in Part II,
the degree to which an appeal is inadequate is highly fact specific. In general,
discovery rulings may be the proper subject of mandamus review when: a
trial court wrongly orders discovery of privileged, confidential, or otherwise
protected information that will have a material effect on the aggrieved
party’s rights;566 a trial court “compels the production of patently irrelevant
or duplicative documents, such that it clearly constitutes harassment or
imposes a burden on the producing party far out of proportion to any
benefit that may obtain to the requesting party”;567 a trial court’s order
vitiates or severely compromises the party’s ability to present a viable claim
or defense at trial so the trial could be a waste of judicial resources;568 the
trial court’s denial of discovery goes “to the heart of a party’s case”;569 the
trial court denies discovery “and the missing discovery cannot be made [a]
part of the appellate record”;570 the trial court denies discovery and “refuses

proceeding) (denying mandamus relief where deemed admissions simplified the trial process and
relator had an adequate remedy by appeal).
565. In re Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc., 175 S.W.3d 253, 255–56 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding); In
re Kuntz, 124 S.W.3d 179, 180 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839
(Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
566. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843; accord Living Ctrs. of Tex., 175 S.W.3d at 255–56; In re Ford Motor
Co., 988 S.W.2d 714, 721 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
567. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843; accord Tex. Water Comm’n v. Dellana, 849 S.W.2d 808, 810
(Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
568. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843 (reiterating the court’s holding that “when a trial court
imposes discovery sanctions which have the effect of precluding a decision on the merits of a party’s claims—
such as by striking pleadings, dismissing an action, or rendering default judgment—a party’s remedy
by eventual appeal is inadequate, unless the sanctions are imposed simultaneously with the rendition
of a final, appealable judgment”); see also In re Family Hospice, Ltd., 62 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding) (restating that if a trial court invalidates a party’s capability to pursue a
practicable cause of action or defense, an appellate remedy may be deficient).
569. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843.
570. Id.; accord Ford Motor Co., 988 S.W.2d at 721; Family Hospice, 62 S.W.3d at 316; In re Frank
A. Smith Sales, Inc., 32 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, orig. proceeding); In re
Kellogg Brown & Root, 7 S.W.3d 655, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, orig. proceeding);
In re Valero Energy Corp., 973 S.W.2d 453, 457 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig.
proceeding); see also Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (holding
that the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by issuing a protective order for discoverable
documents).
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to make [the requested discovery] part of the record”571 or the trial court’s
order would “skew the proceedings, potentially affect the outcome of the
litigation, and compromise the presentation of [the relator’s] defense [or
claims] in ways unlikely to be apparent in the appellate record,” mandamus
is proper.572
1.

Withdrawing Deemed Admissions

Once an action has officially commenced, a party can serve on any other
party a written request for admissions pursuant to Rule 198 of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure.573 If the party given the request does not respond
before thirty days after the request was served (fifty days if a defendant is
served before his answer is due),574 the requests are automatically deemed
admitted with no discretion to find otherwise.575 “A matter admitted . . . is
conclusively established as to the party making the admission unless the
court permits the party to withdraw or amend the admission.”576
Under Rule 215.4, “an evasive or incomplete answer may be treated as a
failure to answer.”577 The requesting party may challenge the sufficiency
of the answers or objections, and if the court finds the answer insufficient
under Rule 198, it may deem the matter admitted or order an amended
answer to be served.578
571. See Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 843–44 (“Because the evidence exempted from discovery would
not appear in the record, the appellate courts would find it impossible to determine whether denying
the discovery was harmful.” (quoting Jampole v. Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569, 576 (Tex. 1984))).
572. In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d. 625, 630 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding) (first alteration in
original) (quoting In re CVR Energy, Inc., 500 S.W.3d 67, 81–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016,
orig. proceeding)).
573. TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.1.
574. Id. R. 198.2(a).
575. Id. R. 198.2(c); Beasley v. Burns, 7 S.W.3d 768, 769 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet.
denied); Morgan v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,
pet. denied); Ruiz v. Nicolas Trevino Forwarding Agency, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 86, 88 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1994, no writ).
576. TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3; accord Cont’l Carbon Co. v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 27 S.W.3d 184, 190
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied); Beasley, 7 S.W.3d at 769.
577. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.4(a).
578. Id.; see State v. Carrillo, 885 S.W.2d 212, 214–16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ)
(affirming trial court’s order to deem answers admitted when respondent failed to make a good faith
effort to answer and instead ignored documents in its own file that would have provided a sufficient
basis to admit or deny the admission); U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Maness, 775 S.W.2d 748, 749 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ ref’d) (approving the trial court’s decision to deem matters admitted
when respondent lacked any evidence that it had made a diligent inquiry into the matters covered by
the requested admissions).
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When admissions are deemed against a party, the party should file a
motion to withdraw or amend the admissions as soon as possible.579 Rule
198.3 permits the trial court to allow a party to withdraw or amend
admissions if:
(a) the party shows good cause for the withdrawal or amendment; and (b) the
court finds that the parties relying upon the responses and deemed admissions
will not be unduly prejudiced and that the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved by permitting the party to amend or withdraw the
admission.580

Therefore, the motion should allege: (1) that there is good cause for not
having responded to the request on time; (2) that allowing withdrawal of the
admissions will not “unduly” prejudice the party relying on the deemed
admissions; and (3) that the case can be presented on the merits following
the withdrawal of the admission.581 “[T]he ‘good cause’ requirement is a
threshold issue which must be determined before the trial judge can even
consider the remaining requirements set forth in the rule.”582 Generally,
undue prejudice depends upon whether withdrawal of the deemed
admission will delay trial or seriously hamper the opposition’s ability to
prepare for trial.583 The moving party should also attach affidavits setting
out detailed facts supporting the elements of the rule and attach the answers
it would have filed.584

579. See Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Halton, 792 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ
denied) (holding that while defense counsel’s response to admission requests were over fifty days late,
counsel showed good cause and was diligent in filing a motion to withdraw the deemed admissions).
580. TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3; accord Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 770 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); Morgan, 1 S.W.3d at 807.
581. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d at 770; Morgan, 1 S.W.3d at 807; see Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439,
442 (Tex. 2005) (noting that withdrawing deemed admissions is proper upon a showing of good cause
and no undue prejudice).
582. Boone v. Tex. Emp’rs’ Ins. Ass’n, 790 S.W.2d 683, 688 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1990, no writ);
accord Webb v. Ray, 944 S.W.2d 458, 461 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
583. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443.
584. See Halton, 792 S.W.2d at 467 (basing its decision to withdraw deemed admissions on the
affidavits and additional evidence provided by the defense counsel). The party seeking to withdraw
admissions should request a hearing on its motion. At the hearing, the moving party must present
evidence and witnesses that are necessary to convince the trial court to permit withdrawal of the
deemed admissions. Following the presentation of evidence, the party should obtain a ruling on its
motion.
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In Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Halton,585 the court observed that there
is an analogy between a motion to set aside a default judgment occasioned
by a failure to file a timely answer, and a motion to set aside admissions of
fact occasioned by a party’s failure to timely file proper responses.586 Thus,
a party may establish “good cause” by proving that the party did not act
intentionally or with conscious disregard in failing to timely file answers to
the requests.587 Consequently, even a weak excuse will suffice, particularly
when the opposing party suffers no prejudice as a result of the delay.588
The decision to allow or deny the withdrawal of deemed admissions lies
within the discretion of the trial court.589
2.

Amending Admissions

A party may amend or replace an admission “upon a showing of good
cause for such withdrawal . . . if the court finds that the parties relying upon
the responses . . . will not be unduly prejudiced and that the presentation of
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby.”590 The same
considerations applicable to a motion to withdraw deemed admissions apply
to a party who seeks to withdraw its original response and substitute it with
a new response.591 Accordingly, the trial court enjoys discretion in allowing
the withdrawal or amendment of admissions.592
585. Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Halton, 792 S.W.2d 462, 462 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, writ
denied).
586. See id. at 466 (“[N]ew trials may be granted and judgment set aside for good cause, on
motion . . . .” (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 320)).
587. Wheeler v. Green, 157 S.W.3d 439, 452 (Tex. 2005); Tommy Gio, Inc. v. Dunlop,
348 S.W.3d 503, 508 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied); In re Kellogg-Brown & Root, Inc., 45
S.W.3d 772, 775 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.); Steffan v. Steffan, 29 S.W.3d 627, 631 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
588. See Ramsey v. Criswell, 850 S.W.2d 258, 259 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ)
(admitting that, while slight, a party’s illness can be a sufficient excuse); N. River Ins. Co. v. Greene,
824 S.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied) (identifying a calendar-diary error as
a sufficient cause); Esparza v. Diaz, 802 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no
writ) (emphasizing lack of prejudice to the opposing party in finding good cause). However, while a
clerical error may constitute good cause, being busy and overworked does not. Greene, 824 S.W.2d at
700–01.
589. Wheeler, 157 S.W.3d at 443.
590. Stelly v. Papania, 927 S.W.2d 620, 622 (Tex. 1996) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 169(2)); accord
TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3.
591. Stelly, 927 S.W.2d at 621–22; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.3(a)–(b) (listing the requirements
for a response amendment).
592. Stelly, 927 S.W.2d at 622; Tex. Capital Sec., Inc. v. Sandefer, 58 S.W.3d 760, 770 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); In re Kellogg-Brown & Root, Inc., 45 S.W.3d 772, 775
(Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.).
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Supplementing Discovery Responses

Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.5, a party whose response
to a written discovery request is correct and complete when made is,
nonetheless, under a duty to make the response accurate by amendment or
supplement:
(1) to the extent that the written discovery sought the identification of persons
with knowledge of relevant facts, trial witnesses, or expert witnesses, and
(2) to the extent that the written discovery sought other information, unless
the additional or corrective information has been made known to the other
parties in writing, on the record at a deposition, or through other discovery
responses.593

The party supplementing discovery must serve the supplemental discovery
response “reasonably promptly” after the necessity arises.594 If the
supplemental response is given less than thirty days prior to the beginning
of trial, the court will presume that the response was not made in a
reasonable, prompt manner.595 Pursuant to Rule 193.6, the sanction for a
party’s failure to comply with the duty to supplement is the exclusion of the
evidence affected by the violation596 unless the court finds “good cause for
the failure” to supplement597 or the untimely “response will not unfairly
surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.”598 The supreme court
emphasized that “[t]he salutary purpose of Rule 215(5) is to require
complete responses to discovery so as to promote responsible assessment
of settlement and prevent trial by ambush” and that the “rule is mandatory,
and its sole sanction—exclusion of evidence—is automatic, unless there is

593. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(a). Under the former rule, there was generally no affirmative duty to
amend or supplement a response to discovery if the response was correct and complete when initially
made. Id. R. 166b (repealed 1999). Prior to January 1, 1999, the duty to supplement arose only when
imposed by court order or by party agreement to prevent the response from becoming misleading,
which included an expert witness whose testimony would respond to a proper inquiry, or when
required to document a change in expert testimony on a material issue after having been deposed. Id.
Rule 193.5 does not apply to deposition testimony. See id. R. 193.5 cmt. 5 (noting that the duty to
supplement deposition testimony is governed by Rule 195.6).
594. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(b).
595. Id.
596. Id. R. 193.6(a).
597. Id. R. 193.6(a)(1); see also Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 687
(Tex. 2002) (defining “good cause” in motions for withdrawal and amendment of deemed admissions).
598. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(2).
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good cause to excuse its imposition.”599
The party seeking to introduce the evidence has the “burden of
establishing good cause or the lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice,”
which “must be supported by the record.”600 However, the court may
decide to grant a continuance or postpone the trial temporarily to allow a
supplemental response to be made “[e]ven if the party seeking to introduce
the evidence” fails to meet its burden.601 The useful benefit of Rule 193.6
is that it requires “complete responses to discovery so as to promote
responsible assessment of settlement and to prevent trial by ambush.”602
a.

Fact Witnesses

In general, a party must disclose the identity of any potential party or
person having knowledge of relevant facts.603 If, after a proper discovery
request, a fact witness is not disclosed at least thirty days prior to the
beginning of trial, the witness may be subject to a motion to strike or
exclude.604 There are two exceptions to this harsh sanction, and the trial
court’s ruling under either exception is reviewed for abuse of discretion.605
599. Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. 1992).
600. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(b).
601. Id. R. 193.6(c) (stating that the court has discretion to temporarily delay the trial even if the
party seeking to introduce evidence fails to meet the burden set forth in subsection (b) of this rule).
However, the exclusion does not apply when the original trial date is continued, and “the date set is
more than thirty days from the date of the original trial date.” H.B. Zachry Co. v. Gonzalez, 847
S.W.2d 246, 246 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
602. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Specia, 849 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding)
(quoting Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914) (referring to former Rule 215(5)); accord Etheridge v. Oak Creek
Mobile Homes, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, no pet.); Castillo v. Am.
Garment Finishers Corp., 965 S.W.2d 646, 652 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1998, no pet.); see also Mauzey v.
Sutliff, 125 S.W.3d 71, 77 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. denied) (noting that former Rule 215(5)
is largely the same as present Rule 193.6). Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6 (reflecting the subject matter
of former Rule 215(5) after the 1998 legislative amendments, which became effective on January 1,
1999), with id. R. 215(5) (West 1998, superseded 1999) (illustrating the addition of unfair surprise or
prejudice as an exception to evidence exclusion in Rule 193.6), and id. R. 215.5 cmt. (noting that Rule
215.5 was superseded by Rule 193.6).
603. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(c), (i).
604. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 915; Yeldell v. Holiday Hills Ret. & Nursing Ctr., Inc., 701 S.W.2d
243, 246 (Tex. 1985); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(b) (requiring that all “amended or supplemental
response[s] must be made reasonably promptly after the party discovers the necessity for such a
response” and stating that amendments made less than thirty days before trial are not considered
reasonably prompt).
605. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914; see also Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d
35, 43 (Tex. 1998) (indicating that a ruling with no legitimate basis or guiding principle is an abuse of
discretion).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

95

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4

1194

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1099

Under the first exception, a party must demonstrate good cause on the
record to allow testimony of the witness.606 Unfortunately, trying to define
“good cause” is like trying to define “abuse of discretion.” It is usually easier
to define what is not considered “good cause.”607
Under the second exception, the untimely identified witness may testify
if the party seeking to introduce the testimony demonstrates that the other
parties will not be unfairly surprised or prejudiced by the late response.608
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, however, does not apply to parties
named in the suit.609 Thus, named parties may testify as fact witnesses even
though those parties failed to supplement the discovery response in a timely
manner.610 A named party to the suit may testify at trial “when [the] identity
[of the party] is certain and when his or her personal knowledge of relevant
facts has been communicated to all other parties, through pleadings by name
and response to other discovery at least thirty . . . days in advance of
trial.”611
606. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(1), (b); see also Fort Brown Villas III Condo. Ass’n v. Gillenwater,
285 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex. 2009) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(b)). Former Rule 215(5) also required
that the party show good cause for admission of the testimony. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215(5) (West 1998,
superseded 1999); Smith v. Sw. Feed Yards, 835 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1992); Mayes v. Stewart, 11 S.W.3d
440, 456 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied). Before Rule 193.6 superseded 215(5),
however, it was held that the offering party must show good cause for its failure to properly respond
to the discovery request. Clark v. Trailways, Inc., 774 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1989).
607. See Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 687 (Tex. 2002) (reviewing
several cases that did not “specifically define ‘good cause’” but instead held that “inadvertent failure to
supplement responses was insufficient to establish good cause”); Remington Arms Co. v. Canales,
837 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (stating that inadvertence of counsel is not enough
to satisfy the good cause exception); Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914 (observing that defining the good
cause rule is very problematic and that the importance of the witness should not be considered); Sharp
v. Broadway Nat. Bank, 784 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1990) (providing that the fact that a witness’s
identity is known to the other party does not establish good cause for the failure to supplement); Rainbo
Baking Co. v. Stafford, 787 S.W.2d 41, 41 (Tex. 1990) (holding that failure to contact a witness until
the day of trial when the party expected to settle the case was not good cause); Clark, 774 S.W.2d at
647 (explaining that mere failure to locate the witness until the last minute will not suffice absent
sufficient efforts to locate the witness); Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989)
(concluding a claim of “great harm” from the denial of the testimony will not establish good cause);
Gee v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 765 S.W.2d 394, 395 n.2 (Tex. 1989) (suggesting that lack of surprise
may be considered as a factor); Morrow v. H.E.B., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex. 1986) (holding that
lack of surprise is not enough to establish good cause).
608. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(2), (b).
609. See id. R. 193.6(a) (stating that named parties are not included as witnesses whose identities
must be disclosed).
610. Id.
611. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Bynum, 836 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1992) (quoting Smith, 835 S.W.2d
at 91); accord Rogers v. Stell, 835 S.W.2d 100, 100–01 (Tex. 1992).
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Expert Witnesses

Under Rule 192.7, there are two types of expert witnesses: (1) a testifying
expert,612 and (2) a consulting expert.613 “A party may discover [a list of]
information regarding a testifying expert or . . . a consulting expert whose
mental impressions and opinions have been reviewed by a testifying expert,”
including: the expert’s identity, contact information, testimonial subject
matter, relevant facts known, relevant mental impressions and opinions,
bias, and “documents, tangible things, reports, models, or data
compilations” that were provided, reviewed, or prepared for the testifying
expert’s testimony.614 However, if a consulting expert’s conclusions have
not been reviewed by a testifying expert, neither the consulting expert’s
identity nor his conclusions are discoverable.615
Pursuant to Rule 195.1, a party may request the disclosure of information
regarding testifying expert witnesses.616 This request must be done via a
request for disclosure.617 Upon proper request, a party must “designate”
experts (i.e., disclose the requested information) by “the later of . . . [thirty]
days after the request is served, or . . . with regard to all experts testifying
for a party seeking affirmative relief, [ninety] days before the end of the
discovery period; . . . with regard to all other experts, [sixty] days before the
end of the discovery period.”618
Any amendment or supplement to the response regarding expert
testimony “must be made reasonably promptly after the party discovers the
necessity for such a response.”619 If an amended or supplemental response
612. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.7(c) (defining a testifying expert as “an expert who may be called
to testify as an expert witness at trial”).
613. See id. R. 192.7(d) (defining a consulting expert as an expert “consulted, retained, or
specially employed by a party in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial, but who is not a
testifying expert”).
614. Id. R. 192.3(e).
615. Id.
616. Id. R. 195.1.
617. Id. R. 194.1 (indicating how a party may obtain certain information listed in Rule 194.2
from an opposing party); Id. R. 194.2(f) (identifying the information that can be obtained about a
testifying expert through disclosure); Id. R. 195.1 (stating expert witness information can be obtained
by a disclosure request pursuant to Rule 194).
618. Id. R. 195.2; see also id. R. 191.1 (stating that discovery rules can be modified by party
agreement or by the court for good cause).
619. Id. R. 193.5(b); accord id. R. 195.6. Under former Rule 166b(6)(b), expert witnesses were to
be disclosed “as soon as is practical.” Id. R. 166b(6)(b) (repealed 1999). In Mentis v. Barnard, the Texas
Supreme Court observed that since Rule 166b(6)(b) did not provide a time period by which a party
must actually decide to retain its testifying experts, “as soon as practical” meant that the attorney was
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is made fewer than thirty days before trial, it is presumed to have been made
without reasonable promptness.620 Failure to designate an expert in a
timely manner will result in the exclusion of the expert’s testimony unless
the party seeking to call the expert witness can show good cause for failing
to timely respond,621 or that the failure to timely respond “will not unfairly
surprise or unfairly prejudice the other parties.”622 The trial court’s ruling
to admit or exclude an improperly identified expert is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion.623 Expert witness testimony may be limited or excluded for
other reasons, as discussed in Part V.
c.

Rebuttal Witnesses

The fact that a witness will be used only as a rebuttal witness does not
eliminate the obligation to disclose the witness’s identity pursuant to the
required to communicate the witness designation once it was finally decided that the expert was
expected to testify. Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1994). The trial court was to “consider
good cause for late identification only if [the court found] that the witness was not designated as soon
as was practical.” Id. at 15. The new rule replaces “as soon as is practical” with “reasonably promptly”
after the necessity for the response is discovered, and it also allows an exception for lack of unfair
surprise and unfair prejudice to the other parties, in addition to the good cause exception. TEX. R.
CIV. P. 193.5(b), 193.6(a). There is also no longer the mandatory sanction of automatic exclusion if
the exceptions do not apply. See Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 86 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002,
no pet.) (stating that the “new Rule 193.6 is less burdensome than the former rule”).
620. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(b). One appellate court concluded that supplemental responses
submitted prior to the onset of the presumption of unreasonableness did not constitute a presumption
that the response is made “reasonably promptly.” Snider v. Stanley, 44 S.W.3d 713, 715 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2001, pet. denied). In ruling that the plaintiff’s choice to wait almost thirty days before
designating their expert was not reasonably prompt, the Snider court distinguished the Mentis v. Barnard
decision, which the appellants relied upon, on the ground that Mentis was decided under the former
rule. Id. at 716.
621. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(1). Factors that alone do not show good cause, but may in
combination, include: “(1) inadvertence of counsel, (2) lack of surprise, unfairness, or ambush, (3)
uniqueness of excluded evidence, . . . (4) the fact that a witness has been deposed[,] . . . [and (5)] the
amount of time which an expert had to prepare a report or form an opinion before trial.” Rodriguez
v. Hyundai Motor Co., 944 S.W.2d 757, 765–66 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997), rev’d on other grounds,
995 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1999); accord Colo. Interstate Gas Co. v. Hunt Energy Corp., 47 S.W.3d 1, 14
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.).
622. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(2); accord F & H Invs. Inc. v. State, 55 S.W.3d 663, 670 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(2)).
623. Fort Borwon Villas Condo Ass’n, Inc. V. Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d 879, 881 (Tex 2009)
(per curiam) (“A trial court’s exclusion of an expert who has not been properly designated can be
overturned only upon a finding of abuse of discretion.”) (quoting Mentis, 870 S.W.2d at 16)); see
Gutierrez, 86 S.W.3d at 736 (finding no abuse of discretion to permit expert testimony regarding
attorney’s fees where a witness was not identified as an expert in response to discovery, but was
identified as a fact witness).
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duty to supplement discovery.624 Thus, for a late disclosure, the party
offering a rebuttal witness’s testimony must still demonstrate good cause or
the lack of unfair surprise to the other parties for the late disclosure.625
Good cause may be established when counsel is unable to reasonably
anticipate the need for such rebuttal evidence.626 The trial court’s decision
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.627
4.

Quashing Depositions

A party “may object to the time and place designated for an oral
deposition by motion for protective order or by motion to quash the notice
of deposition.”628 There are numerous other grounds for objecting to the
substance of a proposed deposition, the most common of which may be the
“apex” objection asserted by a high level corporate official denying
knowledge of relevant facts.629 Generally, the denial of a motion to quash
a deposition or the denial of a protective order is not a final, appealable

624. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.5(a)(1) (obligating the responding party to amend his response “to
the extent that the written discovery sought the identification of persons with knowledge of relevant
facts, trial witnesses, or expert witnesses”); see also Valley Indus., Inc. v. Cook, 767 S.W.2d 458, 462
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied) (stating that rebuttal evidence, which includes rebuttal witness
testimony, disproves facts introduced into evidence by an opposing party).
625. TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6(a)(1), (2); see also Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 916–
17 (Tex. 1992) (explaining that Alvarado failed to assert good cause for failing to disclose a rebuttal
witness).
626. TEX. R. CIV. P. 192.3(d); see also Gannett Outdoor Co. of Tex. v. Kubeczka, 710 S.W.2d
79, 84 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ) (approving the admission of an expert’s
testimony based on good cause when the need for his testimony as a rebuttal witness could not have
been anticipated prior to the unexpected false testimony of the opponent’s witness), superseded by rule,
TEX. R. CIV. P. 193.6, as recognized in Lopez v. La Madeleine of Tex., Inc., 200 S.W.3d 854, 861 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (stating that the Gannett Outdoor holding was decided prior to January 1,
1999 and, therefore, the “argument that previously undisclosed evidence may be admitted solely for
impeachment purposes” has been superseded by Rule 193.6).
627. Alvarado, 830 S.W.2d at 914, 916–17 (stating that the trial court abused its discretion by
allowing testimony of an undisclosed rebuttal witness).
628. TEX. R. CIV. P. 199.4; see also Vega v. Davila, 31 S.W.3d 376, 380 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2000, no pet.) (noting that an appealing party had attempted to quash a deposition notice on
the grounds that the time and place for the deposition were unreasonable, but holding that “a
nonresident may be required to attend a deposition in the county in which he is served with a
subpoena”).
629. See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 127–28 (Tex. 1995) (defining
“apex” deposition); see also In re Alcatel USA, Inc. 11 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding)
(reaffirming Crown Central and setting forth procedure for challenging an apex deposition request); cf.
West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tex. 1978) (objecting to depositions of former attorneys based
on the attorney-client privilege).
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order and must therefore be challenged by writ of mandamus.630 The trial
court’s ruling is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.631
H. Dismissal
A motion to dismiss a case can be based on any number of legal theories.
The most representative reasons are discussed here.
1.

Dismissal for Defect of Parties

If a party’s capacity to sue is contested, Rule 93 requires the filing of a
verified plea whenever the record does not affirmatively show the party’s
right to file suit in the capacity in which the party is suing.632 The trial
court’s dismissal based on a defect in parties is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.633
2.

Dismissal for Defect in Pleadings

The trial court’s decision to dismiss for insufficient pleadings is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard.634 In general, however, a trial court
should not dismiss for defective pleadings unless the pleading party is given
an opportunity to amend.635 Accordingly, see Part IV(S)(1) on special
exceptions infra. If a party pleads facts that affirmatively demonstrate an
630. See Alcatel, 11 S.W.3d at 175 (granting mandamus relief when trial court wrongly denied a
motion to quash deposition notices); Borden, Inc. v. Valdez, 773 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1989, orig. proceeding) (denying mandamus relief from a trial court’s denial of a motion to
quash a deposition). But see Vega, 31 S.W.3d at 378 (permitting appeal when an order denying a motion
to quash addressed witnesses who were not parties to the suit); Transceiver Corp. of Am. v. Ring
Around Prods., Inc., 581 S.W.2d 712, 712–13 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, no writ) (permitting an appeal
when an order denying a motion to quash addressed a post-judgment deposition); cf. Pub. Citizen v.
Ins. Servs. Office, Inc., 824 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no writ) (allowing an appeal of
an order denying a motion to vacate a protective order).
631. Alcatel, 11 S.W.3d at 175.
632. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93; Pledger v. Schoellkopf, 762 S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. 1988).
633. Dahl v. Hartman, 14 S.W.3d 434, 436 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied);
Miller v. Gann, 822 S.W.2d 283, 286 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied). For more
information about proper parties, see infra Part IV(O) (discussing proper parties and joinder).
634. Humphreys v. Meadows, 938 S.W.2d 750, 753–54 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ
denied).
635. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002); Gallien v. Wash. Mut.
Home Loans, Inc., 209 S.W.3d 856, 864–65 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.); see also Sherman v.
Triton Energy Corp., 124 S.W.3d 272, 279–80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (holding that the
trial court had authority to strike the plaintiffs’ petition and dismiss the case when the plaintiffs failed
to amend the petition pursuant to the court’s orders sustaining the defendant’s special exceptions). See
infra Part IV(S)(1) (addressing special exceptions).
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absence of jurisdiction, such a defect is incurable and immediate dismissal
of the case is proper.636
3.

Dismissal for Want of Prosecution

The trial court has an obligation to control its docket and demand that
parties diligently prosecute their suits.637 Thus, a trial court has the
authority to dismiss a case for want of prosecution pursuant to either its
inherent powers or Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a.638 The trial court’s
powers to dismiss under Rule 165a(1) (failure to appear at a hearing or trial),
Rule 165a(2) (failure to meet time standards promulgated by the supreme
court), and Rule 165a(4) (want of prosecution and trial court’s inherent
powers) are cumulative and independent.639 If the trial court’s order
dismissing for want of prosecution does not specify the basis for dismissal,
then the order must be affirmed if any valid basis is supported by the
record.640
When resolving the central issue of “whether the plaintiffs exercised
reasonable diligence,”641 the court may consider the entire trial history, and
“[n]o single factor is dispositive.”642 Whether the plaintiff intended to
abandon the litigation is not the inquiry, “[n]or is the existence of a belated
636. Peek v. Equip. Serv. Co. of San Antonio, 779 S.W.2d 802, 804 (Tex. 1989); see also infra
Part IV(S)(1) (discussing subject-matter jurisdiction).
637. 3V, Inc. v. JTS Enters., Inc., 40 S.W.3d 533, 540 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000,
no pet.); see also State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 508–09 (Tex. 1984) (emphasizing the inherent power
of a trial court “to dismiss cases not prosecuted with due diligence”), superseded by rule, TEX. R. CIV. P.
3a, as recognized in Seigle v. Hollech, 892 S.W.2d 201, 202 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no
writ) (recognizing that “Rotello was decided before approval of local rules by the supreme court was
required”).
638. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(1), (4); Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 850 (Tex.
2004).
639. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(4) (explaining that dismissal procedures are “cumulative of the
rules and laws governing any other procedures available to the parties in such cases,” including the
court’s inherent powers); Veterans’ Land Bd. v. Williams, 543 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. 1976) (“Rule 165a
is not the exclusive authority by which the trial court derives its authority or discretion to dismiss a
cause for want of prosecution.” (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(4))).
640. City of Houston v. Thomas, 838 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
no writ); accord Fox v. Wardy, 225 S.W.3d 198, 199–200 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2005, pet. denied).
641. MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997); accord Pedraza v. Crossroads Sec. Sys.,
960 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no pet.); see also Christian v. Christian,
985 S.W.2d 513, 515 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (discussing various reasons given by the
plaintiff to determine if reasonable diligence was exercised).
642. Dueitt v. Arrowhead Lakes Prop. Owners, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 733, 739 (Tex. App.—Waco
2005, pet. denied); accord Scoville v. Shaffer, 9 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no
pet.).
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trial setting or an asserted eagerness to proceed to trial conclusive.”643
Furthermore, the fact that settlement activity is in progress,644 or that the
opposing parties have remained passive, does not prevent a case from being
dismissed based upon want of diligence.645 Similar to a trial court’s
considerations on whether to grant a motion for continuance, factors
traditionally examined when deciding on a dismissal for want of prosecution
include “the length of time the case was on file, the extent of activity in the
case, whether a trial setting was requested, and the existence of reasonable
excuses for the delay.”646 Other circumstances may be considered as well,
“such as periods of activity, intervals of inactivity, reasons for lack of
attention, and the passage of time.”647
If the dismissal is pursuant to Rule 165a, as opposed to the trial court’s
inherent powers, then Rule 165a(3) requires the trial court to reinstate the
case “upon finding after a hearing that the failure of the party or his attorney
[to appear] was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but
was due to an accident or mistake or that the failure has been otherwise
reasonably explained.”648 The reinstatement provisions in Rule 165a(3)
only apply to dismissals for failure to appear at trial or a hearing,649 and they

643. Ozuna v. Sw. Bio-Clinical Labs, 766 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ
denied), overruled in part by Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., 994 S.W.2d 628, 633 (overruling
Ozuna to the extent it “can be read to hold that the Bexar County notice of dismissal apprises parties
of the court’s intent to dismiss on a ground other than the failure to appear under Rule 165a”); accord
Scoville, 9 S.W.3d at 204.
644. See FDIC v. Kendrick, 897 S.W.2d 476, 481 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, no writ)
(explaining how settlement efforts do not constitute an excuse for failing to diligently prosecute a case).
645. See Tex. Soc’y, Daughters of the Am. Revolution, Inc. v. Estate of Hubbard, 768 S.W.2d
858, 861 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, no writ) (noting that the attitude of the opposing party “does
not excuse want of diligence”).
646. Bard v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 767 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, writ
denied); Villarreal v. San Antonio Truck & Equip., Inc., 974 S.W.2d 275, 278 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1998), rev’d on other grounds, 994 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. 1999).
647. Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 902.
648. TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(3); accord Stolz v. Honeycutt, 42 S.W.3d 305, 309 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.); Brown v. Howeth Invs., Inc., 820 S.W.2d 900, 902 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied); Quita, Inc. v. Haney, 810 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 1991, no writ); see also Armentrout v. Murdock, 779 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1989, no writ) (stating that after conducting the hearing required by Rule 165a(3), the trial
court has the discretion not to reinstate the case); cf. Clark v. Yarbrough, 900 S.W.2d 406, 408–09 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1995, writ denied) (describing the trial court’s ability to dismiss for want of
prosecution and the process of reinstatement).
649. Clark, 900 S.W.2d at 408–09; Ozuna, 766 S.W.2d at 903; see also Moore v. Armour & Co.,
748 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1988, no writ) (asserting that the reinstatement provisions
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share several similarities with the Craddock requisites for granting a new trial
to set aside a proper default judgment.650 The standard of review applied
to a dismissal for want of prosecution, or the overruling of a motion to
reinstate, is an abuse of discretion.651
4. Dismissal of Health Care Liability Claims for Lack of Expert
Reports
In Texas, traditional “medical malpractice” litigation was fundamentally
altered in 1977 when the Texas legislature enacted the Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act in response to a perceived crisis in the cost of
health care.652 Article 4590i of the Revised Civil Statutes provided a notice
of suit provision and capped recoverable damages in those cases described
as a “health care liability claim.”653
of Rule 165a(3) do not apply to dismissal under the court’s inherent powers for failure to prosecute
with due diligence).
650. Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 165a(3) (mandating that a court reinstate a case if it finds that the
party’s failure to appear “was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference but was due to an
accident or mistake or that the failure has been otherwise reasonably explained”), with Craddock v.
Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. 1939) (instructing judges to set aside a default
judgment if the defendant’s failure to answer “was not intentional, or the result of conscious
indifference on his part, but was due to a mistake or an accident”).
651. MacGregor v. Rich, 941 S.W.2d 74, 75 (Tex. 1997); State v. Rotello, 671 S.W.2d 507, 509
(Tex. 1984), superseded by rule, TEX. R. CIV. P. 3a, as recognized in Seigle v. Hollech, 892 S.W.2d 201, 202
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). If the trial court fails to set and conduct a hearing
on the motion to reinstate, the dismissal order will be reversed on appeal. See Dueitt v. Arrowhead
Lakes Prop. Owners, Inc., 180 S.W.3d 733, 740 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, pet. denied) (“The rule is
mandatory, and the trial court has no discretion about whether to set a hearing on the motion.”); see
also Reed v. City of Dallas, 774 S.W.2d 384, 385 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied) (reversing the
trial court and ordering it to conduct a hearing). The dissent in Reed v. City of Dallas, however, argued
that the court should have reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits. Id. at 385 (Howell, J.,
dissenting). It is also important to note that “dismissal for want of prosecution does not preclude the
filing of another suit and[,] therefore[,] a dismissal of the case ‘with prejudice’ is improper.” Willis v.
Barron, 604 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Melton v. Ryander, 727
S.W.2d 299, 303 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (noting that a “dismissal for want of
prosecution is not an adjudication on the merits” of the case). If the trial court dismisses the case with
prejudice, the appellate court will “reform the judgment to strike the words ‘with prejudice’ from the
judgment.” Id.
652. McGlothlin v. Cullington, 989 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied)
(discussing the history of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act).
653. Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act of Texas, 65th Leg., R.S., ch. 817,
§§ 4.01(c), 11.02, 11.04, 1977 Tex. Gen. Laws 2039, 2048, 2053, repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th
Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884. The Act defined “health care provider” as
“any person, partnership, professional association, corporation, facility, or institution duly licensed or
chartered by the State of Texas to provide health care as a registered nurse, hospital, dentist, podiatrist,
pharmacist, or nursing home, or an officer, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope
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Almost twenty years later, despite the enactment of Article 4590i, the
Texas legislature still faced what was considered “a medical malpractice
crisis in this state.”654 To address the continuing and growing concerns,
thirty years since the enactment of Article 4590i, the legislature responded
by adding the requirement of an expert report, which required “trial courts
to dismiss health care lawsuits unless an expert report that met certain
requirements was filed within the first 180 days of the suit.”655 “The
obvious intent of this statutory provision was to stop suits that had no merit
from proceeding through the courts.”656
In 2003, the legislature expressed concern that “the number of health care
liability claims” had still not decreased but had actually increased
“inordinately.”657 Once again attempting to reduce the cost of health care,
the legislature repealed Article 4590i and enacted Chapter 74 of the Civil
Practice and Remedies Code.658 In enacting the specific provisions of
Section 74.351, the legislature made extensive changes to the expert report
requirement.659
Under Section 74.351, within 120 days after filing the original petition, a
plaintiff must serve on all parties or their attorneys the expert reports,
including a curriculum vitae for each reporting expert.660 The parties,
however, may arrange to extend the deadline for serving an expert report by

of his employment.” Id. § 1.03(3). A “health care liability claim” was “a cause of action against a health
care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted
standards of medical care or health care or safety which proximately result[ed] in injury to or death of
the patient, whether the patient’s claim or cause of action [was based] in tort or contract.” Id. § 1.03(4).
654. In re Woman’s Hosp. of Tex., Inc., 141 S.W.3d 144, 147 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)
(Owen, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Hecht & Brister, JJ.).
655. Id. (citing Act of May 5, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 140, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 985, 986
(former TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4590i, § 13.01), repealed by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 204, § 10.09, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884 (current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 74.001)).
656. Id.
657. Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 10.11(a)(1), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 884.
658. Mokkala v. Mead, 178 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
See generally TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74 (repealing the Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act of 1977).
659. Mokkala, 178 S.W.3d at 75–76; see McGahey v. Daughters of Charity Health Servs. of
Waco, No. 10-02-00288-CV, 2004 WL 1903300, at *2 & n.4 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 25, 2004, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (noting some of the differences in seeking extensions for filing expert reports between
section 74.351(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code and former Article 4590i).
660. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(a); see also id. § 74.351(r)(6) (defining
“expert report” and providing the requirements necessary to meet this definition).
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a written agreement.661 If an expert report is not timely served, the trial
court, “on the motion of the affected physician or health care provider, shall
. . . [dismiss] the claim with respect to the physician or health care provider,
with prejudice” and award to the affected healthcare provider “reasonable
attorney’s fees and costs.”662 If an expert report is served within 120 days
but “elements of the report are found deficient, the court may grant one 30–
day extension to the claimant in order to cure the deficiency.”663
The statutory criteria of Section 74.351 have been tested extensively for
virtually every factual scenario.664 Appellate review has aided this
experimentation by both interlocutory appeal and mandamus proceeding.
Section 51.014(a) provides that the trial court’s failure to dismiss under
Section 74.351 is subject to interlocutory appeal.665 Cases governed by the
predecessor statute may warrant mandamus relief.666
Regardless of the procedural vehicle used in obtaining appellate review,
the threshold decision regarding the statute’s applicability is a question of
law subject to de novo review.667 A trial court’s decision to dismiss a case

661. Id. § 74.351(a).
662. Id. § 74.351(b).
663. Id. § 74.351(c).
664. Cf. Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 210 (Tex. 2008) (Brister, J., dissenting) (noting that
“a substantial part of the state’s appellate resources are already being expended reviewing preliminary
expert reports”).
665. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(9) (providing interlocutory appeal of an
order that “denies all or part of the relief sought by a motion under Section 74.351(b), except that an
appeal may not be taken from an order granting an extension under Section 74.351”); Ogletree v.
Matthews, 262 S.W.3d 316, 321 (Tex. 2007) (“[T]he trial court retains discretion to grant a thirty day
extension, and the Legislature explicitly stated that such orders are not appealable.”). “A provider may
pursue an interlocutory appeal of the denial of a motion to dismiss when no expert report has been
timely served, whether or not the trial court grants an extension of time.” Badiga v. Lopez, 274 S.W.3d
681, 685 (Tex. 2009). But see Emeritus Corp. v. Highsmith, 211 S.W.3d 321, 326 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2006, pet. denied) (“[W]e hold that section 51.014(a)(9) authorizes an interlocutory appeal of
an order denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss in whole or in part unless the order also grants a
claimant an extension of time pursuant to section 74.351(c) to cure the deficiencies in a timely-served
report.”).
666. See, e.g., In re Collum & Carney Clinic Ass’n, 62 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2001, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief because the trial court failed to dismiss the claim
after the defendant complained that the expert report did not meet the statutory requirements).
667. Wickware v. Sullivan, 70 S.W.3d 214, 218 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.). A
“health care liability claim” is defined as:
[A] cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or
other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or
professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in
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under Section 74.351(b), like its decision under the predecessor statute
(Article 4590i), is reviewed for abuse of discretion.668 The trial court’s
decision to grant an extension to cure a deficient report is also subject to an
abuse of discretion review.669 However, when an expert report is not timely
served, the trial court has no discretion but to dismiss a health care liability
claim.670 Under this standard, the appellate court defers to a trial court’s
factual determinations, but reviews de novo questions of law involving
statutory interpretation and constitutional challenges.671
5.

Dismissal of In Forma Pauperis and Inmate Proceedings

The Texas Constitution and rules of procedure recognize that “courts
must be open to all with legitimate disputes, not just [to] those who can
afford to pay the fees to get in.”672 However, when a party files an
affidavit of inability to pay under Rule 145673 (in forma pauperis) or
under Section 13.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code,674
“the trial court has broad discretion to dismiss the suit” if the
allegation of poverty is false675 or the action is “frivolous or
injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant’s claim or cause of action sounds in tort or
contract.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.001(a)(13). The definition of “health care provider” is also
broader than the predecessor statute. See id. § 74.001(a)(12)(B) (defining “health care provider” to
include any “officer, director, shareholder, member, partner, manager, owner, or affiliate of a health
care provider or physician,” as well as their employees when acting within the scope of their
employment).
668. Compare McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 749 (Tex. 2003) (stating the standard under
Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code), with Bowie Mem’l Hosp. v. Wright,
79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002) (explaining the standard under former Article 4590i), and Am.
Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Tex. 2001) (noting the standard
for reviewing Article 4590i).
669. Ogletree, 262 S.W.3d at 321.
670. Badiga, 274 S.W.3d at 683.
671. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. at Houston v. Joplin, 525 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citing Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Center at Houston v.
Cheatham, 357 S.W.3d 747, 748 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied).
672. Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Thirteenth Court of Appeals, 934 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding) (citing TEX. CONST. art. I, § 13; TEX. R. CIV. P. 145; TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1).
673. TEX. R. CIV. P. 145.
674. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001 (allowing for dismissal of cases upon
finding that the allegation of poverty is false or that the action is frivolous or malicious).
675. McFarland v. Collins, No. 01-96-00376-CV, 1997 WL 69860, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] Feb. 20, 1997, writ denied) (not designated for publication) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 13.001(a)(2)); accord Felix v. Thaler, 923 S.W.2d 650, 651 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, no writ).
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malicious.”676 A trial court’s dismissal of a case under Section 13.001 is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.677 Similar abuse of discretion review
is extended to the trial court’s dismissal of inmate litigation under Section
14.003 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code.678 In 2005, Rule 145
was amended to prohibit the contest of an affidavit that is accompanied by
an attorney’s IOLTA certificate that confirms the party’s inability to pay.679
“In determining whether the action is frivolous, the trial court may
consider whether: (1) the action’s realistic chance of ultimate success is
slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or in fact; or (3) it is clear
that the party cannot prove a set of facts in support of the claim.”680 Of
the three factors set forth in Section 13.001 (or the four factors of Section
14.003), the supreme court has essentially approved as constitutionally
sound only the factor that questions whether the claim has an arguable basis
in law or fact.681 Therefore, before dismissing a petition under Section
13.001(b)(2), the judge must examine the petition to ensure that the claim
has no basis in law and in fact.682 “A claim that has no legal basis is one
based upon an ‘indisputably meritless legal theory,’”683 and a claim that has
676. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001(a)(2). Dismissal may be made on motion
or by the trial court sua sponte. Black v. Jackson, 82 S.W.3d 44, 53 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.).
677. Williams v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 176 S.W.3d 590, 593 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005,
pet. denied); Jones v. CGU Ins. Co., 78 S.W.3d 626, 628 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); Bohannan
v. Tex. Bd. of Criminal Justice, 942 S.W.2d 113, 115 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, writ denied).
678. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(3) (permitting dismissal upon a
finding that the inmate made a filing “that the inmate knew was false”); Johnson v. Tex. Dep’t of
Criminal Justice, 71 S.W.3d 492, 493 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.) (reviewing a trial court’s
dismissal under Section 14.003 for abuse of discretion). Inmate litigation may also be dismissed if the
inmate filed an affidavit or unsworn declaration required by statute that the inmate knew was false.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(a)(3).
679. TEX. R. CIV. P. 145(c).
680. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.001(b). In De La Vega v. Taco Cabana, Inc., the
Fourth Court of Appeals observed that “frivolous” is defined as having no basis in law or fact. De La
Vega v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 974 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.). Inmate
litigation may also be frivolous or malicious if the claim is substantially similar to a prior claim filed by
the inmate arising from the same operative facts. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.003(b)(4).
681. Johnson v. Lynaugh, 796 S.W.2d 705, 706 (Tex. 1990) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1990)).
The Texas Supreme Court observed that the United States Supreme Court has approved the same
factor (the lack of arguable basis in law or fact) as appropriate in the federal context. Id. Furthermore,
the court noted that the Fifth Circuit doubted the validity of the third factor (that the party is unable
to prove facts in support of the claim) in Section 13.001(b)(3). Id.
682. Carson v. Gomez, 841 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig.
proceeding).
683. Black v. Jackson, 82 S.W.3d 44, 53 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.); accord Thomas v.
Holder, 836 S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, no writ); see also McFarland v. Collins, No. 01-
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no factual basis is one that arises out of “fantastic or delusional
scenarios.”684
If the plaintiff desires to appeal without paying for the reporter’s record,
based on an affidavit of inability to pay, the trial court must find that the
appeal is not frivolous and that the reporter’s record is not needed to decide
the issues on appeal.685 In determining whether the appeal is frivolous, the
trial court may consider “whether the appellant has presented a substantial
question for appellate review.”686
I.

Disqualification of Counsel

“A motion to disqualify counsel is the proper procedural vehicle to
challenge an attorney’s representation whenever an attorney seeks to
represent an interest adverse to that of a former client.”687 However,
because disqualification is so severe, courts must be wary of ordering such
a remedy.688 Disqualification may result in “palpable harm, disrupt trial
court proceedings, and deprive a party of the right to have counsel of
choice.”689 In considering a disqualification motion, “the court must
strictly adhere to an exacting standard” to ensure that disqualification is not
used as a dilatory trial tactic.690 Further, a motion to disqualify an attorney
must be timely filed.691 Courts have found that a six-month delay

96-00376-CV, 1997 WL 69860, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 20, 1997, writ denied) (not
designated for publication) (holding that a suit is frivolous if it “allege[s] substantially the same facts
arising from a common series of events already unsuccessfully litigated”).
684. Thomas, 836 S.W.2d at 352.
685. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.003(a); TEX. R. APP. P. 20.1.
686. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 13.003(b).
687. NCNB Tex. Nat’l Bank v. Coker, 765 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding).
“This strict rule is based on a conclusive presumption that confidences and secrets were imparted to
the attorney during the prior representation.” Phoenix Founders, Inc. v. Marshall, 887 S.W.2d 831,
833 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
688. See In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (noting that
disqualification is a severe measure that can result in immediate harm).
689. Id. at 422.
690. Id.; see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Syntek Fin. Corp., 881 S.W.2d 319, 320–21 (Tex. 1994)
(reiterating that “the substantial relationship test” must be met for the movant to establish a basis for
disqualification); Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 399 (stressing the need to strictly adhere to guidelines when
considering a motion to disqualify); In re Taylor, 67 S.W.3d 530, 533 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, orig.
proceeding) (noting that counsel disqualification is an extreme remedy); Walton v. Canon, Short &
Gaston, 23 S.W.3d 143, 157 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.) (declaring that disqualification is a
severe remedy).
691. In re George, 28 S.W.3d 511, 513 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding).
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constituted waiver692 but that a two-month delay did not.693
To disqualify an attorney, the movant must timely offer to the court a
preponderance of the facts proving a substantial relationship between the
present matter and a previous representation.694 The movant must prove
that (1) during the existence of a prior attorney-client relationship, or some
other relationship giving rise to an implied fiduciary obligation; (2) factual
matters were involved that are so related to the facts in the pending
litigation; (3) that the prior relationship creates a “genuine threat that
confidences revealed to his former counsel will be divulged to his present
adversary.”695 To satisfy this burden, the movant must offer “evidence of
specific similarities capable of being recited in the disqualification order.”696
The standard of review used in assessing a trial court’s ruling on a motion
to disqualify is the abuse of discretion standard.697 In addition, the trial
court’s order granting or denying a motion to disqualify may be reviewed by
mandamus.698
J.

Disqualification of Judges
1.

Disqualification and Recusal

Pursuant to Rule 18a, any party may file a motion to recuse the trial judge
if done at least ten days before the date of the trial or other hearing699 and
a motion to disqualify “should be filed as soon as practicable after the
movant knows of the ground stated in the motion.”700 A motion to
disqualify seeks to prevent a judge from hearing a case based on
692. Vaughan v. Walther, 875 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tex. 1994) (orig. proceeding).
693. In re Am. Home Prods. Corp., 985 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding).
694. In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346, 350–51 (Tex. 1998); Ghidoni v. Stone Oak, Inc., 966 S.W.2d
573, 579 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Nat’l Med. Enters., Inc. v. Godbey, 924 S.W.2d
123, 126 (Tex. 1996); Syntek Fin. Corp., 881 S.W.2d at 320–21; Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400; see also Vaughan,
875 S.W.2d at 690 (“A party who fails to file its motion to disqualify opposing counsel in a timely
manner waives the complaint.”).
695. Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400; accord Texaco, Inc. v. Garcia, 891 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. 1995)
(orig. proceeding).
696. Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400.
697. In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 420 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); Walton v.
Canon, Short & Gaston, 23 S.W.3d 143, 151 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, no pet.); Ghidoni, 966 S.W.2d
at 579; Syntek Fin. Corp., 881 S.W.2d at 321; Coker, 765 S.W.2d at 400.
698. In re Sanders, 153 S.W.3d 54, 57 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); In re Nitla S.A., 92 S.W.3d
at 422; Nat’l Med. Enters., 924 S.W.2d at 128; Vaughan, 875 S.W.2d at 691.
699. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b); see also In re O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. 2002)
(demonstrating that in certain situations the ten-day rule may not apply).
700. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(b)(2).
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constitutional or statutory reasons.701 A motion to recuse seeks to prevent
a judge from hearing a case for nonconstitutional or nonstatutory
reasons.702
If a trial judge should have been disqualified but was not, any orders or
judgments rendered by that judge are void and without effect.703 Thus,
disqualification of a judge based on a constitutional prohibition “can be
raised at any point in” a proceeding.704 In contrast, the existence of
grounds for recusal of a judge “does not void or nullify” subsequent
proceedings before that judge and “can be waived if not raised by proper
motion.”705
Upon the filing of a motion to disqualify or recuse, the trial judge must
either recuse himself or request the administrative judicial region’s presiding
judge to assign a judge to hear the motion.706 Rule 18a(j) provides that if
the motion is denied, the order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.707
However, an order granting a motion to recuse is not reviewable.708

701. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 11; TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 21.005, 74.053, 74.059(c)(3),
573.022–.025; TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(a).
702. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18b(b) (delineating when a judge shall recuse himself).
703. O’Connor, 92 S.W.3d at 449.
704. See Buckholts Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Glaser, 632 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tex. 1982) (holding that
an error regarding disqualification may be raised during the proceeding while an error regarding recusal
may be waived); Kennedy v. Wortham, 314 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. denied)
(disqualification of judge “cannot be waived and can be raised at any time”) (citing Buckholts,
632 S.W.2d at 148); (McElwee v. McElwee, 911 S.W.2d 182, 185–86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1995, writ denied) (confirming that a party waives an error regarding recusal when he fails to raise the
issue by a proper motion).
705. In re Union Pac. Res. Co., 969 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tex. 1998); In re E.R.C., 496 S.W.3d 270,
276 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, pet. denied), cert. denied sub nom., Stokes v. Corsbie, 137 S. Ct. 834
(2017).
706. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(1), (g)(1); Rosas v. State, 76 S.W.3d 771, 773 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.). A different procedure applies to tertiary motions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 30.016 (“[A] ‘tertiary recusal motion’ means a third or subsequent motion for recusal or
disqualification . . . .”).
707. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j); Aguilar v. Anderson, 855 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1993, writ denied); J-IV Invs. v. David Lynn Mach., Inc., 784 S.W.2d 106, 107 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1990, no writ); cf. CNA Ins. Co. v. Scheffey, 828 S.W.2d 785, 793 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, writ
denied) (finding that no abuse of discretion review could be conducted because the trial court failed to
conduct a hearing on the motion to recuse).
708. TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(j); Dist. Judges of Collin Cnty. v. Comm’rs Court of Collin Cnty.,
677 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
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Objection to Visiting Trial Judge

When a visiting judge is assigned to a case, the presiding judge is required
to give notice to each party’s attorney if it is reasonable and practicable, time
permitting.709 “If a party to a civil case files a timely objection . . . the judge
shall not hear the case.”710 An objection must be filed “not later than the
seventh day after the date the party receives actual notice of the assignment
or before the date the first hearing or trial, including pretrial hearings,
commences, whichever date occurs earlier,” although the presiding judge
may extend the time to file an objection on written motion and with good
cause.711 An objection to this assignment must be the first matter presented
to the visiting judge for a ruling.712 If a party timely objects to the
assignment, “the judge shall not hear the case.”713 In addition, a former
judge or justice who was not a retired judge when she left office “may not
sit in a case if either party objects to the” assignment.714 The governing
statute is mandatory and does not give the trial court any discretion to rule
on the objection.715 The court of appeals will review such a ruling for an
abuse of discretion and may do so in a mandamus proceeding.716
K. Docket Management
A trial court has a ministerial duty to consider and rule on motions
“properly filed and pending before” the court, “and mandamus may
issue to compel the” judge to act (although not to take a given
action).717 The trial court will be afforded a reasonable time in
which to perform this ministerial duty after the motion is brought to its

709. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(a).
710. Id. § 74.053(b).
711. Id. § 74.053(c).
712. Chandler v. Chandler, 991 S.W.2d 367, 383 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, pet. denied); Morris
v. Short, 902 S.W.2d 566, 569 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied).
713. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b); In re B.F.B., 241 S.W.3d 643, 645–46 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Flores v. Banner, 932 S.W.2d 500, 501 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); In re Cuban, 24 S.W.3d 381, 382 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, orig. proceeding).
714. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(d); accord Cuban, 24 S.W.3d at 382; see also Mitchell
Energy Corp. v. Ashworth, 943 S.W.2d 436, 440–41 (Tex. 1997) (explaining that, for purposes of
objecting to visiting judges, “the proper inquiry is whether the judge had vested under the State Judicial
Retirement system” before leaving office, and not after).
715. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.053(b); Mitchell Energy Corp., 943 S.W.2d at 441.
716. Mitchell Energy Corp., 943 S.W.2d at 441.
717. Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig.
proceeding).
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attention.718 What constitutes a reasonable time depends on the facts and
circumstances in a particular case.719 However, the supreme court has
admonished the trial courts that while “[t]rial courts are generally granted
considerable discretion when it comes to managing their dockets. Such
discretion . . . is not absolute. It has long been the case that ‘a delay of an
unreasonable duration . . ., if not sufficiently explained, will raise a
conclusive presumption of abandonment of the plaintiff’s suit.’”720
Generally, however, a trial court is given wide discretion in managing
its docket721 to achieve “economy of time and effort for itself, for
counsel, and for litigants.”722 Under Rule 166, a trial court has the
discretion to summon the parties and their counsel to a pretrial conference
so that a discovery schedule may be set and other important matters may be
Although a trial court is given wide “latitude in
resolved.723
managing discovery and preparing a case for trial,” that latitude is not
unlimited, particularly in the mass tort context.724 A trial court’s order
relating to the management of its docket is reviewed for a clear abuse
of discretion.725

718. Barnes v. State, 832 S.W.2d 424, 426 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig.
proceeding); see also Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 49 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ
denied) (stating that a trial court cannot consider a motion unless the motion has been brought to the
court’s attention).
719. In re Salazar, 134 S.W.3d 357, 358 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, orig. proceeding).
720. In re Conner, 458 S.W.3d 552, 534 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Callahan v. Staples, 161 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1942)).
721. Polaris Inv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Abascal, 892 S.W.2d 860, 861 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding)
(per curiam); Clanton v. Clark, 639 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1982); Stockton v. Cotton Bledsoe Tighe &
Dawson, P.C., No. 09-03-00586-CV, 2005 WL 66570, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Jan. 13, 2005, no
pet.) (mem. op.); In re Carter, 958 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1997, orig. proceeding);
Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 38; Emp’rs Ins. of Wausau v. Horton, 797 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1990, no writ); see also Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979)
(recognizing the inherent power of a trial court “to aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the
administration of justice, and in the preservation of its independence and integrity”).
722. Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 38 (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).
723. Taiwan Shrimp Farm Vill. Ass’n v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev., Inc., 915 S.W.2d 61, 69
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
724. See In re Allied Chem. Corp., 227 S.W.3d 652, 658–59 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)
(determining that the setting of a trial in a mass tort case without requiring certain discovery responses
was an abuse of discretion); In re Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 62 S.W.3d 197, 200 (Tex. 2001) (orig.
proceeding) (holding that a blanket abatement of discovery in a mass tort case is an abuse of discretion).
725. Clanton, 639 S.W.2d at 931; Metzger, 892 S.W.2d at 38; Horton, 797 S.W.2d at 680.
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L. Forum Non Conveniens
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, “[t]he doctrine of forum
non conveniens, which originated in the common law and is now codified
in Texas, ‘comes into play when there are sufficient contacts between the
defendant and the forum state to confer personal jurisdiction upon the trial
court, but the case itself has no significant connection to the forum.’”726
The trial court has discretionary power to decline jurisdiction if the
convenience of the parties and “justice would be better served” in another
forum that could have maintained the suit.727 Upon a party’s written
motion to stay or dismiss, the trial court may refuse to impose its jurisdiction
over the case even though venue is proper in the instant forum.728 When
a party seeks to stay or dismiss a claim, the court will consider the following
factors:
(1) an alternate forum exists in which the claim or action may be tried;
(2) the alternate forum provides an adequate remedy;
(3) maintenance of the claim or action in the courts of this state would work
a substantial injustice to the moving party;
(4) the alternate forum, as a result of the submission of the parties or
otherwise, can exercise jurisdiction over all the defendants properly joined to
the plaintiff’s claim;
(5) the balance of the private interests of the parties and the public interest of
the state predominate in favor of the claim or action being brought in an
alternate forum, which shall include consideration of the extent to which an
injury or death resulted from acts or omissions that occurred in this state; and

726. In re Bridgestone Ams. Tire Operations, LLC, 459 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tex. 2015) (orig
proceeding) (quoting In re Pirelli Tire, LLC, 247 S.W.3d 670, 675–76 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)).
727. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Webb, 809 S.W.2d 899, 901 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1991, writ
dism’d w.o.j.); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. Castro Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 695–96 (Tex. 1990) (explaining
the process courts must go through before declining jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens), superseded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(i), as recognized in Jones
v. Raytheon Aircraft Servs., Inc., 120 S.W.3d 40, 44 & n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied)
(recognizing that the supreme court’s finding in Dow Chemical that the forum non conveniens doctrined
is not applicable to wrongful death cases was overturned by the legislature in 2003).
728. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b); see also Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 675–
76 (discussing the doctrine’s common-law roots).
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(6) the stay or dismissal would not result in unreasonable duplication or
proliferation of litigation.729

An appellate court reviews a trial court’s decision about whether to
dismiss a case on forum non conveniens grounds for an abuse of
discretion.730 An order denying a motion to dismiss based on forum non
conveniens may be reviewed in a mandamus proceeding.731 If a trial court
“grants a motion to stay or dismiss an action under the doctrine forum non
conveniens,” it must issue “findings of fact and conclusions of law,”
although the effect of such findings and conclusions is questionable.732
Finally, the trial court does not have the discretion to stay or dismiss the
case if the plaintiff is a legal resident of Texas.733
M. Gag Orders
When a trial court issues a gag order prohibiting discussion of a case
outside of the courtroom (prior restraint), the order is reviewed for its
constitutionality.734 To withstand this review standard, the court must
729. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(b)(1)–(6). See generally In re Gen. Elec. Co.,
271 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. 2008) (discussing how Section 71.051(b) has been amended and no longer places
the burden of proof on a particular party in regard to the factors enumerated in the statute). Prior to
2003, the statutory language provided that a case “‘may’ be stayed or dismissed under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens.” Id. at 686 (citing Act of May 27, 1997, 75th Leg., R.S., ch. 424, § 1, 1997 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1680, amended by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 3.04, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws
847, 854).
730. Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d at 569; Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 676.
731. Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 679.
732. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(f). The supreme court’s recognition of a
trial court’s discretion to stay or dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds predates this statutory
requirement. Pirelli Tire, 247 S.W.3d at 676–77. It would be theoretically possible to review the trial
court’s facts for sufficiency of the evidence while reviewing its legal conclusions de novo. Compare
Lonza AG v. Blum, 70 S.W.3d 184, 188 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (arguing that the
“proper standard of review of a plea to the jurisdiction . . . is abuse of discretion”), with BMC Software
Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002) (stating that a trial court’s order denying a
special appearance should be reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency in its findings of fact and
reviewed de novo in its findings of law).
733. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051(e); Bridgestone, 459 S.W.3d at 569; In re Ford
Motor Co., 442 S.W.3d 265, 269 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding); Owens Corning v. Carter, 997 S.W.2d
560, 568–71 (Tex. 1999).
734. Grigsby v. Coker, 904 S.W.2d 619, 620–21 (Tex. 1995) (orig. proceeding); see also
Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 10 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing that some aspects
of free speech under the Texas Constitution are broader than the federal counterpart). But see
Operation Rescue-Nat’l v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 975 S.W.2d 546, 559 (Tex.
1998) (“We know of nothing to suggest that injunctions restricting speech should be judged by a
different standard under the state constitution than the First Amendment.”).
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make written findings supported by the evidence.735 The order must be
supported by specific findings based on evidence establishing (1) that “an
imminent and irreparable harm to the judicial process will” result, depriving
the “litigants of a just resolution of their dispute, and” (2) that the order
“represents the least restrictive means” available to prevent the harm.736
This two-part constitutional test is a question of law reviewed de novo.737
Gag orders may be challenged by mandamus.738
N. Injunctive Relief
Injunctions are a form of equitable relief that may also be authorized by
statute.739 “The purpose of a TRO [(temporary restraining order)] is to
preserve the status quo, which . . . [is] ‘the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status [that] preceded the pending controversy.’”740 The purpose
of a temporary injunction “is to preserve the status quo of the litigation’s
subject matter pending a trial on the merits.”741 “The purpose of a
permanent injunction is to grant the injunctive relief to which the applicant
[or movant] is entitled as part of the final judgment after a trial on the
merits.”742 Injunctions are extraordinary remedies, not relief owed to any
party.743
735. Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 10. The Texas Supreme Court has applied the Davenport test to
prior restraints on expression. Ex parte Tucci, 859 S.W.2d 1, 5–6 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
736. Grigsby, 904 S.W.2d at 620; Davenport, 834 S.W.2d at 9.
737. Markel v. World Flight, Inc., 938 S.W.2d 74, 79–80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no
writ); Siebert v. AFL-CIO Union Pines Houston Tr., No. 04-95-00575-CV, 1995 WL 702533, at *1–2
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 30, 1995, no writ) (not designated for publication); see also Harris Cnty.
Hosp. Dist. v. Tomball Reg’l Hosp., 283 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2009) (requiring de novo review of
constitutional issues).
738. Markel, 938 S.W.2d at 79–80.
739. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 65.011(c); see, e.g., In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d 313,
317 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (discussing a provision for injunctive relief provided by the Texas
Election Code).
740. In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648, 651 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Janis Films, Inc.
v. City of Fort Worth, 358 S.W.2d 589, 589 (Tex. 1962)).
741. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); see also Newton, 146 S.W.3d at
651 n.12 (“The issuance of a temporary restraining order, like the issuance of a temporary injunction,
is to maintain the status quo between the parties.”); Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 57 (Tex. 1993)
(explaining that a court may grant a temporary writ of injunction to preserve the status quo of a pending
trial).
742. Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. SSC Settlements, LLC, 251 S.W.3d 129, 147 (Tex. App.—Tyler
2008, pet. denied) (quoting NMTC Corp. v. Conarroe, 99 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Tex. App.—Beaumont
2003, no pet.)).
743. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Nolte Irrigation Co. v. Willis, 180 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 1944, writ ref’d w.o.m.).
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While an interlocutory appeal from the grant or denial of a temporary
injunction is allowed,744 no statutory provision permits an appeal from the
grant or denial of a temporary restraining order.745 Mandamus relief from
a temporary restraining order may nonetheless be available under unusual
circumstances.746
To be entitled to a temporary injunction, the movant must show: “(1) a
cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief
sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the
interim.”747 An irreparable injury exists if the party injured cannot
sufficiently be compensated in damages or the amount of damages is
immeasurable by pecuniary standards.748 A temporary injunction is subject
to equitable principles such as laches or the clean hands doctrine.749

744. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4).
745. See Lesikar v. Rappeport, 899 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Tex. 1995) (holding that whether an order
is a non-appealable temporary restraining order or an appealable temporary injunction depends on the
order’s characteristics and function, not its title).
746. See In re Office of the Att’y Gen., 257 S.W.3d 695, 698 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding)
(addressing a temporary restraining order that did not state a basis and was extended without setting a
trial date); Newton, 146 S.W.3d at 652–53 (involving a temporary restraining order affecting a party’s
rights to participate in an election that would be over before the order expired); In re Tex. Natural Res.
Conservation Comm’n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 207 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (holding that “mandamus is
available to remedy a temporary restraining order that violates Rule 680’s time limitations”). These
cases involve highly unusual circumstances. Most courts are likely to find an adequate remedy by
appeal should the temporary restraining order be converted to a temporary injunction. See In re
Benkiser, No. 01-08-00451-CV, 2008 WL 2388044, at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 9, 2008,
orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (concluding that, although an appeal was set after the election in question
and kept relators from participating in the election, relators failed to establish a lack of remedy by
appeal); see also In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 538 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (“This Court may
review a temporary injunction from a petition for writ of mandamus when an expedited appeal would
be inadequate . . . .”).
747. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; see also Bob E. Shannon et al., Temporary Restraining Orders and
Temporary Injunctions in Texas—A Ten Year Survey, 1975–1985, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 689, 700–21 (1986)
(setting forth the factors for issuing injunctive relief). Statutory bases of injunctive relief may or may
not dispense with these common-law requirements. Compare David Jasen West & Pydia, Inc. v. State,
212 S.W.3d 513, 519 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, no pet.) (holding that the injunction authorized by the
Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act supersedes the common law elements), with
Town of Palm Valley v. Johnson, 87 S.W.3d 110, 110–11 (Tex. 2001) (construing Section 65.011(1) of
the Civil Practice and Remedies Code as requiring proof of irreparable harm, despite language
suggesting the contrary).
748. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.
749. See In re Gamble, 71 S.W.3d 313, 317 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding) (noting that “a request
for injunctive relief” calls upon a court’s equity jurisdiction); see also In re Francis, 186 S.W.3d 534, 551
(Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (Wainwright, J., dissenting, joined by O’Neill & Johnson, JJ.)
(recognizing that the clean hands doctrine can prevent a party from obtaining a temporary injunction);
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Whether a party is entitled to invoke an equitable defense “is a
determination left to the [sound] discretion of the trial court.”750
In an interlocutory appeal from a temporary injunction,751 the merits of
the movant’s case are not presented for the appellate court’s review;752
therefore, a “trial court may not grant a temporary injunction” that would
accomplish the objective of the lawsuit.753 Appellate review is strictly
limited to evaluating whether there has been an abuse of discretion.754
Where the facts definitively indicate that a party is in violation of the law,
the court is under a duty to enjoin the violation, thereby eliminating the need
for the court to exercise its discretion.755
All orders that grant a temporary injunction are required to include a date
setting the case for trial on the merits.756 Failure to include an order setting
the matter for a trial on the merits mandates dissolution of the
injunction.757 Furthermore, the trial court must detail the specific reasons
it relied upon in ruling on whether a temporary injunction should be granted
or denied.758 The trial court is not required to explain why it believes an
applicant has shown probable entitlement to final relief; however, the trial
court must divulge the reasons why injury will occur if the temporary
injunction is not granted.759 If the order fails to meet these requirements,
Keene v. Reed, 340 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. App.—Waco 1960, writ ref’d) (acknowledging that the
equitable principle of laches can keep a party from obtaining a temporary injunction).
750. Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 551 (Wainwright, J., dissenting, joined by O’Neill & Johnson, JJ.).
751. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4).
752. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 861 (Tex. 1978).
753. Tex. Foundries, Inc. v. Int’l Moulders & Foundry Workers’ Union, 248 S.W.2d 460, 464
(Tex. 1952); accord Francis, 186 S.W.3d at 552 (Wainwright, J., dissenting).
754. In re Nitla S.A. de C.V., 92 S.W.3d 419, 422 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding); Butnaru v. Ford
Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002); Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993).
755. Priest v. Tex. Animal Health Comm’n, 780 S.W.2d 874, 876 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no
writ); City of Houston v. Mem’l Bend Util. Co., 331 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston 1960, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
756. TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex.
2000); see also EOG Res., Inc. v. Gutierrez, 75 S.W.3d 50, 52 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.)
(explaining that the trial court’s order did not set the case for trial and thus violated Rule 683).
757. Qwest, 24 S.W.3d at 337; InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d
640, 641 (Tex. 1986); EOG Res., 75 S.W.3d at 52; Ebony Lake Healthcare Ctr. v. Tex. Dep’t of Human
Servs., 62 S.W.3d 867, 870 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.).
758. Big D Props., Inc. v. Foster, 2 S.W.3d 21, 22 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, no pet.)
(quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 683); Arrechea v. Plantowsky, 705 S.W.2d 186, 189 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1985, no writ); Univ. Interscholastic League v. Torres, 616 S.W.2d 355, 357–58
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1981, no writ).
759. State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex. 1971); Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex.
v. City of Austin, 710 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex. App.—Austin 1986, no writ); accord Transp. Co. of Tex.
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it is rendered fatally defective and void, requiring reversal regardless of
whether the issue was raised by issue or point of error.760
In an appeal from a permanent injunction, the standard of review is also
an abuse of discretion.761 A litigant is entitled to a jury trial in an injunction
action, but only the ultimate factual issues are submitted for their
determination.762 The jury is not entitled to “determine the expediency,
necessity or propriety of equitable relief.”763 Thus, the trial court’s order
granting or denying a permanent injunction based upon the ultimate facts is
reviewed the same as an order regarding a temporary injunction.764
O. Joinder
Joinder and intervention are distinct.765 While intervention is automatic
unless challenged,766 “permissive joinder relates to ‘proper parties to an
action who may be joined or omitted at the pleader’s election’” under
various rules of pleading and procedure.767 “A court’s decision on joinder
should be based on practical considerations with a view to what is fair and
orderly.”768 A trial court has discretion in such matters, and its decisions
“will not be disturbed on appeal” absent an abuse of discretion.769 A
joinder decision may also be reviewed by writ of mandamus.770
v. Robertson Transps., Inc., 261 S.W.2d 549, 552–53 (Tex. 1953); Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. at Houston
v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992), aff’d as modified, 901 S.W.2d 926
(Tex. 1995); Beckham v. Beckham 672 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ);
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 683 (requiring every order that grants an injunction or restraining order to “set
forth the reasons for its issuance”).
760. Arrechea, 705 S.W.2d at 189; Torres, 616 S.W.2d at 358.
761. Jim Rutherford Inv., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass’n, 25 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied); Tri-State Pipe & Equip., Inc. v. S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.,
8 S.W.3d 394, 401 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.); SRS Prods. Co., Inc. v. LG Eng’g Co.,
994 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); Priest v. Tex. Animal Health
Comm’n, 780 S.W.2d 874, 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, no writ).
762. Priest, 780 S.W.2d at 876.
763. Id.; see also Alamo Title Co. v. San Antonio Bar Ass’n, 360 S.W.2d 814, 816 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (acknowledging that a jury in equity should not determine issues related
to the “expediency, necessity, or propriety of [the] relief”).
764. Priest, 780 S.W.2d at 875–76.
765. In re Union Carbide Corp., 273 S.W.3d 152, 155 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
766. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990).
767. TEX. R. CIV. P. 37–40, 51(a), 97(f); see also Union Carbide, 273 S.W.3d at 155 (describing
permissive joinder and noting that the joinder standard is distinct from the intervention standard).
768. In re Arthur Andersen LLP, 121 S.W.3d 471, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003,
orig. proceeding).
769. Allison v. Ark. La. Gas Co., 624 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. 1981).
770. Arthur Andersen, 121 S.W.3d at 483.
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When more than one plaintiff joins a case, each plaintiff must establish
proper venue independently from all other plaintiffs.771 If a plaintiff cannot
independently demonstrate “proper venue” under a mandatory or
permissive venue statute, the case must be transferred to a county of proper
venue or dismissed unless the plaintiff can establish the four joinder
requirements of Section 15.003(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies
Code.772 In determining proper venue, “[p]roperly pleaded venue facts are
taken as true unless specifically denied,” in which case prima facie proof of
the denied facts must be made, including “affidavits and duly proved
attachments.”773
A trial court’s determination under Section 15.003(a) is an appealable
interlocutory order.774 A trial court’s decision regarding transfer of venue
now subject to interlocutory appeal under the exception set forth in Section
15.003(a) and (b).775 The standard of review applicable to the trial court’s
order based on Section 15.003(a) is, by statute, de novo.776
P. Judicial Notice
Pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, a trial court upon
its own motion may, or upon the motion of a party shall, take judicial notice
of the constitutions, public statutes, rules, regulations, ordinances, court
decisions, and common law of every other state, territory, or jurisdiction of
771. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a).
772. Surgitek v. Abel, 997 S.W.2d 598, 602 (Tex. 1999); O’Quinn v. Hall, 77 S.W.3d 438, 448–
49 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). The four-prong joinder requirements are:
(1) joinder of that plaintiff or intervention in the suit by that plaintiff is proper under the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) maintaining venue as to that plaintiff in the county of suit does not
unfairly prejudice another party to the suit; (3) there is an essential need to have that plaintiff’s
claim tried in the county in which the suit is pending; and (4) the county in which the suit is
pending is a fair and convenient venue for that plaintiff and all persons against whom the suit is
brought.
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a)(1)–(4).
773. O’Quinn, 77 S.W.3d at 448–49.
774. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(b) (permitting interlocutory appeal when
a trial court determines that: “(1) a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue; or (2)
a plaintiff that did not independently establish proper venue did or did not establish the items
prescribed by Subsections (a)(1)–(4)”).
775. Id. § 15.003(a), (b); Union Pac. R. Co. v. Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d 233, 236 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2013, pet. dism’d).
776. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c)(1); Surgitek, 997 S.W.2d at 603. An
appeal is accelerated and stays trial of the case. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(c)(2),
(d).
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the United States.777 A party who wants judicial notice to be taken of a
given matter must provide the court with enough information to allow it to
properly consider the request, and must provide all parties such notice as
the court deems necessary for them to counter the request.778 Whether
these requirements have been met is left largely to the trial court’s
discretion.779 As one court has noted, “the sufficiency of a motion to take
judicial notice is a question best answered by the trial court.”780 However,
“once the law has been invoked by proper motion, the trial court has no
discretion—it must acknowledge that law.”781
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Evidence 201, a trial judge may also take
judicial notice of a fact if it is “not subject to reasonable dispute because it:
(1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or
(2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned.”782 In addition, facts that are notorious
and indisputable,783 or “well known and easily ascertainable,”784 may be
judicially noticed. However, simply because a trial judge has personal
knowledge of a fact does not permit the judge to take judicial notice of it.785
The test on review is whether the fact to be judicially noticed is “verifiably
certain.”786

777. TEX. R. EVID. 202.
778. Id.; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Gunderson, Inc., 235 S.W.3d 287, 290 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. withdrawn); see also In re Gonzales, No. 07-06-00324-CV, 2006 WL
2588696, at *1 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 6, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (explaining that while
the movant is entitled to a hearing, the trial court is entitled to a reasonable time to rule on the motion).
779. See Daugherty v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 772 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. 1989) (noting that the failure
to plead a statute or regulation does not preclude the trial court from judicially noticing it).
780. Keller v. Nevel, 699 S.W.2d 211, 211 (Tex. 1985). The appellate courts may also take
judicial notice of their own records. Victory v. State, 158 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tex. 1942); Birdo v.
Holbrook, 775 S.W.2d 411, 412 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ denied).
781. Keller, 699 S.W.2d at 212; see also Eppenauer v. Eppenauer, 831 S.W.2d 30, 31 n.1 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1992, no writ) (indicating that a court must take judicial notice of any fact whenever
the court is given the proper information).
782. TEX. R. EVID. 201(b); see also In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005) (quoting Rule 201(b)).
783. Harper v. Killion, 348 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1961).
784. Barber v. Intercoast Jobbers & Brokers, 417 S.W.2d 154, 158 (Tex. 1967) (naming wellknown geographical facts as an example of things that are commonly judicially noticed); see also City of
Houston v. Todd, 41 S.W.3d 289, 301 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (reiterating
that if a fact is “notorious, well-known, or easily ascertainable,” then judicial notice may be taken of
that fact).
785. Eagle Trucking Co. v. Tex. Bitulithic Co., 612 S.W.2d 503, 506 (Tex. 1981).
786. Id.; Levit v. Adams, 841 S.W.2d 478, 485 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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Q. Jury Demand
The Texas Supreme Court has observed that “[t]he right to jury trial is
one of our most precious rights, holding ‘a sacred place in English and
American history.’”787 While a party has a constitutional right to trial by
jury,788 the right is not absolute.789 If a party desires a jury trial, Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 216 requires the party (1) to file with the court clerk a
written request within a “reasonable time before the date set for trial . . . but
not less than thirty days in advance”790 and (2) to pay the jury fee.791 As
long as the party requests a jury trial at least thirty days before trial, it “is
presumed to have been made a reasonable time before trial.”792
The trial court has no discretion to refuse a jury trial if the fee is paid
and request is made on or before the appearance date.793 If the trial court
denies a jury trial, it will be considered harmful error if the case involves
questions of material fact.794 In determining whether a late request for a
jury trial should be granted or denied, the supreme court has
reminded the courts that a trial court should grant “the right to jury trial if
it can be done without interfering with the court’s docket, delaying the
trial, or injuring the opposing party.”795 The trial court’s decision will be

787. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (quoting
White v. White, 196 S.W. 508, 512 (Tex. 1917)).
788. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15; Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp. v. Rhyne, 925 S.W.2d 664, 666 (Tex.
1996).
789. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 10; In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 132 (Tex. 2004)
(orig. proceeding) (holding that the constitutional right to trial by jury may be waived via contract so
long as the waiver is made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences).
790. TEX. R. CIV. P. 216(a); see also Glazer’s Wholesale Distribs., Inc. v. Heineken USA, Inc.,
95 S.W.3d 286, 305–06 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (noting that a litigant perfects
a jury trial request when the litigant demands a jury trial and pays the necessary fee).
791. TEX. R. CIV. P. 216(b); Huddle v. Huddle, 696 S.W.2d 895, 895 (Tex. 1985).
792. Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 371 (Tex. 1991); cf. In re T.H., 131 S.W.3d 598, 601–
02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, pet. denied) (upholding the denial of request for jury trial made after
trial had already begun).
793. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Tex. 2004) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 216, 220); Squires
v. Squires, 673 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ). But see Prudential,
148 S.W.3d at 140–41 (directing the trial court to quash a jury demand and set the case on the nonjury
docket when the parties had contractually waived their right to jury trial).
794. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 98. “A refusal to grant a jury trial is harmless error only if the
record shows that no material issues of fact exist and an instructed verdict would have been justified.”
Halsell v. Dehoyos, 810 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1991).
795. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 476 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding); see also
Taylor v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 93, 101 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (noting that courts abuse their
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reviewed for an abuse of discretion.796
R. Personal Jurisdiction
“[P]ersonal jurisdiction concerns the court’s power to bind a particular
person or party.”797 “[F]or a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant, due process requires [that the defendant] have
purposefully established such minimum contacts with the forum state that
it could reasonably anticipate being sued in the courts” of Texas.798 The
nonresident’s contacts with Texas “may give rise to either general or specific
jurisdiction.”799 If the defendant has “continuous and systematic contacts
with the forum,” general jurisdiction is established.800 Furthermore, when
the defendant’s alleged liability relates to or arises from activity that occurred
within the state, specific jurisdiction is established.801
A special appearance is used to challenge the trial court’s jurisdiction over
the person or property based on the claim that neither is amenable to
process in this state.802 To make this challenge a success, one must first be
discretion if they deny a properly made request for a jury trial if the opposition has not shown that
such granting would cause it injury, interfere with the docket, or infringe on court procedure). In
General Motors Corporation v. Gayle, the court observed that a “failure to make [a timely jury fee payment]
does not forfeit the right to have a trial by jury when such failure does not operate to the prejudice of
the opposite party.” Gayle, 951 S.W.2d at 476 (alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Plummer, 9 S.W.
672, 673 (Tex. 1888)); see also In re D.R., 177 S.W.3d 574, 580 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,
pet. denied) (upholding denial of jury request when trial court record revealed opposing side had been
preparing their case and submitting evidence based on the understanding there would not be a jury).
796. See In re Fallis, No. 04-08-00781-CV, 2009 WL 262119, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
Feb. 4, 2009, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (illustrating error raised in a petition for writ of mandamus);
Taylor v. Taylor, 63 S.W.3d 93, 101 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (illustrating error raised in an
appeal from a final judgment); In re V.R.W., 41 S.W.3d 183, 194 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, no pet.) (discussing that a trial court’s denial of a jury trial “is reviewed under the abuse of
discretion standard”).
797. CSR, Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding).
798. Commonwealth Gen. Corp. v. York, 177 S.W.3d 923, 924 (Tex. 2005); see PHC-Minden,
L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 2007) (“Personal jurisdiction over nonresident
defendants is constitutional when: (1) the defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum
state, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.” (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 325 U.S. 310, 316 (1945))).
799. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d at 925.
800. Id.
801. Id.; see also Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 585 (Tex. 2007)
(requiring substantial connection between defendant’s contacts with the forum and the operative facts
of the litigation).
802. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a; GFTA Trendanalysen B.G.A. Herrdum GMBH & Co. v. Varme,
991 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. 1999). For a history of this procedural vehicle in Texas, see Kelly v. Gen.
Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 658 (Tex. 2010).
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a nonresident of Texas because it is presumed that Texas courts
automatically have jurisdiction over Texas residents.803 “The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of pleading sufficient allegations to bring a nonresident
. . . within the provisions of the long-arm statute.”804 To prevail on a
special appearance, the nonresident defendant has the burden to negate all
forms of personal jurisdiction claimed by the plaintiff.805
A trial court considering a special appearance should address arguments
concerning the forum’s jurisdiction over the defendant and should not hear
any arguments regarding defects in service.806 “[D]efective jurisdictional
allegations in the petition, defective service of process, and defects in the
citation must be challenged by a motion to quash, not a special
appearance.”807 A special appearance motion that appropriately challenges
personal jurisdiction is not converted into a general appearance merely
because it also challenges the method of service.808
If a defendant’s special appearance is rejected, the defendant should ask
the court to prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law, including the
reporter’s record from the hearing on appeal.809 The reporter’s record is
necessary only if the trial court considered evidence at the hearing—
that is, more than a hearing conducted on paper, or with affidavits or
exhibits filed with the clerk—using exhibits and testimony presented in
open court beyond that which is already on file with the clerk.810 All of the
evidence before the trial court on the question of personal or in rem
jurisdiction is considered by the appellate court in determining the propriety

803. See Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 201, 203 (Tex. 1985) (observing
that Rule 120a permits only a nonresident defendant to challenge jurisdiction of the court over one’s
person or property).
804. BMC Software Belgium, N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 793 (Tex. 2002); see also Kelly,
301 S.W.3d at 658 n.4 (“While the pleadings are essential to frame the jurisdictional dispute, they are
not dispositive.”).
805. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 793; CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (orig.
proceeding).
806. Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 47 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]),
writ ref’d n.r.e., 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985).
807. Kawasaki, 699 S.W.2d at 203.
808. See GFTA v. Varme, 991 S.W.2d 785, 786 (Tex. 1999) (noting that a defendant does not
waive a jurisdictional challenge when contesting the method of service in a special appearance).
809. Pessina v. Rosson, 77 S.W.3d 293, 297 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. denied); DaimlerBenz Aktiengesellschaft v. Olson, 21 S.W.3d 707, 715 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.);
Fish v. Tandy Corp., 948 S.W.2d 886, 891–92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, writ denied).
810. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 781–82 (Tex. 2005).
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of the trial court’s ruling.811
A trial court’s order granting or denying a special appearance is an
appealable interlocutory order.812 “Whether a court can exercise
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is a question of law.”813
Generally, a trial court must resolve disputed questions of fact before
resolving the jurisdiction issue.814 If the trial judge enters findings of fact
and conclusions of law, the factual determinations are subject to legal and
factual sufficiency standards of review.815 The trial judge’s legal
conclusions are reviewed de novo.816 While an appellant may not challenge
conclusions of law for their factual sufficiency, the appellate court may
review the lower court’s legal conclusions based on the facts to review their
correctness.817 If the reviewing court finds an erroneous conclusion of law,
but the trial court’s judgment was proper, the erroneous legal conclusion
will not warrant reversal.818
If a trial court fails to include findings of fact and conclusions of law in
its order on special appearance, and the record on appeal does not include
the reporter’s record or clerk’s record, all facts which are necessary to
uphold the judgment, as well as those facts supported by the evidence, are
811. Texana Cmty. MHMR Ctr. v. Silvas, 62 S.W.3d 317, 323 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001,
no pet.); Silva v. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo, 28 S.W.3d 122, 124 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2000, pet. denied);
Fish, 948 S.W.2d at 892.
812. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(7). The interlocutory appeal “stays the
commencement of a trial in the trial court pending resolution of the appeal.” Id. § 51.014(b); accord In
re AIU Ins. Co., 148 S.W.3d. 109, 119 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding); see Raymond Overseas Holding,
Ltd. v. Curry, 955 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, orig. proceeding) (stating that the
recent amendments to the Civil Practice and Remedies Code provide for an interlocutory appeal from
an order granting or denying a special appearance). The availability of this interlocutory appeal
eliminates the need to seek mandamus relief on review of an order denying a special appearance. See
CSR Ltd. v. Link, 925 S.W.2d 591, 596 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (expressing that circumstances
worthy of mandamus relief are not found when a special appearance is denied in an ordinary case, but
allowing mandamus to be used upon denial of special appearance in mass tort case due to
“extraordinary circumstances”).
813. Kelly v. Gen. Interior Constr., Inc., 301 S.W.3d 653, 657 (Tex. 2010) (citing Moki Mac
River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex.2007); see also Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc.
v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 805–06 (Tex. 2002) (reviewing legal conclusions relating to the grant or
denial of a special appearance de novo); BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794
(Tex. 2002) (“Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant is a question of law.”).
814. Am. Type Culture, 83 S.W.3d at 806; BMC Software 83 S.W.3d at 794.
815. See BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794 (rejecting the abuse of discretion standard that had
been applied by some courts of appeals).
816. Id.
817. Id.
818. Id.
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implied.819 When the record includes both the reporter’s record and the
clerk’s record, the implied findings are inconclusive, and thus they may be
challenged for their factual and legal sufficiency.820 Finally, if findings of
fact are not issued, the reviewing court should assume that the trial court
found all factual disputes favorable to its order.821 If the special appearance
is based upon undisputed or established facts, the appellate court conducts
a de novo review of the trial court’s order.822
S.

Pleadings

Technically, “pleadings” are petitions and answers.823 As a practical
matter, practitioners often use the term “pleadings” to include all manner of
motions filed in the trial court.824 For purposes of this subsection, the term
is broadly construed because the concepts discussed may apply to motions
and other pleas for affirmative relief in addition to answers and petitions.
1.

Special Exceptions

A petition is sufficient if it gives “fair and adequate notice of the facts
upon which the pleader bases his claim.”825 Special exceptions are “used
to challenge the sufficiency of a pleading.”826 If a pleading fails to give fair

819. Id. at 795.
820. Id.
821. Am. Type Culture Collection, Inc. v. Coleman, 83 S.W.3d 801, 806 (Tex. 2002); see BMC
Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (noting that simply more than a scintilla of evidence will defeat the evidence
challenge).
822. Ahadi v. Ahadi, 61 S.W.3d 714, 718 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. denied),
overruled on other grounds by Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 791–92 (Tex.
2005) (“[W]e disapprove of those opinions holding that . . . specific jurisdiction is necessarily
established by allegations or evidence that a nonresident committed a tort in a telephone call from a
Texas number . . . .”); Conner v. Conticarriers & Terminak, Inc., 944 S.W.2d 405, 411 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
823. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 45 (defining pleadings); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 13, 21, 21b
(distinguishing motions from pleadings); Crain v. San Jacinto Sav. Ass’n, 781 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ dism’d) (holding that a motion is not the functional equivalent
of a pleading and does not carry the same legal significance).
824. See Lindley v. Flores, 672 S.W.2d 612, 614 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ)
(“[W]e hold that motions are in the nature of pleadings . . . .”).
825. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp. v. Auld, 34 S.W.3d 887, 897 (Tex. 2000) (quoting Roark
v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex. 1982)); Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Doe, 903 S.W.2d 347, 354
(Tex. 1995) (quoting Roark, 633 S.W.2d at 810).
826. Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998).
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notice,827 the defendant should specially except to the petition pursuant to
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91.828 If no special exceptions are filed, the
pleadings will be construed liberally in the pleading party’s favor.829 The
purpose of special exceptions is to “point out intelligibly and with
particularity the defect, omission, obscurity, duplicity, generality, or other
insufficiency in the allegations”830 or otherwise require the adverse party to
clarify his pleadings “when they are not clear or sufficiently specific.”831
Special exceptions apply to petitions and answers,832 but may be used in
motion practice as well.833
Generally, if a trial court sustains a party’s special exceptions, the other
party must be afforded the opportunity to make amendments to the
pleadings before the case is dismissed.834 If the defect in the pleading is
not cured after amendment, the trial court may then dismiss the case.835 In
reviewing the trial court’s order of dismissal upon special exceptions, the
appellate court is required to accept as true all the factual allegations set forth

827. See City of Houston v. Howard, 786 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
1990, writ denied) (defining the test of “fair notice” as whether a reasonably competent opposing
attorney is able to understand the character of the controversy and what testimony probably will be
relevant).
828. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91. The State is not precluded from challenging pleadings in a plea to the
jurisdiction or motion for summary judgment. State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 884 (Tex. 2009).
829. Horizon, 34 S.W.3d at 897; Paramount Pipe & Supply Co. v. Muhr, 749 S.W.2d 491, 495
(Tex. 1988).
830. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91; see also State ex rel. White v. Bradley, 956 S.W.2d 725, 744 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1997) (affirming the broad discretion of the court when ruling on special exceptions), rev’d
on other grounds, 990 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. 1999).
831. Villarreal v. Martinez, 834 S.W.2d 450, 451 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); see
also Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied) (noting that if
the pleading party refuses to amend or if the amended pleading fails to state a cause of action, summary
judgment may be granted); San Benito Bank & Trust Co. v. Landair Travels, 31 S.W.3d 312, 317 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2000, no pet.) (stating that the court must allow an opportunity to amend, but
that failure to amend a pleading or to state a cause of action may result in the dismissal of a case).
832. Compare TEX. R. CIV. P. 91 (acknowledging that the primary purpose of the special
exception is to point out with particularity an omission, obscurity, or insufficiency of a pleading), with
TEX. R. CIV. P. 45 (explaining that pleadings shall be by petition and answer and consist of a statement
in plain and concise language).
833. See Franco v. Slavonic Mut. Fire Ins. Ass’n, 154 S.W.3d 777, 784 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) (emphasizing that when summary judgment is attacked on specificity
grounds, a special exception is required).
834. Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1998).
835. Id.
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in the pleadings.836 The trial court’s ruling is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.837
If the pleading deficiency is so severe that it cannot be remedied by an
amendment, there is no need to specially except and summary judgment
should be granted.838 The distinction is “between inadequately pleading a
cause of action [(special exception)] and utterly failing to plead a viable cause
of action [(summary judgment)].”839 The cautious practitioner should
always specially except to the pleading deficiency first, and if the plaintiff
fails to correct the deficiency after being given an opportunity to replead,
then move for summary judgment.840
2.

Interpleader

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 43,841 providing for interpleader actions,
extends and liberalizes the equitable remedy of bill of interpleader.842
Under Rule 43, a stakeholder subject to multiple claims to a fund or property
may join all claimants in a lawsuit and deposit the property or fund into the

836. Pack v. Crossroads, Inc., 53 S.W.3d 492, 507 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied);
Villarreal, 834 S.W.2d at 452; Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Shubert, 646 S.W.2d 270, 277–78 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Armendariz v. Bill Sears Supermarket No. 1, 562 S.W.2d 529, 530
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
837. LaRue v. GeneScreen, Inc., 957 S.W.2d 958, 961 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1997, pet.
denied); Holt v. Reprod. Servs., Inc., 946 S.W.2d 602, 604 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, writ
denied); see also City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d 773, 783 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1992, writ denied) (noting that the trial court’s discretion extends to “hearing, construing, and
sustaining special exceptions”).
838. Friesenhahn, 960 S.W.2d at 658; see also Hidalgo v. Sur. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 462 S.W.2d 540,
543 n.1 (Tex. 1971) (recognizing that when the petition fails to state a cause of action, summary
judgment is given not based on any proof or evidence but merely on the petition’s deficiencies).
839. Chambers v. Huggins, 709 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, no
writ).
840. See Baubles & Beads v. Louis Vuitton, S.A., 766 S.W.2d 377, 379 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
1989, no writ) (basing a summary judgment ruling on the plaintiff’s failure to plead a cause of action
after having received an opportunity to be heard); see also Clayton v. Richards, 47 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied) (stating that a special exception is appropriate when the plaintiff
needs to clarify a cause of action).
841. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 43 (“Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined as
defendants and required to interplead when their claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed
to double or multiple liability.”).
842. Downing v. Laws, 419 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 1967, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also
Sav. & Profit Sharing Fund of Sears Emps. v. Stubbs, 734 S.W.2d 76, 79 (Tex. App.—Austin 1987, no
writ) (discussing early and current interpleader practice).
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court’s registry.843 The stakeholder need not be completely disinterested in
the suit;844 instead, the stakeholder must be subject “to double or multiple
liability” due to conflicting claims, thereby justifying a reasonable doubt,
either in law or fact, as to who is rightfully entitled to funds or property.845
“The purpose of the interpleader procedure is to relieve an innocent
stakeholder of the vexation and expense of multiple litigation and the risk
of multiple liability.”846 Interpleader relief will be granted if: “(1) [the party]
is either subject to, or has reasonable grounds to anticipate, rival claims to
the same fund[s or property]; (2) [the party] has not unreasonably delayed
filing [an] action for interpleader; and (3) [the party] has unconditionally
tendered the fund[s or property] into the registry of the court.”847 Every
reasonable doubt is resolved in favor of allowing the stakeholder to
interplead.848 The granting of interpleader is considered a final, appealable
judgment, which is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion.849
3.

Intervention

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 allows a party to automatically intervene
in an existing cause of action, “subject to being stricken out by the court for
sufficient cause on the motion of any party.”850 The plea in intervention
should be filed before the judgment is rendered.851 A party may not
843. Bryant v. United Shortline Inc. Assurance Servs., N.A., 984 S.W.2d 292, 296 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1998, no pet.); see also United States v. Ray Thomas Gravel Co., 380 S.W.2d 576, 580 (Tex.
1964) (identifying when a party who files an interpleader action may receive attorney’s fees).
844. Downing, 419 S.W.2d at 219–20.
845. Davis v. E. Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 354 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Tex.1962) (quoting TEX. R. CIV.
P. 43); Emp’rs’ Cas. Co. v. Rockwall Cnty., 35 S.W.2d 690, 693 (Tex.1931).
846. Dallas Bank & Trust Co. v. Commonwealth Dev. Corp., 686 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 850
(Tex. 2018) (“An interpleader suit is thus authorized by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 43 when such a
stakeholder is ‘exposed to double or multiple liability.’” (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 43; Taliaferro v. Tex.
Commerce Bank, 660 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, no writ))); Tri-State Pipe &
Equip. Inc. v. S. Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 8 S.W.3d 394, 401–02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.)
(stating that interpleader provides protection for a stakeholder who would otherwise have “to act as
judge and jury at its own peril when faced with conflicting claims”).
847. Fort Worth Transp., 547 S.W.3d at 850; Bryant, 984 S.W.2d at 296; Daniels v. Pecan Valley
Ranch, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 372, 385 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied).
848. Bryant, 984 S.W.2d at 296; Dallas Bank, 686 S.W.2d at 230.
849. Bryant, 984 S.W.2d at 296; K & S Interests, Inc. v. Tex. Am. Bank/Dallas, 749 S.W.2d 887,
889 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied); Taliaferro, 660 S.W.2d at 155.
850. TEX. R. CIV. P. 60.
851. First Alief Bank v. White, 682 S.W.2d 251, 252 (Tex. 1984) (orig. proceeding); Comal Cty.
Rural High Sch. Dist. No. 705 v. Nelson, 314 S.W.2d 956, 957 (Tex. 1958); Highlands Ins. Co. v.
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intervene post-judgment unless and until (1) the trial court sets aside the
judgment, (2) the trial court carefully considers any prejudice the
prospective intervenor might suffer if intervention is denied, (3) the trial
court considers any prejudice the existing parties will suffer as a
consequence of untimely intervention, and (4) the trial court considers any
other circumstance that may militate for or against intervention.852
Under Rule 60, persons or entities have the right to intervene if they
“could have brought the same action” themselves, or if they would have
been “able to defeat recovery, or some part thereof,” had the action been
brought against them.853 The interest asserted can be legal or equitable.854
Significantly, an intervenor does not have the burden of seeking permission
from the court to intervene; rather, the party opposing the intervention
bears the burden of challenging the plea in intervention with a motion to
strike.855 Absent a party’s motion to strike, the trial court is not authorized
to strike the intervention.856
If a motion to strike is filed, the trial court should give the intervenor an
opportunity to explain and prove the intervenor’s interest in the suit before
ruling on the motion to strike.857 In response to the motion, the trial court
“may choose to: (a) try the intervention claim; (b) sever the intervention;
(c) order a separate trial on the intervention issues; or (d) strike the
intervention for good cause.”858

Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co., 794 S.W.2d 600, 602–04 (Tex. App.—Austin 1990, no writ) (explaining
that Comal County is still viable under the modern rules of procedure).
852. State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 788, 791 (Tex. 2015).
853. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657 (Tex. 1990); see
also King v. Olds, 12 S.W. 65, 65–66 (Tex. 1888) (quoting JOHN N. POMEROY, REMEDIES AND
REMEDIAL RIGHTS BY THE CIVIL ACTION § 430 (2d ed. 1883)) (explaining when a person has a right
to intervene).
854. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657; Mendez v. Brewer, 626 S.W.2d 498, 499 (Tex.
1982), superseded by statute, TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.004, as recognized in In re N.L.G., 238 S.W.3d
828, 830 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.) (recognizing that the Texas legislature established a
“new, more relaxed substantial past contact test for establishing intervenor standing in a [suit affecting
the parent-child relationship]”).
855. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657.
856. Id.
857. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Pennzoil Co., 866 S.W.2d 248, 250 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1993, no writ); Barrows v. Ezer, 624 S.W.2d 613, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
858. Saldana v. Saldana, 791 S.W.2d 316, 320 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). The
trial court should rule on a motion to strike an intervention before considering other matters, such as
severance. In re Union Carbide, 273 S.W.3d 152, 156 (Tex. 2008) (orig. proceeding).
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The trial court’s order is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.859 The trial
court abuses its discretion in striking the plea if: “(1) the intervenor meets
the above test[;] (2) the intervention will not complicate the case by an
excessive multiplication of the issues[;] and (3) the intervention is almost
essential to effectively protect the intervenor’s interest.”860 While the trial
court’s ruling on intervention is typically considered on appeal from a final
judgment, interlocutory review may be made by petition for writ of
mandamus.861
4.

Frivolous Pleadings

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13,862 in combination with the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code,863 instructs the trial court to impose
appropriate sanctions available under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure
215(2)(b) if “a pleading, motion or other paper is [signed], ‘groundless and
brought in bad faith[,] or . . . for the purpose of harassment.’”864 Generally,
courts presume that pleadings and other papers are filed in good faith.865

859. In re Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 184 S.W.3d 718, 722 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).
860. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 657; see also Metromedia Long Distance, Inc. v. Hughes,
810 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, writ denied) (noting that “interventions are
favored to avoid a multiplicity of suits”).
861. See, e.g., In re Helena Chem. Co., 286 S.W.3d 492, 496 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2009,
orig. proceeding) (noting mandamus review may be appropriate in “exceptional” cases where “time
and money” would be “utterly wasted”).
862. TEX. R. CIV. P. 13. Rule 13 is similar to its federal counterpart. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11
(discussing the procedure for sanctions applicable to the signing of pleadings and motions).
863. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.001–.013, 10.001–.006 (providing for the
assessment of attorney’s fees, costs, and damages for certain frivolous lawsuits and defenses). The
essential elements of a claim under Chapter 9 that a pleading is frivolous are that the pleading is
(1) groundless and brought in bad faith; (2) groundless and brought for the purpose of harassment; or
(3) groundless and brought for an improper purpose, such as unnecessary delay. Id. at §§ 9.011, .012.
In summary, to prevail on a claim under Chapter 9, a party must plead and prove two elements: (1) that
the pleading has no basis in law or fact and (2) that it was brought in bad faith, or for harassment, or for
an improper purpose, such as delay. Hawxhurst v. Austin’s Boat Tours, 550 S.W.3d 220, 230 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2018, no pet.).
864. Keith v. Solls, 256 S.W.3d 912, 916 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (quoting TEX. R.
CIV. P. 13). “‘Groundless’ means no basis in law or fact and not warranted by a good faith argument
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.” Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 13). “Bad
faith is not simply bad judgment or negligence, but means the conscious doing of a wrong for
dishonest, discriminatory, or malicious purpose.” Id. “Harass is used in a variety of legal contexts to
describe words, gestures, and actions that tend to annoy, alarm, and verbally abuse another person.”
Id. at 916–17 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Elkins v. Scotts-Brown (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)).
865. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner,
856 S.W.2d 725, 730 (Tex. 1993).
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The party seeking sanctions bears the burden of overcoming this
presumption of good faith.866 A trial court must consider the facts available
to the litigant, the circumstances existing at the time the document is filed,
and whether the legal assertions within the document are “warranted by
good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of [current]
law.”867 The court may also consider the amount of time available to
prepare the pleading (e.g., only a few days before the statute of limitations
expires), and “examine the signer’s credibility taking into consideration all
[of] the facts and circumstances available to him at the time of the filing.”868
The courts have observed that Rule 13 should only be used “in those
egregious situations where the worst of the bar” uses the judicial system for
“ill motive without regard to reason and the guiding principles of the
law.”869 Rule 13 should not be used as “a weapon . . . to punish those with
whose intellect or philosophic viewpoint the trial court finds fault.”870
A court may only impose sanctions for good cause,871 “the particulars of
which must be [included] in the sanction order.”872 The purposes of the
particularity requirement have been described as to:
866. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 731.
867. Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d 884, 889 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1991, no writ) (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 13); accord TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 10.001(2); In re United Servs. Auto Ass’n, 76 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, orig.
proceeding).
868. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d at 889; see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 9.012(b) (listing
factors that the court must consider). Rule 13 imposes a duty on the trial court to point out with
particularity the act or omission on which the sanctions are based. Tarrant Cnty. v. Chancey, 942
S.W.2d 151, 155 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997, no writ); Zarsky v. Zurich Mgmt., Inc., 829 S.W.2d
398, 399 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); see also Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Baty, 946
S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) (holding that the trial court’s
spontaneous sanction order failed to meet Rule 13 requirements).
869. See Chancey, 942 S.W.2d at 154–55 (quoting Dyson Descendant Corp. v. Sonat Exploration
Co., 861 S.W.2d 942, 951 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ)).
870. Id. at 155 (quoting Dyson, 861 S.W.2d at 951).
871. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 13 (“No sanctions under this rule may be imposed except for good
cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order.”); Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 730
(quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 13). In addition to monetary sanctions or dismissal of the frivolous pleading
or motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 and Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
Section 10.004, the trial court may report the offending attorney to the grievance committee if the
attorney “consistently engage[s] in activity that results in sanctions under Section 9.012.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 9.013.
872. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 10.005; TEX. R. CIV. P. 13; see also Murphy v.
Friendswood Dev. Co., 965 S.W.2d 708, 710 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.) (reversing
a sanction order that merely incorporated by reference a motion for sanctions); Schexnider v. Scott &
White Mem’l Hosp., 953 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ) (failing to determine the
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(1) ensure that the trial court is held accountable and adheres to the standard
of the rule; (2) require the trial court to reflect carefully on its order before
imposing sanctions; (3) inform the offending party of the particular conduct
warranting sanction, for the purpose of deterring similar conduct in the future;
and (4) enable the appellate court to review the order in light of the particular
findings made by the trial court.873

A trial court’s order under Rule 13 or the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.874
5.

Vexatious Litigation for Repeat Pleadings

The Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code was amended to include
Chapter 11 in an attempt to deter non-meritorious or frivolous litigation.875
The Code now provides that within ninety days after the date the defendant
files an original answer or a special appearance, the defendant may file a
motion asking the trial court for an order: “(1) determining that the plaintiff
is a vexatious litigant; and (2) requiring the plaintiff to furnish security.”876
After the defendant files this motion, the litigation is stayed until the trial
facts supporting sanctions in the trial court’s bare order). There is a split among the courts of appeals
whether a sanctioned party’s failure to object to the lack of particularity of the trial court’s order waives
that complaint. See Birnbaum v. Law Offices of G. David Westfall, P.C., 120 S.W.3d 470, 475–76 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied) (refusing to address the validity of trial court’s sanctions because the
issue was not preserved); Land v. AT & S Transp., Inc., 947 S.W.2d 665, 666–67 (Tex. App.—Austin
1997, no writ) (acknowledging the split and requiring an objection to the lack of particularity to properly
preserve a complaint for appellate review). Unlike Rule 13, Rule 215 does not require a trial court to
state any reasons for good cause. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215 (imposing a standard that does not require
the trial court to specify reasons creating good cause); Kahn v. Garcia, 816 S.W.2d 131, 133 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding) (noting the distinction between Rule 13 and Rule
215).
873. Houtex Ready Mix Concrete & Materials v. Eagle Constr. & Envtl. Servs., L.P., 226 S.W.3d
514, 522 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); see Saulnier v. Haase , No. 02-16-00139-CV,
2017 WL 1428725, at *3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 20, 2017, pet. dism’d) (reaffirming Houtex Ready
Mix).
874. See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001)
(“Sanctions are generally reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”); Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 730
(reviewing the district court’s imposition of sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard); Koslow’s
v. Mackie, 796 S.W.2d 700, 704 (Tex. 1990) (commenting that an appellate court will only set aside the
imposition of sanctions upon the “showing of a clear abuse of discretion”).
875. See Tex. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.001–.104 (addressing vexatious litigants in
trial courts, not appellate courts); 1901 NW 28th St. Tr. v. Lillian Wilson, LLC, 535 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2017, no pet.) (“Chapter 11 of the civil practice and remedies code contains the
legislature’s plan for confronting vexatious litigants—pro se individuals who abuse the legal system by
pursuing numerous frivolous lawsuits.” (citing Tex. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 11.001–.104).
876. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 11.051.
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court determines the merits of the motion.877 The Code sets forth the
criteria for determining whether a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.878
If the trial court finds that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant, the trial
court must “order the plaintiff to furnish security for the benefit of the
moving defendant” in such an amount to compensate the defendant’s
reasonable expenses in connection with the litigation, including court costs
and attorney’s fees.879 If the plaintiff fails to provide the security before
the set time frame ends, the court shall dismiss the litigation.880 After notice
and a hearing, the trial court may also “enter an order prohibiting [the
plaintiff] from filing . . . new litigation . . . if the court finds[:]” (1) the
plaintiff is a vexatious litigant; and (2) the local administrative court judge
has not given the plaintiff permission to file the litigation.881 If the plaintiff
violates the order, the plaintiff “is subject to contempt of court.”882 The
abuse of discretion standard of review applies to a trial court’s order ruling
that a plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.883
T. Sanctions
1.

Inherent Power to Sanction

Trial courts have the inherent power to impose sanctions for bad faith
abuse of the judicial process, even when that conduct may not be covered
by rule or statute.884 The inherent powers of a trial court are those that
“aid in the exercise of its jurisdiction, in the administration of justice, and in
the preservation of its independence and integrity.”885 The inherent power
877. Id. § 11.052(b).
878. Id. § 11.054.
879. Id. § 11.055.
880. Id. § 11.056.
881. Id. § 11.101(a).
882. Id. § 11.101(b).
883. 1901 NW 28th St. Tr. v. Lillian Wilson, LLC, 535 S.W.3d 96, 98 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2017, no pet.); Harris v. Rose, 204 S.W.3d 903, 905 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.).
884. See In re Sheshtawy, 154 S.W.3d 114, 124 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding) (explaining that
contempt power “is an essential element of judicial independence and authority”); In re Bennett,
960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (recognizing a court’s “inherent power to impose
sanctions”); Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell, 850 S.W.2d 167, 172 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding)
(holding the trial court has “inherent and statutory power to discipline errant counsel for improper trial
conduct in the exercise of its contempt powers”).
885. Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 40 (quoting Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398–99
(Tex. 1979)); Westview Drive Invs., LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 522 S.W.3d 583, 613 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (citing Bennett, 960 S.W.2d at 40); Union Carbide Corp. v.
Martin, 349 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citing Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d at 398–
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exists only “to the extent necessary to deter, alleviate, and counteract bad
faith abuse of the judicial process, such as any significant interference with
the traditional core functions of Texas courts.”886 The trial court must
make findings of fact that the abuse significantly interfered with the core
functions of the judiciary,887 such as “hearing evidence, deciding issues of
fact raised by the pleadings, deciding questions of law, rendering final
judgment, and enforcing [that] judgment.”888 “[T]he trial court should
attempt to determine if the offensive conduct is attributable to the attorney,
the party, or both.”889 “‘[L]esser sanctions must first be tested to determine
whether they are adequate’ before a sanction that [precludes a judgment] on
the merits of a case [can] be justified.”890
“Case[-]determinative sanctions may be imposed . . . only in exceptional
cases when they are clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser
sanctions would promote compliance with the rules.”891 The record must
reflect that the court considered the availability of lesser sanctions before

99); accord Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. 1988); In re K.A.R.,
171 S.W.3d 705, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (Guzman, J., dissenting).
886. Westview Drive, 522 S.W.3d at 613 (quoting White v. Zhou Pei, 452 S.W.3d 527, 546 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.)); Union Carbide, 349 S.W.3d at 147 (citing Greiner v.
Jameson, 865 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied); Lawrence v. Kohl, 853 S.W.2d
697, 700 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no writ)); Kutch v. Del Mar Coll., 831 S.W.2d 506,
510 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); see also In re Martin, No. 05-06-00072-CV, 2006 WL
234411, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 1, 2006, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.) (explaining that a trial
court may use its inherent sanction power to remedy any “significant interference with the legitimate
exercise of the traditional core functions of the court”).
887. See Union Carbide, 349 S.W.3d at 147 (citing Island Entm’t Inc. v. Castaneda, 882 S.W.2d 2,
5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)); Ezeoke v. Tracy, 349 S.W.3d 679, 685 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Howell v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 143 S.W.3d 416,
447 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. denied) (illustrating specific findings); McWhorter v. Sheller, 993
S.W.2d 781, 789 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (noting that findings did not
address interference with core functions); Kutch, 831 S.W.2d at 510 (requiring some evidence showing
the complained-of conduct obstructed the court’s legitimate exercise of power).
888. Westview Drive, 522 S.W.3d at 613 (citing White, 452 S.W.3d at 546); Union Carbide,
349 S.W.3d at 147 (citing Dallas Cnty. Constable Precinct 5 v. KingVision Pay-Per-View, Ltd.,
219 S.W.3d 602, 610 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.)); Kutch, 831 S.W.2d at 510; see also Trevino v.
Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 958 (Tex. 1998) (delineating the core functions of the judiciary).
889. Williams v. Akzo Nobel Chems., Inc., 999 S.W.2d 836, 843 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, no
pet.).
890. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 840 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon,
841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992)).
891. GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
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imposing case-determinative or death-penalty sanctions.892
The court of appeals reviews a trial court’s use of its inherent sanction
power for abuse of discretion, which necessitates review of the entire
record.893 Sanctions imposed pursuant to the court’s inherent power must
be just and appropriate.894 A trial court abuses its discretion if the sanctions
imposed are not just.895 In determining whether sanctions are just,
appellate courts apply a two-prong test.896 First, a direct nexus must exist
“among the offensive conduct, the offender, and the sanction imposed.”897
Accordingly, the “sanction must be directed against the abuse and toward
remedying the prejudice caused [to] the innocent party,” and “should be
visited upon the offender.”898 Second, the sanction must not be
excessive.899 Due to the amorphous nature of this inherent power and its
potency, the courts of appeals have admonished trial courts to use it
sparingly and to be mindful of the sanctioned party’s due process rights.900
Whether a trial court’s sanction is reviewable by mandamus or by appeal
is not clear in every case. If a sanctioned party has an adequate remedy at
law, then mandamus is not available,901 unless the judgment or order is void

892. See Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 839–40 (noting that a trial court should consider, and utilize when
effective, the imposition of lesser sanctions).
893. Ezeoke v. Tracy, 349 S.W.3d 679, 685 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.);
Kutch, 831 S.W.2d at 512; see also In re K.A.R., 171 S.W.3d 705, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, no pet.) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (noting the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing the
imposition of sanctions at the trial level); In re N.R.C., 94 S.W.3d 799, 809 n.7 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2002, pet. denied) (recounting the abuse of discretion standard of review of sanctions
imposed by the trial court).
894. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 916–17 & n.4 (Tex. 1991)
(orig. proceeding).
895. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 731; Williams v. Akzo Nobel Chems., Inc., 999 S.W.2d 836, 843
(Tex. App.—Tyler 1999, no pet.).
896. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917; Williams, 999 S.W.2d at 843.
897. Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003).
898. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
899. Id.
900. See In re Bennett, 960 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding) (reminding that “[t]he
power to sanction is of course limited by the due process clause”); Kutch v. Del Mar Coll., 831 S.W.2d
506, 510–11 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ) (reiterating the due process limitations on a
court’s power to sanction); see also In re K.A.R., 171 S.W.3d 705, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, no pet.) (Guzman, J., dissenting) (recognizing the need to use the inherent sanction power
sparingly).
901. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding); TransAmerican,
811 S.W.2d at 919.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

135

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4

1234

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1099

when issued.902 In TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell,903 the Texas
Supreme Court held that when sanctions “have the effect of adjudicating a
dispute, whether by striking pleadings, dismissing an action[,] or rendering
a default judgment, but . . . do not result in rendition of an appealable
judgment, then the eventual remedy by appeal is inadequate.”904 A deathpenalty or case-determinative sanction precludes the merits of the case from
being presented and is clearly reviewable by mandamus.905 In addition, a
monetary sanction may be reviewed by mandamus if it “raises the real
possibility that a party’s willingness or ability to continue the litigation will
be significantly impaired.”906 There is a split among the courts of appeals
on the issue of whether the striking of a party’s witnesses may be reviewed

902. See, e.g., In re Suarez, 261 S.W.3d 880, 882 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, orig. proceeding)
(presuming no adequate appellate relief at law when an order is void).
903. TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991) (orig.
proceeding).
904. Id. at 919; see also Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003) (reiterating that
“[c]ase determinative sanctions may be imposed in the first instance only in exceptional cases when
they are clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance
with the rules” (quoting GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) (orig.
proceeding))).
905. See Tanner, 856 S.W.2d at 729 (reviewing death-penalty sanctions in an original mandamus
proceeding); TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 920 (holding that a discovery sanction, which precludes a
decision on the merits, is reviewable by mandamus). Death-penalty sanctions are also limited by
constitutional due process. Id. at 917; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating “nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 19
(“No citizen of this State shall be deprived of life, liberty, property, privileges or immunities, or in any
manner disfranchised, except by the due course of the law of the land.”). Consequently, courts have
strictly applied the requirements to impose sanctions, especially death-penalty sanctions. See Hamill v.
Level, 917 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. 1996) (stating that courts may not use death-penalty sanctions unless
the sanctioned party’s conduct justifies the presumption of a meritless claim).
906. Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding). In Braden, the
court found the large monetary sanction, which had to be paid before an appeal would be allowed, was
reviewable by mandamus. Id. at 929–30. But cf. Stringer v. Eleventh Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d
801, 802 (Tex. 1986) (orig. proceeding) (ruling that a sanction of $200 in attorney’s fees was not
reviewable by mandamus); Street v. Second Court of Appeals, 715 S.W.2d 638, 639 (Tex. 1986) (orig.
proceeding) (declaring that a sanction of $1,050 was not reviewable by mandamus). If the court’s
imposition of monetary sanctions jeopardizes a party’s ability to continue the litigation, appeal is a
sufficient remedy only if the court defers payment of the sanction until the court renders final judgment
and the party has an opportunity to appeal the judgment. Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929. To preserve the
issue, the sanctioned party must complain that the monetary sanction prevents the party’s access to the
court. Id. If the sanctioned party complains, the trial court must either defer payment of the sanction
until the final judgment is rendered or make express written findings explaining why the sanction does
not preclude the complaining litigant’s access to the court. Id.
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by mandamus.907 The availability of mandamus, with regard to the striking
of a party’s witnesses, generally depends on whether the sanction is casedeterminative.908
2.

Power to Sanction for Discovery Abuse

A party may obtain discovery relevant to the subject matter, which is to
be “liberally construed to allow the litigants to obtain the fullest knowledge
of the facts and issues prior to trial.”909 A trial court may impose sanctions
“to assure compliance with discovery and deter those who might be tempted
to abuse discovery in the absence of a deterrent.”910 A trial court’s ruling
on a motion for sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.911

907. Compare In re Thornton-Johnson, 65 S.W.3d 137,139–40 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, orig.
proceeding) (order striking expert witness in medical malpractice claim against doctors presented an
obstacle but did not warrant mandamus), Pope v. Davidson, 849 S.W.2d 916, 920 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, orig. proceeding) (concluding that striking a witness’s testimony in part
may be presented to and reviewed by a court on appeal and, therefore, does not warrant mandamus),
and Humana Hosp. Corp. v. Casseb, 809 S.W.2d 543, 546 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1991, orig.
proceeding) (ruling that striking an expert witness may be reviewed on appeal by a bill of exceptions),
with J.G. v. Murray 915 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, orig. proceeding)
(mandamus relief appropriate where trial court erroneously struck defendant’s expert witness), In re
Kings Ridge Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 303 S.W.3d 773, 785–86 (Tex. App. —Fort Worth 2009, orig.
proceeding) (mandamus relief was appropriate where trial court struck defendant’s sole expert witness),
Buyers Prods. Co. v. Clark, 847 S.W.2d 270, 273 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1992, orig. proceeding)
(determining it was inappropriate for the trial court to strike the defendant’s witnesses because of the
attorney’s violations and conditionally issuing a writ of mandamus), Mother Frances Hosp. v. Coats,
796 S.W.2d 566, 571–72 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding) (finding that an appeal is not an
adequate remedy and mandamus is appropriate when an order striking witnesses amounts to an
emasculation of a party’s defense), and Williams v. Crier, 734 S.W.2d 190, 193 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987,
orig. proceeding) (holding that the facts of the instant case justified mandamus because the trial court’s
order striking three witnesses “was a clear abuse of discretion”).
908. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d 313, 325–26 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (stating that as long as exclusion of testimony impairs only the party’s
presentation of its case and does not prohibit a trial on the merits, the striking of testimony is within
the court’s discretion and is not a case-determinative sanction). Until a bright-line rule is created, which
probably will not occur, Justice Peeples’s analysis of the issue remains correct: “The law does not
permit pre-trial mandamus review of witness-exclusion rulings, except in extreme cases of complete
emasculation” of a party’s case. Casseb, 809 S.W.2d at 548 (Peeples, J., concurring).
909. Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 664 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (quoting
Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding)); Chapa v. Garcia,
848 S.W.2d 667, 668 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (quoting Axelson, 798 S.W.2d at 553); see also State
v. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex. 1991) (“[D]iscovery is . . . the linchpin of the search for truth.”).
910. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 839 (Tex. 2004).
911. Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006); Cire, 134 S.W.3d at
838; Bodnow Corp. v. City of Hondo, 721 S.W.2d 839, 840 (Tex. 1986).
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Rule 215.3, which authorizes trial courts to impose appropriate sanctions
upon persons who abuse the discovery process, provides that orders
imposing such sanctions “shall be subject to review on appeal from the final
judgment.”912 Because the legislature has not created an interlocutory
appeal regarding discovery sanctions, such sanctions are not appealable until
a final judgment is signed.913 Nonetheless, a sanctioned party may pursue
a writ of mandamus if that party has no adequate remedy by appeal.914
Rule 215 permits a wide range of sanctions for a variety of purposes:915
“to secure compliance with discovery rules; . . . to deter other litigants from
similar misconduct; . . . to punish violators;”916 “to insure a fair trial[;] to
compensate a party for past prejudice[;] . . . and to deter certain bad faith
conduct.”917 The sanctions, however, must be “just.”918 A two-pronged
analysis has been developed to determine whether a trial court’s sanctions
are just.919
The first prong of this analysis requires that “a direct relationship . . . exist
between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed.”920 Accordingly,
the sanction imposed against the offending party “must be directed against
the abuse and toward remedying the prejudice caused the innocent

912. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.3.
913. In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 569 (Tex. 2006) (“A sanction[] order is appealable when the
judgment is signed.”); see also Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding)
(“[D]iscovery sanctions are not appealable until the district court renders a final judgment.” (quoting
Bodnow Corp., 721 S.W.2d at 840)).
914. See TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 920 (Tex. 1991) (orig.
proceeding) (holding discovery sanctions that result in preventing a judgment on the merits and that
are not immediately appealable may be reviewed by mandamus because an ordinary appeal would be
inadequate).
915. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b) (identifying the various sanctions a trial court has at its disposal
to correct discovery violations for a pending action).
916. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see also
Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer, 104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003) (discussing the legitimate purposes of
sanctions).
917. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Specia, 849 S.W.2d 805, 807 n.4 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding).
918. TEX. R. CIV. P. 215.2(b); Spohn, 104 S.W.3d at 882; Remington Arms Co. v. Caldwell,
850 S.W.2d 167, 171 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding); Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 849; TransAmerican, 811
S.W.2d at 917.
919. Am. Flood Research, Inc. v. Jones, 192 S.W.3d 581, 583 (Tex. 2006); see also Spohn,
104 S.W.3d at 882 (Tex. 2003) (using the two-part test established in TransAmerican for determining
whether a trial court abused its discretion when imposing sanctions).
920. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917.
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party.”921 In other words, the sanctions must be specifically tailored to the
abuse found.922
The second prong of this analysis requires that the sanction not be
excessive—the sanction must fit the offensive conduct.923 The sanction
should not be more severe than necessary to satisfy its legitimate
purpose.924 Moreover, as a general rule, a trial court should always impose
lesser sanctions before imposing a death-penalty sanction.925 The Texas
Supreme Court has emphasized “that case-determinative sanctions may only
be imposed in ‘exceptional cases’ where they are ‘clearly justified’ and it is
‘fully apparent that no lesser sanctions would promote compliance with the
rules.’”926 Trial courts, however, are not required to “test the effectiveness
of lesser sanctions by actually implementing and ordering each and every
sanction.”927 Instead, trial courts “must analyze the available sanctions and
offer a reasoned explanation as to the appropriateness of the sanction
imposed.”928
921. Id. at 917; accord Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied); In re Adkins, 70 S.W.3d 384, 390 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2002, orig. proceeding); In re Polaris Indus., Inc., 65 S.W.3d 746, 751 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2001,
orig. proceeding).
922. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917; Paradigm, 161 S.W.3d at 537; see also Vela v. Wagner &
Brown, Ltd., 203 S.W.3d 37, 61 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (finding a direct relationship
between the abuse and misconduct documented by the trial court and the sanctions imposed).
923. TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917 (“The punishment should fit the crime.”); Polaris,
65 S.W.3d at 751; see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Rodriguez, 88 S.W.3d 313, 326–27 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (finding the trial court’s discovery sanction was not a death-penalty
sanction and, even if it were, the trial court did not abuse its discretion because the sanction was
justified and not excessive); Adkins, 70 S.W.3d at 391 (reversing a death-penalty sanction because it
was excessive and therefore unjust).
924. See Jones, 192 S.W.3d at 583 (“[T]he court must make certain that less severe sanctions
would not have been sufficient to promote compliance.”); TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 917 (“[C]ourts
must consider the availability of less stringent sanctions and whether such lesser sanctions would fully
promote compliance.”); Adkins, 70 S.W.3d at 390 (stating the record must “reflect that the court
considered the availability of lesser sanctions”).
925. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding) (holding
that lesser sanctions will suffice if they “promote compliance, deterrence, and discourage further
abuse”); see also Hamill v. Level, 917 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Tex. 1996) (disapproving of the death-penalty
sanction imposed by the trial court because lesser sanctions were available to serve the immediate
purpose); Polaris, 65 S.W.3d at 751 (noting a trial court should “first test the effectiveness of lesser
sanctions before entering death penalty sanctions”).
926. Cire v. Cummings, 134 S.W.3d 835, 840–41 (Tex. 2004) (quoting GTE Commc’ns Sys.
Corp. v. Tanner, 856 S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding)); see also Spohn Hosp. v. Mayer,
104 S.W.3d 878, 882 (Tex. 2003) (requiring courts to first consider less preclusive sanctions).
927. Cire, 134 S.W.3d at 842.
928. Id.
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In determining whether the sanction imposed is just, the trial court should
consider the entire record, not merely the trial court’s findings of fact and
conclusions of law, in reviewing the sanction order.929 Therefore, the trial
court is not restricted to considering only the specific violation committed
but is entitled to consider other conduct occurring during discovery.930
In appropriate cases, the Texas Supreme Court has encouraged trial
judges to prepare written findings that set forth the trial court’s reasons for
imposing severe sanctions.931 However, written findings are not required
because they are often unnecessary and constitute an undue burden on the
trial court.932 However, the appellate courts are required to review the
entire record and to defer to the trial court’s written findings.933
U. Sealing Court Records
Rule 76a provides very specific guidelines for a trial court to follow in
determining whether to seal court records.934 The trial court must strictly
929. Jones, 192 S.W.3d at 583 (citing Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852; Downer v. Aquamarine
Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. 1985); accord Sharpe v. Kilcoyne, 962 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1998, no pet.).
930. Hernandez v. Mid-Loop, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 138, 143 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, no
pet.); Paradigm Oil, Inc. v. Retamco Operating, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 531, 536 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2004, pet. denied). In TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, Justice Gonzalez identified fourteen
factors commonly used to analyze sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 920–21 (Tex. 1991) (orig. proceeding)
(Gonzalez, J., concurring). Two Texas courts of appeals have adopted the approach used by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to determine whether the conduct by the sanctioned
party warranted the particular sanction imposed. Pelt v. Johnson, 818 S.W.2d 212, 216 (Tex. App.—
Waco 1991, orig. proceeding) (implementing the six-factor test of Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868–70 (3d Cir. 1984)); Hanley v. Hanley, 813 S.W.2d 511, 517–18 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1991, no writ) (utilizing the six-factor test of Poulis). But see Lisa Ann Mokry, Note, Discovery
Sanctions Must Be “Just,” Consistent with Due Process, and Are Subject to Mandamus Review: TransAmerican
Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. 1991), 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 617, 640 (1992)
(criticizing TransAmerican for failing “to provide guiding rules and principles for the trial courts to
follow”).
931. IKB Indus. v. Pro-Line Corp., 938 S.W.2d 440, 442 (Tex. 1997); Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at
850; TransAmerican, 811 S.W.2d at 919 n.9. The supreme court noted three benefits to making findings:
first, such findings are useful in appellate review in that they demonstrate whether the trial judge
followed a reasoned analysis pursuant to the TransAmerican and Braden standards; second, such findings
help assure the parties involved that the decision resulted from thoughtful judicial deliberation; and
third, written findings increase the likelihood that the sanctions will deter future sanctionable conduct.
Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d at 852.
932. IKB Indus., 938 S.W.2d at 442.
933. Jones, 192 S.W.3d at 583.
934. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1). The rule allows court records to be sealed only if there is “(a) a
specific, serious[,] and substantial interest which clearly outweighs: (1) [the] presumption of openness;
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adhere to these guidelines because court records “are presumed to be open
to the general public.”935 Any order on a motion to seal or unseal public
records must be supported by specific findings of fact that state the
requirements of Rule 76a(1) have been met.936 Any order relating to the
sealing or unsealing of court records is subject to immediate appellate
review.937 The abuse of discretion standard of review applies to orders
regarding motions to seal records.938
V. Service of Process
A complaint regarding a curable defect in the service of process does not
defeat amenability to the court’s process; thus, it should not be brought via
a special appearance.939 Rather, a motion to quash is the appropriate
procedural device to raise such an objection.940 The remedy for defective
service in Texas state courts is additional time to answer the suit, not
dismissal.941 The trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash service of process

(2) any probable adverse effect that sealing will have upon the general public health or safety; [and] (b)
no less restrictive means . . . [that] will adequately and effectively protect the specific interest asserted.”
Id.
935. Id.; Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 23–24 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding); see also Gen.
Tire, Inc. v. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d 520, 524 (Tex. 1998) (mandating that the standards set forth in Rule
76a be strictly followed).
936. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(6).
937. TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(8); see also Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co., 829 S.W.2d 774, 775 (Tex.
1992) (“Any party aggrieved by the trial court’s decision, finding, or failure to find made pursuant to
Rule 76a, including the decision whether the document is a ‘court record,’ as that term is defined by
the rule, may seek review by interlocutory appeal.” (quoting Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 829 S.W.2d
157, 158 (Tex. 1992))); Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc. v. U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 195 S.W.3d 129, 132 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet.) (quoting Rule 76a(8)).
938. Kepple, 970 S.W.2d at 526; BP Prods. N. Am., Inc. v. Houston Chron. Publ’g Co.,
263 S.W.3d 31, 34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Clear Channel, 195 S.W.3d at 134.
939. TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a(1); Kawasaki Steel Corp. v. Middleton, 699 S.W.2d 199, 202–03 (Tex.
1985).
940. See Wheat v. Toone, 700 S.W.2d 915, 915 (Tex. 1985) (expounding that “defective
jurisdictional allegations in the petition, defective service of process, and defects in the citation must
be challenged by a motion to quash, not a special appearance” (quoting Kawasaki, 699 S.W.2d at 203));
Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Kreipe, 29 S.W.3d 334, 336 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
denied) (affirming a motion to quash is the proper vehicle to address defective service).
941. See Kawasaki, 699 S.W.2d at 202 (stating “a non-resident defendant, like any other
defendant, may move to quash [a] citation for defects in the process, but his only relief is additional
time to answer rather than dismissal of the cause”); Alcala v. Williams, 908 S.W.2d 54, 56 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1995, no writ) (construing a motion to abate as a motion to quash). Although Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(4) and 12(b)(5) provide for dismissal of a suit for failure to serve process
or for insufficient service of process, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain analogous
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is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.942
W. Severance
Severance of a claim under Rule 41943 is proper if: “(1) the controversy
involves more than one cause of action; (2) the severed claim is one that
could be asserted independently in a separate lawsuit; and (3) the severed
actions are not so interwoven with the other claims that they involve the
same facts and issues.”944 The purpose of granting a severance is to ensure
justice, deter prejudice, and add convenience.945 A severance is required in
cases where the facts and circumstances clearly require a separate trial to
prevent injustice, where the facts and circumstances do not support a
contrary determination, and where no prejudice will be experienced.946
Under these circumstances, the failure to order separate trials violates a plain
legal duty and is considered an abuse of discretion.947 Rule 41 gives the
trial court “broad” discretion to grant a severance, which will not be
reversed absent an abuse of discretion.948
X. Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
Subject-matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to decide a case; it is

provisions. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(4)–(5) (permitting a party to move for dismissal on grounds
of insufficient process or insufficient service of process), with TEX. R. CIV. P. 120a (recognizing no
grounds for dismissal for improper service other than lack of jurisdiction).
942. Alcala, 908 S.W.2d at 56.
943. TEX. R. CIV. P. 41 (addressing misjoinder and non-joinder of parties); see also In re B.L.D.,
113 S.W.3d 340, 345 n.3 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that a party seeking to sever under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 41 “may seek separate trials as an alternative form of relief” under Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 174).
944. Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v. Akin, 927 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding);
accord Coal. of Cities for Affordable Util. Rates v. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 798 S.W.2d 560, 564
(Tex. 1990).
945. Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990).
946. Womack v. Berry, 291 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Tex. 1956) (orig. proceeding); In re Progressive
Cty Mut. Ins. Co., 439 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding)
(quoting Womack, 291 S.W.2d at 683); In re Burgett, 23 S.W.3d 124, 127 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000,
orig. proceeding).
947. Burgett, 23 S.W.3d at 126 n.1.
948. TEX. R. CIV. P. 41; Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank, 793 S.W.2d at 658; Morgan v. Compugraphic
Corp., 675 S.W.2d 729, 734 (Tex. 1984); Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause, 641 S.W.2d 522, 525
(Tex. 1982); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Wilborn, 835 S.W.2d 260, 261 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (noting a “trial court has wide discretion to order or not
order separate trials when judicial convenience is served and prejudice avoided”).
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never presumed and cannot be waived.949 Without subject-matter
jurisdiction, a judgment is void rather than voidable.950
A trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is typically challenged by a plea
to the jurisdiction, although other procedural vehicles may be used as
well.951 Challenging subject-matter jurisdiction is a dilatory plea “to defeat
a cause of action without regard to whether the claims . . . have [any]
merit.”952
Unless the plaintiff’s petition affirmatively demonstrates an absence of
jurisdiction, the trial court construes the petition liberally in favor of
jurisdiction.953 Absent incurable defects in jurisdiction, the trial court
should give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.954 If the pleadings
affirmatively negates jurisdiction, the jurisdictional plea may be granted
without permitting the plaintiff to amend.955 If a trial court lacks subjectmatter jurisdiction, it has no choice but to dismiss the case956 because
subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the trial court by either
consent or waiver.957
In Texas Department of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda,958 the court held:

949. Carroll v. Carroll, 304 S.W.3d 366, 367 (Tex. 2010); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control
Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993).
950. Engelman Irrigation Dist. V. Shields Bros., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 746, 750 (Tex. 2017); Mapco,
Inc. v. Forrest, 795 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. 1990) (orig. proceeding).
951. City of Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 621 (Tex. 2009); Harris Cty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d
635, 638 (Tex. 2004); see also Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000) (naming
a motion for summary judgment as another procedural vehicle for challenging lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction).
952. Blue, 34 S.W.3d at 554.
953. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004); Tex. Ass’n
of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.
954. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–27.
955. Id.
956. Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n of Bus.,
852 S.W.2d at 446; see also Taiwan Shrimp Farm Vill. Ass’n v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev., Inc.,
915 S.W.2d 61, 66 n.1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied) (“A judge may not sit or act in a
case unless it is within the jurisdiction of his court.” (quoting TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 74.121(a)
(West 1988))).
957. See City of Desoto v. White, 288 S.W.3d 389, 393 (Tex. 2009) (“The failure of a
jurisdictional requirement deprives the court of the power to act (other than to determine that it has
no jurisdiction), and ever to have acted, as a matter of law.” (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. at
Dallas v. Loutzenhiser, 140 S.W.3d 351, 359 (Tex. 2004))).
958. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004); see also City of
Waco v. Kirwan, 298 S.W.3d 618, 621–22 (Tex. 2009) (reaffirming Miranda).
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When the consideration of a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction requires
the examination of evidence, the trial court exercises its discretion in deciding
whether the jurisdictional determination should be made at a preliminary
hearing or await a fuller development of the case, mindful that this
determination must be made as soon as practicable.959

Where the jurisdictional challenge involves the merits of the plaintiff’s
claim “and the plea to the jurisdiction includes evidence, the trial court
reviews the relevant evidence to determine if a fact issue exists.”960 If the
evidence raises a question of fact regarding jurisdiction, “the trial court
cannot grant the plea to the jurisdiction,” and the fact-finder will resolve the
fact issue.961 If, however, the evidence is undisputed or does not raise a
fact issue on the question of jurisdiction, then “the trial court rules on the
plea to the jurisdiction as a matter of law.”962
Decisions involving the government may be reviewed by interlocutory
appeal to determine whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction.963
A trial court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction “is fundamental error and
must be noted and reviewed by the appellate court at any time it
appears.”964 The reviewing court “construe[s] the pleadings in favor of the
plaintiff and look[s] to the pleader’s intent.”965 Whether a petition alleges
facts that affirmatively demonstrate subject-matter jurisdiction is treated as
a question of law and is reviewed de novo.966 Similarly, whether

959. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 227.
960. Id.
961. Id. at 227–28.
962. Id. at 228.
963. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(8) (authorizing an interlocutory
appeal of an order that “grants or denies a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit”); Harris Cty.
v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that “when a trial court denies the governmental
entity’s claim of no jurisdiction, whether it has been asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion for
summary judgment, or otherwise . . . an interlocutory appeal may be brought”). “If a plaintiff has been
provided a reasonable opportunity to amend after a governmental entity files its plea to the
jurisdiction,” any subsequent dismissal is with prejudice. Id. at 639.
964. Fincher v. City of Texarkana, 598 S.W.2d 22, 23 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1980, writ ref’d
n.r.e.); accord Tullos v. Eaton Corp., 695 S.W.2d 568, 568 (Tex. 1985); Tex. Emp’t Comm’n v. Int’l
Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local Union No. 782, 352 S.W.2d 252, 253 (Tex. 1961); see
also Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998) (indicating that lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction can be raised sua sponte by the appellate court).
965. Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993) (quoting
Huston v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 663 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
966. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226.
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uncontroverted evidence of jurisdictional facts demonstrates subject-matter
jurisdiction is also a question of law.967
Occasionally, “disputed evidence of jurisdictional facts that also implicate
the merits of the case may require resolution by the finder of fact.”968
“When reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction in which the pleading
requirement has been met and evidence has been submitted to support the
plea that implicates the merits of the case, [the reviewing court accepts] as
true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant,” indulges every logical
inference, and resolves any doubts in favor of the nonmovant.969 Only
matters presented to the trial court will be reviewed upon appeal from the
order dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction.970
1.

Standing

“Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to [maintaining] suit.”971 It is
also an essential “component of subject matter jurisdiction.”972 “In Texas,
the standing doctrine requires a concrete injury to the plaintiff and a real
controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.”973 A
party has standing “when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it
is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal
authority to act, regardless of whether it has a justiciable interest in the
controversy.”974 “To have standing a party must have suffered a threatened
967. Id.
968. Id. at 227.
969. See id. at 228 (noting that this standard mirrors the summary judgment standard).
970. Huston, 663 S.W.2d at 129 (citing Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 496 S.W.2d 146, 148
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1973), aff’d, 507 S.W.2d 526 (Tex. 1974)).
971. Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012) (citing Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v.
Mktg. on Hold Inc., 308 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2010)); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley,
146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004) (citing Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440,
444 (Tex. 1993); Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex. 1984)).
972. Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d at 646; accord M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d
704, 708 (Tex. 2001); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000); see also Austin
Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005) (“Without standing, a court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the case.”); Munters Corp. v. Locher, 936 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, writ denied) (observing that the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction
makes the judgment void).
973. Heckman, 369 S.W3d at 154 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d. 299, 304,
307 (Tex. 2008)).
974. Austin Nursing Ctr., 171 S.W.3d at 848–49 (quoting Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty.
Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996)); see also Coastal Liquids Transp., L.P. v. Harris Cty.
Appraisal Dist., 46 S.W.3d 880, 884 (Tex. 2001) (explaining that both standing and capacity are required
for a party to bring a lawsuit).
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or actual injury.”975 An opinion issued in a lawsuit where there is no
standing (or where there is no case or controversy)976 is an advisory
opinion, which Texas courts are prohibited from issuing.977
Standing is determined at the time suit is filed in the trial court.978 Except
for issues involving mootness, subsequent events do not deprive the court
of subject-matter jurisdiction.979
To establish standing, a person “must demonstrate a personal stake in the
controversy.”980 A court determines if an individual has standing by
analyzing whether there is “(1) ‘a real controversy between the parties,’ that
(2) ‘will be actually determined by the judicial declaration sought.’”981 For
example, whether an association has standing to sue on behalf of its
members is determined by reviewing whether “its members would
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right,” whether “the interests it
seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose,” and whether
“the claim asserted [or] the relief requested requires the participation of
individual members in the lawsuit.”982
The de novo standard of review applicable to subject-matter jurisdiction
applies to standing as well, and, “[a]s a component of subject matter
jurisdiction,”983 the “issue of standing may be raised for the first time on

975. Allstate Indemn. Co. v. Forth, 204 S.W.3d 795, 796 (Tex. 2006).
976. See Brooks v. Northglen Ass’n, 141 S.W.3d 158, 164 (Tex. 2004) (stating that a justiciable
controversy must be before the court to warrant adjudication). “A judicial decision reached without a
case or controversy is an advisory opinion, which is barred by the separation of powers provision of
the Texas Constitution.” Id. (citing TEX. CONST. art. II, § 1).
977. McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v.
Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993). The Texas Supreme Court has interpreted the
separation of powers article to mean that courts are prohibited “from issuing advisory opinions because
such is the function of the executive rather than the judicial department.” Id.; see also TEX. CONST.
art. II, § 1 (describing Texas’s separation of powers).
978. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 n.9.
979. See id. (explaining the court’s power to retain subject-matter jurisdiction).
980. Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 795 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ); accord Austin
Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. 2005); Hunt v. Bass, 664 S.W.2d 323, 324 (Tex.
1984); see also Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. City of Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2004)
(“Standing consists of some interest peculiar to persons individually and not as members of the general
public.” (quoting Hunt, 664 S.W.2d at 324)).
981. Austin Nursing Ctr., 171 S.W.3d at 849 (quoting Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cty. Appraisal
Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1996)); accord Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d
504, 517–18 (Tex. 1995); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.
982. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 447 (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n,
432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977)); accord Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 518.
983. Sunset Valley, 146 S.W.3d at 646; accord Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 445–46.
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appeal.”984 When reviewing a trial court’s order regarding standing,985
“Texas appellate courts ‘construe the pleadings in favor of the plaintiff and
look to the pleader’s intent.’”986 When standing is raised for the first time
on appeal, Texas appellate courts “construe the petition in favor of the
party, and if necessary, review the entire record to determine if any evidence
supports standing.”987
2.

Mootness

Like standing, mootness is a component of subject-matter
jurisdiction.988 The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in
which an actual controversy exists.989 A case becomes moot if a
controversy no longer exists or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest
in the outcome.990
If a case becomes moot, the parties lose standing to maintain their
claims.991 There are two exceptions that confer jurisdiction regardless of
mootness: (1) if the issue is “[capable] of repetition yet evading review”; and
(2) if the collateral consequences doctrine is applicable.992 Because the
issue of mootness implicates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, appellate
courts review the trial court’s dismissal based on mootness with the de novo
standard of review.993
984. Austin Nursing Ctr., 171 S.W.3d at 849; accord Garcia, 893 S.W.2d at 517 n.15; see also McAllen
Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cortez, 66 S.W.3d 227, 238 (Tex. 2001) (stating that standing, as an element of
subject-matter jurisdiction, cannot be waived).
985. The typical challenge to standing is made in the trial court by a motion to dismiss, but it
may take other forms as well. See Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000)
(challenging with a motion to dismiss); In re A.M.S., 277 S.W.3d 92, 95 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
2009, orig. proceeding) (utilizing a motion for new trial). While standing may be further challenged by
appeal, in certain situations, standing may be raised in an original proceeding. See In re K.K.C., 292
S.W.3d 788, 790 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief in a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship when the petitioner lacked standing to file suit).
986. Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446 (quoting Huston v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.,
663 S.W.2d 126, 129 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
987. Id.
988. See Black v. Jackson, 82 S.W.3d 44, 51–52 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.) (stating once
a case becomes moot, the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction).
989. Camarena v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988).
990. In re Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 166 S.W.3d 732, 737 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding).
991. Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001).
992. Gen. Land Office of the State of Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex.
1990).
993. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2016); Heckman v.
Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 149–50 (Tex. 2012); City of Shoreacres v. Tex. Comm’n on Envtl.
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Ripeness

Ripeness “is a threshold issue that implicates subject matter
jurisdiction.”994 “While standing focuses on the issue of who may bring an
action, ripeness focuses on when that action may be brought.”995 As a
component of subject-matter jurisdiction, ripeness “cannot be waived and
may be raised for the first time on appeal.”996
Ripeness concerns whether, at the time a lawsuit is brought, “the facts
have developed sufficiently so that an injury has occurred or is likely to
occur, rather than being contingent or remote.”997 To establish that a claim
is ripe based on an injury that is likely to occur, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the injury is imminent, direct, and immediate, and not
merely remote, conjectural, or hypothetical.998 “Ripeness, like standing, is
a threshold issue that implicates subject matter jurisdiction, . . . and like
standing, emphasizes the need for a concrete injury for a justiciable claim to
be presented.”999
If the pleadings are insufficient, the trial court should afford an
opportunity to replead if the defects are potentially curable, but it may
dismiss “if the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of
jurisdiction.”1000 Ripeness may be raised through various procedural
vehicles, such as a motion to dismiss or plea to the jurisdiction.1001
Ripeness is subject to de novo review.1002 The appellate court will
accept as true all evidence favorable to the plaintiff and “indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the [plaintiff’s]

Quality, 166 S.W.3d 825, 830 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.); Pantera Energy Co. v. R.R. Comm’n
of Tex., 150 S.W.3d 466, 471 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.).
994. Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston & Se. Tex., Inc., 971 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Tex.
1998).
995. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Tex. 2000) (citing Patterson,
971 S.W.2d at 442; Barshop v. Medina Cty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618,
626–27 (Tex.1996)).
996. Id.
997. Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442.
998. Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 852.
999. Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442 (citing Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928
(Tex. 1998)).
1000. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–27 (Tex. 2004).
1001. See Gibson, 22 S.W.3d at 851 (using a motion to dismiss to raise ripeness); Combs v.
Entm’t Publ’ns, Inc., 292 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.) (reviewing a plea to the
jurisdiction via interlocutory appeal).
1002. Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 928–29.
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favor.”1003 Of course, the appellate court is not bound by the trial court’s
legal conclusions.1004
Y. Summary Judgment
The underlying purpose of Texas’s summary judgment rules is a narrow
one—the elimination of “patently unmeritorious claims and untenable
defenses.”1005 There are two separate methods of moving for summary
judgment in Texas, each with different standards of review on appeal.1006
Texas law generally considers “summary judgment to be a harsh remedy
requiring strict construction.”1007
1.

Traditional Summary Judgment: Rule 166a(c)

Pursuant to Rule 166a(c), a summary judgment is proper only when a
movant establishes there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the movant
is therefore “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”1008 A defendant may
be entitled to summary judgment if the defendant disproves “at least one of
the essential elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action”1009 or establishes
all the elements of an affirmative defense as a matter of law.1010
In a summary judgment proceeding, the burden of proof is on the movant
who, unless the movant has leave of court, has twenty-one days prior to the
date set for hearing to file and serve the summary judgment motion and

1003. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 228; Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Garrett Place, Inc., 972 S.W.2d
140, 143 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, no pet.).
1004. See Salazar v. Morales, 900 S.W.2d 929, 932 n.6 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no writ)
(asserting that an appellate court accepts as true a trial court’s factual determinations, but it is not
required to accept the trial court’s blanket legal conclusions).
1005. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc. 555 S.W.3d 79, 87 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Gulbenkian v. Penn,
252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (Tex. 1952)) (underlying purpose of Rule 166a is to eliminate patently
unmeritorious claims and untenable defenses); Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 556 (Tex. 1989)
(quoting City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 n.5 (Tex. 1979)); accord
Gulbenkian, 252 S.W.2d at 931; Breceda v. Whi, 187 S.W.3d 148, 151–52 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2006,
no pet.); Valores Corporativos v. McLane Co., 945 S.W.2d 160, 169 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997,
writ denied).
1006. See generally David Hittner & Lynne Liberato, Summary Judgments in Texas, 54 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1 (2002) (examining summary-judgment practice in Texas and federal courts).
1007. Torres v. Caterpillar, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ
denied).
1008. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84; accord Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d
336, 344 (Tex. 2005); W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).
1009. Little v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 148 S.W.3d 374, 381 (Tex. 2004).
1010. Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Winograd, 956 S.W.2d 529, 530 (Tex. 1997).
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supporting affidavits.1011 Once the movant has established the right to a
summary judgment, the burden of proof “shifts to the nonmovant to raise
a genuine issue of material fact precluding summary judgment.”1012 The
party opposing the motion must file and serve his response and opposing
affidavits no later than seven days before the hearing, unless the court grants
an extension.1013
The trial court may grant the parties a hearing, but it should be
nonevidentiary.1014 To determine whether a disputed issue of material fact
precludes summary judgment, the court construes all competent evidence
in favor of the nonmovant as true, indulging every reasonable inference and
resolving any doubts in favor of the nonmovant.1015
A trial court’s summary judgment is reviewed by an appellate court de
novo.1016 An appellate court “examine[s] the entire record in the light most
1011. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Roskey v. Tex. Health Facilities Comm’n, 639 S.W.2d 302, 303
(Tex. 1982).
1012. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Centeq Realty, Inc. v. Siegler, 899 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.
1995)); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). A summary
judgment cannot be granted simply because the nonmovant fails to respond when the movant’s
summary-judgment evidence is not legally sufficient. Id. The motion for new trial standards in Craddock
v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 133 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. 1939), do not apply after summary judgment is granted
because the nonmovant failed to timely respond to the motion when (1) the nonmovant had notice of
the hearing and (2) an opportunity to move to extend time to alter the deadlines in Rule 166a.
Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons Corp., 98 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. 2002).
[A] motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment response should be granted when the
nonmovant establishes good cause by showing that the failure to timely respond (1) was not
intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of accident or mistake, and (2)
that allowing the late response will occasion no undue delay or otherwise injure the party seeking
summary judgment.
Id. at 688. A trial court’s order on a motion for leave to file a late summary-judgment response is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id.
1013. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).
1014. See In re Am. Media Consol., 121 S.W.3d 70, 74 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig.
proceeding) (“Parties are not entitled to a hearing on a motion for summary judgment.” (citing
TIMOTHY PATTON, SUMMARY JUDGMENTS IN TEXAS § 7.01 (3d ed. 2002))); see also TEX. R. CIV. P.
166a(c)–(d) (stating that oral testimony is not permitted and that summary judgment shall be rendered
based on documents filed with the court at the time of the hearing or filed after the hearing with leave
of the court).
1015. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84 (citing Randall’s Food Markets, Inc. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640,
644 (Tex. 1995)); Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 425 (Tex. 1997).
1016. Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84; Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013)
(citing Buck v. Palmer, 381 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2012)); Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett,
164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005); Enter. Leasing Co. of Houston v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tex.
2004).
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favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and
resolving any doubts against the motion.”1017 Because a reviewing court
views all evidence in favor of the nonmovant, the usual presumption that
the judgment is correct does not apply to a summary judgment.1018
On appeal, evidence that favors the movant will not be “considered
unless it is uncontradicted.”1019 Summary judgment, however, may be
based on the uncontroverted evidence of an interested witness or expert
witness “if the evidence is clear, positive, direct, otherwise credible, free
from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily
controverted.”1020
When appealing from summary judgment, the grounds of review are also
limited.1021 The movant’s “motion for summary judgment must itself
expressly present the grounds upon which it is made, and must stand or fall
on these grounds alone.”1022 “Issues not expressly presented to the trial
court by written motion” for summary judgment or response to the motion
cannot be considered by an appellate court as grounds for reversal.1023 The
appellate court “can consider the record only as it existed at the time
1017. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 824 (Tex. 2005).
1018. See Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005) (stating all
evidence favorable to the nonmovant is reviewed in the interest of judicial economy); IHS Cedars
Treatment Ctr. of DeSoto, Tex., Inc. v. Mason, 143 S.W.3d 794, 798 (Tex. 2004) (affirming that the
court reviews all evidence favorable to the nonmovant when reaching its conclusion); see also Carter v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 962 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (declaring
the standard of review and presumptions in an appeal from summary judgment favor reversal of the
judgment).
1019. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Plumbing Supply Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47
(Tex. 1965).
1020. Republic Nat’l Leasing Corp. v. Schindler, 717 S.W.2d 606, 607 (Tex. 1986) (citing TEX.
R. CIV. P. 166a(c)).
1021. Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Kirby Rest. Equip. & Chem. Supply Co., 170 S.W.3d 144, 146
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2005, pet. denied).
1022. Sci. Spectrum Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. 1997), superseded by rule, TEX.
R. CIV. P. 166a(i), as recognized in Landers v. State Farm Lloyds, 257 S.W.3d 740, 746 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (asserting that the prohibition against summary judgment by default
is inapplicable to motions filed under Rule 166a(i)); accord Johnson v. Brewer & Pritchard, P.C.,
73 S.W.3d 193, 204 (Tex. 2002) (noting a traditional summary judgment cannot be granted on grounds
not presented in the motion); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c) (requiring the movant’s motion to
explicitly state the specific grounds for the summary judgment).
1023. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Progressive Cty. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Boyd, 177 S.W.3d 919, 921
(Tex. 2005); Johnson, 73 S.W.3d at 204 (denying summary judgment to movant’s claim because issues
were not included in original motion before the trial court); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist.,
858 S.W.2d 337, 339 (Tex. 1993); City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 674–
75 (Tex. 1979).
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summary judgment was entered.”1024 Moreover, an appellate court may
not raise grounds for reversing a summary judgment sua sponte.1025 The
appellate court should review “all grounds presented to the trial court and
preserved on appeal in the interest of judicial economy.”1026
When the motion for summary judgment is based on several different
grounds1027 and the order granting the motion is silent as to the reason for
granting the motion, the appellant must show “that each independent
ground alleged is insufficient to support the summary judgment
granted.”1028 The summary judgment must be affirmed if any of the
theories are meritorious.1029 If the reviewing court determines that
summary judgment was improperly granted, the reviewing court will reverse
the judgment and remand the cause for a trial on the merits.1030 However,
if a motion for summary judgment is filed by both parties, and one is granted
by the trial court and one is denied, the reviewing court should determine
all presented questions and render the judgment that should have been
rendered by the trial court.1031
A summary judgment order is not necessarily interlocutory because the
order grants more relief than the movant requested (for example, by
granting summary judgment on claims that were not addressed in the

1024. McGee v. Deere & Co., No. 03-04-00222-CV, 2005 WL 670505, at *1 (Tex. App.—
Austin Mar. 24, 2005, pet. denied) (mem. op.).
1025. San Jacinto River Auth. v. Duke, 783 S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. 1990); see also Jacobs v.
Satterwhite, 65 S.W.3d 653, 655 (Tex. 2001) (stating the appellate court erred in reversing a summary
judgment on a claim that the movant never pled in the trial court).
1026. Diversicare Gen. Partner, Inc. v. Rubio, 185 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. 2005).
1027. The reviewing court should “affirm the summary judgment if any of the theories
presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious.” Joe v. Two Thirty
Nine Joint Venture, 145 S.W.3d 150, 157 (Tex. 2004).
1028. Skiles v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 173, 178 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005), rev’d on
other grounds, 221 S.W.3d 566 (Tex. 2007); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S., 858 S.W.2d 374,
380 (Tex. 1993) (noting “[w]hen reviewing a summary judgment granted on general grounds, [an
appellate] [c]ourt considers whether any theories asserted by the summary judgment movant will
support the summary judgment” (emphasis omitted)).
1029. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013); W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena,
162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Patient Advocates of Tex.,
136 S.W.3d 643, 648 (Tex. 2004); Malooly Bros., Inc. v. Napier, 461 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. 1970).
1030. Jones v. Strauss, 745 S.W.2d 898, 900 (Tex. 1988); accord Lubbock Cty. v. Trammel’s
Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 584 (Tex. 2002).
1031. Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248; Patient Advocates of Tex., 136 S.W.3d at 648; accord SAS Inst.,
Inc. v. Breitenfeld, 167 S.W.3d 840, 841 (Tex. 2005); Argonaut Ins. Co. v. Baker, 87 S.W.3d 526, 529
(Tex. 2002).
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summary judgment motion).1032 “[A]n order that expressly disposes of the
entire case is not interlocutory merely because the record fails to show an
adequate motion or other legal basis for the disposition.”1033 Thus, despite
perceived inadequacies in the record, language in the record expressing
finality may help the appellate court in determining whether the order
should be considered final; “[l]anguage that the plaintiff take nothing by his
claims in the case, or that the case is dismissed, shows finality if there are no
other claims by other parties.”1034 The correct resolution under these
circumstances, therefore, is to treat the summary judgment as final and
appealable.1035 Any claimed error regarding the adequacy of the motion
may result in a reversal on appeal and remand to the trial court, but it should
not result in dismissal of the appeal for lack of a final judgment.1036
2.

No Evidence Summary Judgment: Rule 166a(i)

Since 1997, litigants may seek another basis for summary judgment.1037
Under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), a litigant may file a motion for
summary judgment seeking dismissal of all or part of a lawsuit if there is no
evidence to support at least one of the elements of the adverse party’s claim
or defense.1038 However, it is inappropriate to file a Rule 166a(i) motion
until there has been adequate time for discovery.1039
Moreover, a Rule 166a(i) motion must specifically set forth the elements
of the adverse party’s claim or defense for which there is no evidence.1040
1032. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 204 (Tex. 2001); see also Sultan v. Mathew,
178 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. 2005) (requiring that a judgment dispose of each issue and party before
becoming final and appealable); cf. In re Lynd Co., 195 S.W.3d 682, 685 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)
(noting that during the appeal of a default judgment, appellate review is only proper upon a final
judgment expressly disposing of the case). See generally William J. Boyce, Finality Plus, in UNIV. TEX.
12TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON STATE AND FEDERAL APPEALS (June 2002) (discussing the finality
of summary judgments); William J. Boyce, Is Lehmann the Final Word on Summary Judgment Finality?,
XIV APP. ADVOC. 4 (2001) (analyzing the finality of summary judgments after Lehmann).
1033. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206.
1034. Id. at 205.
1035. See Ritzell v. Espeche, 87 S.W.3d 536, 538 (Tex. 2002) (explaining that the trial court’s
summary judgment order was unmistakably clear that all claims were adjudicated, thus making the
summary judgment final).
1036. See id. (holding that the summary judgment was final because “the trial court was
unequivocally clear that [all] claims were adjudicated, and therefore the summary judgment was”
appealable).
1037. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).
1038. Id.; W. Invs., Inc. v. Urena, 162 S.W.3d 547, 550 (Tex. 2005).
1039. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i).
1040. Id.
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The motion cannot be conclusory or generally allege that there is no
evidence to support the claims.1041 With the filing of the motion, the
burden shifts to the nonmovant, who must present “more than a scintilla of
probative evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact.”1042 Under the
Rule, if the nonmovant fails to provide enough evidence, the trial court must
grant the motion.1043
“A no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed
verdict,” and the same legal sufficiency or no-evidence standard is
applied.1044 No evidence summary judgments are reviewed under the same
legal sufficiency standard as directed verdicts.1045 Accordingly, the trial
court should grant a summary judgment, sustaining a no-evidence point,
when:
(a) there is a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is
barred by rules of law or of evidence from giving weight to the only evidence
offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no
more than a mere scintilla,1046 or (d) the evidence conclusively establishes
the opposite of the vital fact.1047

1041. Keszler v. Mem’l Med. Ctr. of E. Tex., 105 S.W.3d 122, 127–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2003, no pet.).
1042. Forbes Inc. v. Granada Biosciences, Inc., 124 S.W.3d 167, 172 (Tex. 2003).
1043. Wyndham Int’l, Inc. v. Ace Am. Ins. Co., 186 S.W.3d 682, 686 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006,
no pet.); see also Jackson v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 68, 70–71 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.)
(requiring courts to grant summary judgment unless respondent “raise[s] a genuine issue of material
fact”). But see Hight v. Dublin Veterinary Clinic, 22 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2003, pet.
denied) (articulating that “the better approach is to review no-evidence motions for summary
judgments in the same manner any other Rule 166a summary judgment is reviewed,” by indulging in
“every reasonable inference and resolv[ing] all doubts in favor of the nonmovant” rather than
disregarding all contrary evidence when considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the
non-movant).
1044. Wyndham, 186 S.W.3d at 686; King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51
(Tex. 2003); Haas v. George, 71 S.W.3d 904, 911 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no pet.); Maguire Oil
Co. v. City of Houston, 69 S.W.3d 350, 357 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied); Rocha v. Faltys,
69 S.W.3d 315, 320 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.); Kelly v. Demoss Owners Ass’n, 71 S.W.3d
419, 423 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
1045. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013) (citing Chapman,
118 S.W.3d at 750).
1046. More than a scintilla of evidence is found when the evidence would allow “reasonable
and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.” Forbes, 124 S.W.3d at 172; Burroughs Wellcome
Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995).
1047. Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at 248 (quoting Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 751).
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Again, appellate review is de novo. When reviewing a no-evidence
summary judgment on appeal, the appellate court will “review the evidence
presented by the motion and response in the light most favorable to the
party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence
favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary
evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.”1048
Z. Venue
“Venue, as defined by the common law, is the proper place for a lawsuit
to proceed.”1049 Each plaintiff in a multi-plaintiff suit must independently
establish proper venue.1050 Complaints about improper venue must be
raised in the trial court with a motion to transfer venue pursuant to Rule 86
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure.1051
Generally, a venue ruling is not a final judgment nor an order subject to
appeal.1052 Mandatory venue statutes are enforceable by petition for writ
of mandamus1053 and reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1054 On appeal,
a trial court’s order granting or denying a motion to transfer venue is
reviewed by the appellate court de novo.1055 On appeal, an appellate court

1048. Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006); Merriman, 407 S.W.3d at
248.
1049. Ramsay v. Tex. Trading Co., 254 S.W.3d 620, 626 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, pet.
denied).
1050. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(a); Shell Oil Co. v. Baran, 258 S.W.3d
719, 721 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2008, pet. abated). A party may file an interlocutory appeal of a trial
court’s determination that “a plaintiff did or did not independently establish proper venue.” TEX. CIV.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.003(b).
1051. TEX. R. CIV. P. 86(1); see also Gordon v. Jones, 196 S.W.3d 376, 383–84 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (explaining that venue is not jurisdictional and a party waives any
objection to improper venue if its objection is not made by a timely filed written motion).
1052. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(a); TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(b); In re Signorelli
Co., 446 S.W.3d 470, 473 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, orig. proceeding). There are
exceptions. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE. ANN. § 15.003(a), (b)(1).
1053. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.0642; In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174, 176
(Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (citing In re Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 988 S.W.2d 733, 735
(Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding)); In re Tex. Dep’t of Transp., 218 S.W.3d 74, 76 (Tex. 2007) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam); see also In re Team Rocket, L.P., 256 S.W.3d 257, 262–63 (Tex. 2008) (orig.
proceeding) (enforcing a venue ruling on mandamus that was not followed by the transferee court).
1054. Signorelli, 446 S.W.3d at 473 (citing In re Applied Chem. Magnesias Corp., 206 S.W.3d 114,
117 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding)).
1055. Wilson v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 886 S.W.2d. 259, 260 (Tex. 1994); Union Pac.
R.R. Co. v. Stouffer, 420 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. dism’d); Killeen v. Lighthouse
Elec. Contractors, L.P., 248 S.W.3d 343, 347 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, pet. denied); Highland
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cannot review the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the plaintiff’s
venue choice.1056 “If there is probative evidence to support the trial court’s
determination, even if the preponderance of the evidence is to the contrary
. . . the appellate court should defer to the trial court.”1057
On appeal of a venue order, the reviewing court must consider the entire
record and the trial itself to determine whether the trial court improperly
transferred a case to another county under Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure 861058 and 87,1059 and the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code Section 15.064(b).1060 Appellate review of the venue determination,
thus, differs greatly from the scope of the decision made by the trial judges,
who must rule solely on the basis of certain documents without the benefit
of live testimony and the entire record.1061 As a consequence, the trial
court may properly overrule a motion to transfer venue and later determine,
based on additional evidence (or during trial), that venue lies in another
county.1062 This scope of review—the entire record puts—the appellate
courts in the position of considering matters that the trial court had no
opportunity to assess before making its decision.1063 Nevertheless, the
Capital Mgmt., L.P. v. Ryder Scott Co., 212 S.W.3d 522, 535 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006,
pet. denied).
1056. Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 752, 757–58 (Tex. 1993).
1057. Id.
1058. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 86 (pertaining to motions to transfer venue).
1059. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87 (regarding determination of motions to transfer venue).
1060. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b) (stating that appellate courts
consider the entire record, which includes a trial on the merits, in determining whether venue was
proper); see also Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 261–62 (addressing the appellate court’s consideration of the
entire record during review of a transfer of venue (citing Dan R. Price, New Texas Venue Statute:
Legislative History, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 855, 878–79 (1984))). See generally TEX. R. CIV. P. 255, 257–259
(setting forth provisions regarding change of venue based on allegations of prejudice).
1061. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 87(3)(b) (requiring the court to base its decision on the pleadings,
party stipulations, affidavits, and attachments filed by the parties); Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757–58 (noting
the difference between the trial court’s venue transfer hearing, which must take prima facie evidence
as true, and the appellate court’s review, which must reverse if any evidence destroys the prima facie
proof); Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Carter, 778 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ
denied) (discussing a trial court’s limited sources when determining venue under Rule 87(3)(b)); Tex.
City Ref., Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 183, 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ
denied) (stating that while the scope of appellate review encompasses the entire record, the trial court
must look only to certain documents and may not hear live testimony), abrogated in part by Ruiz,
868 S.W.2d at 758 (abrogating the preponderance of the evidence standard of review adopted by Texas
City Refining).
1062. Tex. City Ref., 767 S.W.2d at 185.
1063. Bristol v. Placid Oil Co., 74 S.W.3d 156, 158 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (mem.
op.); Kansas City S. Ry., 778 S.W.2d at 915; Tex. City Ref., 767 S.W.2d at 185.
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appellate courts continue to review the trial court’s determination by
considering the entire record.1064
If venue was improper, the case must be reversed, even if the county of
transfer would have been proper if originally chosen by the plaintiff.1065
Reversal is required whether a motion to transfer is erroneously granted or
denied.1066
V. TRIAL RULINGS
Rulings that relate to the general conduct of a trial are within the broad
discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion.1067 A trial court even has the authority to express itself
in exercising its discretion.1068 A trial court may intervene to maintain
control in the courtroom, to expedite the trial, to prevent a waste of time,
and may make remarks that are “critical or disapproving of, or even hostile
to, counsel, the parties, or their cases.”1069 A trial court may permit jurors
to submit occasional questions to the witnesses in conjunction with
appropriate procedural safeguards.1070 In summary, a trial court has
inherent power to control the disposition of cases “with economy of time
and effort for itself, for counsel, and for the litigants.”1071 The more
common trial rulings are discussed here.

1064. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b); see Ruiz, 868 S.W.2d at 757–58
(rejecting a preponderance of the evidence review and noting the confusion in interpreting, applying,
and harmonizing Rule 87 with Section 15.064(b)).
1065. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b); Wilson, 886 S.W.2d at 261; Ruiz, 868
S.W.2d at 758.
1066. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 15.064(b); In re Masonite Corp., 997 S.W.2d 194,
198 (Tex. 1999) (orig. proceeding); Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 382 (Tex. 1998); Wichita
Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Tex. 1996).
1067. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 240–41 (Tex. 2001); Schroeder v. Brandon,
172 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Tex. 1943); see also Metzger v. Sebek, 892 S.W.2d 20, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (declaring the trial court is responsible for the management of his or her
docket); Kreymer v. N. Tex. Mun. Water Dist., 842 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, no writ)
(emphasizing the trial court has broad discretion concerning the extent of cross-examination allowed).
1068. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 240–41.
1069. Id. at 240 (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994)); accord Great Glob.
Assurance Co. v. Keltex Props., Inc., 904 S.W.2d 771, 777 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1995, no writ).
1070. Hudson v. Markum, 948 S.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, writ denied).
1071. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 240 (quoting Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).
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A. Invoking the Rule
Texas Rule of Evidence 614 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 267
govern sequestration of witnesses in civil litigation.1072 The purpose of
sequestration, or “invoking the rule,” is to minimize “witnesses[] tailoring
their testimony in response to that of other witnesses and [to] prevent[]
collusion among witnesses testifying for the same side.”1073 However,
invoking the rule does not prevent a witness from talking about the case
before trial, especially when the witness’s speech is directed toward persons
not involved in the pertinent case.1074 Either the parties or the court, on
its own motion, may sequester witnesses.1075 The rule is not discretionary;
a court must exclude witnesses upon request of the parties.1076 The rule
provides that at the request of any party, the witnesses in the case shall be
removed from the courtroom to a place where they cannot hear the
testimony of any other witness in the case.1077 Certain witnesses are
exempt from sequestration, including:
(1) a party who is a natural person or his or her spouse; (2) an officer or
employee of a party that is not a natural person and who is designated as its
representative by its attorney; [and] (3) a person whose presence is shown by
a party to be essential to the presentation of the [case].1078

Although an expert witness is generally found to be exempt under the
essential presence exception, experts are not automatically exempt.1079
Instead, Rules 614 and 267 give the trial court “broad discretion to
determine whether a witness is essential.”1080 A party has the burden of
showing why the presence of its witness is essential to the presentation of
its case.1081 A trial court’s refusal to grant a party’s request for a witness to
remain during trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1082
1072. Drilex Sys., Inc. v. Flores, 1 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 1999); In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 28
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
1073. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 116.
1074. Kennedy v. Eden, 837 S.W.2d 98, 98 (Tex. 1992).
1075. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 116 & n.2.
1076. Elbar, Inc. v. Claussen, 774 S.W.2d 45, 51 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ dism’d).
1077. Id.
1078. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 116–17; In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2002, no pet.).
1079. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 116–17.
1080. Id. at 118–19.
1081. Id. at 117.
1082. Id. at 117–18.
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The exemptions can be limited, however, by other legislation. In In re M-I
L.L.C.,1083 the court construed the Texas Uniform Trade Secrets Act as
granting the trial court discretion to exclude a party’s corporate
representative from portions of a temporary injunction hearing involving
alleged trade secret information about which he was potentially
unaware.1084
When a party or the court invokes the rule, the parties should request that
the trial court “exempt any prospective witnesses whose presence is essential
to the presentation of the [case].”1085 The party seeking the exemption
from the rule has the burden to establish that the witness’s presence is
necessary.1086 If the witness is exempt, then the witness is not placed under
the rule and “need not be sworn or admonished.”1087 When “the [r]ule is
invoked, all nonexempt witnesses must be placed under the [r]ule and
excluded from the courtroom.”1088 Generally, “witnesses under the [r]ule
. . . may not discuss the case with anyone other than the attorneys in the
case.”1089
The rule is violated “when a nonexempt prospective witness remains in
the courtroom during the testimony of another witness, or when a
nonexempt prospective witness learns about [another witness’s] trial
testimony through discussions with persons other than the attorneys in the
case or by reading reports or comments about the testimony.”1090 When
the rule is violated, a party may file a motion to exclude the witness, and the
trial court, considering all of the circumstances,1091 may “allow the
testimony of the potential witness, exclude the testimony, or hold the

1083. In re M-I L.L.C., 505 S.W.3d 569 (Tex. 2016).
1084. Id. at 579 (construing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 134A.006).
1085. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 117.
1086. Id.
1087. Id.
1088. Id.
1089. Id.
1090. Id.
1091. The supreme court noted that some of the “circumstances” may include: “whether the
party calling the witness was at fault in causing or permitting the violation, whether the witness’s
testimony is cumulative, and whether the witness is a fact witness.” Id. at 117 n.3; accord Upton v. State,
894 S.W.2d 426, 428 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1995, pet. ref’d); Garza v. Cole, 753 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Holstein v. Grier, 262 S.W.2d 954, 955 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1953, no writ).
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violator in contempt.”1092 The trial court’s decision is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.1093
B. Motion in Limine
A motion in limine does not preserve any issue for appellate review.1094
To preserve error on appeal for the wrongful exclusion of evidence, the
record must reflect that the party opposing the motion in limine actually
attempted to introduce the excluded evidence during the trial and obtained
a ruling from the court that the evidence would not be admitted.1095 If a
party complains of the wrongful admission of evidence, the record must
reflect that the party seeking to exclude the evidence made a proper
objection when the evidence was actually offered during the trial on the
merits.1096 In either event, the standard of review is based on the rule of
evidence invoked.1097
C. Empanelling a Jury
1.

Jury Shuffle

Under Rule 223 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, a party has the
right to demand a jury shuffle as long as it is timely requested.1098 The
demand must be made before voir dire, and only one shuffle may be
granted.1099 “Before voir dire” means prior to jury-questionnaire responses

1092. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 117 (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 267(e)); Triton Oil & Gas Corp. v.
E.W. Moran Drilling Co., 509 S.W.2d 678, 684 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.); accord
In re K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d 18, 28 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.).
1093. Drilex Sys., 1 S.W.3d at 117–18; K.M.B., 91 S.W.3d at 28.
1094. Zinda v. McCann St., Ltd., 178 S.W.3d 883, 894 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet.
denied).
1095. Id.; Richards v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 35 S.W.3d 243, 252 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.).
1096. Richards, 35 S.W.3d at 252; Collins v. Collins, 904 S.W.2d 792, 798 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); Johnson v. Garza, 884 S.W.2d 831, 834 (Tex. App.—Austin 1994, writ
denied); Wilkins v. Royal Indem. Co., 592 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1979, no writ).
1097. See infra Section V(F) (discussing admission of evidence).
1098. TEX. R. CIV. P. 223; Carr v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 128, 133 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000,
pet. denied); Whiteside v. Watson, 12 S.W.3d 614, 618 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2000, pet. granted,
judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); Martinez v. City of Austin, 852 S.W.2d 71, 73 (Tex. App.—Austin 1993, writ
denied).
1099. TEX. R. CIV. P. 223; Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 133; Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d at 618; Martinez, 852
S.W.2d at 73.
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being examined by any of the parties.1100 Rule 223 procedures for a jury
shuffle are mandatory and failure to comply with them is error.1101
Whether that error results in reversal depends on the court. In deciding
whether to grant a new trial for failing to conduct a requested jury shuffle,
one court of appeals used a traditional harmless error analysis.1102 Under
this analysis, the court requires appellants to show that “violation of Rule
223 probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.”1103
Otherwise, a violation of the rule will generally not be an “infringement
upon the fundamental right to [a] trial by jury” and any error will be
harmless.1104
Another court of appeals adopted the “relaxed” harmless error standard
used in the jury selection context.1105 Under this analysis, a complaining
party must show that a “trial was materially unfair, without having to show
more.”1106 Furthermore, the appellate court must examine the entire
record.1107 Under this standard, a party does not have to show specific
harm or prejudice arising from the inappropriate shuffle; however, it does
require “some showing that the randomness of the jury has suffered.”1108
Such a showing will result in the granting of a new trial.1109 The “relaxed”
standard has been subject to sharp criticism.1110

1100. Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 133–34.
1101. Id.; Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d at 619.
1102. Whiteside, 12 S.W.3d at 620.
1103. Id.
1104. Id.
1105. Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 135.
1106. Id.
1107. Id.
1108. Id. at 136.
1109. Id.
1110. See Jackson v. Williams Bros. Constr. Co., 364 S.W.3d 317, 328 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (Sharp, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “existing case law imposes a
harmless-error analysis on a sitting Texas trial judge’s conscious refusal to abide by a very clearlyworded rule” and criticizing that analysis. “Obviously the appellate court cannot compare the
composition of the non-shuffled panel with the shuffled panel when the trial court did not do its job.
Instead, harm is analyzed under this so-called ‘relaxed’ standard by which a burden is placed on the
party demanding the shuffle to somehow prove a lack of randomness in the jury panel. This begs the
question of just how bad does the panel have to be before it crosses over into hypothetical
‘unrandomness.’ Engaging in such esoteric arguments is a valid reason for laypersons to make fun of
our jury system. The worst part of this ‘relaxed’ harm analysis, however, is that, absent an egregious
‘unrandom’ initial jury panel, the trial court’s response to the shuffle demand is essentially
discretionary.”).
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In BNSF Railway Co. v. Wipff,1111 the court of appeals presumed harm
from the trial court’s refusal to shuffle the jury, but did so because BNSF
specifically argued to the trial court that two objectionable jurors were seated
that it would have otherwise struck.1112 The court of appeals presumed
harm because “we cannot know for certain that [the objectionable jurors’]
inclusion did not affect the verdict.”1113 The court of appeals further
explained that it would have found the error harmful even under the
“relaxed” standard of review, based on the following factors that rendered
the case “hotly contested” and, thus, materially unfair: “(1) the number of
special issues, (2) the count of the verdict, (3) the absence of summaryjudgment motions or motions for instructed verdict, (4) the pleadings and
the jury findings, (5) whether the record shows how the parties used their
strikes, and (6) whether there were any double strikes.”1114 “Viewing all
these factors in light of the entire record, BNSF has shown that the trial was
materially unfair based on the erroneous denial of a jury shuffle arguably
resulting in the seating of two objectionable jurors.”1115
2.

Voir Dire and Challenges for Cause

The Texas Supreme Court has instructed the trial courts to provide a
litigant with broad latitude during voir dire examination to enable the litigant
“to discover any bias or prejudice by the potential jurors so that peremptory
challenges may be intelligently exercised.”1116 Although voir dire
examination is left chiefly to the sound discretion of the trial court,1117 the
trial court “abuses its discretion when its denial of the right to ask a proper
question prevents determination of whether grounds exist to challenge for
cause or denies intelligent use of peremptory challenges.”1118 “[T]o

1111. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Wipff, 408 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.).
1112. Id. at 668.
1113. Id. (quoting Cortez ex rel. Estate of Puentes v. HCCI-San Antonio, Inc., 159 S.W.3d 87,
91 (Tex. 2005)).
1114. Id. at 669 (citing Carr, 22 S.W.3d at 136).
1115. Id.
1116. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 749 (Tex. 2006) (quoting Babcock v.
Nw. Mem’l Hosp., 767 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. 1989)); Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d
362, 375 (Tex. 2000); Haryanto v. Saeed, 860 S.W.2d 913, 918 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993,
writ denied). Bias and prejudice are statutory grounds for disqualification. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 62.105(4).
1117. Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 92.
1118. Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 709; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 228 (defining “challenge for cause”);
Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d at 750 (noting that inquiry into juror bias and prejudice is proper to determine

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss4/4

162

Hall and Anderson: Standards of Review in Texas

2019]

STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN TEXAS

1261

preserve a complaint that a trial court improperly restricted voir dire, a party
must timely alert the trial court as to the specific manner in which it intends
to pursue the inquiry.”1119 To obtain a reversal, the complaining party must
show the trial court abused its discretion and the error was reasonably
calculated to cause, and “probably [did] cause[], the rendition of an improper
judgment.”1120
Whether bias and prejudice exist is ordinarily a fact question.1121
However, if the “evidence shows that a prospective juror has a state of mind
in favor of or against a litigant [or type of suit] so that the juror is not able
to act impartially and without prejudice, the juror is disqualified as a matter
of law.”1122 “[T]he relevant inquiry is not where jurors start but where they
are likely to end.”1123 If the evidence is not conclusive as a matter of law,
the reviewing court must examine the evidence “in the light most favorable
to the trial court’s ruling.”1124 Once bias or prejudice is established, it is a
legal disqualification and reversible error automatically results if the court
overrules a motion to strike.1125 To preserve error “when a challenge for
cause is denied, a party must use a peremptory challenge against the
veniremember involved, exhaust [all of the party’s] remaining challenges,
and notify the trial court that a specific objectionable veniremember will
remain on the jury” panel in light of the court’s denial of a challenge for
cause.1126 A trial court’s decision regarding challenges for cause is reviewed

whether potential jurors are statutorily disqualified); Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 92 (“[T]rial judges must not
be too hasty in cutting off examination that may yet prove fruitful.”).
1119. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d at 758.
1120. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; accord Babcock, 767 S.W.2d at 709.
1121. See Malone v. Foster, 977 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tex. 1998) (stating that “[i]f prejudice is not
established as a matter of law, the trial court makes a factual determination as to whether the venire
member should be disqualified”); Swap Shop v. Fortune, 365 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex. 1963) (suggesting
that a juror’s bias or prejudice may be a factual determination left to the trial court’s discretion).
1122. Kiefer v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 10 S.W.3d 34, 39 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999,
pet. denied); see also Hafi v. Baker, 164 S.W.3d 383, 385 (Tex. 2005) (labeling a bias “disqualifying if ‘it
appears that the state of mind of the juror leads to the natural inference that he will not or did not act
with impartiality’” (quoting Compton v. Henrie, 364 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1963))). Bias is an
indication toward one side or another, and prejudice means prejudgment and includes bias. Id.
1123. Hafi, 164 S.W.3d at 385 (quoting Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 93).
1124. Kiefer, 10 S.W.3d at 39.
1125. See Compton, 364 S.W.2d at 182 (“It is only where there are grounds for disqualification
other than those provided for in the statute that the discretionary powers of the trial judge may be
exercised.”).
1126. Cortez, 159 S.W.3d at 90–91.
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for an abuse of discretion.1127
It is improper for counsel to question veniremembers about their
potential verdict in light of certain evidence.1128 Questions to prospective
jurors should address their biases and prejudices, not their opinions about
evidence.1129 Questions to prospective jurors cannot isolate one relevant
piece of evidence.1130 “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion in
refusing to allow questions that seek to determine the weight to be given (or
not to be given) a particular fact or set of relevant facts.”1131 Trial courts
have discretion to decide whether an inquiry of potential jurors explores
external biases, unfair prejudices, or possible verdicts based on
evidence.1132
3.

Alignment of Parties and Allocation of Peremptory Strikes

Questions regarding alignment and antagonism of the parties often arise
in multiple-party litigation.1133 Under Rule 233, the trial judge is required
to assess whether antagonism exists among the parties on the same side of
the case before assigning the number of peremptory challenges by the
parties.1134 Upon motion of any of the litigants, the court must allot the
number of peremptory challenges in such a way as to ensure that “no litigant
or side is given [an] unfair advantage.”1135 A trial court’s decision to grant
a motion to realign a party as a plaintiff is permitted “only where the burden
of proof on the whole case rests on the defendant, or where the defendant
makes the required admissions before trial.”1136

1127. Id. at 93; State v. Dick, 69 S.W.3d 612, 618 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, no pet.); Kiefer,
10 S.W.3d at 39.
1128. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Vasquez, 189 S.W.3d 743, 751 (Tex. 2006) (stating that the
court in Cortez “adopted the general rule that it is improper to ask prospective jurors what their verdict
would be if certain facts were proved”).
1129. Id. at 751–52.
1130. See id. at 752 (asserting that asking whether a “juror can be fair after isolating a relevant
fact” is just as confusing “as an inquiry that previews all the facts”).
1131. Id. at 753.
1132. Id. at 754–55.
1133. Amis v. Ashworth, 802 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]) (Ramey, C.J., dissenting).
1134. TEX. R. CIV. P. 233; Perkins v. Freeman, 518 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. 1974); Amis, 802
S.W.2d at 385 (Ramey, C.J., dissenting). Under the Rule, “side” is defined as “one or more litigants
who have common interests on the matters with which the jury is concerned.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 233.
1135. TEX. R. CIV. P. 233.
1136. Amis, 802 S.W.2d at 384.
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On mandamus review, the appellate court reviews the record as it existed
at the time the motion was heard to determine whether the court abused its
discretion.1137 Conversely, appellate review requires the appellate court to
consider the entire record to determine if the court abused its discretion,
and if so, whether the abuse constitutes reversible error.1138 To preserve
error in the allocation of jury strikes, the party must lodge the objection after
voir dire but before exercising the strikes.1139 The party must clearly state
whether it is objecting to the allocation of the peremptory strikes or to the
alignment of the parties.1140
Whether antagonism exists between parties, per se, is a question of
law.1141 “[I]n determining whether antagonism exists, the trial court must
consider the pleadings, information disclosed by pretrial discovery,
information and representations made during voir dire of the jury panel, and
any other information brought to the attention of the trial court before the”
parties exercise their strikes.1142 “The existence of antagonism must be
finally determined after voir dire and prior to the exercise of the strikes of
the parties.”1143 The existence of antagonism is not a discretionary matter;
“it is a question of law [determined from the above factors as to] whether
any of the litigants . . . on the same side of the docket are antagonistic”
regarding an issue that the jury will be asked to answer.1144 “The nature
and degree of the antagonism, and its effect on the number of peremptory
jury strikes allocated to each litigant or side, [however,] are matters left to
the discretion of the trial court.”1145

1137. Id. at 384 n.7.
1138. Id. at 382–83.
1139. Tex. Commerce Bank Reagan v. Lebco Constructors, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 68, 77 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ denied); see also In re T.E.T., 603 S.W.2d 793, 798 (Tex. 1980)
(illustrating that error is not preserved when a party fails to lodge objections to the allocation of strikes
at the proper time).
1140. See Pojar v. Cifre, 199 S.W.3d 317, 327–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied)
(holding that error was preserved only on the issue of alignment of sides and not on the allocation of
strikes because defendant only argued for realignment of sides at trial).
1141. Garcia v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 704 S.W.2d 734, 736 (Tex. 1986); Patterson Dental
Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914, 919 (Tex. 1979).
1142. Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737; accord Patterson Dental Co., 592 S.W.2d at 919.
1143. Garcia, 704 S.W.2d at 737.
1144. Patterson Dental Co., 592 S.W.2d at 919; accord Am. Cyanamid Co. v. Frankson, 732 S.W.2d
648, 652 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
1145. Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Wendt, 718 S.W.2d 766, 768 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
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Thus, if the trial court based its finding “upon a reasonable assessment of
the situation,” as it existed at the time when the challenges were made, no
abuse of discretion occurred.1146 On the other hand, if the trial court has
disregarded “the posture of the parties[,] or has misconstrued or
overlooked” a crucial factor, the trial court’s “decision should be reversed
as an abuse of discretion.”1147
4.

Batson/Edmonson Challenges

In Batson v. Kentucky,1148 the Supreme Court of the United States held the
Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution1149 prohibits
parties from using peremptory strikes to exclude members of a jury panel
solely on the basis of race.1150 This proscription applies to both criminal
and civil trials.1151 The United States Supreme Court has explained the
three-step process in resolving a Batson objection to a peremptory
challenge.1152 First, “the opponent of the . . . challenge must establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination.”1153 Second, the burden shifts to
the party exercising the strike to present a race-neutral explanation.1154
“Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the” reason offered, the
explanation “will be deemed race-neutral.”1155 Third, the trial court must
then determine whether the challenging party “has proven purposeful racial
discrimination.”1156 “[T]he issue of whether the race-neutral explanation
should be believed is [] a question of fact for the trial court.”1157 The
1146. Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 S.W.2d at 661; see also Pojar v. Cifre, 199 S.W.3d 317, 329–30 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied) (holding that a trial court’s allocation of peremptory
challenges is reviewed for abuse of discretion).
1147. Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 S.W.2d at 661.
1148. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
1149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1150. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
1151. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 629 (1991); see also Goode v.
Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 444 (Tex. 1997) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has extended
Batson to civil trials); Powers v. Palacios, 813 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. 1991) (holding that use of
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race violates the equal protection rights of the
excluded juror).
1152. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445; see Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 514–15 (Tex. 2008)
(noting that a Batson challenge involves a three-step process).
1153. Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 445.
1154. Id.
1155. Id.
1156. Id.
1157. Id. at 446. Unless the explanation offered is too incredible to be believed, the reviewing
court cannot reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion. Id.
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standard of review of a trial court’s decision regarding a Batson/Edmonson
challenge is abuse of discretion.1158 To preserve a Batson/Edmonson issue
for appellate review, the complaining party must object to the allegedly
offensive peremptory strikes before swearing in the jury.1159 The exclusion
of even one potential juror on the basis of race invalidates the entire jury
selection process and requires a new trial.1160
D. Opening Statements
Rule 265(a) does not allow counsel to describe to the jury the evidence
that counsel plans to offer, “nor to read or display the documents and
photographs he proposes to offer.”1161 Additionally, the trial court has
broad discretion to limit opening statements, subject only to review for
abuse of discretion.1162
E. Trial Amendments of Pleadings
When a request to amend pleadings is made within seven days of trial or
thereafter,1163 the request must be granted “unless (1) the opposing party
presents evidence of surprise or prejudice, or (2) the amendment asserts a
new cause of action or defense, and thus is prejudicial on its face.”1164 If
1158. See id. (asserting the Texas Supreme Court reviews a trial court’s Batson ruling for abuse
of discretion); accord Davis v. Fisk Elec. Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 515 (Tex. 2008). However, “[t]he Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals has . . . adopted the clearly erroneous standard of review for Batson issues.”
Goode, 943 S.W.2d at 446 (citing Whitsey v. State, 796 S.W.2d 707, 720–26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
The federal system also “employs a ‘clearly erroneous’ standard of review.” Davis, 268 S.W.3d at 515.
1159. Jones v. Martin K. Eby Constr. Co., 841 S.W.2d 426, 429 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ
denied).
1160. Davis, 268 S.W.3d at 521.
1161. Guerrero v. Smith, 864 S.W.2d 797, 799 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ);
see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 265(a) (allowing counsel to only “state to the jury briefly the nature of his claim
or defense and what said party expects to prove, and the relief sought”).
1162. Guerrero, 864 S.W.2d at 800; Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 170 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
1163. TEX. R. CIV. P. 63, 66. The “date of trial” means the day the case is scheduled for trial,
not the day the case actually begins trial. Taiwan Shrimp Farm Vill. Ass’n v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev.,
Inc., 915 S.W.2d 61, 69 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied); AmSav Group, Inc. v. Am.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Brazoria Cty., 796 S.W.2d 482, 490 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ
denied). The rule also applies to summary judgment proceedings because a summary judgment hearing
is a trial. Goswami v. Metro. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 1988).
1164. State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1994). “The burden of showing
surprise or prejudice rests on the party resisting the amendment.” Id.; accord Chapin & Chapin, Inc. v.
Tex. Sand & Gravel Co., 844 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. 1992); Greenhalgh v. Serv. Lloyds Ins. Co.,
787 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex. 1990). “Surprise may be shown as a matter of law if the pleading asserts a
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the amendment is procedural in nature (i.e., merely conforming the
pleadings to the evidence at trial), the trial court must grant the
amendment.1165 However, if the amendment is substantive in nature (i.e.,
changing the basis of a party’s causes of action), the trial court has discretion
to grant or deny the amendment.1166
The standard of review for granting a trial amendment is whether the trial
court abused its discretion.1167 To establish an abuse of discretion in
allowing the amendment, the complaining party must (1) present evidence
of surprise or prejudice;1168 and (2) request a continuance.1169 Mere
allegations of surprise or prejudice are not sufficient to establish an abuse of
discretion.1170
F. Admission of Evidence
The admission or exclusion of evidence is a matter within the trial court’s
discretion.1171 To obtain reversal of a judgment based on error in the
admission or exclusion of evidence, an appellant must show that the trial
court’s ruling was in error and that the error was calculated to cause and
probably did cause “the rendition of an improper judgment.”1172
Reversible error does not usually occur in connection with rulings on
new and independent cause of action or defense.” Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
1165. Chapin & Chapin, 844 S.W.2d at 665. “The rule of trial by consent is limited to those
exceptional cases where the parties clearly tried an unpleaded issue[;] . . . [therefore, t]he rule should be
cautiously applied and [is] not [appropriate] in doubtful situations.” Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d
783, 797 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ).
1166. Smith v. Heard, 980 S.W.2d 693, 698 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied);
Libhart, 949 S.W.2d at 797; Taiwan Shrimp Farm, 915 S.W.2d at 70.
1167. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d at 658; Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 939; Williams v. Williams,
19 S.W.3d 544, 546 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
1168. Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 940.
1169. Fletcher v. Edwards, 26 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Cook, 840 S.W.2d 42, 46 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1992, writ denied); James v. Tex. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 836 S.W.2d 236, 238 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1992, no writ).
1170. Greenhalgh, 787 S.W.2d at 941; see also Weidner v. Sanchez, 14 S.W.3d 353, 377 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (finding no error where the court allowed an amended
pleading post-verdict when opposing party presented no evidence of either surprise or prejudice).
1171. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Tex. 2005); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez,
159 S.W.3d 897, 918 (Tex. 2004) (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting); Interstate Northborough P’ship v. State,
66 S.W.3d 213, 220 (Tex. 2001); see also LSR Joint Venture No. 2 v. Callewart, 837 S.W.2d 693, 698
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (discussing the balancing factors related to the admission or
exclusion of evidence).
1172. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; accord Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 918 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). See
infra Section VIII(H)(3) (discussing reversible error).
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questions of evidence unless the appellant can demonstrate that the whole
case turns on the particular evidence that was admitted or excluded.1173
Furthermore, error from the improper admission of evidence is usually
deemed harmless if (1) the objecting party “opens the door” by “introducing
the same evidence or evidence of a similar character,”1174 (2) the objecting
party “opens the door” by subsequently permitting the same or similar
evidence to be introduced without objection,1175 or (3) the evidence is
merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence.1176
1.

Expert Testimony

“Expert testimony is necessary when the alleged [conduct] is of such a
nature [that it is not] within the experience of [a] layman.”1177 When a party
objects to an expert’s proposed testimony regarding a matter of science, or
any other technical or specialized knowledge, whether novel or
conventional, the proponent of the expert testimony has the burden of
demonstrating its admissibility.1178 Accordingly, the proponent must
establish that the expert’s testimony is based on a reliable foundation.1179
Texas Rule of Evidence 702 provides a two-part test to determine the
admissibility of an expert’s testimony.1180 First, the expert must be

1173. Interstate Northborough P’ship, 66 S.W.3d at 220.
1174. Sw. Elec. Power Co. v. Burlington N. R.R., Co., 966 S.W.2d 467, 473 (Tex. 1998) (quoting
McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 673 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. 1984)).
1175. Richardson v. Green, 677 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Tex. 1984).
1176. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d at 919; City of Austin v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 844 S.W.2d
773, 791 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied).
1177. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84, 90 (Tex. 2004) (quoting Roark v.
Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982)).
1178. Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 410 (Tex. 1998); E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995). In Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., the
supreme court held that the Robinson factors apply to all expert testimony offered under Texas Rule of
Evidence 702. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998). To preserve
error on a complaint that expert testimony is not reliable and, therefore, “no evidence, a party must
object to the evidence before trial or when the evidence is offered.” Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 409. In his
concurrence, Justice Gonzalez outlined the steps he thought necessary to preserve a Daubert/Robinson
challenge for appellate review. Id. at 412–15 (Gonzalez, J., concurring).
1179. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 556.
1180. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001); see also TEX. R. EVID. 702
(“A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

169

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4

1268

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1099

qualified.1181 Second, the expert’s opinion must be relevant to the issues
in the case and based upon a reliable foundation.1182
Qualified. Under Rule 104(a),1183 whether an expert is qualified is a
preliminary question for the trial court to decide, and the party offering the
expert’s testimony has the burden of establishing the witness is qualified
under Rule 702.1184 In determining whether an expert is qualified, the trial
court must make certain that the purported expert truly has the expertise
concerning the subject matter about which the expert is offering an
opinion.1185 The supreme court has noted that the trial court is not to
decide whether an expert’s conclusion is correct, but instead, should only
determine whether the analysis used to reach the conclusion is reliable.1186
Relevant. The relevance requirement, which includes the relevancy
analysis under Texas Rules of Evidence 401 and 402,1187 “is met if the
expert testimony is ‘sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid
the jury in resolving a factual dispute.’”1188 If the evidence has no
relationship to any issue in the case, the evidence does not satisfy Rule 702
and is, therefore, inadmissible.1189 “Opinion testimony that is conclusory
or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make the
existence of a material fact ‘more probable or less probable,’”1190 and such
testimony is incompetent evidence that cannot support a judgment.1191
Similarly, an expert who offers only personal credentials and subjective
opinions has offered essentially uncorroborated evidence, which does not

1181. TEX. R. EVID. 702; Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Tex.
2006).
1182. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800. “The exacting standards for expert testimony set forth by
the United States Supreme Court” and by the Texas Supreme Court “are well-known to Texas
litigators.” Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 259 (Tex. 2004) (citations omitted), abrogated
on other grounds by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
1183. TEX. R. EVID. 104(a).
1184. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Tex. 1998).
1185. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499; Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 719.
1186. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 728.
1187. TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402.
1188. Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002) (quoting E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995)).
1189. See TEX. R. EVID. 702 (requiring that the expert’s knowledge “help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue”).
1190. Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004)
(quoting TEX. R. EVID. 401).
1191. Id. at 232.
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assist the jury.1192 As the court in Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez1193
pointed out, “Rule 702, by its terms, only provides for the admission of
expert testimony that actually assists the finder of fact.”1194 Justice
Gonzalez poignantly observed in E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Robinson1195 that a reviewing court is not obligated to accept as some
evidence the testimony of an expert who states “that the world is flat, that
the moon is made of green cheese, or that the Earth is the center of the
solar system.”1196 Such evidence carries absolutely no weight and is the
equivalent of no evidence.1197
Reliable. “The reliability requirement focuses on the principles, research,
and methodology underlying an expert’s conclusions.”1198 Expert
testimony is not reliable if it “is not grounded ‘in the methods and
procedures of science’” and is the equivalent of “no more than ‘subjective
belief or unsupported speculation.’”1199 If an expert’s scientific evidence
is not reliable, then it is “legally” not evidence.1200 To determine reliability,
the supreme court observed:
Daubert and Rule 702 demand that the district court evaluate the methods,
analysis, and principles relied upon in reaching the opinion. The court should
ensure that the opinion comports with applicable professional standards
outside the courtroom and that it “will have a reliable basis in the knowledge
and experience of [the] discipline.”1201

In Robinson, the Texas Supreme Court adopted the following six
nonexclusive factors for admissibility of scientific evidence, of which four
were first stated by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell

1192. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. 2006); Coastal Transp.
Co., 136 S.W.3d at 232; Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex. 1997).
1193. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797 (Tex. 2006).
1194. Id. at 801.
1195. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549 (Tex. 1995).
1196. Id. at 558.
1197. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 712.
1198. Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton, 133 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. 2004), abrogated on other grounds
by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
1199. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
590 (1993)).
1200. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mendez, 204 S.W.3d 797, 801 (Tex. 2006).
1201. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 725–26 (Tex. 1998) (quoting
Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 1997)).
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Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc:1202
(1) the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested;
(2) the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation
of the expert . . . ;
(3) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication;
(4) the technique’s potential rate of error;
(5) whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as
valid by the relevant scientific community; and
(6) the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or
technique.1203

In Cooper Tire, the Texas Supreme Court emphasized that the six factors
are not exclusive and “that Rule 702 contemplates a flexible inquiry.”1204
The supreme court recognized in Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.,1205
“that the Robinson factors may not apply to certain testimony”;1206 however,
in those cases “there still must be some basis for the opinion offered to
[demonstrate] reliability.”1207 The courts have emphasized that it is
ultimately up to the trial court, in exercising its duty as evidentiary
gatekeeper, to assess the reliability of particular expert testimony.1208
The Texas Supreme Court has developed several principles for
determining reliability. The trial court is required to ensure that purported
experts do in fact have expertise regarding the subject matter of their offered
opinion when deciding whether an expert is qualified.1209 Under the
reliability requirement, the expert testimony “is unreliable if it is not
1202. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995). See
generally Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587–97 (1993) (addressing factors to be considered).
1203. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557; accord Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801; Helena Chem. Co. v.
Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Tex.
1999); see also Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 720 (reviewing the factors that a trial judge may consider when
determining admissibility of scientific evidence).
1204. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801.
1205. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
1206. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499; accord Ford Motor Co. v. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d 32,
39–40 (Tex. 2007).
1207. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499.
1208. Id. at 499; Coastal Tankships, Inc. v. Anderson, 87 S.W.3d 591, 611 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. denied).
1209. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800.
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grounded ‘in the methods and procedures of science’ and amounts to no
more than a ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation.’”1210
Additionally, if the analytical gap between the data the expert relies upon
and the opinion offered is too great, the expert testimony is unreliable.1211
The reviewing court is “not required . . . to ignore fatal gaps in an expert’s
analysis or assertions that are simply incorrect.”1212 Thus, “if an expert
relies upon unreliable foundational data,” any opinion based on that data is
unreliable.1213 “When an expert’s opinion is predicated on a particular set
of facts, those facts need not be undisputed. An expert’s opinion is only
unreliable if it is contrary to actual, undisputed facts.”1214 Similarly, if the
underlying data is sound, but the expert’s methodology is flawed, the
opinion is also unreliable.1215 In applying the reliability standard, the trial
court does not “determine whether the expert’s conclusions are correct;
rather,” the trial court’s role is to determine “whether the analysis used to
reach those conclusions is reliable.”1216 The court stated in General Motors
Corp. v. Iracheta:1217
We [previously] noted . . . that, although expert opinion testimony often
provides valuable evidence in a case, “it is the basis of the witness’s opinion,
and not the witness’s qualifications or his bare opinions alone, that can settle
an issue as a matter of law; a claim will not stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit
[an assertion made not proved] of a credentialed witness.” Opinion testimony
that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not
tend to make the existence of a material fact “more probable or less probable.”
This [c]ourt has labeled such testimony as “incompetent evidence,” and has
1210. Id. (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex.
1995)); accord Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002); see also Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d
at 40–41 (determining the expert’s testimony “amounted to . . . more than a recitation of his credentials
and a subjective opinion” and, thus, was properly admitted).
1211. Ledesma, 242 S.W.3d at 40; Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800; Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Helton,
133 S.W.3d 245, 254 (Tex. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy
Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008); Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d at 629.
1212. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800–01 (quoting Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez,
159 S.W.3d 897, 912 (Tex. 2004)).
1213. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499.
1214. Caffe Ribs, Inc. v. State, 487 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. 2016) (citations omitted) (first citing
Hous. Unlimited, Inc. Metal Processing v. Mel Acres Ranch, 443 S.W.3d 820, 833 (Tex. 2014); then
citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995)).
1215. Helena Chem. Co., 47 S.W.3d at 499.
1216. Kerr-McGee Corp., 133 S.W.3d at 254; Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972
S.W.2d 713, 728 (Tex. 1998).
1217. General Motors Corp. v. Iracheta, 161 S.W.3d 462 (Tex. 2005).
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often held that such conclusory testimony cannot support a judgment.
Furthermore, this [c]ourt has held that such conclusory statements cannot
support a judgment even when no objection was made to the [testimony].1218

While the Robinson factors cannot always be used to determine an expert’s
reliability, “there must be some basis for the opinion offered to show its
reliability.”1219 The court emphasized, however, that all expert testimony
must meet both the relevance and reliability requirements.1220
“A flaw in the expert’s reasoning from the data may render reliance on a
study unreasonable and render the inferences drawn therefrom dubious.
Under that circumstance, the expert’s scientific testimony is unreliable and,
legally, no evidence.”1221 When reviewing the sufficiency of the scientific
evidence supporting a jury finding, unreliable scientific evidence is the legal
equivalent of no evidence at all.1222 Thus, “[i]f the foundational data
underlying [the scientific] opinion testimony are unreliable,” or the expert
used a flawed methodology or flawed reasoning, the scientific evidence—
even if admitted without objection—is legally “no evidence.”1223
In Robinson, the Texas Supreme Court determined “that the trial court is
the evidentiary gatekeeper” to determine whether the expert and his
proffered testimony meet these two tests.1224 Even though the trial court
functions as an “evidentiary gatekeeper” by screening for irrelevant and
unreliable expert evidence, it ultimately has broad discretion in determining
the admissibility of the evidence.1225 The trial court’s determination that
1218. Id. at 470–71 (citations omitted) (quoting Coastal Transp. Co. v. Crown Cent. Petroleum
Corp., 136 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. 2004)); see also Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801 (explaining “the trial
court is not required ‘to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse
dixit of the expert’” (quoting Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727)).
1219. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 801 (quoting Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 726).
1220. Id.
1221. Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex. 1997)).
1222. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 712.
1223. Id.; see also Iracheta, 161 S.W.3d at 471 (concluding that the expert testimony was unreliable
and did not “rise to the level of competent evidence”).
1224. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex. 1995); accord
Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex. 2001); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez,
997 S.W.2d 584, 590 (Tex. 1999); Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 409 (Tex. 1998).
1225. Exxon Pipeline Co. v. Zwahr, 88 S.W.3d 623, 629 (Tex. 2002); Helena Chem. Co.,
47 S.W.3d at 499; Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 726 (Tex. 1998); see also
Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558–59 (holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding
the expert’s scientific testimony because that evidence “was not based upon a reliable foundation,” the
expert used methodology that “follow[ed] no scientific principles,” the expert’s opinion had not been
subjected to peer review, and the expert conducted his research “for the purpose of litigation”).
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these requirements have been met is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion.1226 Both the admissibility and sufficiency of unreliable scientific
evidence may be challenged for the first time on appeal.1227
The trial court’s determination of whether an expert witness is necessary
to establish a negligence claim is reviewed de novo.1228
2.

Demonstrative Evidence

Visual, real, or demonstrative evidence is admissible where it tends to
resolve some issue at trial and is relevant, so long as its probative value
outweighs its prejudicial effect.1229 In line with these principles, a trial court
should admit evidence of an out-of-court experiment only when there is a
substantial similarity between the conditions existing at the time of the
occurrence giving rise to the litigation and the conditions created by the
experiment.1230 However, the conditions do not have to be identical; the
experiment may be admitted if the trial court, in exercising its discretion,
finds the difference in condition to be minor.1231 A trial court may permit
a demonstration of the plaintiff’s injury as long as it focuses on “the extent
and nature of the injury” and is not designed to inflame the minds of the
jury.1232 The admission of such demonstrative evidence is within the trial
court’s discretion and is subject to an abuse of discretion review.1233
“[E]xcept in rare circumstances . . . when the admissibility of a video is at
issue, the proper exercise of discretion requires the trial court to actually
view video evidence before ruling on its admissibility.”1234
1226. Cooper Tire, 204 S.W.3d at 800; Larson v. Downing, 197 S.W.3d 303, 304–05 (Tex. 2006);
Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft, 77 S.W.3d 805, 807 (Tex. 2002); Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 718–
19; Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Tex. 1996).
1227. Compare Ellis, 971 S.W.2d at 409 (reviewing the trial court’s order excluding scientific
evidence), with Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711 (considering a “no evidence” point of error).
1228. See, e.g., FFE Transp. Serv., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. 2004).
1229. TEX. R. EVID. 403; In re C.J.F., 134 S.W.3d 343, 356 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, pet.
denied); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 389 (Tex. 1998) (plurality opinion) (observing
that admission of videotapes of sled tests was harmful error because the conditions present at the time
of the accident were not shown to be similar to those during the test).
1230. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gayle, 951 S.W.2d 469, 475 (Tex. 1997); accord Horn v. Hefner,
115 S.W.3d 255, 256 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.).
1231. Fort Worth & Denver Ry. Co. v. Williams, 375 S.W.2d 279, 282 (Tex. 1964).
1232. Parkway Hosp., Inc. v. Lee, 946 S.W.2d 580, 585 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997,
writ denied).
1233. Id.
1234. Diamond Offshore Servs. v. Williams, 542 S.W.3d 539, 542 (Tex. 2018) (reversing and
remanding for new trial where trial court excluded defendant’s video of personal injury plaintiff
engaged in various activities).
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G. Motion for Mistrial
An order granting a motion for mistrial is an interlocutory order and is
typically not appealable.1235 The remedy for review of an order granting a
mistrial is by mandamus.1236 An order denying a motion for mistrial is
reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1237
H. Bifurcation
Under Rule 174(b), a trial court may order a separate trial on any issue in
the interest “of convenience or to avoid prejudice” to a party.1238 A trial
court’s order of bifurcation is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1239
If a defendant timely files a motion for bifurcated trial as to punitive
damages, a trial court must separate the determination of the amount of
punitive damages from the remaining issues.1240 “Under this approach, the
jury first hears evidence relevant to liability for actual damages, the amount
of actual damages, and liability for punitive damages (e.g., gross negligence),
and then returns findings on [those] issues.”1241 If the jury finds in favor
of the plaintiff on the issue of punitive damages liability, the same jury is
presented with evidence relevant to punitive damages, such as evidence of

1235. See Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 236 (Tex. 1984) (noting an
interlocutory order granting a motion for new trial is not reviewable on appeal); Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc.
v. Blakely, 30 S.W.3d 678, 683 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, no pet.) (reiterating that a grant of a motion
for new trial is not appealable directly or after final judgment from further proceedings in the trial).
But see Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005) (recognizing that there
are “two instances when a Texas appellate court has overturned the trial court’s grant of a new trial:
when the trial court’s order was wholly void, and where the trial court specified in the written order
that the sole ground for granting the motion was that the jury’s answers to special issues were
irreconcilably conflicting”).
1236. Galvan v. Downey, 933 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ
denied).
1237. Schlafly v. Schlafly, 33 S.W.3d 863, 868 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
denied); Sowards v. Yanes, 955 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1997), rev’d on other grounds,
996 S.W.2d 849 (Tex. 1999).
1238. TEX. R. CIV. P. 174(b); Tarrant Reg’l Water Dist. v. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d 546, 556 (Tex.
2004).
1239. Gragg, 151 S.W.3d at 556.
1240. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.009; Sw. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425,
430 (Tex. 2000); Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 (Tex. 1994); see also Hyman Farm Servs.,
Inc. v. Earth Oil & Gas Co., 920 S.W.2d 452, 457 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, no writ) (noting that
bifurcation is used to prevent the jury from considering a defendant’s net worth when determining
liability).
1241. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 30.
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the defendant’s net worth.1242 The jury then determines the amount of
damages to award after considering all of the evidence presented at both
phases of the trial.1243 Significantly, a “verdict may be rendered awarding
exemplary damages only if the jury was unanimous in finding liability for
and the amount of exemplary damages.”1244
I.

Motion for Directed or Instructed Verdict
1.

Jury Trial

A directed verdict is a procedural device that authorizes a court to
“direct” or “instruct” the jury to render a verdict because there is nothing
to decide.1245 A defendant may make a motion for directed verdict after a
plaintiff rests.1246 After the defendant rests or both sides close, either party
may make a motion for directed verdict.1247 A court may also grant a
motion for directed verdict on its own initiative.1248 The directed verdict
is like a no-evidence motion for summary judgment, except that it is brought
during trial.1249 A court may direct a verdict “if no evidence of probative

1242. See Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1988) (orig. proceeding) (noting that
“forty-three states now allow evidence of net worth to be discovered and admitted for the limited
purpose of assessing punitive damages”), rev’d on other grounds, 827 S.W.2d 833, 841−42 (Tex. 1992). In
holding a defendant’s net worth was relevant to the issue of punitive damages and, thus, discoverable,
the Lunsford court noted “two of the purposes of punitive damages: punishing the wrongdoer and
deterring the same or similar future conduct.” Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Admiral Ins. Co.,
152 S.W.3d 172, 184 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
1243. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 30.
1244. TEX. R. CIV. P. 292(b); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(d)
(requiring exemplary damages to be based on a unanimous jury finding for both liability and the amount
of damages).
1245. TEX. R. CIV. P. 268.
1246. See Wedgeworth v. Kirskey, 985 S.W.2d 115, 116−17 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet.
denied) (asserting the proper time to grant a motion for directed verdict is after the plaintiff has had
an opportunity to present his case).
1247. See Cecil Pond Constr. Co. v. Ed Bell Invs., Inc., 864 S.W.2d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—Tyler
1993, no writ) (holding a motion for directed verdict was premature because both parties had not yet
rested). Note that if a court overrules a directed verdict during trial (jury or non-jury), the movant can
either test the ruling on appeal or introduce more evidence. However, if more evidence is introduced,
the motion must be re-urged at the close of all evidence to avoid waiver. 1986 Dodge 150 Pickup VIN
# 1B7FD14T1GS006316 v. State, 129 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2004, no pet.); Wenk
v. City Nat’l Bank, 613 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1981, no writ).
1248. See Encina P’ship v. Corenergy, L.L.C., 50 S.W.3d 66, 69 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2001, pet. denied) (asserting that when a jury does not come back with a verdict, but there is not yet
an order for mistrial, the court may reconsider and grant a previous motion for instructed verdict).
1249. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 750–51 (Tex. 2003).
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force raises a fact issue” on a material element of the plaintiff’s claim.1250
A court may also direct a verdict “if the evidence conclusively establishes a
defense to the plaintiff’s cause of action.”1251
Whether as a “no evidence” point or “matter of law” point, the court of
appeals reviews a trial court’s directed verdict under a legal sufficiency
standard.1252 If the directed verdict is denied, the court of appeals is
“limited to the specific grounds stated in the motion.”1253 But, in reviewing
a trial court’s grant of a directed verdict, the reviewing court may consider
any reason the directed verdict should have been granted, even if not stated
in the court’s order or the party’s motion.1254
2.

Non-Jury Trial

A motion for directed verdict may also be made in a non-jury trial,
though there is technically no jury to “direct.”1255 In a non-jury trial, a
directed verdict is sought by a motion for judgment.1256 As in a jury trial,
the court of appeals reviews the trial court’s judgment under the legal

1250. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs. Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000).
1251. Id.
1252. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005) (applying the same legal
sufficiency standard to directed verdicts as well as summary judgments, judgments notwithstanding the
verdict, and appellate no-evidence review). See generally supra Part III (discussing the legal sufficiency
standard of review).
1253. Cooper v. Lyon Fin. Servs. Inc., 65 S.W.3d 197, 207 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2001, no pet.). But see Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414, 425–26 (Tex.
2015) (“Despite FPL Farming’s reliance on the wrong burden in its motion for directed verdict, we
will consider its contentions because ‘[i]t is our practice to liberally construe the points of error in order
to obtain a just, fair and equitable adjudication of the rights of the litigants.’ Thus, liberally construing
FPL Farming’s contentions, FPL Farming would have been entitled to a directed verdict if it
conclusively established, as a matter of law, that it did not authorize or consent to EPS’s alleged entry.”
(citations omitted) (first quoting Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d 694, 696 (Tex. 1982); then citing O’Neil
v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 542 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex. 1976); and then citing Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis,
46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam))).
1254. See Reyna v. First Nat’l Bank, 55 S.W.3d 58, 69 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.)
(explaining that a reviewing court may affirm the lower court’s directed verdict, even if it was on
erroneous grounds, as long as there is other support for the motion).
1255. See Carrasco v. Tex. Transp. Inst., 908 S.W.2d 575, 576 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995, no writ)
(identifying the different standards of review for a motion for directed verdict in a jury trial and a bench
trial).
1256. McKinley Iron Works, Inc. v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 917 S.W.2d 468, 469−70 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ).
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sufficiency standard.1257
J.

Charge of the Court

Due to its ever-developing nature, confusion remains regarding the
standard of review applicable to complaints about the court’s charge to the
jury.1258 The confusion is due to the existence of different standards for
different aspects of charge practice, which courts sometimes simplistically
fail to limit to their proper procedural context.1259
1257. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 823 (concluding that the standard of review should be
uniform for directed verdicts “without or against a jury verdict” as well as other motions). See generally
supra Part III (discussing the legal sufficiency standard of review).
1258. See First Valley Bank v. Martin, 144 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Tex. 2004) (explaining that “in some
cases a request can serve as an objection sufficient to preserve error in a jury charge”); see also State
Dep’t of Pub. Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 240 (Tex. 1992) (“The rules governing charge
procedures are difficult enough; the caselaw applying them has made compliance a labyrinth daunting
to the most experienced trial lawyer.”). In Payne, the court severely criticized the traps involved in
preserving error at the charge stage of the trial. Id. The court stated:
The procedure for preparing and objecting to the jury charge has lost its philosophical moorings.
There should be but one test for determining if a party has preserved error in the jury charge, and
that is whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and
obtained a ruling. The more specific requirements of the rules should be applied, while they
remain, to serve rather than defeat this principle.
Id.; see also Burbage v. Burbage, 447 S.W.3d 249, 258 (Tex. 2014) (“Our procedural rules are technical,
but not trivial. We construe such rules liberally so that the right to appeal is not lost unnecessarily. But
when an objection fails to explain the nature of the error, we cannot make assumptions. Preservation
of error reflects important prudential considerations recognizing that the judicial process benefits
greatly when trial courts have the opportunity to first consider and rule on error. Affording courts this
opportunity conserves judicial resources and promotes fairness by ensuring that a party does not
neglect a complaint at trial and raise it for the first time on appeal.” (citations omitted) (first citing
Arkoma Basin Expl. Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990–A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 388 (Tex. 2008); then citing
In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. 2003))); id. (noting that party’s status as pro se did not warrant
leniency on preserving error).
1259. See Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006) (explaining that the appellate
court “review[s] a trial court’s decision to submit or refuse a particular instruction under an abuse of
discretion standard”); Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990) (noting
that “[t]he standard for review of the charge is abuse of discretion, [which] occurs only when the trial
court acts without reference to any guiding principle”). However, “when a trial court submits a single
broad-form liability question incorporating multiple theories of liability,” one of which is an invalid
theory, and the reviewing court cannot determine whether the jury based its verdict on the invalid
theory, the error is harmful and a new trial must be granted. Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d
378, 388 (Tex. 2000); see also Columbia Rio Grande Healthcare v. Hawley, 284 S.W.3d 851, 864 (Tex.
2009) (reiterating the holding in Casteel that an appellate court must presume harmful error when it
cannot determine whether the jury verdict was based on an invalid theory); Romero v. KPH Consol.,
Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212, 226, 230 (Tex. 2005) (affirming Casteel and Harris County v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230
(Tex. 2002), and explaining that the “reversible error rule of Casteel and Harris County neither encourages
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Time for Objecting and Requesting Instructions

In King Fisher Marine Serv., L.P. v. Tamez,1260 the court reviewed a trial
court’s decision to deny a requested instruction because the request was not
tendered by the trial court’s deadline.1261 The trial court refused the
requested instruction on the morning the charge was to be read to the jury,
based on its setting of a deadline for making all objections and tendering all
requests by the close of the formal charge conference the prior
afternoon.1262 The court held Rule 272 affords trial courts the discretion
to set a deadline for charge objections that precedes the reading of the
charge to the jury as long as a reasonable amount of time is afforded for
counsel to examine and object to the charge.1263 The court further stated:
Accordingly, while the rule strictly prohibits objections after the charge is read,
it affords trial courts latitude in addressing objections made before. And it is
not surprising that many trial courts would prefer to avoid the confusion and
scheduling difficulties that would arise if objections were allowed up to the
moment the court plans to charge the jury.1264

nor requires parties to submit separate questions for every possible issue or combination of issues; the
rule does both encourage and require parties not to submit issues that have no basis in law and fact in
such a way that the error cannot be corrected without retrial”); cf. City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich,
29 S.W.3d 62, 69 n.1 (Tex. 2000) (noting that the court has not decided whether the rationale in Casteel
should be extended to cases in which there allegedly was no evidence to support one or more theories
included within a broad-form submission); see also Scott v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
572 S.W.2d 273, 277–78 (Tex. 1978) (addressing a broad-form negligence question with several
potential factual bases for finding negligence, some pled and some not). In Scott v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Co., the court affirmed the court of appeal’s reversal of the trial court’s judgment,
presuming harm from the incorrect submission, and addressed actions that a trial court might take to
eliminate such error. Id. The court suggested that the charge should list “the relevant acts or
omissions” raised by the evidence and warned to do otherwise would allow the jury to return a verdict
supported by no evidence. Id. The question is whether the failure to take this step or the failure to
eliminate theories not supported by the evidence creates a Casteel/Harris County problem. The Fort
Worth Court of Appeals rejected a Casteel/Harris County complaint in Columbia Medical Center of
Las Colinas v. Bush ex. rel. Bush, holding that there was nothing affirmatively misleading in the charge,
which “did not instruct the jury to consider or not to consider any specific act or negligence.”
Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas v. Bush ex. rel. Bush, 122 S.W.3d 835, 859 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2003, pet. denied). The supreme court denied review in Bush. The issue remains unresolved. While
Scott is still good law, if appellate courts required trial courts to load the charge with granulated factual
allegations in limiting instructions, broad form might never be “feasible.”
1260. King Fisher Marine Serv., L.P. v. Tamez, 443 S.W.3d 838 (Tex. 2014).
1261. Id. at 842–47.
1262. Id. at 847.
1263. Id.
1264. Id. at 843–44.
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It is worth noting that the court cautioned against trial courts rejecting, out
of hand, objections or requested instructions and questions solely because
they were made after a court-imposed deadline.
An objection that may seem obvious to an appellate court perusing a cold
record may occur to battle-weary trial counsel only when the fog of war has
lifted after a long day in the courtroom, or simply after a decent night’s sleep.
Trial courts should therefore make every effort to entertain on the merits a
charge objection brought in good faith after conclusion of the formal charge
conference but before the charge is read to the jury.1265

2.

Questions

Unless extraordinary circumstances exist, a trial court must submit broadform questions to the jury.1266 The broad-form submission requirement
was “intended to simplify jury charges for the benefit of the jury, the parties,
and the trial court.”1267 The supreme court has stated that “[w]hen
properly utilized, broad-form submission can simplify charge conferences
and provide more comprehensible questions for the jury.”1268 Rule 278
provides that “[t]he court shall submit the questions . . . in the form
provided by Rule 277, which are raised by the written pleadings and the
evidence.”1269 The supreme court has interpreted Rule 278 as providing
“a substantive, nondiscretionary directive to trial courts requiring them to
submit requested questions to the jury if the pleadings and any evidence
support them.”1270 Thus, as “long as matters are timely raised and properly
1265. Id. at 847.
1266. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); see also TEX. R.
CIV. P. 277 (“In all jury cases the court shall, whenever feasible, submit the cause upon broad-form
[submissions].”); Keetch v. Kroger Co., 845 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tex. 1992) (reiterating that Rule 277
requires broad-form submission “whenever feasible”); Crawford v. Deets, 828 S.W.2d 795, 800 (Tex.
App.⎯Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (“Unless extraordinary circumstances exist, a court must submit
such broad-form questions.”).
1267. Romero v. KPH Consol., Inc., 166 S.W.3d 212, 230 (Tex. 2005).
1268. Harris Cty. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2002); see also Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 230
(following the holding in Smith and recognizing that broad-form submission can simplify charges and
allow questions to be more comprehensible). However, broad-form submission is not always
practicable and “cannot be used to broaden the harmless error rule to deny a party the correct charge
to which it would otherwise be entitled.” Id.
1269. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278; see also Romero, 166 S.W.3d at 215 (explaining that questions should
be submitted to the jury in broad form as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 277 “whenever
feasible”; however, “broad-form submission cannot be used to put before the jury issues that have no
basis in the law or the evidence”).
1270. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1992).
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requested as part of a trial court’s charge,” a judgment must be reversed
“when a party is denied proper submission of a valid theory of recovery or
a vital defensive issue raised by the pleadings and evidence.”1271
The submission of controlling issues in the case—in terms of theories of
recovery or defenses—appears to be a question of law and is reviewable de
novo.1272 Likewise, other objections, such as those which claim that the
issue in question was “not supported by the pleadings”1273 or that the
evidence is not legally sufficient to support submission,1274 should be
reviewed de novo because each complaint raises a question of law.1275
Whether a trial court should have submitted a theory by questions or
instructions is reviewed under an abuse of discretion test, recognizing,
however, that there is a presumption in favor of broad-form submission of
questions.1276 “To determine whether an alleged error in the jury charge is
reversible, the reviewing court must consider the pleadings of the parties,
the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its entirety.”1277 In
addition, the reversible error analysis applies to complaints about errors in
the charge.1278 However, when the complaint alleges that an element of a
theory has been omitted in the questions or instructions—either because
1271. Exxon Corp. v. Perez, 842 S.W.2d 629, 631 (Tex. 1992).
1272. See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Street, 379 S.W.2d 648, 651 (Tex. 1964) (declining to review a
controlling issue because the parties had not objected to submission of the issue to the jury and,
therefore, waived any objection to its form).
1273. McLennan Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Sims, 376 S.W.2d 924, 927 (Tex. App.—Waco 1964, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
1274. Elbaor, 845 S.W.2d at 243; Brown v. Goldstein, 685 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1985); Garza
v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. 1965). However, “stock no-evidence” objections and general
objections that do not address the issue of broad-form submission are not sufficient to preserve error.
Tefsa v. Stewart, 135 S.W.3d 272, 276 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied).
1275. See, e.g., St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 94 S.W.3d 513, 525 (Tex. 2002) (plurality opinion)
(holding whether a submitted definition misstates the law is a legal question and affirming that the
court of appeals properly applied the de novo standard of review).
1276. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); Niemeyer v. Tana
Oil & Gas Corp., 39 S.W.3d 380, 387 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.); McReynolds v. First Office
Mgmt., 948 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 277 (explaining
that the court shall submit those instructions and definitions necessary for the jury’s deliberations in
broad-form questions, whenever feasible).
1277. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass’n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex.
1986); cf. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 293 (Tex. 1994) (noting that the
holding in Island Recreational would not be extended to the instant case where “the trial court
affirmatively charged the jury on the wrong standard of causation,” nor would the court consider
overruling it).
1278. Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 786–87 (Tex. 2001) (citing TEX. R.
APP. P. 61.1); Island Recreational, 710 S.W.2d at 555.
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the court believed that it was established as a matter of law or because an
element of the theory of recovery was omitted—the appropriate standard
of review should be de novo.1279
3.

Instructions and Definitions

A litigant has the right to have the jury properly instructed on the issues
“authorized and supported by the law governing the case.”1280 The trial
court should generally “explain to the jury any legal or technical terms”
contained in instructions and definitions.1281 The decision of whether to
submit a particular instruction or definition is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion,1282 with the essential inquiry being whether the instruction or
definition aids the jury in answering the questions.1283 Accordingly, a court
is given wide latitude to determine the sufficiency of explanatory
instructions and definitions.1284 “[A] court has considerably more
discretion in submitting instructions and definitions than it has in submitting
[jury questions].”1285
1279. See State Dep’t of Pub. Highways v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 240–41 (Tex. 1992)
(emphasizing the plaintiff’s failure to submit an element of his theory of recovery over the defendant’s
objection); see also Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 846 n.4 (Tex. 2005) (applying Payne
and concluding that error was preserved because counsel “made a clear, timely objection and obtained
a ruling”); McKinley v. Stripling, 763 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex. 1989) (ruling that the plaintiff’s refusal to
submit the proximate cause issue in an informed consent action, after the defendant properly objected
to the omission, waived the issue and the plaintiff could not recover).
1280. Harris Cty. v. Smith, 96 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2002) (quoting Crown Life Ins. Co. v.
Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 389 (Tex. 2000)).
1281. K-Mart Corp. Store No. 7441 v. Trotti, 677 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1984, writ ref’d n.r.e.); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 277 (requiring courts to “submit such instructions
and definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict”); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v.
Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2002) (affirming that courts “must submit ‘such instructions and
definitions as shall be proper to enable the jury to render a verdict’” (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 277));
Niemeyer, 39 S.W.3d at 387 (stating a trial judge “has wide discretion in submitting jury questions, as
well as instructions, and definitions”); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Garcia, 758 S.W.2d 893, 894 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied) (reiterating that Rule 277 requires courts to submit any
instructions and definitions that the jury may need to render a proper verdict).
1282. Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006); State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau,
951 S.W.2d 444, 451–52 (Tex. 1997); Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., Inc., 721 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tex. 1986).
1283. Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 842–43 (Tex. 2005); McReynolds v. First
Office Mgmt., 948 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ).
1284. Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex. 1995); Mobil Chem. Co. v.
Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 256 (Tex. 1974); Perez v. Weingarten Realty Inv’rs, 881 S.W.2d 490, 496 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied); M.N. Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624,
631 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
1285. Harris v. Harris, 765 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ
denied); cf. Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1999) (“[S]ubmission of a
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When instructions or definitions are actually given, the question on
review is whether the instruction or definition is “proper.”1286 An
instruction is proper if it assists the jury, is supported by the pleadings or
evidence, and accurately states the law.1287 Examples of “improper”
instructions include those that misstate the law or mislead the jury,1288
those that “comment on the weight of the evidence,”1289 or those that
“‘nudge’ or ‘tilt’ the jury.”1290 The test of sufficiency for a definition is its
“reasonable clarity in performing [its] function.”1291 Both instructions and
definitions are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.1292
However, whether the terms are properly defined or the instruction properly

single question relating to multiple theories may be necessary to avoid the risk that the jury will become
confused and answer questions inconsistently.”). The aim of the jury charge is to present “the issues
for decision logically, simply, clearly, fairly, correctly, and completely.” Id. “Toward that end, the trial
judge [has] broad discretion so long as the [jury] charge is legally correct.” Id. Generally, plaintiffs are
entitled to obtain findings in support of alternative recovery theories, even if those theories speak to a
single injury. Id. at 668. In those cases, the trial judge should structure the charge so as to “allow the
plaintiff to elect a basis of recovery, and [allow] the defendant to assert defenses that may not be
available” under all theories. Id. The Rodriguez court further stated, “Our holding today does not
hamper the trial court from submitting a charge on multiple theories.” Id. Interestingly, the court in
Rodriguez did not cite or discuss Rule 278, which provides that judgment will not be reversed because
of the failure to submit alternate wordings of the same question. TEX. R. CIV. P. 278.
1286. TEX. R. CIV. P. 277; Plainsman Trading, 898 S.W.2d at 791; M.N. Dannenbaum, 840 S.W.2d
at 631; Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Middleman, 661 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
1287. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex. 2002); Tex. Workers’ Comp.
Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 34 S.W.3d 909, 912 (Tex. 2000); El Paso Ref., Inc. v. Scurlock Permian Corp.,
77 S.W.3d 374, 388 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, no pet.).
1288. Jackson v. Fontaine’s Clinics, Inc., 499 S.W.2d 87, 89 (Tex. 1973); Steak & Ale of Tex.,
Inc. v. Borneman, 62 S.W.3d 898, 904–05 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.); McReynolds,
948 S.W.2d at 344; Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin, 942 S.W.2d 712, 721–22 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1997, no writ).
1289. Torres v. Caterpillar, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 233, 241 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, writ
denied). A “comment on the weight of the evidence” may be demonstrated when the instruction
“assumes the truth of a material controverted fact, or exaggerates, minimizes, or withdraws some
pertinent evidence from the jury’s consideration.” Id. at 241–42; accord H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v.
Bilotto, 985 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. 1998).
1290. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex. 2003).
1291. Harris v. Harris, 765 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, writ
denied).
1292. Torres, 928 S.W.2d at 242; see also Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791
(Tex. 1995) (recognizing that an incidental comment on the evidence is permissible “when it is properly
a part of an instruction or definition”); Harris, 765 S.W.2d at 801 (defining an improper explanatory
instruction as one that misstates the law as applied to the facts).
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worded should be a question of law reviewable de novo.1293 A de novo
standard of review should also be used when the complaint is that an
explanatory instruction or definition misstates the law1294 or directly
comments on the weight of the evidence.1295 If the definition or instruction
was improper, the reviewing court must then determine whether the error
was harmless.1296
When a party complains about the court’s refusal “to submit a requested
instruction or definition,” the question on review is “whether the request
was reasonably necessary to enable the jury to render a proper verdict.”1297
When “the refusal is based on a determination that the request is
unnecessary, the abuse of discretion standard” of review should apply.1298
In contrast, when the refusal is based upon a determination that the
instruction or definition was not raised by the pleadings,1299 was not
supported by at least “some evidence,”1300 was not tendered in substantially
correct form, or was not an element of a ground of recovery or defense in

1293. See M.N. Dannenbaum, Inc. v. Brummerhop, 840 S.W.2d 624, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (asserting that an instruction is improper if it misstates the law); Villareal
v. Reza, 236 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1951, no writ) (finding an instruction that fails
to properly instruct the jury on the burden of proof issue is erroneous).
1294. See Harris, 765 S.W.2d at 801 (holding that a definition given by the trial court was legally
correct, aided the understanding of the jury, and was not demonstrably a source of harmful error);
Wakefield v. Bevly, 704 S.W.2d 339, 350 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1985, no writ) (refusing to rule
before the trial occurs on what instructions a trial court may properly submit to the jury in a case on
remand); Bennett v. Bailey, 597 S.W.2d 532, 533 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (declining
to find error in the trial court’s submission of broadly worded issues to the jury).
1295. City of Pearland v. Alexander, 483 S.W.2d 244, 249 (Tex. 1972); Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of
Fla. v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427, 434–35 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ).
1296. Quantum Chem. Corp. v. Toennies, 47 S.W.3d 473, 480 (Tex. 2001); see also OwensCorning Fiberglas Corp. v. Martin, 942 S.W.2d 712, 722 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ) (holding
the court’s discretion is not abused unless an instruction caused an improper judgment to be rendered);
M.N. Dannenbaum, 840 S.W.2d at 631 (restating that an error must have caused the rendering of an
improper verdict to constitute reversible error).
1297. Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997,
writ dism’d by agr.); accord Plainsman Trading, 898 S.W.2d at 790; Johnson v. Whitehurst, 652 S.W.2d
441, 447 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Steinberger v. Archer Cty.,
621 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, no writ); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 277 (describing
what type of instructions and definitions are required).
1298. Moran, 946 S.W.2d at 405.
1299. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 999 S.W.2d 579, 594 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999) (holding
the trial court did not err in excluding a negligence instruction from the jury charge because it was not
alleged in the pleadings), rev’d on other grounds, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002).
1300. Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 243–44 (Tex. 1992); accord Ornelas v. Moore Serv. Bus
Lines, 410 S.W.2d 919, 923 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1966, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
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broad-form submission,1301 the complaint presents a legal question
reviewable de novo.1302 Except (perhaps) for a refusal to submit
instructions concerning otherwise nonsubmitted elements of a party’s cause
of action or defense, which implicates the constitutional right of trial by jury,
the harmless error rule applies when determining whether the improper
refusal to submit a requested instruction or definition requires reversal.1303
In determining whether an alleged error in the submission of instructions
or definitions is reversible, “the reviewing court must consider the pleadings
of the parties, the evidence presented at trial, and the charge in its
entirety.”1304 The error will constitute reversible error only if, when viewed
in light of the totality of these circumstances, the error amounted to such a
denial of the complaining party’s rights “as was reasonably calculated and
probably did cause the rendition of an improper judgment.”1305

1301. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 168–69 (Tex. 2002); Placencio v. Allied
Indus. Int’l, Inc., 724 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1987); M.L. Rendleman v. Clarke, 909 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, writ dism’d); see also Ornelas, 410 S.W.2d at 923 (holding that
appellant’s requested jury instructions were too vague or erroneously worded to constitute proper
instructions).
1302. See Wolff, 999 S.W.2d at 586 (stating that the appropriate test for reviewing a trial court’s
legal conclusions, such as “the substance of a submitted definition[, is] de novo”).
1303. Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex. 2006) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 61.1(a),
44.1(a)); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 723 (Tex. 2003); Vingcard A.S. v. Merrimac
Hosp. Sys., Inc., 59 S.W.3d 847, 865 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. denied); St. James Transp.
Co. v. Porter, 840 S.W.2d 658, 664 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); cf. Williams,
85 S.W.3d at 170 (referring to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 61.1(a) and an earlier erroneous
admonition by the trial court to the jury).
1304. Island Recreational Dev. Corp. v. Republic of Tex. Sav. Ass’n, 710 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tex.
1986); accord Vinson & Elkins v. Moran, 946 S.W.2d 381, 406 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997,
writ dism’d by agr.).
1305. Island Recreational Dev. Corp., 710 S.W.2d at 555; accord TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; Bed, Bath &
Beyond v. Urista, 211 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Tex. 2006); Moran, 946 S.W.2d at 406; cf. Ford Motor Co. v.
Miles, 967 S.W.2d 377, 387 (Tex. 1998) (plurality opinion) (stating that an “erroneous instruction . . .
infect[s] the entire charge”). In Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equipment Corp., the supreme court held
that the submission of the charge was reversible error “[b]ecause the charge failed to instruct the jury
on the proper measure of . . . damages.” Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d
812, 817 (Tex. 1997). The court, however, did not engage in a reversible error analysis. Id. Conversely,
in State v. Williams, the supreme court did employ a reversible error analysis to an improper instruction
and concluded that the error was not harmful. State v. Williams, 940 S.W.2d 583, 585 (Tex. 1996);
see also Johnson, 106 S.W.3d at 723 (finding that although the trial court had abused its discretion in
allowing an instruction, it did not cause an improper verdict).
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K. Closing Statements
As with opening statements, the trial court has discretion to limit and
control closing remarks to the jury.1306 To obtain reversal of a judgment
on the basis of improper jury argument, an appellant must prove the
existence of:
(1) an error (2) that was not invited or provoked, (3) that was preserved by the
proper trial predicate, such as an objection, a motion to instruct, or a motion
for mistrial, and (4) [that] was not curable by an instruction, a prompt
withdrawal of the statement, or a reprimand by the [trial court].1307

Additionally, if the argument is incurable,1308 the appellant must also
“prove . . . that the argument by its nature, degree, and extent constitute[s]
reversibl[e] . . . error.”1309
Improper jury arguments rarely result in reversible error.1310 Some
notable examples of improper jury arguments include appealing to racial or
ethnic prejudice,1311 accusing a defendant corporation of being a killer of

1306. See Dang v. State, 202 S.W.3d 278, 281 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, no
pet.) (noting that Texas courts have yet to answer which harm analysis should be applied when
reviewing whether a trial court abused its discretion regarding the time length of a closing argument).
1307. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1979); see also TEX. R. CIV. P.
269 (discussing rules for jury arguments).
1308. See Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Haywood, 266 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Tex. 1954) (“The true test
[for incurability] is the degree of prejudice [that flows] from the argument—whether the argument,
considered in its proper setting, was reasonably calculated to cause such prejudice to the opposing
litigant that a withdrawal by counsel or an instruction by the court, or both, could not eliminate the
probability that it resulted in an improper verdict.”); see also Austin v. Shampine, 948 S.W.2d 900, 906–
07 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, writ withdrawn) (applying Haywood to determine that the word
“corrupt” did not affect the outcome of the case).
1309. Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 839; accord Shampine, 948 S.W.2d at 906; Lone Star Ford, Inc. v. Carter,
848 S.W.2d 850, 853 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ). Only in the rare instance of
incurable jury argument is error preserved without an objection. See Rodriguez v. Hyundai Motor Co.,
944 S.W.2d 757, 774 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997) (stressing the requirement that error must be
preserved on most claims of improper argument), rev’d on other grounds, 995 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1999).
1310. Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 839 (illustrating that improper jury arguments rarely result in
reversible error); Shampine, 948 S.W.2d at 907 (applying Reese to decide that use of the word “corrupt”
was not incurably improper); Isern v. Watson, 942 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1997, writ
denied) (stressing that jury arguments causing incurable harm are rare and therefore reversible error is
rare); Boone v. Panola Cty., 880 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, no writ) (indicating that
improper jury arguments rarely result in reversible error because most errors can be cured by instructing
the jury to disregard it).
1311. See Living Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Peñalver, 256 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Tex. 2008) (comparing
trial counsel to Nazis was incurable jury argument); Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Guerrero, 800 S.W.2d
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families,1312 referring to a party as “cattle,”1313 and a “party’s personal
expression of gratitude to the jury.”1314 In these instances, the appellant
must prove that the argument, by its “nature, degree[,] and extent
constituted reversibly harmful error”1315 (proper inquiries include: the
length of the argument, whether the argument was repeated or abandoned,
and whether cumulative error existed),1316 and that “the probability that
the [improper] argument caused harm exceeds the probability that the
verdict was based upon proper proceedings and evidence.”1317 Finally, the
reviewing court must evaluate the improper jury argument in light of the
entire case, “[f]rom voir dire . . . [to] closing argument[s].”1318
L. Jury Deliberations
The scheduling of jury deliberations, sequestration of jurors, breaks, and
the like are all reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1319 Responses to jury
notes are reviewed in the same manner as regular charge practices.1320
While repeating testimony to the jury and the extent of the repetition is
discretionary, testimony must be reread if the requirements of Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 287 are met.1321 In the absence of disagreement
859, 866–67 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied) (holding “incurable reversible error”
occurred when counsel appealed to ethnic unity in his closing argument to the jury).
1312. Carter, 848 S.W.2d at 854 (finding reversible error present in attorney’s statement which
suggested that Ford Motor Company knowingly manufactured cars that killed people and valued
greater profits over human life).
1313. See Sw. Greyhound Lines v. Dickson, 236 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex. 1951) (holding the trial
court’s “curative” instruction for the jury to disregard plaintiff’s counsel’s inflammatory and abusive
statement that the defendant was lacking in “common decency” and acted as “cattle” was still
prejudicial to the defendant’s rights and thus, constituted reversible error).
1314. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Iracheta, 161 S.W.3d 462, 472 (Tex. 2005) (“A party’s personal
expression of gratitude [in Spanish] to the [all-Hispanic] jury at the close of a case is [manifest] error
that cannot be repaired and therefore need not be objected to.”).
1315. Reese, 584 S.W.2d at 839.
1316. Id. at 840.
1317. Austin v. Shampine, 948 S.W.2d 900, 907 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, pet. withdrawn);
accord Isern v. Watson, 942 S.W.2d 186, 198 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1997, writ denied); Boone v.
Panola Cnty., 880 S.W.2d 195, 198 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1994, no writ).
1318. Luna v. N. Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex. 1984); Reese, 584 S.W.2d at
840; Jones v. Republic Waste Servs. of Tex., Ltd., 236 S.W.3d 390, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Boone, 880 S.W.2d at 198; La. & Ark. Ry. Co. v. Capps, 766 S.W.2d 291, 294
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ denied).
1319. TEX. R. CIV. P. 282.
1320. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 286 (expressing the similarity of jury notes to regular charge practices).
1321. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 287 (requiring disagreement among jurors as to witness statements
before testimony can be read back to them).
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between jurors, however, the court is not obligated to have testimony read
back.1322 Furthermore, the trial court has broad discretion in deciding what
portion of testimony is relevant to the point in dispute.1323
A trial court has discretion to issue a supplemental charge to the jury
(“verdict urging” or “dynamite” charge) or return a jury for further
deliberations in an attempt to encourage them to reach a verdict.1324
Typically, to test a supplemental charge for coerciveness, the supplemental
charge must be “broken down into its several particulars and analyzed for
[its] possible coercive [effect].”1325 A potentially coercive charge will not
constitute reversible error unless the charge as a whole retains its coercive
nature when all the “circumstances surrounding its rendition and effect are
[analyzed].”1326 Additionally, the length of time a court allows for jury
deliberations is a decision within the sound discretion of the trial court.1327
Although the trial court has considerable latitude, if the complaining party
can show substantial evidence on appeal “that it was altogether improbable
that the jury would reach a verdict,” then the error is reversible.1328
M. Conflicting Jury Findings
In reviewing the legal question of whether jury findings irreconcilably
conflict, the appellate court applies a de novo standard of review.1329
Because this is purely a legal question, the trial court’s granting of a new trial
on the express basis of irreconcilably conflicting jury findings can be

1322. See Krishnan v. Ramirez, 42 S.W.3d 205, 225–26 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet.
denied) (stressing that the jury is only entitled to hear the testimony in dispute).
1323. Id. at 225; Wirtz v. Orr, 575 S.W.2d 66, 72 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1978, writ dism’d);
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Scott, 423 S.W.2d 351, 354 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, writ
dism’d w.o.j.).
1324. See Lochinvar Corp. v. Meyers, 930 S.W.2d 182, 187 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1996, no writ)
(stating that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 286, the trial court may also issue a supplemental
charge to correct an error in the original charge); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 286 (permitting courts to issue
written instructions to juries during deliberations). Violations of Rule 286 are reversed only if the error
is prejudicial. Lochinvar Corp., 930 S.W.2d at 187.
1325. Stevens v. Travelers Ins. Co., 563 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Tex. 1978); accord Minn. Mining &
Mfg. Co. v. Nishika Ltd., 885 S.W.2d 603, 632 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1994), rev’d on other grounds, 953
S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1997).
1326. Stevens, 563 S.W.2d at 229, 232.
1327. Nishika, 885 S.W.2d at 632; Shaw v. Greater Houston Transp. Co., 791 S.W.2d 204, 205–
06 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
1328. Shaw, 791 S.W.2d at 206.
1329. See FFE Transp. Servs., Inc. v. Fulgham, 154 S.W.3d 84, 89–90 (Tex. 2004) (stating that
issues of law are decided de novo).
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challenged by mandamus.1330
“In reviewing the jury findings for conflict, the threshold [inquiry] is
whether the findings [implicate] the same material fact.”1331 If the conflict
can be reasonably reconciled, the reviewing “court may not strike
[conflicting] jury answers.”1332 The reviewing “court must ‘reconcile
apparent conflicts in the jury’s findings’ if reasonably possible [considering]
the pleadings and evidence, the manner of submission, and the other
findings considered as a whole.”1333 When “the issues submitted ‘[may
have] more than one reasonable construction,’” the reviewing court will
generally adopt the construction that “avoids a conflict in the answers.”1334
Appellate review is “limited to the question of conflict, and . . . review of
the jury findings is limited to a consideration of the factors before the
jury.”1335 Similarly, when no conflict exists, the appellate court cannot use
the jury’s answer to one question to challenge the insufficiency of the
evidence supporting the jury’s answer to another question.1336
VI. POST-TRIAL RULINGS
A. Post-Verdict & Post-Judgment Pleading Amendments
When a request to amend pleadings is made after trial, the request must
be granted, “unless (1) the opposing party presents evidence of surprise or
prejudice; or (2) the amendment asserts a new cause of action or defense,
and thus[,] is prejudicial on its face.”1337 If the amendment is procedural
in nature (i.e., merely conforming “the pleadings to the evidence at trial”),

1330. Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Craik, 346 S.W.2d 830, 831–32 (Tex. 1961).
1331. USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 508 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Bender
v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 600 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex. 1980)).
1332. Bender, 600 S.W.2d at 260; see also Lee v. Huntsville Livestock Servs., 934 S.W.2d 158, 160
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, pet. denied) (asserting that jury answers must result in
different judgments before one will be stricken).
1333. Bender, 600 S.W.2d at 260.
1334. Id.
1335. Id.
1336. See Huber v. Ryan, 627 S.W.2d 145, 145–46 (Tex. 1981) (holding that a jury’s findings of
injury and zero damages for past pain and suffering could be reconciled).
1337. State Bar of Tex. v. Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. 1994); accord TEX. R. CIV. P.
63, 66. “The burden of showing surprise or prejudice rests on the party resisting the amendment.”
Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d at 658. “Surprise may be shown as a matter of law if the pleading asserts a new
and independent cause of action or defense.” Bell v. Moores, 832 S.W.2d 749, 757 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
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the trial court must grant the amendment.1338
A trial amendment is prejudicial on its face if “(1) the amendment asserts
a new substantive matter that reshapes the nature of the trial itself; (2) the
new matter is of such a nature that the opposing party could not have
anticipated it in light of the development of the case up to the time the
amendment was requested; and (3) the opposing party’s presentation of its
case would be detrimentally affected by the amendment.”1339 Accordingly,
if the amendment is substantive in nature (i.e., changing the basis of a party’s
causes of action), the trial court has discretion to grant or deny the
amendment.1340 While “the trend is to give the trial court[s] wide latitude
in allowing amendments,” post-verdict or post-judgment trial amendments
may not be permitted.1341 The trial court’s decision will be reviewed on
appeal for an abuse of discretion.1342
B. Motion to Disregard Jury Findings
A trial court may disregard a jury’s answer to a question in the charge only
when the answer has no support in evidence, or the question is
immaterial.1343 “A [jury] question is immaterial when it should not have
been submitted, it calls for a finding beyond the province of the jury (e.g.,
such as a question of law), or when it was properly submitted but has been

1338. Chapin & Chapin, Inc. v. Tex. Sand & Gravel Co., 844 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. 1992);
Stephenson v. Le Boeuf, 16 S.W.3d 829, 839 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
“The rule of trial by consent is limited to those exceptional cases where the parties clearly tried an
unpleaded issue[;] . . . [therefore, t]he rule should be cautiously applied and [is] not [appropriate] in
doubtful situations.” Libhart v. Copeland, 949 S.W.2d 783, 797 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no writ).
1339. Zarate v. Rodriguez, 542 S.W.3d 26, 37 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet.
denied) (citing Tanglewood Homes Ass’n v. Feldman, 436 S.W.3d 48, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2014, pet. denied)).
1340. Rusk v. Rusk, 5 S.W.3d 299, 309 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied);
Smith v. Heard, 980 S.W.2d 693, 698 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied); Libhart, 949 S.W.2d
at 797; Taiwan Shrimp Farm Vill. Ass’n v. U.S.A. Shrimp Farm Dev., 915 S.W.2d 61, 70 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1996, writ denied).
1341. Boarder to Boarder Trucking, Inc. v. Mondi, Inc., 831 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1992, no writ); see also Mayhew v. Dealey, 143 S.W.3d 356, 371 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2004, pet. denied) (affirming trial court’s grant of motion for leave to amend petition the same day it
rendered judgment).
1342. See Kilpatrick, 874 S.W.2d at 658 (exercising the right to review the trial court’s decision
for an abuse of discretion).
1343. TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Spencer v. Eagle Star Ins. Co. of Am., 876 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex.
1994); River Oaks Place Council of Co-Owners v. Daly, 172 S.W.3d 314, 321 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 2005, no pet.).
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rendered immaterial by other findings.”1344 If the issue is immaterial, has
no support in the evidence, or if the evidence establishes a contrary finding,
then the court may disregard an answer and substitute its own finding.1345
A court reviews the denial of a motion to disregard jury findings as a legal
sufficiency challenge.1346 Therefore, the court views the “evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict,” “credit[ing] favorable evidence if
reasonable jurors could, and disregard[ing] contrary evidence unless
reasonable jurors could not.”1347 The court sustains such a challenge only
when no more than a scintilla of evidence supported the jury’s finding.1348
“More than a scintilla of evidence exists when . . . reasonable and fairminded people [could] differ in their conclusions.”1349 The court must
“view the evidence in a light that tends to support the jury’s finding and
disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary” unless doing so would
be unreasonable.1350 Where some evidence supports the disregarded
finding, the reviewing court “must reverse and render [a] judgment on the
verdict unless the appellee [asserts] cross-points [or issues] . . . [showing]
grounds for a new trial.”1351
C. Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (JNOV)
A trial court may disregard a jury verdict and render a JNOV if no
evidence supports the jury finding on an issue necessary to liability or if a
directed verdict would have been proper.1352 Unlike the motion to
disregard jury findings (discussed above in Part VI(B)), a motion for JNOV
1344. Se. Pipe Line Co. v. Tichacek, 997 S.W.2d 166, 172 (Tex. 1999).
1345. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 820 (Tex. 2005); Green Int’l, Inc. v. Solis,
951 S.W.2d 384, 389 (Tex. 1997); Eubanks v. Winn, 420 S.W.2d 698, 701 (Tex. 1967); see also TEX. R.
CIV. P. 301 (“[T]he court may, upon like motion and notice, disregard any jury finding or a question
that has no support in the evidence.”). A jury finding is immaterial if the question “should not have
been submitted” to the jury or if the question, although “properly submitted[, was] rendered immaterial
by other findings.” Spencer, 876 S.W.2d at 157.
1346. Willard Law Firm, L.P. v. Sewell, 464 S.W.3d 747, 751 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, no pet.); Excel Corp. v. McDonald, 223 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, pet.
denied).
1347. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d at 822, 827.
1348. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997).
1349. Id. (citing Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995)).
1350. McDonald, 224 S.W.3d at 508.
1351. Basin Operating Co. v. Valley Steel Prods., 620 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1981,
writ ref’d n.r.e.).
1352. TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; Tiller v. McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 713 (Tex. 2003); Fort Bend Cty.
Drainage Dist. v. Sbrusch, 818 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. 1991); see also supra Section VI(I) (explaining
standards for directed verdict).
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asks the trial court to disregard all of the jury’s findings and render judgment
contrary to them.1353
A court of appeals reviews an appellant’s challenge to the trial court’s
grant or denial of a motion for JNOV under the legal sufficiency
standard.1354 Generally, where the court of appeals finds error, it will
reverse and render the judgment.1355 But in some instances, such as where
the law on which the case was tried has changed between the time of trial
and appeal, the court of appeals will remand for a new trial.1356 An appellee
that received negative jury findings but had its motion for JNOV granted by
the trial court should argue that the trial court did not err in granting a
motion for JNOV, and also raise independent issues, if any, that may be
grounds for granting a new trial.1357
D. Motion to Admit Additional Evidence
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 270 allows, but does not require, the court
to permit additional evidence.1358 Rule 270 states that “[w]hen it clearly
appears to be necessary to the due administration of justice, the court may
permit additional evidence to be offered at any time; provided that in a jury
case no evidence on a controversial matter shall be received after the verdict

1353. Cf. Teston v. Miller, 349 S.W.2d 296, 299 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1961, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) (referencing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301, but stating “[t]his is not a case involving a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict but one to disregard the findings”).
1354. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 823 (Tex. 2005) (stating that the standard
of review for JNOV is legal sufficiency); Mikob Props., Inc, v. Joachim, 468 S.W.3d 587, 594 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 2015, pet. denied) (stating that the standard of review for JNOV is legal sufficiency); see
also Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 289 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. 2009) (asserting that the test for
legal sufficiency must involve the determination of whether the evidence would enable a reasonable
person to reach the verdict under review). See generally supra Section III(A)(1) (discussing legal
sufficiency standard of review).
1355. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Miller, 102 S.W.3d 706, 710 (Tex. 2003).
1356. Scott v. Liebman, 404 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex. 1966), abrogated on other grounds by Parker v.
Highland Park, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 512 (Tex. 1978).
1357. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(c) (“[T]he appellee may bring forward by cross-point contained in
his brief filed in the Court of Appeals any ground which would have vitiated the verdict or would have
prevented an affirmance of the judgment had one been rendered by the trial court in harmony with the
verdict . . . .”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(b)(2) (“[T]he appellate court must remand a case to the trial
court to take evidence if: (A) the appellate court has sustained a point raised by the appellant; and
(B) the appellee has raised a cross-point that requires the taking of additional evidence.”); N.N. v. Inst.
for Rehab., 234 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.) (noting that appellee
defends the JNOV as correct and asserts two cross-points, but only if appellant’s issue is sustained in
the court of appeals).
1358. Krishnan v. Ramirez, 42 S.W.3d 205, 223 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
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of the jury.”1359 After having rested a case, the party’s right to reopen the
case and introduce additional evidence is a matter within “the sound
discretion of the trial court.”1360 In a bench trial, the trial court may permit
the introduction of additional evidence even after judgment has been
entered if it does so within the court’s plenary power.1361 In both jury and
nonjury trials, the trial court has discretion to reopen the evidence on an
uncontested or noncontroversial matter.1362
Factors the trial court considers in determining whether to allow
additional evidence include whether the party seeking to introduce the
evidence showed due diligence in obtaining that evidence, whether the
evidence is decisive, whether the trial court’s reception of the evidence
would cause undue delay, and whether allowing the additional evidence
would cause an injustice.1363 In making this determination, “[t]he trial court
should exercise its discretion liberally ‘in the interest of permitting both sides
to fully develop the case in the interest of justice.’”1364
The trial court’s decision to permit additional evidence will be disturbed
on appeal only when it abuses its discretion.1365 The trial court
automatically abuses its discretion if it reopens, post-verdict, the evidence

1359. TEX. R. CIV. P. 270; accord Chapman v. Abbot, 251 S.W.3d 612, 620 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
1360. Binford v. Snyder, 189 S.W.2d 471, 476 (Tex. 1945); accord Lopez v. Lopez, 55 S.W.3d
194, 201 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, no pet.).
1361. See McCarthy v. George, 623 S.W.2d 772, 776 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) (holding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing plaintiffs to reopen the evidence
thirty-three days after trial even though plaintiffs did not argue that failure to submit evidence at trial
was not due to a lack of diligence; under the facts of the case, “development of this case was clearly in
the interest of justice”); Priddy v. Tabor, 189 S.W. 111, 116 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1916, writ ref’d)
(concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion by hearing additional testimony after entering
judgment in bench trial when additional testimony was heard during same term as original judgment);
see also Harrison v. Bailey, 260 S.W.2d 702, 704–05 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1953, no writ) (holding trial
court did not err by allowing appellees to introduce evidence at hearing on opposing party’s motion to
reform judgment).
1362. TEX. R. CIV. P. 270.
1363. Rollins v. Tex. Coll., 515 S.W.3d 364, 371 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2016, pet. denied) (citing
Poag v. Flories, 317 S.W.3d 820, 828 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, pet. denied)); Hernandez v.
Lautensack, 201 S.W.3d 771, 779 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied).
1364. Hernandez, 201 S.W.3d at 779 (quoting Word of Faith World Outreach Ctr. Church v.
Oechsner, 669 S.W.2d 364, 366–67 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)).
1365. Rollins, 515 S.W.3d at 371 (citing Poag v. Flories, 317 S.W.3d at 827); Lopez, 55 S.W.3d at
201; Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Mfg. Co., 598 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1980, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
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on a contested matter in a jury case, because to do so contravenes Rule
270.1366
E. Motion for New Trial
1.

Motion for New Trial Generally

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 provides that:
New trials may be granted and judgment set aside for good cause, on
motion or on the court’s own motion on such terms as the court shall direct.
New trials may be granted when the damages are manifestly too small or too
large. When it appears to the court that a new trial should be granted on a
point or points that affect only a part of the matters in controversy and that
such part is clearly separable without unfairness to the parties, the court may
grant a new trial as to that part only, provided that a separate trial on
unliquidated damages alone shall not be ordered if liability issues are
contested. Each motion for new trial shall be in writing and signed by the
party or his attorney.1367

The denial of a motion for new trial is reviewable by appeal.1368 “The
standard of review depends on the [nature of the] complaint preserved by
the motion for new trial.”1369 Generally, a trial court’s denial of a motion
for new trial is reviewed for abuse of discretion.1370 For example, “the
denial of a motion for new trial that does not contain one of the complaints
enumerated in Rule 324(b) [see infra], is reviewed under an abuse of
discretion.”1371 A trial court’s order on a motion for new trial based upon

1366. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 270 (allowing additional noncontroversial testimony only before the
jury verdict is rendered).
1367. TEX. R. CIV. P. 320.
1368. See In re Marriage of Edwards, 79 S.W.3d 88, 101–02 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no
pet.) (affirming, on appeal, the trial court’s denial of a motion for new trial); In re M.A.N.M., 75 S.W.3d
73, 80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (enforcing the trial court’s discretion in denying a
motion for new trial); Prestige Ford Co. v. Gilmore, 56 S.W.3d 73, 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (finding, on appeal, that the trial court did not err in granting the motion for new
trial); Delgado v. Hernandez, 951 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1997, no writ) (affirming
the trial court’s decision to deny a motion for new trial and stating the standard of review on appeal).
1369. Delgado, 951 S.W.2d at 98; see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 324 (presenting prerequisites for motion
for new trial).
1370. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2006).
1371. Champion Int’l Corp. v. Twelfth Court of Appeals, 762 S.W.2d 898, 899 (Tex. 1988)
(orig. proceeding); Marriage of Edwards, 79 S.W.3d at 102; M.A.N.M., 75 S.W.3d at 80; Gilmore, 56 S.W.3d
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jury misconduct is likewise reviewed for an abuse of discretion.1372
However, sufficiency of the evidence challenges are governed by the legal
and factual sufficiency standards of review.1373
“Except in very limited circumstances, an order granting a motion for
new trial rendered within the period of the trial court’s plenary power is not
reviewable on appeal.”1374 The longstanding rule was that the granting of
a new trial may only be subject to appellate review if: (1) the trial court’s
plenary power had expired prior to the grant;1375 or (2) the order was based
on the sole ground of “irreconcilably conflicting” jury answers.1376 But a
2009 decision of the Texas Supreme Court indicates both that mandamus
review is available to review grants of new trials and that lower courts need
to recognize the limits of that power.1377 The supreme court emphasized
that “Texas trial courts have historically been afforded broad discretion in
granting new trials[,] [b]ut that discretion is not limitless.”1378 While the
trial court has significant discretion to grant a new trial, it is required to
specify the reasons it is ordering a new trial, and the “reasons should be
clearly identified and reasonably specific.”1379 “Broad statements such as
‘in the interest of justice’ are not sufficiently specific.”1380 Each point relied
upon in a motion for new trial “shall briefly refer to that part of the ruling
of the court, charge given to the jury, or charge refused, admission or
rejection of evidence, or other proceedings which are designated to be
complained of, in such a way that the objection can be clearly identified and

at 77; Delgado, 951 S.W.2d at 98; Washington v. McMillan, 898 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1995, no writ).
1372. Pabich v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500, 510 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied). To
obtain a new trial based upon jury misconduct, the movant “must show that (1) misconduct occurred;
(2) it was material; and (3) based on the record as a whole, the misconduct resulted in harm” to the
movant. Id.
1373. See supra Part III (explaining sufficiency of the evidence).
1374. Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005); accord Cummins
v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 235–36 (Tex. 1984).
1375. Wilkins, 160 S.W.3d at 563.
1376. Id.; accord Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. 1985) (orig.
proceeding), overruled in part by In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 213 (Tex.
2009) (orig. proceeding); see also Rogers v. Clinton, 794 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Tex. 1990) (finding mandamus
to be the proper remedy because judge granted order for a new trial after the party withdrew the motion
for new trial).
1377. Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210.
1378. Id.
1379. Id. at 215.
1380. Id.
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understood by the court.”1381 “Generality in motions for new trial must
be avoided because objections phrased in general terms shall not be
considered by the court.”1382 It is arbitrary and an abuse of discretion when
a trial court fails to give its reasons for disregarding a jury verdict.1383
In In re United Scaffolding, Inc.,1384 the Texas Supreme Court noted that an
order granting a motion for a new trial will not be held to be an abuse of
discretion if “its stated reason for granting a new trial (1) is a reason for
which a new trial is legally appropriate . . . ; and (2) is specific enough to
indicate that the trial court did not simply parrot a pro forma template, but
rather derived the articulated reasons from the particular facts and
circumstances of the case at hand.”1385 The court added that it may be an
abuse of discretion “if the given reason, specific or not, is not one for which
a new trial is legally valid.”1386 Thus, “[t]he good cause for which [Rule
320] allows trial courts to grant new trials does not mean just any cause.”1387
Further, mandamus would issue if the trial court’s “articulated reasons
plainly state that the trial court merely substituted its own judgment for the
jury’s, or that the trial court simply disliked one party’s lawyer, or that the
reason is based on invidious discrimination.”1388 Additionally, mandamus
may be granted “if the order, though rubber-stamped with a valid new-trial
rationale, provides little or no insight into the trial judge’s reasoning.”1389
The Texas Supreme Court observed that “the mere recitation of a legal
standard, such as a statement that a finding is against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence,” is not sufficient, and that the new trial
order “must indicate that the trial judge considered the specific facts and
circumstances of the case” and “explain how the evidence (or lack of
evidence) undermines the jury’s findings.”1390 The court finally noted that
that “[a] trial court abuses its discretion if its . . . order provides no more

1381. Id. at 210 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 321).
1382. Id. (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 322).
1383. Id. at 213.
1384. In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding).
1385. Id. at 688–89
1386. Id. at 689 (citing Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210 n.3).
1387. Id. (quoting Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210 n.3).
1388. Id. (citations omitted) (first citing Columbia Med. Ctr., 290 S.W.3d at 210; then citing In re
BMW, 8 S.W.3d 326, 328 (Tex. 2000) (orig. proceeding) (Hecht, J., dissenting from the denial of
rehearing of a petition for mandamus)).
1389. Id.
1390. Id.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

197

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4

1296

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1099

than a pro forma template rather than the trial judge’s analysis.”1391
The Court of Criminal Appeals also observed that a trial court’s discretion
to grant a new trial in the interest of justice is not “unbounded or
unfettered.”1392 The court specified that:
A trial judge does not have authority to grant a new trial unless the first
proceeding was not in accordance with the law. He cannot grant a new trial
on mere sympathy, an inarticulate hunch, or simply because he personally
believes that the defendant is innocent or “received a raw deal . . . .”
[Additionally,] [a]lthough not all of the grounds for which a trial court may
grant a motion for new trial need be listed in [a] statute or rule, the trial court
does not have discretion to grant a new trial unless the defendant shows that
he is entitled to one under the law. To grant a new trial for a non-legal or
legally invalid reason is an abuse of discretion.1393

As a general rule, it is not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant
a motion for new trial if the defendant: “(1) articulated a valid legal claim in
[the] motion for new trial; (2) produced evidence or pointed to evidence in
the trial record that substantiated [the asserted] legal claim; and (3) showed
prejudice to [the defendant’s] substantial rights under the [rules of appellate
procedure].”1394 “The defendant need not establish reversible error as a
matter of law before the trial court may exercise its discretion in granting a
motion for new trial.”1395 “On the other hand, trial courts do not have the
discretion to grant a new trial unless the defendant demonstrates that [the]
first trial was seriously flawed and that the flaws adversely affected [the
defendant’s] substantial rights to a fair trial.”1396
Practitioners should carefully note that a motion for new trial is required
to preserve several issues on appeal.1397 Rule 324(b) requires that the
following issues be raised by a motion for new trial:

1391. Id.
1392. State v. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d 901, 906–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
1393. Id. at 907.
1394. Id. at 909; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(a) (stating that when the appellate record indicates
constitutional error in a criminal case, “the court of appeals must reverse a judgment of conviction or
punishment unless the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute
to the conviction or punishment”).
1395. Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 909.
1396. Id.
1397. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(a) (providing that “a motion for new trial is a prerequisite to a
complaint on appeal in either a jury or a nonjury case, except as provided in subdivision (b)”).
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(1) A complaint on which evidence must be heard such as one of jury
misconduct or newly discovered evidence or failure to set aside a judgment
by default;
(2) A complaint of factual insufficiency of the evidence to support a jury
finding;
(3) A complaint that a jury finding is against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence;
(4) A complaint of inadequacy or excessiveness of the damages found by the
jury; or
(5) Incurable jury argument if not otherwise ruled on by the trial court.1398

“An appellate court has no jurisdiction to consider [these] issues” unless
a motion for new trial has been “filed with the trial court to preserve [the]
issue[s].”1399 The reason for requiring that these matters first be brought
to the attention of the trial court is to allow it the opportunity to correct any
errors that were not considered prior to the motion.1400
2.

Motion for New Trial Based on Jury Misconduct

When the evidence on the question of alleged jury misconduct is
conflicting, the appellate court will generally defer to the trial court’s
findings of fact and review under an abuse of discretion standard.1401 If
there is conflicting evidence on the issue of misconduct, the trial court's
finding must be upheld on appeal.1402
To obtain a new trial based upon jury misconduct, a party must show:
(1) that misconduct occurred; (2) that the misconduct was material; and

1398. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1)–(5).
1399. Moore v. Kitsmiller, 201 S.W.3d 147, 152 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2006, pet. denied); accord
Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Hecht, 225 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, pet. granted,
judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (concluding that since a motion for new trial was not filed, appellant failed to
preserve its factual sufficiency issue on appeal).
1400. Stillman v. Hirsch, 99 S.W.2d 270, 275 (Tex. 1936); accord In re Marriage of Wilburn,
18 S.W.3d 837, 842 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet. denied); Mushinski v. Mushinski, 621 S.W.2d 669,
670–71 (Tex. App.—Waco 1981, no writ). The motion for new trial may be overruled by signed order
or otherwise by operation of law if not ruled upon “within seventy-five days after the judgment [is]
signed.” Cecil v. Smith, 804 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex. 1991).
1401. See Pharo v. Chambers Cty., 922 S.W.2d 945, 948–49 (Tex. 1996) (deferring to the trial
court’s determination of whether jury misconduct occurred).
1402. Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d 362, 372 (Tex. 2000); Losier v. Ravi,
362 S.W.3d 639, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.).
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(3) that, based upon the whole record, it probably resulted in harm.1403 In
considering a motion for new trial premised on jury misconduct, a court will
review a “juror’s affidavit alleging [that] ‘outside influences’ were brought to
bear upon the jury.”1404 In addition, “[a] court may, of course, admit
competent evidence of juror misconduct from any other source.”1405 To
obtain a hearing in the absence of a juror’s affidavit, a party must explain
why affidavits cannot be obtained and provide specific examples of material
jury misconduct.1406
There is no probable injury when the jury probably would have rendered
the same verdict even if the misconduct had not occurred.1407
“Determining the existence of probable injury is a question of law.”1408
3.

Motion for New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence

To obtain a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence,1409 a
movant must show:
[F]irst, that the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial; second,
that it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come sooner;
third, that it is not cumulative; fourth, that it is so material that it would
probably produce a different result if a new trial were granted.1410

1403. TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(a); accord Jackson, 24 S.W.3d at 372; Redinger v. Living, Inc., 689
S.W.2d 415, 419 (Tex. 1985).
1404. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d at 369 (quoting at Weaver v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 739 S.W.2d 23,
24 (Tex. 1987)); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 327(b) (limiting juror’s ability to testify about deliberations to
cases where outside influences were improperly used); TEX. R. EVID. 606(b) (barring juror’s testimony
regarding deliberations except when outside influence was used).
1405. Jackson, 24 S.W.3d at 369 (citing Mayo v. State, 708 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986); Fillinger v. Fuller, 746 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1988, no writ)).
1406. See Roy Jones Lumber Co. v. Murphy, 163 S.W.2d 644, 646 (Tex. 1942) (noting that it is
reversible error to decline testimony on the motion of material jury misconduct if the lack of affidavits
is supported by reasonable explanation and excuse); Ramsey v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 623, 636
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied) (requiring “a reasonable explanation and excuse as
to why affidavits cannot be secured” and specific allegations of jury misconduct).
1407. Redinger, 689 S.W.2d at 419.
1408. Pharo, 922 S.W.2d at 950 (citing State v. Wair, 351 S.W.2d 878, 879 (Tex. 1961) (per
curiam)); Losier, 362 S.W.3d at 647 (citing id.).
1409. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(1).
1410. Jackson v. Van Winkle, 660 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tex. 1983) (citing New Amsterdam Cas.
Co. v. Jordan, 359 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1962); Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Moser, 152 S.W.2d 390, 395
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1941, no writ); In re Y., 516 S.W.2d 199, 205–06 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.)), overruled on other grounds by Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715, 720–21 (Tex. 2003);
accord Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 813 (Tex. 2010) (listing the factors set out in
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Furthermore, the newly discovered evidence must be admissible,
competent evidence.1411 Because this information is generally outside of
the court’s knowledge, each of the above elements should be supported by
an affidavit of the party.1412
Whether a motion for new trial based on the ground of newly discovered
evidence will be granted or denied lies within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and the court’s decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion.1413 “When a trial court refuses to grant a new trial based on
newly discovered evidence,” the appellate court will accept every reasonable
inference in favor of affirming the trial court’s decision.1414 In reviewing
the trial court’s decision to refuse a new trial, appellate courts recognize the
well-established principle that motions for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence are disfavored, and therefore should be reviewed with
careful scrutiny.1415
F. Motion to Modify, Reform, or Correct the Judgment
In addition to motions for new trial, a trial court, during its period of
plenary power, may modify, correct, or reform a judgment.1416 The court
reviews the denial of a motion to modify a judgment for abuse of
Jackson); Armendariz v. Redcats USA, L.P., 390 S.W.3d 463, 471 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.)
(reaffirming the Jackson factors); In re A.G.C., 279 S.W.3d 441, 453 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2009, no pet.) (citing to Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809).
1411. Fantasy Ranch, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 193 S.W.3d 605, 615 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2006, pet. denied); Nguyen v. Minh Food Co., 744 S.W.2d 620, 621 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ
denied).
1412. See Rivera v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 262 S.W.3d 834, 844 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2008, no pet.) (recognizing each of the four elements “must be established by an affidavit of the party”
(citing In re Thoma, 873 S.W.2d 477, 512 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1994, no appeal))), abrogated on other grounds by
Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 505 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. 2016); In re Thoma, 873 S.W.2d at 512
(noting the moving party must show the four factors in an affidavit to win a new trial).
1413. Waffle House, 313 S.W.3d at 813); Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809; Armendariz, 390 S.W.3d
at 471; Fantasy Ranch, 193 S.W.3d at 615.
1414. In re M.A.N.M., 75 S.W.3d 73, 80 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.); accord
Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605, 621 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet. denied) (“Every
reasonable presumption will be made on review in favor of orders of the trial court refusing new trials.”
(citing Jackson, 660 S.W.2d at 809)).
1415. See State Farm Lloyds v. Nicolau, 951 S.W.2d 444, 452 (Tex. 1997) (affirming the court
of appeals’ decision that denied remand for trial based on newly discovered evidence); Kirkpatrick v.
Mem’l Hosp. of Garland, 862 S.W.2d 762, 775 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, writ denied) (holding motions
for new trial based on newly discovered evidence are disfavored unless the new evidence would cause
a different result); Nguyen, 744 S.W.2d at 622 (noting appellate courts should review with careful
scrutiny a motion for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence).
1416. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d)–(e).
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discretion.1417 “An appellate court [also] has the power to correct and
reform a trial court judgment to make the record speak the truth when it has
the necessary data and information to do so.”1418
Rule 329b provides that motions for new trial and motions to modify,
correct, or reform a judgment are overruled by operation of law after certain
periods of time.1419 “When a motion for new trial is overruled by operation
of law,” the court of appeals reviews “whether the trial court abused its
discretion [by] allowing the motion to be overruled.”1420
G. Motion for Judgment Nunc Pro Tunc or Clarification Orders
After the trial court’s plenary power over its own judgment terminates
and the judgment becomes final, the trial court still retains the authority to
correct clerical errors made in entering the judgment through a judgment
nunc pro tunc or through a clarification order.1421 A judgment nunc pro tunc is
appropriate only to correct a clerical error; that is, it cannot be used to
correct a judicial error.1422 “A clerical error is one which does not result
from judicial reasoning or determination.”1423 “A judicial error is [the type
1417. See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991) (holding when
confronted with the issuance of a turnover order, the court of appeals should review under an abuse
of discretion, rather than a no evidence, standard); Hodges v. Rajpal, 459 S.W.3d 237, 250 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2015, no pet.) (noting denial of a motion to modify a final judgment is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion); Wagner v. Edlund, 229 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied) (concluding
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the modification of judgment).
1418. Jackson v. State, 288 S.W.3d 60, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d)
(citing Nolan v. State, 39 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.); TEX. R.
APP. P. 43.2(b)); accord Williams v. State, 911 S.W.2d 788, 791 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ)
(affirming an appellate court has the power to modify a judgment “to make the record speak the truth”
(quoting Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d))).
1419. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b.
1420. Limestone Constr., Inc. v. Summit Commercial Indus. Props., Inc., 143 S.W.3d 538, 542
(Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.) (citing Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex.
1992)).
1421. TEX. R. CIV. P. 316; TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f); see Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231
(Tex. 1986) (“After the trial court loses its jurisdiction over a judgment, it can correct only clerical
errors in the judgment by judgment nunc pro tunc.” (emphasis added)); Comet Aluminum Co. v. Dibrell,
450 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1970) (recognizing the well-settled law that clerical errors, but not judicial
errors in the rendition of judgment, may be corrected after the trial court loses jurisdiction).
1422. See Barton v. Gillespie, 178 S.W.3d 121, 126 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no
pet.) (“Even if the trial court incorrectly renders judgment, the trial court cannot alter a written
judgment that precisely reflects the incorrect rendition.” (citing Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232)).
1423. Andrews v. Koch, 702 S.W.2d 584, 585 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Petroleum Equip.
Fin. Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Fort Worth, 622 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1981, writ
ref’d n.r.e.)).
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of] error which occurs in the rendering as opposed to the entering of a
judgment.”1424
A clerical error is a discrepancy between the entry of a judgment in the
record and the judgment that was actually rendered. A clerical error does not
result from judicial reasoning, evidence[,] or determination. Conversely, a
judicial error arises from a mistake of law or fact that requires judicial
reasoning to correct.1425

Whether an error in a judgment is judicial or clerical is a question of law that
is reviewable de novo and not binding on the appellate court.1426
“[F]or a judgment nunc pro tunc to be properly granted, the evidence must
be clear and convincing that a clerical error was made.”1427 “Evidence may
be in the form of oral testimony of witnesses, written documents, previous
judgments, the court’s docket[,] or the [trial] judge’s personal
recollection.”1428 To the extent the trial judge relied upon his personal
recollection of the facts at the time the original judgment was entered and
then entered the judgment nunc pro tunc, a court may presume that his
personal recollection supports the finding of clerical error.1429 “[W]hether
the [trial] court pronounced judgment orally and the terms of [any]
1424. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 231 (citing Comet, 450 S.W.2d at 58; Knox v. Long, 257 S.W.2d
289, 292–93 (Tex. 1953), overruled in part by Jackson v. Hernandez, 285 S.W.2d 184, 191 (Tex. 1955);
Petroleum Equip., 622 S.W.2d at 154; Samples Exterminators v. Samples, 640 S.W.2d 873, 875 (Tex.
1982) (per curiam)); see In re Fuselier, 56 S.W.3d 265, 267 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, orig.
proceeding) (holding the trial court judge “rendered judgment when she signed the order” and “[t]hus,
the error in the order was a judicial error”); Crocker v. Synpol, Inc., 732 S.W.2d 429, 436 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1987, no writ) (defining judicial error).
1425. Barton, 178 S.W.3d at 126 (internal citations omitted) (citing Andrews, 702 S.W.2d at 585;
Butler v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 31 S.W.3d 642, 647 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied)).
1426. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232; see Finlay v. Jones, 435 S.W.2d 136, 138 (Tex. 1968) (orig.
proceeding) (noting the trial court’s findings or conclusions “as to the nature of the errors” are not
binding on the Texas Supreme Court).
1427. Barton, 178 S.W.3d at 127 (emphasis added) (citing Riner v. Briargrove Park Prop.
Owners, Inc., 976 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); In re Broussard,
112 S.W.3d 827, 833–34 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding)); accord Riner,
976 S.W.2d at 683 (reiterating the clear and convincing standard). But see Wittau v. Storie, 145 S.W.3d
732, 736 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (per curiam) (applying traditional legal and factual
sufficiency standards).
1428. Riner, 976 S.W.2d at 683 (citing Pruet v. Coastal States Trading, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 702, 705
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1986, no writ.)).
1429. Davis v. Davis, 647 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Tex. App.—Austin 1983, no writ); see Pruet,
715 S.W.2d at 705 (stating a presumption arises that a judge’s personal recollection will support the
finding of clerical errors if he corrects the judgment nunc pro tunc).
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pronouncement are questions of fact” that are reviewed for legal and factual
sufficiency.1430
H. Remittitur
The remittitur process arises out of the trial court’s discretion to grant
new trials.1431 Professors Powers and Ratliff correctly observe that when
a trial court believes that a jury’s award of damages is excessive, the trial
court can use its autonomy to persuade a “plaintiff to make what amounts
to a settlement offer.”1432 In such a situation, the trial court typically denies
the defendant’s motion for new trial on the condition that the plaintiff remit
a specified amount of damages so that the trial judge may sign a lesser
judgment.1433 The plaintiff has two choices: to remit the suggested amount
unconditionally or to have a new trial.1434 Because the trial court “has no
authority to change a jury award[,]” the trial court judge “cannot compel a
remittitur, but can ‘suggest’ it.”1435 Because a trial court cannot grant a new
trial for any reason or no reason, its power to use remittitur as a settlement
tool is limited somewhat.
In suggesting a remittitur or in reviewing a trial court’s order of remittitur,
the proper standard of review is factual sufficiency,1436 not abuse of
discretion.1437 Because remittitur involves the question of factual
sufficiency, the Texas Supreme Court may not order a remittitur, but the
1430. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d at 232 (citing Wood v. Paulus, 524 S.W.2d 749, 755 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Thomas M. Reavley & David L. Orr, Trial Court’s Power to Amend
Its Judgments, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 191, 203 (1973)).
1431. Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 564.
1432. Id.
1433. Id.
1434. Id.; see Larson v. Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987) (holding if the plaintiff
rejects the court’s “suggestion,” the trial court may grant a new trial).
1435. Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 564.
1436. See Bentley v. Bunton (Bentley I), 94 S.W.3d 561, 620 (Tex. 2002) (Baker, J., dissenting)
(stating the standard of review in Texas for excessive damages is factual sufficiency of the evidence).
1437. See Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30–31 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d
118, 140 (Tex. 2012) (explaining the factual sufficiency standard should be used for the review of
punitive damage awards); Snoke v. Republic Underwriters Ins. Co., 770 S.W.2d 777, 777–78 (Tex.
1989) (per curiam) (using a factual sufficiency standard for attorney’s fees); Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641
(applying a factual sufficiency standard to actual damages); Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex.
1986) (per curiam) (emphasizing factual sufficiency as the only acceptable standard to review remittitur
of actual damages); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 46.2 (allowing appellate review of remittitur requests); TEX.
R. CIV. P. 315 (providing for remittitur generally); TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2) (discussing factual
insufficiency to support jury findings).
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courts of appeals may.1438 Although the supreme court lacks jurisdiction
to review or order a remittitur because it is a factual sufficiency issue,1439
the court does have jurisdiction to determine whether the court of appeals
applied the proper standard in reviewing the remittitur issue.1440 Where
the Texas Supreme Court has found error, the court has either remanded to
the court of appeals for a suggestion of remittitur, or reversed and remanded
to the trial court for a new trial when there was evidence to support some
damages but no evidence to support the amount awarded by the jury.1441
I.

Actual Damages
1.

Unliquidated Damages

“In determining [actual] damages, the jury has [the] discretion to award
damages within the range of evidence presented at trial.”1442 “But the
verdict must fall within the range of the evidence presented, and a jury may
not ‘pull figures out of a hat’ in assessing damages.”1443
This general rule becomes more problematic when “awarding damages
for amorphous, discretionary injuries[,] such as mental anguish [and] pain
and suffering”—such damages are inherently difficult because the injury
constitutes “a subjective, unliquidated, nonpecuniary loss.”1444 It “is
1438. See TEX. R. APP. P. 46.3 (“The court of appeals may suggest a remittitur.”); Tony Gullo
Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310 (Tex. 2006) (discussing how the Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure allow courts of appeals to provide remittitur orders).
1439. See Bentley I, 94 S.W.3d at 620 (explaining since the determination of whether a remittitur
is excessive is factual, it is final in the court of appeals, and the supreme court does not have jurisdiction
to review the findings); cf. Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng’rs & Contractors, Inc.,
960 S.W.2d 41, 51 (Tex. 1998) (overruling a motion for voluntary remittitur for failure to present a
question of law). See supra Part III(A)(2) (addressing the factual insufficiency of the evidence standard
of review).
1440. See Pope, 711 S.W.2d at 623 (recognizing the jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court
because “determining the proper remittitur standard is a question of law” (citing Flanigan v. Carswell,
324 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1959), overruled in part by Larson, 730 S.W.2d at 641)).
1441. Guevara v. Ferrer, 247 S.W.3d 662, 670 (Tex. 2007).
1442. Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Low, 79 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Tex. 2002) (citing Price Pfister, Inc. v.
Moore & Kimmey, Inc., 48 S.W.3d 341, 352 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)).
1443. 338 Indus., LLC v. Point Com, LLC, 530 S.W.3d 729, 735 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2017,
pet. denied) (quoting CCC Grp., Inc. v. S. Cent. Cement, Ltd., 450 S.W.3d 191, 200 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.)).
1444. Sanchez v. Balderrama, 546 S.W.3d 230, 237 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.) (citing
Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Wagnon, 979 S.W.2d 343, 354 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, pet. denied); Duron
v. Merritt, 846 S.W.2d 23, 26 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ)); see Roberts v. Williamson,
111 S.W.3d 113, 120 (Tex. 2003) (referring to the difficulty involved in determining the value of
intangible damages).
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necessarily an arbitrary process[,]” not subject to objective analysis or
mathematical calculation.1445 Because there are no objective guidelines to
assess the money equivalent of such injuries, the jury is given a great deal of
discretion in awarding an amount of damages it determines appropriate.1446
While the jury has broad discretion, there must be evidence to justify the
amount awarded, as the jury “cannot simply pick a number and put it in the
blank.”1447 The Eighth Court of Appeals observed that once there is some
amount of mental anguish or pain and suffering established by the evidence,
the “award of damages is virtually unreviewable.”1448 However, a jury’s
discretion to compensate for mental anguish is limited to that which “causes
[a] ‘substantial disruption in [the plaintiff’s] daily routine[,]’ or ‘a high degree
of mental pain and distress.’”1449 Furthermore, the court added that while
the damages are clearly reviewable under a sufficiency of the evidence
review, there are tremendous difficulties “inherent in an appellate court’s
review of discretionary damages.”1450 Nevertheless, a challenge to a
damages award for these types of unliquidated and intangible injuries is
reviewed as any other challenge based upon the sufficiency of the evidence

1445. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc. v. Nabhan, 808 S.W.2d 198, 202 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1991, writ
dism’d).
1446. See Texarkana Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Murdock, 946 S.W.2d 836, 841 (Tex. 1997)
(recognizing the broad discretion of the jury in determining damages for pain and suffering); see also
Greater Hous. Transp. Co. v. Zrubeck, 850 S.W.2d 579, 589 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, writ
denied) (holding an award of discretionary damages such as mental anguish “will be shunted to the
discretionary domain of the jury” (citing Kneip v. UnitedBank–Victoria, 774 S.W.2d 757, 760 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1989, no writ); Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 566)); Marshall v. Superior
Heat Treating Co., 826 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1992, no writ) (concluding damage
awards for future physical impairment are “particularly within the province of the jury”).
1447. Turner v. Duggin, 532 S.W.3d 473, 484–85 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.)
(quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Burry, 203 S.W.3d 514, 552 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet.
denied)).
1448. Worsham Steel Co. v. Arias, 831 S.W.2d 81, 85 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1992, no writ) (citing
Brown v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1988, no writ), overruled in part by Saenz v. Fid.
& Guar. Ins. Underwriters, 925 S.W.2d 607, 614 (Tex. 1996)); accord Martin v. Tex. Dental Plans, Inc.,
948 S.W.2d 799, 805–06 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (“We must note the subjective
nature of a mental anguish question and the wide discretion given to juries in determining such
questions.” (citing Arias, 831 S.W.2d at 85)).
1449. Saenz, 925 S.W.2d at 614 (quoting Parkway Co. v. Woodruff, 901 S.W.2d 434, 444 (Tex.
1995)); accord Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 797 (Tex. 2006) (“Mental anguish awards
will pass a legal sufficiency review if evidence is presented describing ‘the nature, duration, and severity
of their mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in the plaintiffs’ daily routine.’” (citing
Parkway, 901 S.W.2d at 444)).
1450. Arias, 831 S.W.2d at 85 n.2.
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(legal and factual)1451 or based upon the factual sufficiency of the evidence
where the excessiveness of the damages is challenged.1452
2.

Zero Damages

“In reviewing an argument that the jury’s failure to make a finding of
damages [or an award of zero damages] is ‘against the great weight and
preponderance’ of the evidence,” the appellate court “must consider and
weigh all of the evidence, keeping in mind that the jurors are the sole judges
of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony,
and may choose to believe one witness and disbelieve another.”1453
Texas courts “have uniformly recognized a distinction between cases in
which the plaintiff has presented uncontroverted ‘objective’ evidence of an
injury caused by a defendant’s negligence, and cases in which the plaintiff’s
injuries are more ‘subjective’ in nature.”1454 For example, when “‘the
plaintiff has objective symptoms of injury . . . and there is [evidence] . . .
which the defendant could offer to refute such fact[s], [the] plaintiff’s
evidence cannot be disregarded by the jury when the defendant fails to

1451. See Bunton v. Bentley (Bentley II), 153 S.W.3d 50, 52–53 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)
(determining an award for mental anguish was supported by legally sufficient evidence); Larson v.
Cactus Util. Co., 730 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex. 1987) (concluding the evidence must be factually
insufficient to support the damages verdict before the court will order remittitur). Two authors have
noted that when intangible damages are at issue, appellate courts find it difficult to refer to specific
testimony that demonstrates inadequacy or excessiveness as required by Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,
715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986). Powers & Ratliff, supra note 138, at 567. “Nevertheless, common sense
suggests that courts should have some authority to review excessive or inadequate damage awards. It
would be unwise to permit a jury to make any award it thinks fit without limit, even though it is dealing
with damages that resist exact calculation or quantification.” Id.
1452. Bentley II, 153 S.W.3d at 53; Mar. Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 406 (Tex.
1998); Rose v. Doctors Hosp., 801 S.W.2d 841, 847–48 (Tex. 1990); Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622,
624 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam).
1453. Rumzek v. Lucchesi, 543 S.W.3d 327, 332 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, pet. denied) (citing
Golden Eagle Archery, Inc. v. Jackson, 116 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex. 2003); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d
802, 819 (Tex. 2005); McGuffin v. Terrell, 732 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no
writ); Montgomery Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 567 (Tex. 2000)).
1454. Id. (citing In re State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 483 S.W.3d 249, 263 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2016, orig. proceeding); Hammett v. Zimmerman, 804 S.W.2d 663, 665–66 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1991, no writ); Thompson v. Stolar, 458 S.W.3d 46, 62 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.); Lanier
v. E. Founds., Inc., 401 S.W.3d 445, 456 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.); Horton v. Denny’s Inc.,
128 S.W.3d 256, 259–62 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2003, pet. denied); Hyler v. Boytor, 823 S.W.2d 425, 427–28
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Blizzard v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 756 S.W.2d
801, 805 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, no writ); Davis v. Davison, 905 S.W.2d 789, 792 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 1995, no writ)).
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refute it.’”1455 Accordingly, “[w]hen there is uncontroverted, objective
evidence of an injury and the causation of the injury[,] . . . appellate courts
are more likely to overturn jury findings of [zero] damages for past pain and
mental anguish.”1456
Alternatively, if the plaintiff’s complaints are subjective in nature and,
therefore, incapable of direct proof, the jury may award zero damages. As the
Fort Worth Court of Appeals has recognized, where the evidence of pain is
conflicting, scant, or more subjective than objective, appellate courts are
generally more reluctant to determine a jury finding of [zero] damages is
contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.1457
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals has provided examples of cases in which
courts have held that a plaintiff suffered an “objective” injury, which would
mandate an award of damages; these examples include fractures, organic brain
syndrome and nerve damage, severe electrical burns, cuts, and “lacerations,
tendinitis, and torn muscles requiring surgery.” In contrast, courts have
generally held that soft tissue injuries are more subjective than objective in
nature, and that in such cases, a jury has the discretion to enter a zero damages
award.1458

Accordingly, a challenge to an award of zero damages should be reviewed
as any other challenge based upon the sufficiency of the evidence; therefore,
the award of zero damages should be reversed if it is “so contrary to the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence to be manifestly
unjust.”1459

1455. Id. (first quoting Hammett, 804 S.W.2d at 666; then citing Lopez v. Salazar, 878 S.W.2d
662, 663 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1994, no writ); Russell v. Hankerson, 771 S.W.2d 650, 652 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied); Lowery v. Berry, 269 S.W.2d 795, 796–97 (Tex. 1954)).
1456. Id. at 332–33 (first alteration in original) (quoting In re State Farm, 483 S.W.3d at 263; then
citing Blizzard, 756 S.W.2d at 805).
1457. Id. at 333 (citations omitted) (first citing Stolar, 458 S.W.3d at 62; Monroe v. Grider,
884 S.W.2d 811, 820 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, writ denied); then citing In re State Farm, 483 S.W.3d
at 264; McGuffin, 732 S.W.2d at 427; Blizzard, 756 S.W.2d at 805).
1458. Id. (citations omitted) (footnote omitted) (first quoting Hammett, 804 S.W.2d at 665–66;
then citing Sanchez v. King, 932 S.W.2d 177, 180–83 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1996, no writ); Gutierrez
v. Martinez, No. 01-07-00363-CV, 2008 WL 5392023, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 19,
2008, no pet.) (mem. op.); Lamb v. Franklin, 976 S.W.2d 339, 341–42 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1998, no
pet.); Crow v. Burnett, 951 S.W.2d 894, 898–99 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. denied); Davison,
905 S.W.2d at 793; Hyler, 823 S.W.2d at 427–28).
1459. Marshall v. Superior Heat Treating Co., 826 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
1992, no writ); accord Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam) (detailing
a “proper factual-sufficiency review”).
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Punitive Damages

The primary purpose of awarding punitive damages is not to compensate
individuals, but to punish a wrongdoer and to serve as a deterrent to future
wrongdoers.1460 Punitive damages are levied against a defendant “to
punish the defendant for outrageous, malicious, or otherwise morally
culpable conduct.”1461 The legal justification for punitive damages is
similar to the justification for criminal punishment. “[L]ike criminal
punishment, punitive damages require appropriate substantive and
procedural safeguards to minimize the risk of unjust punishment.1462
Although punitive damages are [imposed to serve] the public purpose[s] of
punishment and deterrence, the proceeds become a private windfall.”1463
However, “criminal fines are paid to a governmental entity and [are] used
for [the] public[’s] benefit.”1464 Thus, the duty of reviewing courts in civil
cases, “like the duty of criminal courts, is to ensure that defendants who
deserve to be punished in fact receive an appropriate level of punishment,
while . . . preventing [the imposition of] . . . excessive or otherwise
erroneous” punishment.1465
Punitive damages are reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence and for excessiveness.1466
1460. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone, 972 S.W.2d 35, 49 (Tex. 1998); Transp. Ins.
Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16–17 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 41.003(b), as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012).
1461. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 16 (citing S. Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587, 600–
601 (1880); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(3)); accord Bradley, 52 Tex. at 599–01 (noting
the purpose of punitive damages is to punish the offender); Celanese Ltd. v. Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc.,
75 S.W.3d 593, 600 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (restating the purpose of punitive
damages); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.001(5) (defining exemplary damages as “any
damages awarded as a penalty or by way of punishment but not for compensatory purposes”).
1462. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 16–17; accord Bunton v. Bentley (Bentley II), 153 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Tex.
2004) (per curiam) (noting exemplary damages should be “reasonably proportionate” to the “actual
harm suffered”); Burleson State Bank v. Plunkett, 27 S.W.3d 605, 620 (Tex. App.—Waco 2000, pet.
denied) (detailing the procedure for assessing exemplary damages).
1463. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 17 (footnote omitted) (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 104, 104(a)(2) (2012);
Commissioner v. Miller, 914 F.2d 586, 591 (4th Cir. 1990)); accord Hall v. Diamond Shamrock Ref. Co.,
82 S.W.3d 5, 22 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001) (explaining proceeds from these damages are a
windfall, not a right), rev’d on other grounds, 168 S.W.3d 164 (Tex. 2005).
1464. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 17.
1465. Id.
1466. See Myers v. Walker, 61 S.W.3d 722, 731–32 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. denied)
(holding that the award must be carefully reviewed “to ensure that the award is supported by the
evidence”); see also TEX. R. CIV. P. 301 (discussing legal insufficiency raised in a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict); TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2), (4) (stating to complain of factual sufficiency
or excessiveness issues on appeal, these points must be raised in a motion for new trial). The United
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Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to support the punitive damages
award, appellees [are] required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the harm they suffered resulted from fraud, malice, or gross negligence. In
reviewing the evidence for legal sufficiency under the clear and convincing
standard, we must determine whether the evidence is such that a factfinder
could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.
We must review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and
judgment. We must also disregard all evidence a reasonable factfinder could
have disbelieved, but we must consider undisputed evidence even if it does
not support the finding.1467

In a factual sufficiency review, the court of appeals must determine
“whether, on the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm
conviction or belief that the allegations in the petition were proven.”1468
When reviewing an award of punitive damages, the reviewing court must
consider a number of factors to determine the reasonableness of the
award.1469
[T]he United States Supreme Court requires courts reviewing exemplary
damages to consider three factors: “(1) the degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant’s misconduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award; and (3) the
States Supreme Court has held that the standard of review of punitive damages is de novo review.
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001). It is doubtful, however,
that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in that case will have an impact on Texas courts’
review of punitive damages awards.
1467. Bright v. Addison, 171 S.W.3d 588, 604 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (citations
omitted) (first citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(a)(1)–(3); then citing Sw. Bell Tel.
Co. v. Garza, 164 S.W.3d 607, 623–25, 627 (Tex. 2004); Citizens Nat’l Bank v. Allen Rae Invs., Inc.,
142 S.W.3d 459, 483 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.)).
1468. Bright v. Addison, 171 S.W.3d 588, 604 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, pet. denied) (citing
Citizens Nat’l Bank, 142 S.W.3d at 483).
1469. See Moriel, 879 S.W.2d at 31 (requiring courts to “detail the relevant evidence in . . .
opinion[s], explaining why that evidence either supports or does not support the punitive damages
award in light of the Kraus factors”); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.013 (ordering
any court reviewing exemplary damages to state the “reasons for upholding or disturbing the finding[,]”
and to address the evidence or lack thereof “with specificity . . . as it relates to the liability for or amount
of exemplary damages”); Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981) (“Factors to
consider in determining whether an award of exemplary damages is reasonable include (1) the nature
of the wrong, (2) the character of the conduct involved, (3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer,
(4) the situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned, and (5) the extent to which [the] conduct
offends a public sense of justice and propriety.” (citing First Sec. Bank & Trust Co. v. Roach,
493 S.W.2d 612, 619 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1973, writ ref’d n. r. e.); Cain v. Fontana, 423 S.W.2d 134,
139 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1967, writ ref’d n. r. e.))).
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difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.”1470

The standard of review of the constitutionality of punitive damages award
is de novo.1471 The three factors help ensure a reasonable relationship
between punitive damages and actual damages.1472 Accordingly, one court
has noted, “actual damages are used to indicate the reasonableness of
[punitive] damages under the rule that [punitive] damages must be rationally
related to actual damages.”1473 There is no exact formula to measure
punitive damages by actual damages.1474 Rather, this ratio is merely one
tool to assist the courts in determining whether a punitive damage award is
the product of a jury’s passion rather than reason.1475 In addition to the
ratio of punitive to actual damages, the appellate court also considers:
“(1) the nature of the wrong; (2) the character of the conduct involved;
(3) the degree of culpability of the wrongdoer; (4) the situation and
sensibilities of the parties concerned; (5) the extent to which such conduct

1470. Bunton v. Bentley (Bentley II), 153 S.W.3d 50, 53 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (quoting State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003)); accord Horizon Health Corp. v. Acadia
Healthcare Co., Inc., 520 S.W.3d 848, 873–74 (Tex. 2017) (quoting the factors set out in Campbell); see
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 308–09 (Tex. 2006) (elaborating on the Texas
law formulation of the test outlined in Campbell).
1471. Horizon, 520 S.W.3d at 874; Bentley II, 153 S.W.3d at 54.
1472. Bentley II, 153 S.W.3d at 54.
1473. Wright v. Gifford-Hill & Co., 725 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. 1987); see Moriel, 879 S.W.2d
at 28–29 (detailing the procedural safeguards Texas courts use in assessing punitive damage awards).
1474. See Bentley II, 153 S.W.3d at 54 (stating mathematical formulas and particular ratios are but
one consideration and must be examined in light of the other factors); Tatum v. Preston Carter Co.,
702 S.W.2d 186, 188 (Tex. 1986) (noting no set rule exists to measure punitive damages by actual
damages); see also Foley v. Parlier, 68 S.W.3d 870, 881 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (declaring
courts “must make [the] determination [of punitive damages] on a case-by-case basis” (citing Kraus,
616 S.W.2d at 910)); InterFirst Bank Dallas, N.A. v. Risser, 739 S.W.2d 882, 909 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1987, no writ) (discussing the “reasonable relationship” test for punitive damages). But cf.
Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 308–09 (stating an award that is four times the amount of compensatory damages
might be constitutionally impermissible). The ratio of actual damages to punitive damages has been
substantially reduced by the Texas Tort Reform Act. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 41.008(b) (providing, in most cases, that exemplary damages may not exceed the greater of $200,000
or “two times the amount of economic damages; plus . . . an amount equal to any noneconomic
damages found by the jury[,]” not exceeding $750,000).
1475. See Tatum, 702 S.W.2d at 188 (recognizing the reasonable proportion rule will help to
determine whether the jury’s award was reasonable); Risser, 739 S.W.2d at 909 (examining the factors
to consider when determining whether an award was reasonable).
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offends a public sense of justice and propriety; and (6) the net worth of the
defendant.”1476
K. Attorney’s Fees
1.

Fees Based on Contract or Statutes Generally

Texas follows the American Rule for the award of attorney’s fees, which
permits the award of such fees if permitted by statute or contract.1477 For
instance, attorney’s fees may not be recovered in tort cases without
authorization from a statute or contract between the parties.1478 Statutes
authorizing attorney’s fees may involve issues of reasonableness and
necessity (suitable for a jury’s factual determination), as well as equity and
justice (suitable for a judge’s discretion).1479 As a result, the appeal of
attorney’s fees may combine the corresponding standards of review.1480
In reviewing the reasonableness of an award of attorney’s fees (which
may include a legal assistant’s time under certain conditions)1481 the
reviewing court should consider:
1476. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.011(a)(1)–(6); see Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel,
879 S.W.2d 10, 28 (Tex. 1994), superseded by statute, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.003(b),
as recognized in U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. Waldrip, 380 S.W.3d 118, 140 (Tex. 2012) (discussing many factors
have been set forth for evaluation); Tatum, 702 S.W.2d at 188 (listing several factors to consider); Kraus,
616 S.W.2d at 910 (emphasizing what should be considered when determining reasonableness of
punitive damages). In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., the West Virginia Supreme Court
concluded that decisions post-Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991), “fall into three
categories: (1) really stupid defendants; (2) really mean defendants; and (3) really stupid defendants who
could have caused a great deal of harm by their actions but who actually caused minimal harm.” TXO
Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 419 S.E.2d 870, 887–88 (W. Va. 1992), aff’d, 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
1477. 1/2 Price Checks Cashed v. United Auto. Ins. Co., 344 S.W.3d 378, 382 (Tex. 2011);
accord TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (permitting the recovery of “reasonable attorney’s
fees”).
1478. Knebel v. Capital Nat’l Bank in Austin, 518 S.W.2d 795, 803–04 (Tex. 1974); see Brosseau
v. Ranzau, 81 S.W.3d 381, 398 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, pet. denied) (“Generally, attorney’s fees
are not recoverable in tort actions unless provided by statute.” (citing Huddleston v. Pace, 790 S.W.2d
47, 49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, writ denied))).
1479. Transcontinental Ins. Co. v. Crump, 330 S.W.3d 211, 231 (Tex. 2010).
1480. Id.; see Midland W. Bldg. L.L.C. v. First Serv. Air Conditioning Contractors, Inc.,
300 S.W.3d 738, 739 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (stating jury’s award of zero attorney’s fees was improper
because of evidence of party’s attorney’s fees and value thereof).
1481. See Gill Sav. Ass’n v. Int’l Supply Co., 759 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ
denied) (discussing the evidence required to award legal assistant’s fees); accord Kimberly-Clark Corp.
v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No. 3:05-CV-2097-B ECF, 2008 WL 1958998, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30,
2008) (“Under Texas law, compensation for a paralegal or legal assistant’s work may be included in the
award for attorneys’ fees if the paralegal or legal assistant performed work that has traditionally been
done by any attorney.” (citing Gill, 759 S.W.2d at 702)).
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(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill required to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty
of collection before the legal services have been rendered.1482

“To determine whether an attorney’s fee award is excessive, the reviewing
court may draw upon the common knowledge of the justice[s] of the court
and their experiences as lawyers and judges.”1483 “A trial court may not
grant . . . an unconditional award of appellate attorney’s fees”; rather,

1482. Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997) (citing
TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. *1.04, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. *2,
subtit. *G, app. *A (Tex. State Bar R. art. *X, § *9); Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d
880, 881 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Bloyed, 916 S.W.2d 949, 960–961 (Tex.
1996)); Aquila Sw. Pipeline, Inc. v. Harmony Expl., Inc., 48 S.W.3d 225, 240–41 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (citing Arthur, 945 S.W.2d at 818); accord Headington Oil Co., L.P. v. White,
287 S.W.3d 204, 216 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.) (restating the factors set out in
Arthur); Acad. Corp. v. Interior Buildout & Turnkey Constr., Inc. 21 S.W.3d 732, 741–42 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (noting the eight factors are not strict “elements of proof[,]” but
“guidelines” to consider). The preceding cases use the language found in Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.04 in arriving at their respective holdings; however, in the federal system,
a bankruptcy court for the Eastern District of Texas has held that Rule 1.04(f) has been preempted by
11 U.S.C. § 504 (2012). See In re Smith, 397 B.R. 810, 816 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008) (explaining 11 U.S.C.
§ 504 “imposes a prohibition against fee-splitting or the sharing of compensation in virtually all
circumstances arising in a bankruptcy case”).
1483. Aquila Sw. Pipeline, 48 S.W.3d at 241 (citing City of Fort Worth v. Groves, 746 S.W.2d
907, 918 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1988, no writ)); accord Phillips v. Phillips, 296 S.W.3d 656, 673 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 2009, pet. denied) (reaffirming the proposition that judges may rely on their common
knowledge as lawyers in reviewing attorney’s fees); see O’Farrill Avila v. Gonzalez, 974 S.W.2d 237,
248–49 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (discussing a situation in which the judge properly
used personal experience and knowledge of attorneys to determine whether the fees were excessive).
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such an award must be conditioned upon the appellant’s unsuccessful
appeal.1484
When multiple causes of action or multiple parties are involved, the party
asserting those causes must segregate the hours into those (1) for which fees
may be recovered; (2) for which fees cannot be recovered; and (3) for which
party they may be recovered.1485 In Stewart Title Guaranty Co. v. Sterling,1486
the Texas Supreme Court explained an exception to the duty to segregate:
A recognized exception to this duty to segregate arises when the attorney’s
fees rendered are in connection with claims arising out of the same transaction
and are so interrelated that their “prosecution or defense entails proof or
denial of essentially the same facts.” Therefore, when the causes of action
involved in the suit are dependent upon the same set of facts or circumstances
and thus are “inter[t]wined to the point of being inseparable,” the party suing
for attorney’s fees may recover the entire amount covering all claims.1487

1484. Pickett v. Keene, 47 S.W.3d 67, 78 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001, pet. dism’d) (citing
Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Cameron, 24 S.W.3d 386, 400 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2000, pet. denied);
Weynand v. Weynand, 990 S.W.2d 843, 847 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. denied)); accord Cameron,
24 S.W.3d at 400–01 (“An unconditional award of appellate attorneys’ fees is improper.” (citing
Humble Nat’l Bank v. DCV, Inc., 933 S.W.2d 224, 236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ
denied))).
1485. See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006) (“[F]ee
claimants have always been required to segregate fees between claims for which they are recoverable
and claims for which they are not.” (citing Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Aiello, 941 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Tex.
1997); Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Tex. 1991); Matthews v. Candlewood
Builders, Inc., 685 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam); Int’l Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Finck,
496 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Tex. 1973))); Aiello, 941 S.W.2d at 73 (expressing a party must show that the
claim allows recovery of attorney’s fees and that allowable fees have been segregated); Sterling,
822 S.W.2d at 10–11 (“When a plaintiff seeks to recover attorney’s fees in cases where there are
multiple defendants, and one or more of those defendants have made settlements, the plaintiff must
segregate the fees owed by the remaining defendants from those owed by the settling defendants so
that the remaining defendants are not charged fees for which they are not responsible.” (citing Wood
v. Component Constr. Corp., 722 S.W.2d 439, 444–45 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986, no writ), overruled
in part by Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 11; Verette v. Travelers Indem. Co., 645 S.W.2d 562, 568 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.), overruled in part by Sterling, 822 S.W.2d at 11; Stone v. Lawyers Title
Ins. Corp., 537 S.W.2d 55, 63–64 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1976), aff’d in part, rev’d in part,
554 S.W.2d 183 (Tex. 1977))).
1486. Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Sterling, 822 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1991).
1487. Id. at 11–12 (citation omitted) (first quoting Flint & Assocs. v. Intercontinental Pipe &
Steel, Inc., 739 S.W.2d 622, 624–25 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied); then quoting Gill Sav. Ass’n
v. Chair King, Inc., 783 S.W.2d 674, 680 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1989), aff’d in part, modified
in part, 797 S.W.2d 31 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam)).
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In Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa,1488 the Texas Supreme Court stated
that this exception “has since threatened to swallow the [general] rule [of
segregation]”1489 and proceeded to hold that:
To the extent Sterling suggested that a common set of underlying facts
necessarily made all claims arising therefrom “inseparable” and all legal fees
recoverable, it went too far.1490
....
. . . [Rather,] [i]ntertwined facts do not make tort fees recoverable; it is only
when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable
claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be segregated. We
modify Sterling to that extent.1491

“Thus, the general duty to segregate fees applies, unless a party meets its
burden of establishing that the same discrete legal services were rendered
with respect to both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim.”1492
2.

Fees Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act

Under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, the trial court may
award the prevailing party a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of costs.1493
“First, the court must determine the reasonable hours spent by counsel in
the case and a reasonable hourly rate for such work[,]”1494 and second “the
court then multiplies the number of such hours by the applicable rate, the
product of which is the base fee or lodestar.”1495 The court then has the
option to modify the base lodestar up or down or to apply a multiplier, “if
1488. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006).
1489. Id. at 311.
1490. Id. at 313.
1491. Id. at 313–14; accord CA Partners v. Spears, 274 S.W.3d 51, 81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, pet. denied) (“When discrete legal services advance both recoverable claims and
unrecoverable claims, attorneys are not required to segregate fees to recover the total amount covering
all claims.” (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313)); Gallagher Headquarters Ranch Dev., Ltd. v. City of San
Antonio, 269 S.W.3d 628, 641 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008) (reaffirming the principle stated in
Chapa), pet. abated, 303 S.W.3d 700 (Tex. 2010).
1492. Gallagher Headquarters, 269 S.W.3d at 641 (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 314; Hong Kong
Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 455 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.)).
1493. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.259(a).
1494. El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Tex. 2012) (citing Dillard Dep’t Stores,
Inc. v. Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d 398, 412 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002, pet. denied)).
1495. Id. (citing La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 323–24 (5th Cir. 1995) (per
curiam)).
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relevant factors indicate an adjustment is necessary to reach a reasonable fee
in the case.”1496 The relevant non-exclusive factors include:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing
the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty
of collection before the legal services have been rendered.1497

The Texas class action rule “further provides that any adjustment to the
base lodestar ‘must be in the range of 25% to 400% of the lodestar
figure.’”1498 The trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.1499
L. Guardian Ad Litem Attorney’s Fees
Rule 173 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure requires a trial court to
appoint a guardian ad litem when a minor is represented by a guardian or
next of friend who appears to have an interest adverse to that of the
minor.1500 When an attorney is appointed a guardian ad litem pursuant to
Rule 173, the attorney is entitled to a reasonable fee to be taxed as costs

1496. Id. (citing Gonzales, 72 S.W.3d at 412).
1497. Id. at 761 (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. *1.04, reprinted in TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. *2, subtit. *G, app. *A (Tex. State Bar R. art. *X, § *9; Arthur Andersen & Co.
v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. 1997)).
1498. Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 42(i)(1)).
1499. Id.
1500. TEX. R. CIV. P. 173.2(a)(1); Land Rover U.K., Ltd. v. Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d 604, 606–07
(Tex. 2006) (per curiam); Brownsville-Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Gamez, 894 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Tex.
1995).
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pursuant to Rules 131 and 141.1501 As a general rule, ad litem fees are
assessed against the losing party.1502 Generally, the same factors for
determining the reasonableness of attorney’s fees are used to determine the
reasonableness of a guardian ad litem fee.1503 The Texas Supreme Court
has held “[a] reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the number of hours spent
performing necessary services within the guardian ad litem’s role yields a
reasonable fee.”1504 However, “[w]hile necessary services within the
proper, limited scope of the Rule 173 guardian ad litem’s role are
compensable, including those legal services necessarily performed by a
lawyer appointed as guardian ad litem, compensation cannot be awarded for
legal or other services outside that role, even if they are performed.”1505
Additionally, an “ad litem may not recover fees . . . after resolution of the
conflict for which [the ad litem has been] . . . appointed[.]”1506 In applying
these considerations, the award of guardian ad litem attorney fees is a matter
“within the sound discretion of the trial court.”1507 The trial court’s
reasons for an award, however, must be substantiated by the record, or the
trial court may be found to have abused its discretion.1508 “When an ad

1501. TEX. R. CIV. P. 173.6(c); Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d at 606–07; see Roberts v. Williamson,
111 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex. 2003) (explaining how a fee may be taxed as costs under Rules 131 and 141).
1502. See Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124 (asserting there must be good cause on the record for
splitting the guardian ad litem fees among the parties); Dover Elevator Co. v. Servellon, 812 S.W.2d
366, 367 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, no writ) (assessing whether good cause exists for imposing guardian
ad litem fees against the prevailing party).
1503. Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d at 607; Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 794
(Tex. 1987).
1504. Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d at 608 (citing Garcia v. Martinez, 988 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex. 1999)
(per curiam)).
1505. Ford Motor Co. v. Garcia, 363 S.W.3d 573, 580 (Tex. 2012) (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 173(4);
id. at 607).
1506. Brownsville-Valley Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Gamez, 894 S.W.2d 753, 757 (Tex. 1995); see
Hinojosa, 210 S.W.3d at 607 (stating “a guardian ad litem is required to participate in the case only to
the extent necessary to protect the minor’s interest” and “[i]f a guardian ad litem performs work beyond
the scope of this role, such work is non-compensable” (citing Gamez, 894 S.W.2d at 756–57)).
1507. Gamez, 894 S.W.2d at 756 (citing Simon, 739 S.W.2d at 794); accord Garcia, 363 S.W.3d
at 578 (“The amount a guardian ad litem is awarded as compensation is within the trial court’s
discretion and an award will not be set aside except for abuse of that discretion.” (citing Hinojosa,
210 S.W.3d at 607)); Jocson v. Crabb, 196 S.W.3d 302, 305 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no
pet.) (“Rule 173 authorizes the trial court to award an ad litem a reasonable fee for his services, and the
determination of the amount of compensation awarded to an ad litem lies within the sound discretion
of the trial court.” (citing Simon, 739 S.W.2d at 794)); see Simon, 739 S.W.2d at 794 (“The discretion of
the trial court in setting an ad litem fee is not unbridled.”).
1508. Roberts v. Williamson, 111 S.W.3d 113, 124 (Tex. 2003).
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litem’s fee is unreasonable or excessive, [the appellate court] may fix the
proper amount of the fee.”1509
M. Court Costs
Under Rule 131,1510 the successful party in a suit is entitled to recover
from an adversary all costs incurred in the suit, except where otherwise
provided.1511 “Whether a party is the ‘successful’ party and entitled to costs
is determined by the court, and the taxing or tabulation of costs is
determined by the clerk.”1512 Taxing costs against a successful party
generally contravenes Rule 131.1513 “A successful party is ‘one who obtains
a judgment of a competent court vindicating a claim of right, civil in
nature.’”1514 The purpose of Rule 131 “is to ensure that the prevailing
party is freed of the burden of court costs and that the losing party pays
those costs.”1515 Pursuant to Rule 141, the trial court may assess the costs,
other than as provided by law or the rules, for good cause stated on the
record.1516 Even when the trial court states good cause on the record, the
1509. Hirczy v. Hirczy, 838 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied)
(citing Dawson v. Garcia, 666 S.W.2d 254, 264 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984, no writ)); see Celanese Chem.
Co. v. Burleson, 821 S.W.2d 257, 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ) (setting aside the
ad litem fees on appeal because the amount awarded was excessive).
1510. TEX. R. CIV. P. 131.
1511. Id.; Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124; Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 376
(Tex. 2001); Martinez v. Pierce, 759 S.W.2d 114, 114 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam). But see Bethune,
53 S.W.3d at 381 (Baker, J., dissenting, joined by Hankinson & O’Neill, JJ.) (suggesting the majority
implicitly overruled Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. 1985)). The Texas Civil Practice
and Remedies Code specifies items recoverable as costs. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 31.007(b).
1512. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Hayes, 507 S.W.3d 263, 277 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2016, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (citing Wood v. Wood, 320 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Tex. 1959);
Madison v. Williamson, 241 S.W.3d 145, 158 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied)).
1513. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 376; Martinez, 759 S.W.2d at 114; Sparks v. Booth, 232 S.W.3d 853,
872 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.); see Rankin v. FPL Energy, LLC, 266 S.W.3d 506, 515 (Tex.
App.—Eastland 2008, pet. denied) (“Trial courts are generally required to tax costs against the
unsuccessful party.” (citing TEX. R. CIV. P. 31)).
1514. Crow v. Burnett, 951 S.W.2d 894, 899 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, pet. denied) (quoting
Lovato v. Ranger Ins. Co., 597 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); see
Williamson v. Roberts, 52 S.W.3d 354, 356 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001) (concluding a party does not
have to prevail on every claim to be considered successful), aff’d, 111 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. 2003).
1515. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 378.
1516. TEX. R. CIV. P. 141; Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124; see Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 376 (recognizing
the two requirements of Rule 141 to be (1) good cause that is (2) reflected on the record); Sparks,
232 S.W.3d at 872 (recognizing good cause may be stated in a written order or judgment, as well as in
an oral hearing).
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supreme court has admonished the appellate courts to “scrutinize the record
to determine whether it supports the trial [court’s] decision” to assess part
or all of the costs against the prevailing party.1517 “‘Good cause’ is a very
elusive concept . . . determined on a case-by-case basis.”1518 The supreme
court has observed that “good cause” usually means “that the prevailing
party unnecessarily prolonged the proceedings, unreasonably increased
costs, or otherwise did something that should be penalized.”1519 However,
potential harm caused to a losing party, or an inability to pay court costs,
does not constitute good cause as a matter of law.1520 The trial court’s
general notion of fairness, without more, does not constitute good
cause.1521 When the trial court assesses costs in a manner other than under
the general rule and fails to state good cause on the record, the courts
generally hold that the trial court abused its discretion.1522 The trial court’s
determination of good cause and its assessment of court costs are reviewed
for an abuse of discretion.1523
1517. Rogers v. Walmart Stores, Inc., 686 S.W.2d 599, 601 (Tex. 1985); accord Williamson,
52 S.W.3d at 356 (“Good cause is an elusive concept, and appellate courts must scrutinize the record
to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in charging fees to a successful party for good
cause.” (citing Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601)); see Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 515 (“To determine if the trial
court properly exercised its discretion, we have been instructed to scrutinize the record to determine if
it supports the trial court’s decision to tax some or all costs against the prevailing party.”).
1518. Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601 (citing Morrow v. Terrell, 50 S.W. 734, 736 (Tex. App.—1899,
writ ref’d)) (holding the unnecessary lengthening of trial is sufficient as good cause to assess costs
against a successful defendant); accord Sparks, 232 S.W.3d at 872 (reaffirming the elusiveness of “good
cause”); Williamson, 52 S.W.3d at 356 (restating the proposition set out in Rogers and Sparks); see Gleason
v. Lawson, 850 S.W.2d 714, 717 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) (noting Rules 131 and 141
should not be used to penalize a party for refusal to enter into settlement negotiations when a party
has not been ordered or encouraged to do so).
1519. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 377 (citing Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601; Operation Rescue–Nat’l v.
Planned Parenthood of Hous. and Se. Tex., Inc., 937 S.W.2d 60, 86–87 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 1996), aff’d as modified, 975 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. 1998); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pirtle, 977 S.W.2d
657, 658 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied); State v. Castle Hills Forest, Inc., 842 S.W.2d 370,
373 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1992, writ denied)).
1520. Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 515; Price Constr., Inc. v. Castillo, 147 S.W.3d 431, 442 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
1521. Roberts, 111 S.W.3d at 124; Rankin, 266 S.W.3d at 515.
1522. See Sparks, 232 S.W.3d at 872 (“A trial court’s failure to state on the record a finding of
good cause to vary from [R]ule 131 constitutes an abuse of discretion.” (citing Marion v. Davis,
106 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, pet. denied))); Allen v. Crabtree, 936 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 1996, no writ) (declaring appeals courts generally find it an abuse of discretion for
trial courts to assess costs inconsistent with the general rule without stating good cause on the record).
1523. See Rogers, 686 S.W.2d at 601 (stating that a judge’s determination of costs should not be
disturbed on appeal unless abuse of discretion is shown on the record); Sparks, 232 S.W.3d at 872
(indicating the standard of review for a trial court’s assessment of costs is an abuse of discretion).
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N. Exercise of Plenary Power
A trial court has both the plenary power and the jurisdiction to
“reconsider, not only its judgment but also its interlocutory orders until
thirty days after the date a final judgment is signed or, if a motion for new
trial or its equivalent is filed, until thirty days after the motion is overruled
by signed, written order or operation of law,” whichever occurs first.1524
Additionally, a timely filed post-judgment motion that requests a substantive
change in the existing judgment constitutes a motion to modify under
Rule 329b(g),1525 thereby extending the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction and
the appellate timetable.1526 During this period, plenary power is “‘[f]ull,
entire, complete, absolute, perfect, [and] unqualified.’”1527 Once a trial
court loses plenary power over its judgment, the judgment becomes final
and any attempt to exercise further jurisdiction over the judgment (except
to correct clerical errors) will be set aside as void.1528 “A void judgment . . .
1524. Orion Enters., Inc. v. Pope, 927 S.W.2d 654, 658 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, orig.
proceeding) (citing Fruehauf Corp. v. Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. 1993) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam); Bollard v. Berchelmann, 921 S.W.2d 861, 863–64 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, orig.
proceeding); TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b); see TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e) (establishing trial courts’ plenary power
to grant a new trial or change its judgment until thirty days after a motion for new trial is overruled by
written, signed order, or operation of law); In re Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse of McAllen, Inc.,
167 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (“Because the default judgment was interlocutory,
the trial court retained jurisdiction to set the judgment aside and order a new trial.” (citing Carrillo,
848 S.W.2d at 84)); Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 308, 310 (Tex. 2000)
(stating a trial court possesses jurisdiction and plenary power to change its ruling for thirty days after a
final judgment is signed); Carrillo, 848 S.W.2d at 84 (discussing how Rule 329b(d) allows a trial court
thirty days to vacate, modify, correct, or reform its judgment).
1525. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(g).
1526. See Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 562–63 (Tex. 2005) (noting a
motion for new trial extended the appellate timetable for reviewing the original judgment, but that such
motion did not interfere with court’s power to make subsequent judgments); Lane Bank Equip. Co.,
10 S.W.3d at 313–14 (holding a post-judgment motion for sanctions seeking to add an award of
attorney’s fees as a sanction for frivolous litigation extends the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction).
1527. Pope, 927 S.W.2d at 658 (quoting Mesa Agro v. R.C. Dove & Sons, 584 S.W.2d 506, 508
(Tex. App.—El Paso 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)); accord Callaway v. Martin, No. 02-16-00181-CV, 2017 WL
2290160, at *3 n.3 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 25, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (emphasizing the
unqualified nature of the trial court’s plenary power); Zarate v. Sun Operating Ltd., Inc., 40 S.W.3d
617, 619–20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied) (outlining the scope of the trial court’s
plenary power).
1528. See Graham Nat’l Bank v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 747 S.W.2d 370, 370 (Tex. 1987) (orig.
proceeding) (holding a court order void after the order was issued beyond expiration of the court’s
plenary power); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 730 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex. 1987) (per curiam)
(concluding the trial court had no jurisdiction or plenary power to consider a motion to unseal after
judgment became final); Commander v. Bryan, 123 S.W.2d 1008, 1015 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1938,
no writ) (“A void judgment has been termed mere waste paper, an absolute nullity; and all acts
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‘is good nowhere and bad everywhere.’”1529 Whether a trial court properly
exercised its plenary power is a question of law reviewed de novo by the
reviewing court.1530
O. Supersedeas Bond
Generally, if a party loses at the trial court, a writ of supersedeas will stay
execution of the judgment pending appeal1531 and guarantee the appellee
the benefits of the judgment if affirmed.1532 To obtain a writ of
supersedeas, a party generally files with the clerk a “good and sufficient”
supersedeas bond or deposit.1533 Importantly, the amount of actual
damages that must be superseded may be reduced under the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code1534 and implies that punitive damages no

performed under it are also nullities. Again, it has been said to be in law no judgment at all, having no
force or effect, conferring no rights, and binding nobody. ‘It is good nowhere and bad everywhere,’
and neither lapse of time nor judicial action can impart validity. It is not susceptible of ratification or
confirmation, and its invalidity may not be waived.” (quoting 25 TEX. JUR. § 254 (1935))).
1529. Munters Corp. v. Locher, 936 S.W.2d 494, 498 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997,
writ denied) (quoting Dews v. Floyd, 413 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1967, no writ)).
1530. See St. Joseph Hosp. v. Wolff, 999 S.W.2d 579, 586 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999) (stating
legal conclusions should be reviewed de novo), rev’d on other grounds, 94 S.W.3d 513 (Tex. 2002); see also
Lane Bank Equip. Co., 10 S.W.3d at 313–14 (discussing how to determine if the exercise of plenary
power was proper).
1531. See Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. v. Sonat Expl. Co., 74 S.W.3d 185, 189 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (“[A] judgment debtor may supersede the judgment by filing a
supersedeas bond.” (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1)).
1532. See Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 732 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied)
(recognizing the intent of such bond is to fulfill judgment for appellee if trial court ruling is affirmed);
Cooper v. Bowser, 583 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1979, no writ) (per curiam) (holding
supersedeas bond amount must be adequate to secure appellee’s collection of “judgment against
appellant and his sureties” if the trial court judgment is affirmed).
1533. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.1(a)(2). A few judgments are stayed without the requirement of
posting a supersedeas bond or deposit. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 6.001(b) (listing as
some of those exempt: the Veterans’ Administration, and the Federal National Mortgage Association);
id. § 6.002(a) (exempting incorporated cities and towns). Exempt entities supersede the judgment by
filing a notice of appeal. See Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381 S.W.2d 478, 481–82 (Tex. 1964)
(providing exemption from paying bond after notice of appeal was filed by Texas Liquor Control
Board); Weber v. Walker, 591 S.W.2d 559, 562 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1979, orig. proceeding) (explaining
when an exemption exists, “judgment is superseded as a matter of law upon the filing of notice of
appeal” (citing City of West University Place v. Martin, 123 S.W.2d 638, 638 (Tex. 1939))).
1534. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 52.006(b)(1)–(2) (requiring the amount
secured not to exceed one-half of the judgment debtor’s worth or $25 million, whichever is less); id.
§ 52.006(c) (allowing a trial court to reduce the security amount if the debtor would otherwise suffer
economic harm).
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longer must be suspended.1535 In cases where the judgment is for
something other than money, property, or foreclosure, the decision of
whether and under what circumstances to permit supersedeas lies within the
discretion of the trial court.1536
The numerous rules for posting an appropriate supersedeas bond depend
upon the type of judgment and are beyond the scope of this Article.1537
The right to supersedeas is absolute and enforceable by mandamus, even
though the trial court may retain discretion in fixing the amount of the
bond.1538

1535. See id. § 52.006(a)(1)–(3) (mandating a secured amount in the sum of compensatory
damages, interest, and costs awarded, but making no mention of punitive damages).
1536. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3) (ordering the trial judge determine whether and what
security must be posted by the judgment debtor when the judgment is not for money or property);
Isern v. Ninth Court of Appeals, 925 S.W.2d 604, 606 (Tex. 1996) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam)
(holding the trial court had discretion “to set alternate security in the present case”). Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24.2 sets forth the applicable rules for the following: superseding a judgment
involving money, land, or property; other judgments; conservatorship or custody; and for the state,
municipality, a state agency, or a subdivision of the state in its governmental capacity. TEX. R. APP.
P. 24.2(a)(1)–(5). To the extent Chapter 52 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code conflicts
with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, Chapter 52 controls. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. § 52.005(a). Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(3), an appellant may supersede
execution on a judgment for other than money, the recovery of property, or foreclosure, by filing a
bond in the amount fixed by the trial court that will secure the judgment creditor for any loss or damage
occasioned by the appeal. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2(a)(3). However, the trial court has discretion to refuse
to permit the judgment to be suspended upon filing by the judgment creditor of security to be “ordered
by the trial court in an amount and type that will secure the judgment debtor against any loss or damage
caused by the relief granted[.]” Id. The “rule was intended to permit a trial court to deny supersedeas
of an injunction, conditioned upon the setting of a bond sufficient to protect the appealing party’s
interests.” Klein Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 720 S.W.2d 87, 88 (Tex. 1986)
(orig. proceeding) (citing Hill v. Fourteenth Court of Appeals, 695 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1985) (orig.
proceeding) (per curiam)). The trial court’s decision is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.
See id. at 87 (“The sole issue before this court is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing
to allow [an electric company] to supersede the injunctive portion of its judgment.” (citing Johnson v.
Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985) (orig. proceeding), abrogated in part by In re
Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, Subsidiary, L.P., 290 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Tex. 2009) (orig.
proceeding))); see also LMC Complete Auto., Inc. v. Burke, 229 S.W.3d 469, 483 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (stating the amount of security set by the trial court is reviewed under an
abuse of discretion standard).
1537. See generally 5 ROY W. MCDONALD & ELAINE A. CARLSON, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE
§ 30:21 (2d ed. 2018) (discussing rules for posting supersedeas bonds).
1538. See Man-Gas Transmission Co. v. Osborne Oil Co., 693 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1985, no writ) (per curiam) (asserting a “trial judge’s discretion extends only to the amount
of the supersedeas bond and not to whether the bond should be granted”); see also Solar Soccer Club
v. Prince of Peace Lutheran Church of Carrollton, 234 S.W.3d 814, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet.
denied) (“A trial judge is given broad discretion in determining the amount and type of security
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Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 29.2 governs the suspension of
interlocutory orders pending review by the appellate courts.1539 Under this
rule, the trial court may suspend an interlocutory order pending an appeal if
the appellant files a supersedeas bond or makes a deposit pursuant to Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.1540 Denial of supersedeas may be
reviewed by an appellate court for abuse of discretion.1541 Similarly, an
appellate court may issue any necessary temporary orders to ensure that the
rights of the parties are protected, pending disposition of the appeal, and
may require such security as it deems appropriate.1542 However, “if the
appellant’s rights would be adequately protected by supersedeas[,]” then the
appellate court may not suspend the trial court’s order.1543
If the trial court improperly sets the amount of the bond, the clerk
improperly approves it, or if it is believed that an initially sufficient
bond has become insufficient, the remedy is by motion in the court of
appeals once appellate jurisdiction has attached.1544 If a party believes
that the trial court’s order setting the amount of the bond is excessive,
the party may have the trial court’s order reviewed by motion in the court
of appeals.1545 If the appellate court finds that the bond is insufficient
upon review of the bond, the court “may” require an additional

required.” (citing Miller v. Kennedy & Minshew, Prof’l Corp., 80 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2002, no pet.))).
1539. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.2.
1540. Id.; see TEX. R. APP. P. 24.2 (explaining the amount of security needed for various types
of judgments).
1541. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.2.
1542. TEX. R. APP. P. 29.3.
1543. Id.
1544. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a)(1)–(5) (listing reasons an appellate court may review securities
after a proper motion has been made); TransAmerican Nat. Gas Corp. v. Finkelstein, 911 S.W.2d 153,
155 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, no writ) (concluding the appellate court is the appropriate court
to determine the sufficiency of appellant’s bond on motion by appellee); Culbertson v. Brodsky,
775 S.W.2d 451, 455 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (determining the trial court
ordered an excessive amount of bond); Bank of E. Tex. v. Jones, 758 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tex. App.—
Tyler 1988, orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (holding upon motion by appellant, the appellate court had
jurisdiction to determine the sufficiency of the bond).
1545. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(a)(1) (stating an appellate court may review the amount of a bond,
but “must not modify the amount” if the “judgment is for money”). The district clerk’s determination
of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the tendered supersedeas bond is reversed only upon a showing
of an abuse of discretion. See Universal Transp. & Distrib. Co. v. Cantu, 75 S.W.2d 697, 698 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1934, orig. proceeding) (declaring in the absence of an abuse of discretion,
mandamus will be refused).
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bond;1546 likewise, upon a finding that the bond is excessive, the court
“may” reduce the amount of the original bond.1547
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.3(a) gives the trial court continuing
jurisdiction, even beyond the expiration of its plenary power and perfection
of the appeal, to monitor and modify the security.1548 Any changes ordered
by the trial court, however, must be made known to the court of
appeals.1549 The review of the security, as well as any changes to the
security, also remain with the appellate court.1550 Thus, in carrying out the
review, “the appellate court may issue any temporary orders necessary” or
remand the matter to the trial court for evidentiary determinations.1551
P. Turnover Orders
“The Texas turnover statute provides judgment creditors with a
procedural device to assist them in satisfying their judgment

1546. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(d) (“The appellate court may require that the amount of a bond,
deposit, or other security be increased or decreased, and that another bond, deposit, or security be
provided and approved by the trial court clerk.”).
1547. See id. (stating an appellate court has authority to decrease a security amount); McDill
Columbus Corp. v. Univ. Woods Apartments, Inc., 7 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000,
no pet.) (adhering to the supreme court’s reasoning that under some circumstances it is appropriate to
reduce the bond to protect both parties).
1548. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3(a) (authorizing continuing jurisdiction of a trial court to decide
sufficiency of sureties and to modify a security upon a change of circumstances); Miller v. Kennedy &
Minshew, Prof’l Corp.., 80 S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (“[T]he trial court,
during its plenary power or after the expiration of its plenary power, possesses authority to review the
sufficiency of the sureties on a supersedeas bond without regard to whether circumstances have
changed since the district clerk approved the bond.” (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3(a))); Gullo-Haas
Toyota, Inc. v. Davidson, Eagleson & Co., 832 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992,
no writ) (per curiam) (stating despite the loss of plenary power the trial court has continuing jurisdiction
to order or modify a security and continue suspension of the judgment pending appeal).
1549. See TEX. R. APP. P. 24.3(b) (mandating the judgment debtor notify the appellate court of
any modifications of the security made by the trial court).
1550. See id. 24.4(a), (d) (implying once the court of appeals gains jurisdiction, the ability of the
trial court to modify a security does not affect appellate court jurisdiction over the case); Gullo-Haas
Toyota, 832 S.W.2d at 419 (finding an appellate court has jurisdiction to review a trial court’s orders or
modifications of securities upon motion by a party).
1551. TEX. R. APP. P. 24.4(c), (d); see Lowe v. Monsanto Co., 965 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Tex. App.—
El Paso 1998, pet. denied) (per curiam) (vacating trial court’s order and remanding the issue to the trial
court for entry of “findings of fact and for the taking of evidence as to the estimated duration of the
appeal and for a proper amount of post-judgment interest”); Culbertson v. Brodsky, 775 S.W.2d 451,
455 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1989, writ dism’d w.o.j.) (setting aside the order of the trial court
regarding the amount of supersedeas and remanding to the trial court with instructions to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on the sufficiency of supersedeas bond).
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debts.”1552 Section 31.002 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies
Code,1553 commonly referred to as the “turnover” statute, is a procedural
device that allows creditors to reach certain assets of debtors that are usually
“‘difficult to attach or levy on by [normal] legal process.’”1554 Under the
statute, a judgment creditor may “apply to a court for an injunction or other
means to satisfy a judgment debt through a judgment debtor’s property,
including present or future property rights.”1555 The trial court may order
property in the judgment debtor’s possession or control to be turned over
to a sheriff, and “may also appoint a receiver to take possession of the
property.”1556 If the trial court’s turnover order is the functional equivalent
of a mandatory injunction, then it is a final and appealable order.1557 If the
trial court denies a motion for a turnover order, it is a final and appealable
judgment.1558 A trial court’s ruling on a motion for a turnover order is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard.1559
VII. RULINGS ON BILL OF REVIEW
A bill of review is a procedural vehicle closely related to the other
weapons in an appellate lawyer’s arsenal. The bill of review is also an
interesting application of the abuse of discretion standard of review.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(f) provides that “[o]n expiration
of the time within which the trial court has plenary power, a judgment
cannot be set aside by the trial court except by bill of review for sufficient
cause[.]”1560 A bill of review “is the proper method to attack a judgment
when the trial court had jurisdiction to render judgment on the

1552. Alexander Dubose Jefferson & Townsend LLP v. Chevron Phillips Chem. Co., L.P.,
540 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE. § 31.002).
1553. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a).
1554. Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 581 (quoting Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d
223, 224 (Tex. 1991)); Buller, 806 S.W.2d at 224; In re C.H.C., 290 S.W.3d 929, 931 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2009, no pet.); see Burns v. Miller, Hiersche, Martens & Hayward, P.C., 948 S.W.2d 317, 321 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1997, writ denied) (discussing whether appellant’s property is exempt from turnover
order).
1555. Burns, 948 S.W.2d at 321 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(a)).
1556. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 31.002(b)).
1557. Alexander Dubose, 540 S.W.3d at 582.
1558. See In re Marriage of Long, 946 S.W.2d 97, 98 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ)
(announcing the nature of a turnover order).
1559. See In re Smith, 192 S.W.3d 564, 570 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (reviewing
trial court’s order under the abuse of discretion standard as mandated by Buller).
1560. TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(f).
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merits.”1561 Unlike the restricted appeal, which is authorized by the Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure, the bill of review is “an equitable proceeding
brought by a party seeking to set aside a prior judgment that is no longer
subject to challenge by a motion for new trial or appeal.”1562 The purpose
of the bill of review proceeding is to launch a direct attack, as opposed to a
collateral attack,1563 on the former judgment, and to “secure the entry of a
correct judgment[.]”1564 It allows the trial court to rectify its own error,
which eliminates the need for appellate review, permits the trial court to
consider all of the facts rather than only those facts apparent “on the face
of the record[,]” and “it avoids the need to follow both avenues of appeal
seriatim.”1565
Using a bill of review to attack a judgment is a difficult task.1566
Generally, a bill of review is available “only if a party has exercised due
diligence in pursuing all adequate legal remedies against a former judgment
and, through no fault of its own, has been prevented from making a
meritorious claim or defense by the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the
opposing party.”1567 It is an independent proceeding that is only used “to

1561. Holloway v. Starnes, 840 S.W.2d 14, 18 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (citing
Gonzalez v. Mann, 584 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
1562. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 96 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Baker v.
Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979)); accord King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742,
751 (Tex. 2003) (describing a bill of review as an “equitable proceeding”).
1563. See Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. 1987) (explaining void judgments, such
as those from courts without jurisdiction, are subject to collateral attack, whereas non-jurisdictional
errors must be attacked within statutory time limits). “Collateral attacks on final judgments are
generally disallowed because it is the policy of the law to give finality to the judgments of the courts.”
Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2005) (citing Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d
700, 703 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding)).
1564. See Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973)
(distinguishing between a direct attack and a collateral attack).
1565. See Gold v. Gold, 145 S.W.3d 212, 214 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (first citing Caldwell v.
Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998); Stankiewicz v. Oca, 991 S.W.2d 308, 312 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1999, no pet.); then citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint Venture,
811 S.W.2d 942, 944 n.2 (Tex. 1991)) (analyzing the purposes and benefits of the bill of review).
1566. W. Wendell Hall, Appeal, Writ of Error or Bill of Review . . . Which Should I Choose?, 1 APP.
ADVOC. 3, 4 (1988).
1567. Wembley Inv. Co. v. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d 924, 927 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Tice,
767 S.W.2d at 702; Petro-Chem. Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1974)); accord
Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 751 (explaining when “a bill of review is proper”); Carroll, 514 S.W.2d at 243–
44 (outlining a number of factors the defendant must show under a bill of review); see Gold, 145 S.W.3d
at 214 (describing “legal remedies” as a motion to reinstate, motion for new trial, or direct appeal).
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prevent manifest injustice[,]”1568 which permits a trial court to “set aside a
judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new
trial[,]”1569 within the regular time frames.
The rules fail to define what “sufficient cause” means in Rule 329b(f), but
the courts have established several requirements that must be satisfied
before a complainant is entitled to relief by bill of review.1570 “Although it
is an equitable proceeding, the [mere] fact that an injustice [may have]
occurred is not sufficient [grounds] to justify relief by bill of review.”1571
“If legal remedies were available but ignored, relief by equitable bill of
review is unavailable.”1572 From the date a complainant learns of the
judgment, or by the exercise of due diligence could have learned of it, the
complainant must pursue all legal remedies still available.1573 Accordingly,
if a party permits a judgment to become final by neglecting to file a motion
for new trial or appeal, then the party “is precluded from proceeding on
petition for bill of review” unless the complainant can show a good excuse

1568. French v. Brown, 424 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1967); see Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 927–28
(“Although it is an equitable proceeding, the fact that an injustice has occurred is not sufficient to
justify relief by bill of review.” (citing Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (Tex. 1950))).
1569. Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407, 407 (Tex. 1987) (citing Baker
v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. 1979)); see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d 860, 866
(Tex. 2010) (noting a trial court may set aside a judgment by bill of review).
1570. E.g., Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 406–07 (identifying the requirements of “sufficient cause” to
allow for a bill of review).
1571. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d at 998); accord Chapman, 118 S.W.3d
at 751 (“The grounds upon which a bill of review can be obtained are narrow because the procedure
conflicts with the fundamental policy that judgments must become final at some point.” (citing
Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d at 998)); Crouch v. McGaw, 138 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1940) (orig. proceeding)
(noting a successful bill of review requires “more than [an] injustice” being shown).
1572. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998));
accord Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702 (noting a party must have “exercised due diligence” in availing “himself
of all adequate legal remedies” prior to pursuing a bill review); Cannon v. ICO Tubular Servs., Inc.,
905 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) (reiterating when a bill of review
would not be available to a party), abrogated in part by Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc.,
10 S.W.3d 308, 313–14 (Tex. 2000)). A restricted appeal is not an “adequate legal remedy” that a bill
of review plaintiff must pursue. Gold, 145 S.W.3d at 214. Failure to file a restricted appeal is not a bar
to a bill of review unless it is relevant to fault or negligence. Id.
1573. See Rizk v. Mayad, 603 S.W.2d 773, 775–76 (Tex. 1980) (stating availability of appeal bars
relief by way of bill of review). A bill of review is not a mere alternative of review on motion for new
trial or upon appeal, and may be successfully urged only when there remains no other method of
assailing the judgment. See Gold, 145 S.W.3d at 214 (explaining failure to file a restricted appeal is not
a bar to a bill of review proceeding unless relevant to fault or negligence); Law v. Law, 792 S.W.2d 150,
153 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied) (stressing the remedy of a bill of review is only
available after a final judgment).
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for failure to exhaust adequate legal remedies.1574 However, if the party is
not guilty of failing to pursue legal remedies, a delay in bringing a bill of
review proceeding does not bar relief “absent some element of estoppel or
extraordinary circumstance that would render” granting relief
inequitable.1575 The burden on the complainant is harsh, but the
fundamental policy that finality must be accorded to judgments makes the
grounds upon which a bill of review will be granted narrow and
restricted.1576
A bill of review proceeding contains a series of steps. The equitable
powers of the court are invoked when a bill of review petitioner files a
petition (“a separate proceeding from the underlying suit”).1577 The
petition must be brought in the same court that rendered the prior
judgment.1578 To be entitled to relief on a bill of review, the bill of review
plaintiff must plead and prove (1) a meritorious defense; (2) that he or she
was prevented from making “due to [the] fraud, accident, or wrongful act
of” his or her opponent; and (3) that the failure to appear was “unmixed
with any fault or negligence” of his or her own.1579 “The petitioner must
further allege, with particularity, sworn facts sufficient to constitute a
defense and, as a pretrial matter, present prima facie proof to support the
contention.”1580 Before conducting an actual trial of the issues, the trial
court must determine whether the complainant’s defense is barred as a
matter of law.1581 The supreme court has “directed that the petitioner be
required to present prima facie proof of a meritorious defense as a pretrial
1574. Steward v. Steward, 734 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ); accord
French v. Brown, 424 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. 1967) (determining “[r]espondent permitted the judgment
to become final by his failure” to appeal the judgment and “[n]o reason [was] advanced” for his failure
to do so, thus, “relief by bill of review” was unavailable).
1575. Herrera, 11 S.W.3d at 928.
1576. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 751; Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.), overruled in part by Glassman v. Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 782
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (en banc).
1577. Ross v. Nat’l Ctr. for the Emp’t of the Disabled, 197 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (citing Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam)).
1578. Pursley v. Ussery, 937 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ).
1579. Ross, 197 S.W.3d at 797 (citing Baker v. Goldsmith, 582 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Tex. 1979);
Sedgwick v. Kirby Lumber Co., 107 S.W.2d 358, 359 (Tex. 1937)).
1580. State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 778 S.W.2d 463, 464 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam)
(citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 464). A prima facie meritorious defense is shown when the trial court
determines “that the complainant’s defense is not [automatically] barred as a matter of law[,] and that
he [would] be entitled to judgment . . . if no evidence to the contrary is offered.” Baker, 582 S.W.2d
at 408–09.
1581. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408–09.
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matter” to “assure that valuable court time is not wasted by conducting a
spurious ‘full-blown’ [trial on] the merits[.]”1582 A trial of the issues is
required if a prima facie meritorious defense has been shown.1583
“However, if the trial court determines that a prima facie defense [has] not
[been] made out, it may dismiss the case.”1584 The petitioner “must open
and assume the burden of” proof on this issue.1585
At trial, the petitioner must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,
“that the judgment was rendered as the result of . . . fraud, accident or
wrongful act of the opposite party[,] or official mistake unmixed with any
negligence of his own.”1586 “In relation to attacks on final judgments, fraud
[may be] classified as either extrinsic or intrinsic”;1587 “[o]nly extrinsic fraud
will support [relief by] bill of review.”1588 “Extrinsic fraud . . . denies a
losing party the opportunity to fully litigate at trial all the rights or defenses
that could have been asserted.”1589 Generally, the fraud involves wrongful
conduct “outside of the adversarial proceedings[,] . . . collateral to the matter
tried[,] and” something not “actually or potentially in issue.”1590
“[A]llegations of fraud or negligence on the part of a party’s attorney[s] [will

1582. Beck v. Beck, 771 S.W.2d 141, 142 (Tex. 1989) (citing Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 408–09).
1583. Id.
1584. Id.
1585. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409; see id. (noting the relevant inquiry is whether petitioner
presented evidence of a meritorious defense).
1586. Baker, 582 S.W.2d at 409 (citing McEwen v. Harrison, 345 S.W.2d 706, 710 (Tex. 1961),
overruled in part by PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 273 (Tex. 2012)).
1587. Montgomery v. Kennedy, 669 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. 1984); accord King Ranch, Inc. v.
Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 752 (Tex. 2003) (explaining in a bill of review, fraud is characterized as
“either extrinsic or intrinsic”); see Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 347–48 (Tex. 2005) (setting
out reasons for distinguishing between intrinsic and extrinsic fraud).
1588. Tice v. City of Pasadena, 767 S.W.2d 700, 702 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding); accord
Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312 (noting only extrinsic fraud will entitle a party to bill of review relief).
Extrinsic fraud requires some proof of deception by the adverse party, not directly connected to the
issues in the case, that prevented the bill of review plaintiff from fully presenting his claim or defense
in the underlying action. See Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702 (noting extrinsic fraud denies a party the ability to
fully present its case at trial); Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312–13 (describing extrinsic fraud as
“collateral,” in that the fraud was not at issue in the trial).
1589. Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 347 (citing Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312); accord Chapman,
118 S.W.3d at 752 (defining extrinsic fraud).
1590. Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 347 (first citing Alexander v. Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1002
(Tex. 1950); then citing Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d at 312); accord Hagedorn, 226 S.W.2d at 1002
(“[E]xtrinsic fraud is wrongful conduct of the successful party practiced outside of an adversary trial
and which is practiced directly and affirmatively upon the defeated party . . . .”).
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not] . . . support a bill of review.”1591 By contrast, intrinsic fraud “‘relates
to the merits of the issues’” presented at trial that were, or should have been,
determined in the former suit,1592 such as “fraudulent instruments, perjured
testimony, or any matter which was actually presented to and considered by
the trial court in rendering judgment.”1593
There is an exception to the general rule of requiring (1) a showing of a
meritorious defense and (2) a showing that “fraud, accident, wrongful act or
official mistake prevented the plaintiff from presenting such a defense.”1594
A meritorious defense is not required if the service of the petition was
invalid,1595 and the defendant was not given notice in a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner so that the defendant would have had the
opportunity to be heard.1596 “[S]uch a requirement, in the absence of
notice, violates [the] [D]ue [P]rocess” clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.1597
When the trial court grants a bill of review and sets aside a judgment in a
prior case, the subsequent trial on the merits of the prior case occurs in the
same proceeding as the trial on the bill of review.1598 And if the bill of
1591. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 752 (citing Transworld Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d
407, 408 (Tex. 1987); Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913, 918–19 (Tex. 1968)).
1592. Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 347–48 (quoting Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702); accord Chapman,
118 S.W.3d at 752 (defining intrinsic fraud).
1593. Browning, 165 S.W.3d at 348 (citing Tice, 767 S.W.2d at 702; Montgomery, 669 S.W.2d
at 313); accord Chapman, 118 S.W.3d at 752 (providing examples of intrinsic fraud).
1594. Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93, 97–98 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Caldwell v.
Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998); Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Sanchez, 525 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. 1975)
(per curiam)); accord Caldwell v. Barnes, 975 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Tex. 1998) (providing an exception to
the bill of review requirements).
1595. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96. “[T]he testimony of a bill of review plaintiff alone, without
corroborating evidence, [will not] . . . overcome the presumption that the plaintiff was served.” Id.
at 97–98 n.3. “The recitations in the return of service carry so much weight that they cannot be
rebutted by the uncorroborated proof of the moving party.” Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d
151, 152 (Tex. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972); Sanders v.
Harder, 227 S.W.2d 206, 209 (Tex. 1950); Gatlin v. Dibrell, 11 S.W. 908, 909 (Tex. 1889); PierceFordyce Oil Ass’n v. Staley, 190 S.W. 814, 815 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1916, no writ)).
1596. Caldwell, 154 S.W.3d at 96; Caldwell, 975 S.W.2d at 537; Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721,
723 (Tex. 1988) (per curiam); Bronze & Beautiful, Inc. v. Mahone, 750 S.W.2d 28, 29–30 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 1988, no writ).
1597. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d at 723; see Richmond Mfg. Co. v. Fluitt, 754 S.W.2d 359, 360 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (holding due process of law is afforded when defendant is properly
served with citation, and requiring him to allege facts in his motion for new trial does not conflict with
Peralta).
1598. See State v. 1985 Chevrolet Pickup Truck, 778 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tex. 1989) (per curiam)
(affirming a trial on a bill of review necessarily includes a determination of the original cause of action).
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review defendant (the plaintiff in the original proceeding) proves his original
case, the trial court may “substitute a new judgment which properly
adjudicates the entire controversy”1599 that is reviewable according to those
standards that would normally apply after a trial.
When reviewing the grant or denial of a bill of review, a court of appeals
must evaluate its jurisdiction over the appeal with respect to the bill of
review itself, rather than the underlying suit.1600 The denial of a bill of
review is reviewed for abuse of discretion.1601 The grant of “[a] bill of
review [that] sets aside a prior judgment but does not dispose of the case on
the merits is interlocutory and not appealable.”1602 There was a split in
authority as to whether an interlocutory grant of a bill of review itself is
reviewable for abuse of discretion by mandamus1603 or whether the proper
remedy is “appeal from the entire reinstated cause, when that judgment
becomes appealable.”1604 “In reviewing the grant or denial of a bill of
review, every presumption is indulged in favor of the court’s ruling, which
will not be disturbed unless it is affirmatively shown that there was an abuse
of judicial discretion.”1605

1599. In re J.B.A., 127 S.W.3d 850, 851 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (citing Tex.
Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n v. Arnold, 88 S.W.2d 473, 474 (Tex. 1935); Shahbaz v. Feizy Import & Export Co.,
827 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ); Crabtree v. Crabtree, 627 S.W.2d
486, 487 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1981, no writ)).
1600. See In re L.N.M., 182 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.) (holding
appellate court jurisdiction with respect to the appeal of the denial of a bill of review seeking to set
aside termination order is to be determined under general rules of appellate procedure).
1601. Nguyen v. Intertex, Inc., 93 S.W.3d 288, 293 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no
pet.), overruled in part by Glassman v. Goodfriend, 347 S.W.3d 772, 782 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2011, pet. denied) (en banc).
1602. Jordan v. Jordan, 907 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (citing Tesoro Petroleum
v. Smith, 796 S.W.2d 705, 705 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Warren v. Walter, 414 S.W.2d 423, 423 (Tex.
1967) (per curiam)).
1603. See In re Nat’l Unity Ins. Co., 963 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig.
proceeding) (finding “[a]n erroneously granted bill of review is effectively a void order granting a new
trial and is an abuse of discretion that affords no adequate remedy at law[,]” and therefore reviewable
by mandamus (citing Thursby v. Stovall, 647 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. 1983) (orig. proceeding) (per
curiam))); Schnitzius v. Koons, 813 S.W.2d 213, 218 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, orig. proceeding)
(asserting mandamus is available if a trial court improperly grants a petition for bill of review).
1604. Compare In re Estrada, 492 S.W.3d 42, 48–49 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2016, orig.
proceeding) (“[M]andamus may be available to review an order granting a bill of review.”), with Tex.
Mexican Ry. Co. v. Hunter, 726 S.W.2d 616, 618 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1987, orig. proceeding)
(asserting mandamus was not a proper remedy), abrogated in part by In re Estrada, 492 S.W.3d at 48–49.
1605. Nguyen, 93 S.W.3d at 293 (citing Interaction, Inc./State v. State/Interaction, Inc.,
17 S.W.3d 775, 778 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied)); accord Ramsey v. Davis, 261 S.W.3d 811,
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VIII. APPELLATE RULINGS AND CONSIDERATIONS
The proper application of any given standard of review is impacted by a
number of issues related to the procedural posture of the case. An
incomplete record, for example, may severely limit the scope of review and
hence the types of errors that might be challenged. The following section
outlines some of these considerations that may impact the advocate’s
briefing and consideration of applicable standards.
A. Presumptions from an Incomplete Record
In the absence of a clerk’s record, there can be no appeal.1606 Without
a complete reporter’s record or a complete clerk’s record, the appellate court
will presume that the omitted evidence supports the trial court’s
judgment.1607 Stated another way, when an appellant fails to bring forward
a complete record on appeal, it is presumed that the omitted portions are
relevant to the disposition of the appeal.1608 This precludes the reviewing
court from finding reversible error1609 because “[a] reviewing court must
examine the entire record . . . to determine whether an error was reasonably
calculated to cause[,] and probably did cause[,] the rendition of an improper
judgment.”1610 An incomplete reporter’s record prevents the reviewing
court from determining whether a particular ruling by the trial court is
reversible error in the context of the entire case.1611
When there is no reporter’s record, appellate court review is generally
limited to complaints involving errors of law, erroneous pleadings or rulings,
erroneous charges, irreconcilable conflicts of jury findings, summary

815 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, pet. denied) (noting the granting or denying of a bill of review is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion).
1606. See W. Credit Co. v. Olshan Enters., Inc., 714 S.W.2d 137, 138 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1986, no writ) (dismissing an appeal for failing to file a transcript or what is now referred to as
the clerk’s record).
1607. Simon v. York Crane & Rigging Co., 739 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex. 1987); Murray v. Devco,
Ltd., 731 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. 1987).
1608. Enter. Leasing Co. of Hous. v. Barrios, 156 S.W.3d 547, 549–50 (Tex. 2004) (per curiam);
Guthrie v. Nat’l Homes Corp., 394 S.W.2d 494, 495 (Tex. 1965).
1609. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1)–(2) (stating reversible error is precluded unless the court of
appeals “concludes that the error complained of: (1) probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment; or (2) probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of
appeals”).
1610. Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam) (citing Gomez
Leon v. State, 426 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Tex. 1968)).
1611. Id.
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judgments, and fundamental error.1612 The reviewing court cannot review
the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence in the absence of a complete
record.1613 When the appellant, through no fault of his own, is unable to
obtain a reporter’s record, the appellate court may reverse the judgment.1614
There is an exception to the general rule requiring a complete reporter’s
record on appeal.1615 Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c), an
appellant may bring forward a partial reporter’s record if the appellant
includes in the request for a partial reporter’s record a statement of the issues
or points of error to be relied upon on appeal.1616 When an appellant
complies with this rule, including setting forth the statement of issues to be
presented on appeal,1617 a presumption on appeal exists that nothing
omitted from the record is relevant to any of the specified points or to the
disposition of the case on appeal.1618 However, the failure of the appellant
to comply with Rule 34.6(c) will cause the reviewing court to presume that
the omitted evidence supports the trial court’s judgment.1619
B. Agreed Factual Statement
A case may be submitted to the trial court upon an agreed stipulation of
facts.1620 This procedure is similar to a special verdict and constitutes a
1612. Protechnics Int’l, Inc. v. Tru-Tag Sys., Inc., 843 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, no writ); Collins v. Williamson Printing Corp., 746 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1988, no writ); see Bexar Cty. Criminal Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Mayo, 773 S.W.2d 642, 643
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ) (declaring conclusions of law will not bind the appellate court
if erroneous).
1613. Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968) (per curiam); Andrews v.
Sullivan, 76 S.W.3d 702, 705 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.).
1614. See Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. 1976) (granting a new trial to the petitioner
based on his “inability to procure a statement of facts” or reporter’s record).
1615. See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.6(c) (allowing an appellant to bring a partial reporter’s record if the
appellant includes a statement of which points will be relied upon on appeal).
1616. Id.
1617. Id.; Furr’s Supermarkets, Inc. v. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d 375, 377 (Tex. 2001); Gardner v.
Baker & Botts, 6 S.W.3d 295, 297 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). See generally id.
at 296 n.1 (comparing current Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c)(1) with its precursor, Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 53(d), which according to the reviewing court, “contains . . . identical
language” regarding requests for a partial reporter’s record).
1618. Bethune, 53 S.W.3d at 377; Producer’s Constr. Co. v. Muegge, 669 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex.
1984) (per curiam).
1619. Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam); Sandoval v.
Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 25 S.W.3d 720, 722 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet.
denied); Kwik Wash Laundries, Inc. v. McIntyre, 840 S.W.2d 739, 742 (Tex. App.—Austin 1992, no
writ).
1620. TEX. R. CIV. P. 263.
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request for judgment in accordance with applicable law.1621 “[U]nless
provided otherwise in the agreed statement,” neither the trial court nor the
reviewing court may “find any facts not conforming to the agreed
statement.”1622 Therefore, the sole issue on appeal is whether “‘the trial
court correctly appl[ied] the law to the admitted facts[.]’”1623
C. Restricted Appeals
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30:
A party who did not participate—either in person or through counsel—in
the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and who did not
timely file a postjudgment motion or request for findings of fact and
conclusions of law, or a notice of appeal within the time permitted by
Rule 26.1(a), may file a notice of appeal within the time permitted by
Rule 26.1(c).1624

The notice of appeal must be filed within six months after the judgment
or order is signed.1625 A restricted appeal (formerly an appeal by writ of
error)1626 “is not an equitable proceeding[,] such as [a] bill of review[.]”1627

1621. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline v. Sherman, 945 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 1997, no writ); City of Galveston v. Giles, 902 S.W.2d 167, 170 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 1995, no writ).
1622. Sherman, 945 S.W.2d at 228 (citing State Bar of Tex. v. Faubion, 821 S.W.2d 203, 205
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, writ denied)).
1623. Id. (citing Faubion, 821 S.W.2d at 205); Port Arthur Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Port Arthur
Teachers Ass’n, 990 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1999, pet. denied) (per curiam) (“In a
trial to the trial court under an agreed statement of facts . . . the only issue on appeal is whether the
trial court correctly applied the law to the stipulated facts.” (citing Stewart v. Hardie, 978 S.W.2d 203,
206 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1998, pet. denied))).
1624. TEX. R. APP. P. 30.
1625. TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c).
1626. The cases interpreting appeals by writ of error apply to restricted appeals. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 30 (“Restricted appeals replace writ of error appeals to the court of appeals.”); Coastal Banc
SSB v. Helle, 988 S.W.2d 214, 215 n.1 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam) (“[W]rit of error procedure has been
replaced by the restricted appeal.” (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 30)). The former appeal by writ of error
should not be confused with the application for writ of error, which was the briefing mechanism to
invoke the appellate jurisdiction of the Texas Supreme Court. TEX. R. APP. P. 130, 49 TEX. B.J. 586
(Tex. 1986, amended 1997) (current version at TEX. R. APP. P. 53).
1627. Texaco, Inc. v. Cent. Power & Light Co., 925 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Tex. 1996); see supra
Part VII (discussing bill of review).
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It is simply another method of appeal,1628 and it “is filed directly in an
appellate court.”1629
To bring a restricted appeal, a party must show that:
(1) [I]t filed notice of the restricted appeal within six months after the
judgment was signed; (2) it was a party to the underlying lawsuit; (3) it did not
participate in the hearing that resulted in the judgment complained of and did
not timely file any postjudgment motions or requests for findings of fact and
conclusions of law; and (4) error is apparent on the face of the record.1630

“The six-month time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional.”1631 Whether
the appellant participated in the hearing that resulted in the judgment,
thereby precluding a restricted appeal, depends upon the nature and extent
of participation.1632 “[T]he question is whether the appellant has
participated in ‘the decision-making event’” resulting in the complained of
judgment.1633 “The policy behind the nonparticipation requirement” is to
preclude a restricted appeal by an appellant who should have “resort[ed] to
the quicker method of appeal.”1634
“As in any other appeal, the appellate court does not take testimony or
[otherwise] receive evidence[,]” and “the review is limited to errors apparent
on the face of the record.”1635 The “face of the record” means “the entire
record of a case in court up to the point at which reference is made to

1628. Texaco, 925 S.W.2d at 590.
1629. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 30).
1630. Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2004) (citing TEX. R. APP.
P. 26.1(c); Quaestor Invs., Inc. v. State of Chiapas, 997 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex. 1999) (per curiam)); see
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.013 (providing the time for taking a restricted appeal to the
court of appeals); TEX. R. APP. P. 26.1(c) (designating the time to file a restricted notice of appeal).
1631. Quaestor, 997 S.W.2d at 227 (citing Linton v. Smith, 154 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. [Comm’n
Op.] 1941)).
1632. See Texaco, 925 S.W.2d at 589 (“The nature and extent of participation . . . in any particular
case is a matter of degree . . . .”).
1633. Id.
1634. Id. at 590 (citing Lawyers Lloyds of Tex. v. Webb, 152 S.W.2d 1096, 1098 (Tex. 1941)).
1635. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (citing Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d at 848); accord Ginn v. Forrester, 282 S.W.3d 430, 432–33
(Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (noting a party must show error on the face of the record in a restricted
appeal); Wachovia Bank of Del. v. Gilliam, 215 S.W.3d 848, 849 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam) (“As the
restricted appeal was filed within six months by a party that did not participate in the default hearing,
the only question was whether error was apparent on the face of the record.” (citing TEX. R. APP.
P. 30; Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d at 848)).
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it.”1636 The reviewing court is not limited to a review of the clerk’s record
(transcript).1637 The reviewing court may test the validity of a judgment by
reference to all of the papers on file in the case, including the reporter’s
record (statement of facts).1638
In the absence of a reporter’s record, the reviewing court may assume
“that every fact necessary to support the judgment, within [the] limits of the
pleadings, was proved at trial.”1639 Therefore, when an appellant fails to
bring forward a reporter’s record or when there is no evidence that a
reporter’s record was not made, the court may hold that the appellant failed
to establish “error on the face of the record.”1640 The supreme court has
“clearly said that silence is not enough.”1641 For example, the rules do not
impose upon the clerk an affirmative duty to record the mailing of the
required notices.1642
A restricted appeal constitutes a direct attack on a judgment, and when
appropriate, affords review of the trial proceedings of the same scope as an
ordinary appeal.1643 “Generally, the same standards of review and powers

1636. Barnes v. Barnes, 775 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ)
(quoting First Dallas Petroleum, Inc. v. Hawkins, 727 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no
writ)).
1637. Morales v. Dalworth Oil Co., 698 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ
ref’d n.r.e.).
1638. Norman Commc’ns v. Tex. Eastman Co., 955 S.W.2d 269, 270 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam);
DSC Fin. Corp. v. Moffitt, 815 S.W.2d 551, 551 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam). Extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to challenge a judgment on appeal. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Falcon Ridge Apartments, Joint
Venture, 811 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1991); see Garcia v. Arbor Green Owner’s Ass’n, Inc., 838 S.W.2d
800, 803 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied) (holding when extrinsic evidence is
necessary to challenge a judgment, the appropriate remedy is by motion for new trial, under Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 320, 324(b)(1), or by equitable bill of review); Robert S. Wilson Invs. No. 16 Ltd. v.
Blumer, 837 S.W.2d 860, 862 n.1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (noting alternatives
of motion for new trial or bill of review).
1639. Jaramillo v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 694 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (citing Tex. Emp’t Comm’n v. Bell Helicopter Int’l, Inc., 627 S.W.2d 524, 526
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Novak v. DeWied, 574 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1978, writ ref’d n.r.e.)).
1640. Id.; see Salazar v. Tower, 683 S.W.2d 797, 799–800 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no
writ) (holding appellant’s unsubstantiated allegations that the court reporter would not respond to his
request for a record were insufficient to establish a point of error).
1641. Ginn v. Forrester, 282 S.W.3d 430, 433 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
1642. Id.
1643. Norman Commc’ns, 955 S.W.2d at 270; Gunn v. Cavanaugh, 391 S.W.2d 723, 724 (Tex.
1965); Autozone, Inc. v. Duenes, 108 S.W.3d 917, 919 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.);
Conseco Fin. Servicing v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 78 S.W.3d 666, 670 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2002, no pet.); see Pace Sports, Inc. v. Davis Bros. Publ’g Co., 514 S.W.2d 247, 247 (Tex. 1974)
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of disposition [that] govern ordinary direct appeals” also govern review of
default judgments.1644 However, like summary judgments, the usual
presumption of the validity of the judgment does not apply when the
reviewing court considers a judgment by restricted appeal,1645 and “[t]here
are no presumptions in favor of valid issuance, service, and return of
citation.”1646
“No-answer and post-answer default judgments differ in the issues a
plaintiff is required to prove.”1647 In cases of no-answer default, a
defaulting defendant admits all facts properly pled in the plaintiff’s petition
except for the amount of unliquidated damages.1648 Thus, the plaintiff is
only required to prove its claim for unliquidated damages.1649 But if the
defendant files an answer, a trial court may not render judgment on the
pleadings, and the plaintiff is required to offer evidence and prove all aspects
of its claim.1650 When the evidence is legally insufficient to support either
a no-answer or post-answer default judgment, the proper disposition is to
remand for a new trial.1651
D. Objections to Appellate Judges
A party may object to a judge or justice who is assigned to hear that party’s
case on appeal.1652 If a party files a timely objection to the assignment of
the judge or justice, the assigned judge may not hear the case.1653 The
(per curiam) (criticizing a court of appeals for suggesting that a restricted appeal requires a higher
burden than a regular appeal).
1644. Lakeside Leasing Corp. v. Kirkwood Atrium Office Park Phase 3, 750 S.W.2d 847, 849
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, no writ).
1645. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); Lakeside Leasing, 750 S.W.2d at 849.
1646. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co. v. Drewery Constr. Co., 186 S.W.3d 571, 573 (Tex. 2006) (per
curiam) (alteration in original) (quoting Primate Constr., Inc. v. Silver, 884 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. 1994)
(per curiam)); accord Wachovia Bank of Del. v. Gilliam, 215 S.W.3d 848, 850 (Tex. 2007) (per curiam)
(asserting “the face of the record must reflect” valid service).
1647. Dolgencorp of Tex., Inc. v. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d 922, 930 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam).
1648. Holt Atherton Indus., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 83 (Tex. 1992).
1649. Id.; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 243 (stating in an unliquidated damages cause of action, the court
will render judgment after hearing evidence as to damages).
1650. Lerma, 288 S.W.3d at 930.
1651. Id.; see SACMD Acquisition Corp. v. Trevino, No. 13-07-00509-CV, 2009 WL 2541840,
at *4 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Aug. 20, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing a default judgment on
restricted appeal based on legally insufficient evidence to support damages); Jackson v. Gutierrez,
77 S.W.3d 898, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (discussing the scope of review
in a legal insufficiency claim).
1652. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 75.551.
1653. Id. § 75.551(b).
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objection “must be filed not later than the seventh day after the date the
party receives actual notice of the assignment or before the date the case is
submitted to the court, whichever date occurs earlier.”1654 In addition,
each party is only entitled to one objection for the case in the appellate
court.1655 Finally, a former judge or justice who is not officially retired may
not hear a case on appeal if either party timely objects to the assignment.1656
E. Frivolous Appeals
Because meritless litigation constitutes an unnecessary burden on parties
to the litigation and diverts judicial resources from legitimate appeals,1657
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 62 shift to the appellant part of
the prevailing party’s expense and burden of defending a frivolous
appeal.1658 Additionally, Rule 52.11 permits “just sanctions” for filing a
frivolous original proceeding.1659 The State Bar Disciplinary Rules and the
Standards for Appellate Conduct also provide that a “lawyer shall not bring
or defend” a frivolous proceeding or assert a frivolous issue.1660
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 62 provide that if the supreme
court or the courts of appeals determine that an appeal is “frivolous,”1661
the courts may award “just damages” to any prevailing party on their own

1654.
1655.
1656.
1657.

Id. § 75.551(c).
Id. § 75.551(b).
Id. § 75.551(d).
Chapman v. Hootman, 999 S.W.2d 118, 125 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no

pet.).
1658. See Starcrest Trust v. Berry, 926 S.W.2d 343, 356 (Tex. App.—Austin 1996, no writ)
(explaining the purpose of former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 84, which is currently codified
as Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 62); Roever v. Roever, 824 S.W.2d 674, 677 (Tex.
App.—Dallas 1992, no writ) (quoting in full former Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 84); see also
TEX. R. APP. P. 45 (giving appellate courts the authority to award damages if an appeal is determined
to be frivolous in a civil case); TEX. R. APP. P. 62 (reiterating the ability of an appellate court to award
damages for frivolous appeals).
1659. TEX. R. APP. P. 52.11; see Campos v. Inv. Mgmt. Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1996, writ denied) (Green, J., concurring) (recommending sanctions be applied to
lawyers and parties who file frivolous appeals).
1660. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.01, reprinted in TEX. GOV’T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9); see Order of the Supreme Court of Texas and the
Court of Criminal Appeals: Standards for Appellate Conduct, 62 TEX. B.J. 399, 400 (1999) (detailing a lawyer’s
duty to the court to pursue only warranted issues for appeal).
1661. See generally Villanueva v. State, 209 S.W.3d 239, 243 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, no pet.)
(defining “frivolous” as not arguable on the merits or as lacking basis in law or fact); Frivolous, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “frivolous” as “[l]acking a legal basis or legal merit”);
Frivolous, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICTIONARY 913 (2002).
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motion or the motion of any party.1662 The appellate courts are no longer
limited to assessing damages against the offending party alone; the attorney
may also be sanctioned.1663 “[T]o objectively determine whether an appeal
is frivolous, [the court] . . . look[s] at the record from the viewpoint of the
advocate and decide[s] whether he had reasonable grounds to believe that
the case could be reversed.”1664 The decision to grant sanctions is within
the reviewing court’s discretion.1665 In determining the propriety of
awarding sanctions, the courts may not consider any matter that is not in
“the record, briefs, or other papers filed in the court of appeals” or supreme
court.1666
There are two competing concerns in awarding damages for frivolous
appeals. First, the “right to an appeal is a sacred and valuable right.”1667
As a result, frivolous appeal damages are to be assessed “with prudence,
caution, and after careful deliberation.”1668 As long as the argument had a
reasonable basis in law, even if unconvincing, “and constituted an informed,
good-faith challenge to the trial court[’s] judgment[,]” frivolous appeal

1662. TEX. R. APP. P. 45, 62. Under the old rules (84 and 182(b)), if an appeal was taken for
delay and without sufficient cause, the supreme court or court of appeals could award each prevailing
party an amount not to exceed ten percent of the amount of damages awarded to such appellee or
respondent as damages against such appellant or petitioner. Lewis v. Deaf Smith Elec. Coop., Inc.,
768 S.W.2d 511, 513–14 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989, no writ); see Ramirez v. Pecan Deluxe Candy Co.,
839 S.W.2d 101, 108 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, writ denied) (recognizing the court must make two
findings before assessing damages: that the appeal was brought “for delay and without sufficient cause”
(emphasis added) (citing Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Whatley, 742 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1987, no writ))). If there was no money damage award, then the court could award each prevailing
party an amount not to exceed ten times the total taxable costs as damages. Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 356.
1663. TEX. R. APP. P. 45, 62.
1664. Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)
(citing Bradt v. West, 892 S.W.2d 56, 78 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied)).
1665. Goss v. Hous. Cmty. Newspapers, 252 S.W.3d 652, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
1666. TEX. R. APP. P. 45, 62.
1667. Masterson v. Hogue, 842 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1992, no writ) (citing Loyd
Elec. Co., Inc. v. Millett, 767 S.W.2d 476, 484 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1989, no writ); Trinity
Universal Ins. Co. v. Farley, 408 S.W.2d 776, 780 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1966, no writ)); Smith, 51 S.W.3d
at 381; Bradt, 892 S.W.2d at 78; Millett, 767 S.W.2d at 484.
1668. Tate v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 954 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (citing Casteel-Diebolt v. Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ)); accord City of Houston v. Precast Structures, Inc., 60 S.W.3d 331,
340 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (“Whether to grant sanctions is a matter of
discretion, which we exercise with prudence and caution, and only after careful deliberation.” (citing
Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 282 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no
pet.))).
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damages are not appropriate.1669 Thus, reviewing the case from the
appealing party’s point of view at the time of appeal, the appellant will not
be penalized absent a clear showing that there was no reasonable basis to
conclude that the judgment could be reversed.1670 In the absence of some
evidence showing that the appeal was taken in bad faith, or, for some courts,
a lack of good faith,1671 “poor lawyering” alone is not a basis for
sanctions.1672 However, the First Court of Appeals has held that “bad faith
is not required under Rule 45[.]”1673 “[W]hether the matter is groundless
and thus without sufficient cause must be decided on the basis of objective
legal expectations . . . .”1674 There is not a consensus among the courts of
appeals as to the standard applicable for imposing sanctions under
Rule 45.1675 Some of the principles applied include: “the appeal was taken
1669. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex.
1991) (per curiam); In re Marriage of Long, 946 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1997, no writ).
1670. Faddoul, Glasheen & Valles, P.C. v. Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d 209, 213 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2001, no pet.). An unconvincing argument does not constitute a frivolous appeal. Smith v. Renz,
840 S.W.2d 702, 706 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
1671. See Campos v. Inv. Mgmt. Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 356 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1996, writ denied) (noting damages will be imposed for appeals not pursued in good faith).
1672. See Morriss v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 948 S.W.2d 858, 873 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997,
no writ) (reasoning sanctions for “poor lawyering” would only punish the client). But see Mid-Continent
Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 2 S.W.3d 393, 396–97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.)
(rejecting bad faith as a prerequisite to Rule 45 sanctions).
1673. Smith v. Brown, 51 S.W.3d 376, 381 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied).
Most of the courts of appeals continue to apply a bad faith or lack of good faith standard. See Tex.
Dep’t of Transp. v. Beckner, 74 S.W.3d 98, 105 (Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (listing courts of
appeals’ decisions that required good faith). But see Compass Expl., Inc. v. B-E Drilling Co., 60 S.W.3d
273, 279 (Tex. App.—Waco 2001, no pet.) (stating bad faith is not required to find a frivolous appeal,
but noting its relevance in determining damages).
1674. Goad v. Goad, 768 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1989, writ denied) (per
curiam). Texas courts have applied the following factors to determine if the appeal is frivolous: (1) an
unexplained absence of part of the record; (2) the unexplained absence of a motion for new trial, if
necessary; (3) a poorly written brief that does not raise any arguable points of error; (4) the failure to
appear at oral argument with no explanation; and (5) the filing of a supersedeas bond. See Tate v. E.I.
Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 954 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.)
(outlining factors to consider when determining if a penalty should be imposed); Baw v. Baw,
949 S.W.2d 764, 768 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no writ) (listing items considered in determining
whether appeal was granted without sufficient cause); Morriss, 948 S.W.2d at 872 (enumerating factors
which indicate an appeal was filed for delay and without sufficient cause); Hicks v. W. Funding, Inc.,
809 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied) (stating “factors which tend
to indicate an appeal was filed for delay and without sufficient cause”).
1675. See Beckner, 74 S.W.3d at 105 (recognizing lack of uniformity of standard for imposing
sanctions); Compass Expl., 60 S.W.3d at 279–80 (giving examples of different standards used to decide
whether to impose sanctions). The Eighth Court of Appeals observed that the courts of appeals have
identified “four factors which tend to indicate that an appeal is frivolous: (1) the unexplained absence
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for delay and . . . there was no sufficient cause for appeal”;1676 “the
appellant ha[d] no reasonable expectation of reversal” and pursued the
appeal in bad faith;1677 the appellant had no “reasonable expectation of
reversal or . . . pursued the appeal in bad faith”;1678 the circumstances for
taking the appeal “are truly egregious”;1679 or the appeal is “objectively
frivolous and injures the appellee.”1680
Second, judicial resources are severely strained, and frivolous appeals
seriously harm the orderly administration of justice by “divert[ing] scarce
resources away from” cases deserving more attention.1681 One court has
of a statement of facts [(reporter’s record)]; (2) the unexplained failure to file a motion for new trial
when it is required to successfully assert factual sufficiency on appeal; (3) a poorly written brief raising
no arguable points of error; and (4) the appellant’s unexplained failure to appear at oral argument.”
Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d at 213 (citing In re S.R.M., 888 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1994, no writ); Baw, 949 S.W.2d at 687; James v. Hudgins, 876 S.W.2d 418, 424 (Tex. App.—El Paso
1994, writ denied)).
1676. See Keever v. Finlan, 988 S.W.2d 300, 315 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1999, pet. dism’d) (citing
Hudgins, 876 S.W.2d at 424) (adopting old Rule 84 standards for new Rule 45).
1677. Oaxaca, 52 S.W.3d at 213; Guajardo v. Conwell, 30 S.W.3d 15, 18 (Tex. App.—Houston
[14th Dist.] 2000) (per curiam), aff’d, 46 S.W.3d 862 (Tex. 2002) (per curiam); Easter v. Providence
Lloyds Ins. Co., 17 S.W.3d 788, 792 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied); Bridges v. Robinson,
20 S.W.3d 104, 115 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). The Fourth Court of Appeals
has not formulated a consistent standard. See San Antonio State Hosp. v. Lopez, 82 S.W.3d 566, 570
(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, pet. denied) (denying the requested sanctions because although the
court disagreed with the movant’s position, it did not find the appeal to be frivolous and filed only
with the intent to delay); King v. Graham, 47 S.W.3d 595, 612 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000)
(suggesting lack of good faith is a consideration), rev’d, 126 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 2003) (per curiam); Herring
v. Welborn, 27 S.W.3d 132, 143 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, pet. denied) (stating bad faith is a
consideration in determining whether an appeal is frivolous).
1678. Diana Rivera & Assocs., P.C. v. Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d 795, 799 (Tex. App.—Corpus
Christi 1999, pet. denied) (emphasis added) (citing Tate, 954 S.W.2d at 875).
1679. Conseco Fin. Servicing v. Klein Indep. Sch. Dist., 78 S.W.3d 666, 676 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (citing Angelou v. African Overseas Union, 33 S.W.3d 269, 282
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.)); see Brazos Transit Dist. v. Lozano, 72 S.W.3d 442,
445 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2002, no pet.) (holding circumstances were not so egregious as to warrant
sanctions).
1680. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Safe Tire Disposal Corp., 2 S.W.3d 393, 397 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (“Under the current rule, ‘just damages’ are permitted if an appeal is
objectively frivolous and injures the appellee. [But, b]ad faith is thus no longer dispositive or necessarily
even material.” (citation omitted) (first citing David Lopez, Why Texas Courts Are Defenseless Against
Frivolous Appeals: A Historical Analysis with Proposals for Reform, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 51, 147 (1996); then
citing Calvillo, 986 S.W.2d at 799)); see also Mallios v. Standard Ins. Co., 237 S.W.3d 778, 783 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (concluding that, not only was appeal not frivolous,
but the filed briefs were in response to appellee’s request for sanctions).
1681. Campos v. Inv. Mgmt. Props., Inc., 917 S.W.2d 351, 357 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996,
writ denied) (Green, J., concurring); see Lewis v. Deaf Smith Elec. Coop., Inc., 768 S.W.2d 511, 514
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 1989, no writ) (stating a frivolous appeal “requires judicial time and effort that
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observed that “the decision to appeal ‘should not be driven by comparative
economics or wishful thinking; rather it should be based on professional
judgment made after careful review of the record for preserved error’” and
the standard of review applicable to the error.1682 The court also noted
that a bad result at the trial level is not, by itself, reason enough to
appeal.1683 In addition, the court observed that the decision to appeal “is
not a mechanical exercise, but requires the dutiful application of lawyering
skills.”1684 While the old rules in effect at the time limited the court’s
authority to deal with the problem,1685 the court reaffirmed that the
appellate courts “must not be hesitant to use the tools that we have.”1686
“‘[T]he practice of ‘let’s just throw as much mud as we can up on the wall
and see if any of it sticks’ must be discouraged.’”1687 However, where a
party’s argument on appeal fails to convince the appellate court, but “ha[s]
a reasonable basis in law and constitute[s] an informed, good-faith challenge
to a trial court judgment[,]” sanctions are not appropriate.1688

would be better spent on meritorious cases” (quoting Bainbridge v. Bainbridge, 662 S.W.2d 655, 657–
58 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no writ))).
1682. In re S.B.C., 952 S.W.2d 15, 20 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ) (quoting Campos,
917 S.W.2d at 357 (Green, J., concurring)); accord Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Beckner, 74 S.W.3d 98, 105
(Tex. App.—Waco 2002, no pet.) (reiterating a decision to appeal should be based on professional
judgment); see Elm Creek Villas Homeowner Ass’n, Inc. v. Beldon Roofing & Remodeling Co.,
940 S.W.2d 150, 156 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ) (rendering judgment for sanctions
against appellants for filing a frivolous appeal). Justice Green, writing for the court, stated, “[T]he mere
fact that an . . . appeal is theoretically possible does not mean one should be filed . . . . An appeal must
be based upon more than wishful thinking.” Id.
1683. See Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 356 (Green, J., concurring) (“A bad result below, by itself, is
simply not a reason to appeal—not every case is properly appealable.”).
1684. Id. at 357.
1685. Id. at 357 n.4. Under the old rules, the appellate court could only award damages “against
the offending party and not the attorney[.]” Id. Justice Green invited the supreme court to remove
that limitation. Id. The supreme court did so in Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 45 and 62. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 45 (awarding “each prevailing party just damages”); id. 62 (excluding language that
would prevent the awarding of damages against attorneys).
1686. Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 357 (Green, J., concurring); see Dolenz v. A__ B__, 742 S.W.2d
82, 86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied) (“Spurious litigation, unnecessarily burdening parties and
courts alike, should not go unsanctioned.”).
1687. In re S.B.C., 952 S.W.2d at 20 (quoting Campos, 917 S.W.2d at 356–57 (Green, J.,
concurring)).
1688. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. Midland Cent. Appraisal Dist., 826 S.W.2d 124, 125 (Tex.
1991) (per curiam).
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F. Power to Sanction
Like trial courts, appellate courts retain an inherent power to discipline
misconduct before the court when reasonably necessary and to the extent
deemed appropriate.1689 In Johnson v. Johnson,1690 the appellant’s attorney
insulted the trial judge by questioning both his ability to understand the
complexities of the case and his decision to uphold the law.1691 Because
the appellant’s attorney chose to attack a trial judge personally, instead of
addressing the legal issues presented, the court held that its duty to maintain
confidence in the legal system obligated it to assess monetary sanctions
against the attorney and to forward the court’s opinion to the Office of the
General Counsel for the State Bar of Texas for investigation and any action
it deemed necessary.1692 Subsequently, in In re Maloney,1693 an attorney was
ordered to answer a show cause order of the Fourth Court of Appeals based
upon her accusations that the court made its decision based on politics and
her comment that “[i]t must be embarrassing to take such a pro-rapist, probig-insurance-defense-firm position with so appallingly non-existent legal or
logical basis[.]”1694 The court held:
A distinction must be drawn between respectful advocacy and judicial
denigration. Although the former is entitled to a protected voice, the latter
can only be condoned at the expense of the public’s confidence in the judicial
process. Even were this court willing to tolerate the personal insult levied by
[counsel], we are obligated to maintain the respect due this Court and the legal
system we took an oath to serve.1695

1689. See In re Ryan, 993 S.W.2d 294, 298 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.) (recognizing
the inherent power of the court to sanction, “to aid in the exercise of [its] jurisdiction, in the
administration of justice, and in the preservation of [its] independence and integrity” (first quoting
Eichelberger v. Eichelberger, 582 S.W.2d 395, 398 (Tex. 1979); then citing Kutch v. Del Mar College,
831 S.W.2d 506, 509–10 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, no writ))); Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d
835, 840 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied) (“[W]hen attorneys speak disrespectfully of the
trial court, they ‘exceed their rights and evidence a want of proper respect for the court . . . .’” (quoting
Mossop v. Zapp, 179 S.W. 685 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1915, no writ))).
1690. Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
1691. Id. at 840 n.1.
1692. Id. at 841.
1693. In re Maloney, 949 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding) (en
banc) (per curiam).
1694. Id. at 386 (first alteration in original).
1695. Id. at 388.
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The court held the attorney’s comments in her “original motion for
rehearing and her response to [the court’s] show cause order are direct
attacks on the integrity of the justices of this Court” and referred the court’s
opinion to the State Bar for its consideration of disciplinary action.1696
In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner,1697 the Texas Supreme Court
was confronted with a similar attack on the integrity of the court.1698
In its order overruling the petitioner’s motion for rehearing, the court
noted that “[c]ourts possess the inherent power to discipline an attorney’s
behavior” and that “[c]ourts of justice are universally acknowledged to be
vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and
decorum, in their presence.”1699 The court added: “A lawyer should
demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it,
including judges, other lawyers and public officials. While it is a lawyer’s
duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also a
lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.”1700 Following the reasoning of the
Fourth Court of Appeals’ decisions in Johnson and In re Maloney, the
Texas Supreme Court referred the offending attorneys to the State Bar

1696. Id. (citing TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.02(a), reprinted in TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9)).
1697. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (Tex. 1997).
1698. See id. at 732 (addressing the behavior of respondents’ counsel). The supreme court did
not identify in the order the nature of the offensive conduct. Id. The following are a few of the likely
candidates from the respondents’ motion for rehearing: “Outlined against a hazy July sky, the four
horsemen rode again last Wednesday, July 9, 1997. You know them: Pestilence, Death, Famine, and
this Texas Supreme Court”; “Shucking its collective black robe and confidently donning the familiar,
white lab coat, . . . this Court has taken on the world of science. Almost. Instead, [the opinion] is no
more than a detailed, 58-page, science fiction, filled with skewed observations and prissy platitudes . . . .
This Texas Supreme Court, fervent to follow the law laid out for it by those who would kill and injure
for profit, stand stiffly in a row, nine nutty professors, hands clasped tightly together, shoulder to
shoulder, chanting with glazed eyes and cultlike precision”; “A simple, painful truth: No little girl, or
anyone else, will take away corporate money, no matter what—not on our watch”; and “Justice is no
longer for sale in Texas, the money has been escrowed, the deed has been signed, the deal has been
done.” Respondents’ Motion for Rehearing at 1–5, Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706 (No. 95-1036); see Vincent
R. Johnson, Ethical Campaigning for the Judiciary, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 811, 811–12 (1998) (quoting the
colorful language used by the respondents’ attorney, and arguing that “efforts to personalize, rather
than professionalize, the process of judicial criticism suggest the development of an unfortunate trend
of abusing judges for personal or political advantage”).
1699. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 732 (first quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43
(1991); then citing Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. v. Cofer, 754 S.W.2d 121, 124 (Tex. 1988); Johnson,
948 S.W.2d at 840–41).
1700. Id. at 733 (quoting TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶ 1, reprinted
in TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9)).
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Grievance Committee.1701
It is likely that the standards applicable to the trial courts apply to the
courts of appeals—the sanction must be just, there must be a direct
relationship between the offensive conduct and the sanction imposed, and
the sanction must not be excessive.1702 The scope of review would be the
entire record before the court of appeals and the supreme court’s standard
of review of a court of appeal’s sanction would be abuse of discretion.
G. Conclusions of Law
“[C]onclusions of law are always reviewable.”1703 In fact, “conclusions
of law in a nonjury trial are reviewable . . . [even] without preservation”
under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1.1704 “Conclusions of law
will be upheld on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory
supported by the evidence . . . .”1705 “Conclusions of law . . . will not be
reversed unless they are erroneous as a matter of law.”1706 In addition, a
trial court’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo as legal questions,1707
and the reviewing court affords no deference to the lower court’s

1701. Id. at 732–33.
1702. See id. (acknowledging courts possess the power to discipline an attorney’s behavior and
impose respect and decorum in their presence); see also supra Part IV(Q) (explaining jury demands in
Texas).
1703. Spiller v. Spiller, 901 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied) (citing
Westech Eng’g, Inc. v. Clearwater Constructors, Inc., a Div. of Phelps, Inc., 835 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1992, no writ)); Alan Reuber Chevrolet, Inc. v. Grady Chevrolet, Ltd., 287 S.W.3d 877,
883 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.) (citing Spiller, 901 S.W.2d at 556).
1704. Sammons v. Elder, 940 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, writ denied); see TEX.
R. APP. P. 33.1(d) (explaining the requirements for preservation of error). But see Tex. Dep’t of Transp.
v. City of Sunset Valley, 92 S.W.3d 540, 548 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002) (rejecting an argument because
it was raised for the first time on appeal and indicating that it therefore cannot serve as the basis of the
party’s complaint), rev’d, 146 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. 2004); Regan v. Lee, 879 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ) (per curiam) (noting preservation of error is the “general rule”);
Winters v. Arm Ref. Co., 830 S.W.2d 737, 738–39 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied)
(requiring that post-judgment request, objection, or motion in compliance with Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 33.1, always be made to preserve the trial court’s conclusions of law for review).
1705. Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Stockton, 53 S.W.3d 421, 423 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2001, pet. denied); accord Charette v. Fitzgerald, 213 S.W.3d 505, 511 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2006, no pet.) (stating when an appellate court will uphold conclusions of law).
1706. Stockton, 53 S.W.3d at 423 (citing Spiller, 901 S.W.2d at 556); accord State v. Harrell Ranch,
Ltd., 268 S.W.3d 247, 253 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, no pet.) (explaining when an appellate court will
reverse a trial court’s conclusions of law).
1707. Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 222 (Tex. 2002);
State v. Heal, 917 S.W.2d 6, 9 (Tex. 1996); Alan Reuber Chevrolet, 287 S.W.3d at 883.
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decision.1708 Under de novo review, the reviewing court exercises its own
judgment and redetermines each legal issue.1709 Incorrect conclusions of
law will not require a reversal if the controlling finding of facts support a
correct legal theory.1710
H. Error
The standards of review define the parameters of a reviewing court’s
authority in determining whether a trial court erred. But the existence of
error does not necessarily result in appellate relief. Before the appellate
court addresses error, it will look to see if the complaint has been
preserved.1711 Even carefully preserved error will be subjected to an
evaluation of harm.
1.

Preservation of Complaints or Waiver and the Issue of Harm

Preservation of complaints and waiver must be carefully distinguished
from harm. Simply because a party has failed to preserve a complaint, or
has waived it, does not lessen the harm caused by an error. Nonetheless,
unpreserved complaints generally cannot be reviewed on appeal, regardless
of any harmful effects.1712 Appellate advocates and courts should be
careful to analyze an argument first in terms of waiver, rather than harmless
error.
2.

Invited Error

The doctrine of invited error provides that a party cannot complain on
appeal about an action or ruling which the party requested the trial court to
take.1713 The doctrine makes sense. It would be a waste of judicial

1708. Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998); Heal, 917 S.W.2d at 9; Alan Reuber
Chevrolet, 287 S.W.3d at 883.
1709. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 29 (Tex. 2002) (Hecht, J., concurring); Subaru of Am., 84 S.W.3d
at 222; Quick, 7 S.W.3d at 116; Alan Reuber Chevrolet, 287 S.W.3d at 883.
1710. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002).
1711. For a more detailed look at how to preserve error in the trial court, see generally Polly J.
Estes, Preservation of Error: From Filing the Lawsuit Through Presentation of Evidence, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 997
(1999).
1712. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 (requiring preservation of a complaint before it can be presented
on appeal); Ford Motor Co. v. Castillo, 279 S.W.3d 656, 662–63 (Tex. 2009) (illustrating the complexity
of error preservation).
1713. In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 273 S.W.3d 637, 646 (Tex. 2009); Tittizer v.
Union Gas Corp., 171 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam); McInnes v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,
U.S.A., 673 S.W.2d 185, 188 (Tex. 1984).
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resources to permit a party to ask a trial court to render a particular ruling
and then ask the appellate court to reverse the trial court for that ruling. If
a party asks a trial court to commit an error, the party has waived the
complaint for appellate review.1714
3.

Reversible Error and Harmless Error

Assessing the harm caused by an error (neither invited nor waived) is
analytically distinct from the question of whether error in fact occurred.
Lawyers, and sometimes appellate courts, confuse these two terms, and thus
the law. A party can be grievously harmed by a trial court ruling that is
perfectly correct under the law. Likewise, a trial court can make an error of
the worst magnitude that has absolutely no effect on a party’s rights. By
keeping the two concepts of error and harm distinct, the appellate court not
only will improve its own decision making but will make the handling of
future appeals that much easier for counsel and the courts. Similarly, by
presenting the concepts separately in their briefs, appellate lawyers can aid
the court’s decision making and the future development of the law.
The standard of review provides the level of deference a court must give
to a trial court in finding error. Once found, however, the harmless error
doctrine serves as a further check upon the reviewing court’s authority to
tamper with the trial court’s rulings. If no error exists under the applicable
standard of review, the court can stop its inquiry unless it wishes to make
alternative holdings. Only if the court finds error under the applicable
standard of review must the court confront the concept of reversible
error.1715 The requirement of reversible error serves administrative policies
by moving cases through the system. It also mitigates expense to parties
and taxpayers by precluding reversal of cases for technical errors that in
reality did not affect the outcome. Similarly, errors that made a difference,
but did not cause an incorrect result, will not be grounds for reversal.1716
As the Fifth Circuit explained:

1714. Tittizer, 171 S.W.3d at 862.
1715. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1)–(2) (stating a judgment will not be reversed by a court of
appeals unless the error complained of “probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment” or
“probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals”); id. 61.1
(providing the same language for reversible error as Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1, but
applicable to the supreme court).
1716. See Miles v. M/V Miss. Queen, 753 F.2d 1349, 1352 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing error to
be present and properly preserved, but not affecting the substantial rights of the parties so as to warrant
reversal).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2019

247

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 50 [2019], No. 4, Art. 4

1346

ST. MARY’S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50:1099

These rules are based on the sensible concept that a new trial should not be
granted because of an error that inflicted no harm. Perfection is an aspiration,
but the failure to achieve it in the judicial process, as elsewhere in life, does
not, absent injury, require a repeat performance.1717

Stated another way, litigants are “‘entitled to a fair trial[,] . . . not a perfect
one[.]’”1718
Before a judgment can be reversed and a new trial ordered on the ground
that an error of law has been committed by the trial court, the reviewing
court must find that the error complained of amounted to such a denial of
the appellant’s rights as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did
cause “the rendition of an improper judgment,” or that the error “probably
prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case [on appeal].”1719
In determining whether an error rises to the level of reversible error, the
courts do not apply a “but for” test; instead, courts apply a test of
probability.1720 Various formulations of the test reach the same end: Is it
more likely than not (i.e., probable) that the preserved error caused an
improper judgment?1721 If the reviewing court answers in the affirmative,
then the error is reversible; if not, the error is harmless.

1717. Id.
1718. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984) (quoting Brown
v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231–232 (1973)).
1719. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1, 61.1. The supreme court has observed that the harmless error rule
“ebbs and flows” in Texas practice. Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1979).
A careful practitioner should keep this in mind when considering the harm analysis of any given case.
See Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 n.7 (Tex. 2000) (observing “[t]he harmless error
standard [was] . . . recodified without substantive change as [Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1]”
(citing TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1, 61.1)); Franco v. Franco, 81 S.W.3d 319, 343 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2002,
no pet.) (stating while “[f]ormulations of the harmless error rule [have varied] from time to time[,]”
since 1989, the supreme court has repeatedly followed the rule in former Rule 81(b)(1)). Under the
former rule, harmful error is shown “when the evidence is controlling on a material issue and is not
cumulative.” Id. at 344 (citing Mentis v. Barnard, 870 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Tex. 1994)). See generally Robert
W. Calvert, The Development of the Doctrine of Harmless Error in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 1, 3 (1952)
(explaining the development of the harmless error doctrine in Texas); Robert W. Calvert & Susan G.
Perin, Is the Castle Crumbling? Harmless Error Revisited, 20 S. TEX. L.J. 1, 3 (1979) (detailing the harmless
error doctrine); Jack Kenneth Dahlberg, Jr., Analysis of Cumulative Error in the Harmless Error Doctrine,
12 TEX. TECH L. REV. 561, 568 (1981) (analyzing cumulative error in the harmless error doctrine).
1720. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1 (using the word “probably”); see also Tex. Power & Light Co. v.
Hering, 224 S.W.2d 191, 192 (Tex. 1949) (recognizing the complaining party must show at least that
the error “probably resulted” in prejudice instead of a “but for the erroneous ruling” query).
1721. E.g., King v. Skelly, 452 S.W.2d 691, 696 (Tex. 1970) (declaring reversal should not occur
unless the erroneous admission “was calculated to and probably did cause the rendition of an improper
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The harmless error rule applies to all errors.1722 The reviewing court will
review the record to determine if the complaining party failed to prove his
cause of action or defense, in which case the trial court’s error could not
have resulted in a “materially unfair” trial.1723 However, if “the trial is
contested and the evidence is sharply conflicting, the [trial court’s] error
results in a materially unfair trial without showing more[.]”1724 This
determination is a judgment call delegated to the reviewing court’s “sound
discretion and good sense” upon evaluation of the entire case.1725
The chart on the following page may assist in analyzing whether the
record demonstrates reversible error or harmless error and its application to
a particular challenged error.

judgment”); Aultman v. Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co., 260 S.W.2d 596, 599 (Tex. 1953) (reiterating the
“probably did cause” standard).
1722. Lorusso v. Members Mut. Ins. Co., 603 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tex. 1980). Ironically, Lorusso
is also credited as applying a “relaxed” harmless error rule to cases involving peremptory challenges.
See, e.g., Wells v. Barrow, 153 S.W.3d 514, 518 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.) (describing the
“materially unfair” harm analysis as a “relaxed” harmless error standard).
1723. Lorusso, 603 S.W.2d at 820–21.
1724. Id. at 820 (quoting Patterson Dental Co. v. Dunn, 592 S.W.2d 914 (Tex. 1979)).
1725. First Emps. Ins. Co. v. Skinner, 646 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1983).
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4.

Fundamental Error

The Texas Supreme Court first recognized fundamental error in 1846 as
a principle rooted in the common law.1726 The court observed that “if the
foundation of the action has manifestly failed, we cannot, without shocking the
common sense of justice, allow a recovery to stand.”1727 Fundamental
error describes those situations in which a reviewing court reviews sua
sponte “error that was neither raised in the trial court nor assigned on
appeal.”1728 While a party may raise fundamental error for the first time

1726. Jones v. Black, 1 Tex. 527, 530 (1846); see In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 288–93 (Tex. 2002)
(Hankinson, J., dissenting, joined by Enoch, J.) (recounting the history of fundamental error in Texas).
1727. Jones, 1 Tex. at 530.
1728. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 350 (Tex. 2003) (citing McCauley v. Consol. Underwriters,
304 S.W.2d 265, 266 (Tex. 1957) (per curiam)); see Cent. Educ. Agency v. Burke, 711 S.W.2d 7, 8–9
(Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (discussing the applicability of the fundamental error principle). But see Pirtle
v. Gregory, 629 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Tex. 1982) (per curiam) (reasoning error preservation avoids
surprising the opponent and decrying the ability of appellate courts to consider unassigned errors).
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on appeal,1729 it is used very infrequently1730 and has been called “a
discredited doctrine.”1731 Fundamental error survives only in those rare
situations in which the appellate record shows on its face that the court
lacked jurisdiction1732 or that public policy or public interest would be
directly and adversely affected.1733
5.

Cumulative Error

Generally, when an appellant argues that a case should be reversed
because of cumulative error, the appellant is alleging that the trial court’s
errors, nonreversible or harmless errors individually, pervaded the trial, and
in the aggregate, caused the rendition of an improper verdict.1734 The
doctrine is seldom used to reverse a case.1735 Generally, appellants make
the mistake of simply restating their complaints in one final issue.1736
1729. Nuchia v. Woodruff, 956 S.W.2d 612, 616 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, pet.
denied). But see Country Vill. Homes, Inc. v. Patterson, 236 S.W.3d 413, 449 (Tex. App.—Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. granted, judgm’t vacated w.r.m.) (requiring error preservation).
1730. See Am. Gen. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Weinberg, 639 S.W.2d 688, 689 (Tex. 1982)
(“Fundamental error has become a rarity.”).
1731. In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d at 350 (quoting Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 868 (Tex. 1982)
(per curiam)).
1732. See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993)
(stating lack of jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal by the parties or by the court);
McCauley, 304 S.W.2d at 266 (holding a lack of jurisdiction as fundamental error can be considered by
the court without preservation of error).
1733. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 293 (Tex. 2002) (Hankinson, J., dissenting) (arguing the
doctrine should apply to involuntary termination of parental rights cases as a matter of public policy);
In re C.O.S., 988 S.W.2d 760, 767 (Tex. 1999) (concluding the fundamental error standard is to be used
in matters of public policy); Ramsey v. Dunlop, 205 S.W.2d 979, 985 (Tex. 1947) (Alexander, J.,
concurring) (stating the court is authorized to reverse a judgment of fundamental error if it involves a
“matter of public interest”).
1734. See Scoggins v. Curtiss & Taylor, 219 S.W.2d 451, 453–54 (Tex. 1949) (stating acts of
misconduct, when taken together, probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict); Smerke v.
Office Equip. Co., 158 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex. 1941) (expressing the errors, taken in the aggregate,
probably caused the rendition of an improper verdict).
1735. See Strange v. Treasure City, 608 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex. 1980) (concluding cumulative
effects did not result in probable harm); Nat’l Freight, Inc. v. Snyder, 191 S.W.3d 416, 424 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2006, no pet.) (recognizing a “cumulative-error doctrine,” but holding it does not apply);
Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 79 S.W.3d 113, 125 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002) (explaining
multiple errors may have cumulative effect of harm), rev’d on other grounds, 159 S.W.3d 897 (Tex. 2004).
1736. See Crescendo Invs., Inc. v. Brice, 61 S.W.3d 465, 481 n.16 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
2001, pet. denied) (expressing that some cases refuse to discuss cumulative error points as redundant);
Sanchez ex rel. Estate of Galvan v. Brownsville Sports Ctr., Inc., 51 S.W.3d 643, 667 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2001, pet. granted) (declining to address each point of error because appellant simply
restated the issues in raising cumulative error).
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Reversal based upon cumulative error is predicated upon meeting the
standards of reversible error in Rule 44.1.1737 That is, the errors
complained of must amount to such a denial of the rights of the appellant
as was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did “cause [the] rendition
of an improper judgment or prevented [the appellant] from making a proper
presentation of the case to [the] court.”1738 The cumulative error doctrine
“infrequently finds favor with appellate courts[,]”1739 and it “has evolved
almost exclusively in cases involving [improper] jury argument or jury
misconduct.”1740
The doctrine, in practice, makes little sense and has little impact on
appeal. In determining whether an error constitutes reversible error, the
appellate court almost always reviews the entire record. One error under
scrutiny will be considered against the whole record, including the other
errors in the case. If the other errors compound the harm caused by the
error under scrutiny, then reversible error exists from a review of the record
as a whole. Consequently, the doctrine is essentially swallowed up by the
reversible error analysis.
IX. CONCLUSION
While standards of review are, by their very nature, imprecise, they
identify the fundamental questions for the reviewing court and narrow the
focus of those questions for the court. Without identifying and applying the
standard, an appellate brief will not present a coherent or persuasive
argument. Although there are certainly no guarantees of success in the
appellate process—sometimes it is like another throw of the dice—the
appellate advocate will be most effective when he or she focuses on the
applicable standard of review and demonstrates for the appellate court how
that standard, as applied through the scope of review, mandates the result
the party advocates. Equally important to success on appeal is a forceful
1737. TEX. R. APP. P. 44.1; see Mercy Hosp. of Laredo v. Rios, 776 S.W.2d 626, 637–38 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio 1989, writ denied) (holding appellant’s cumulative effects point failed since it did
not show error or that the trial was materially unfair); McCormick v. Tex. Commerce Bank Nat’l Ass’n,
751 S.W.2d 887, 892 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, writ denied) (“Reversal based upon
cumulative error is predicated upon meeting the standards of Texas Rule of Appellate
Procedure 81(b).”). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 81(b)(1) has been recodified as Rule 44.1.
Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Casteel, 22 S.W.3d 378, 388 n.7 (Tex. 2000).
1738. McCormick, 751 S.W.2d at 892.
1739. Ramirez, 79 S.W.3d at 125 (citing Brice, 61 S.W.3d at 481 n.16).
1740. Town E. Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 809–10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no
writ).
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and persuasive brief that demonstrates the harmfulness or harmlessness of
the error—without demonstrating harm or lack of harm, an advocate has
not advanced the client’s position by simply showing a trial court error.
Hopefully, this Article will assist practitioners with their brief writing and
help sharpen their advocacy skills on appeal.
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